House of Commons - Foreign Affairs - Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence

APPENDIX 11

Memorandum from The British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

INTRODUCTION

The United Kingdom and the United States pride themselves on their "special relationship". With the Bush administration in the United States offering a new approach to foreign policy and international security, and a second mandate for the Labour Government in the United Kingdom, it is timely to inquire into the changing dynamic of that relationship. UK foreign policy development may shift in light of the redefined approach by the United States. However, London's special relationship with Washington could also be used to influence US foreign policy development (and in particular, to counter some of the more isolationist and unilateral tendencies within recent American foreign policy).

The United Kingdom and United States both exert considerable power and influence in the international political, economic and military arena through, for example, their membership of the G8, the OSCE, NATO and permanent membership of the UN Security Council. In addition both countries play a prominent role in their own regions: the United Kingdom through membership of the European Union, and the United States through membership of the OAS. Finally, they both also have highly developed and distinct global partnerships and co-operation agreements: the United Kingdom largely through the Commonwealth, and the United States through its network of security arrangements in Europe, the Middle East and South East Asia. While it is commonly recognised that the United Kingdom is a junior partner in the special relationship, over the years both countries have gained considerably from it.

The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) is an independent research organisation that analyses international security issues. BASIC works to promote awareness of security issues among the public, policy-makers and the media in order to foster informed debate on both sides of the Atlantic. BASIC analyses issues surrounding weapons of mass destruction, the weapons trade and European security. With governing directors and offices in both Washington and London, BASIC has played its own small part in facilitating the special relationship over the past 15 years and is uniquely placed to analyse both its strengths and weaknesses.

This submission is structured as follows:

— Section 1 briefly explores the situation after 11 September and the changing foreign policy priorities as a result of the appalling attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon;

— Section 2 discusses the proposed development of a missile defence system and its likely impact on global non-proliferation concerns;

— Section 3 assesses the current status of international efforts to control biological weapons and the need for urgent progress at the forthcoming Review Conference;

— Section 4 describes the current state of play in international efforts to control conventional weapons, with particular emphasis on the dangers of weakening arms export controls to allies in the war against transnational terrorism, the UK Export Control Bill and developments in the international arms control architecture, including the recent UN Conference to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons;

— Section 5 discusses NATO expansion both geographically, in terms of the impact on relations with the Russian Federation, and thematically, in terms of the new mission roles within the Alliance and the relationship with EU and OSCE crisis management structures; and

— Section 6 draws a number of conclusions and provides a summary of recommendations.

It should be emphasised that the aim of this submission is not to undermine the importance of the "special relationship", but to recommend ways in which the United Kingdom and United States can work more closely together in developing more progressive arms control and security policies.

The only effective way to secure long-term national and international security is to remove the causes of insecurity. This requires the development, strengthening and implementation of multilateral security regimes and agreements. Also, we must take security in its widest understanding of "human security", not just military security—promotion of human rights, democracy, sustainable development, rule of law, etc. To achieve this, the full engagement of states—especially the United States—is required. Building on the work of predominantly non-military institutions such as the United Nations, OSCE, European Union, International Criminal Court, and to continue to uphold and strengthen multilateral arms control regimes will be crucial.

In short, the emphasis must be on pursuing multilateral, joint approaches to common international security concerns, such as terrorism and arms proliferation.

Section 1. THE SITUATION AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER AND THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

1.1 In light of the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September, BASIC has been closely monitoring and analysing the reaction by the international community, and our website (www.basicint.org) carries up-to-date comment and analysis from key US and European sources on the crisis. The United Kingdom has played a prominent role in that response, "standing shoulder to shoulder" with the United States in its hour of need. It is right and proper that the United Kingdom should have done so, and should continue to do so. The UK Government, however, must act within the framework of international law and in the best interests of developing sustainable and long-term solutions to terrorism and other security threats.

1.2 Commenting on the current military action with any certainty is extremely problematical. Few people outside of the US and UK military and governments are acquainted with the true picture. However, for as long as the military action against Afghanistan continues we must hope that at some stage it will ultimately result in those responsible for the attack on New York and Washington facing an impartial international tribunal. But to the outsider it appears as if the bombing exacerbates the humanitarian problem, destabilises neighbouring states and threatens the fragile international coalition against terrorism which was so painstakingly assembled at the beginning of the crisis—all with little appreciable gain.

1.3 In the past, the international community, including the United States and United Kingdom, viewed terrorism as primarily a problem of law enforcement. The new "Bush doctrine" in the "war against terrorism" straddles two classic legal paradigms—law enforcement and war—and represents a further blurring of the two both conceptually and operationally. This is not a new phenomenon, however. As traditional security threats have receded, other non-military threats have become more virulent, attacking not the territory of the state but its society, institutions and the well being of its citizens. Threats from organised crime, illicit arms trafficking and even corruption are now viewed as issues of national security to be dealt with in part by military organisations (such as NATO) [30]

1.4 The challenges of co-ordinating the fight against terrorism across North America, Europe and beyond are many: traditionally distinct intelligence, military and law enforcement bodies and different departments within agencies will need to work together, cultural differences in working practices will need to be overcome; legal systems and judicial procedure will need to be harmonised; and the political will to take concrete steps forward will need to be found. Many law enforcement (and military) agencies will argue for increased powers to aid them in the fight against terrorism, but the question of extending such powers will require careful examination, not least with regard to their potential impact on civil liberties and human rights, but also to evaluate their likely effectiveness in combating and preventing such threats. Parliaments and civil society have a crucial role to play in monitoring the balance between effective security and law enforcement measures and civil rights, and in ensuring that appropriate transparency and accountability mechanisms and safeguards are developed alongside efforts to improve operational effectiveness in combating transnational terrorism.

1.5 It may also be the case that these new threats have rendered traditional law enforcement and military counter-measures inadequate. Traditional institutions and policies, the separation between military, intelligence and law enforcement agencies for example, may now be inappropriate to combat security threats that cannot be categorised along these lines. New approaches, and more crucially in the short-term, cross-agency collaboration, have been slow to develop. The sophistication of the "new order" of transnational terrorism is beginning to be recognised, yet a more coherent and sustainable "third way" of fighting it has yet to emerge. It is unlikely to do so overnight, and BASIC will critically explore some of the transatlantic policies and practices of such a "third way" in future reports. In the meantime, the Foreign Affairs Committee should explore a number of questions concerning the adequacy of the existing response.

The UN mandate for the war against terrorism

1.6 The international community, and specifically the US and UK Governments and the United Nations, should re-double their efforts to work within the framework of international law. As of 17 October the UN Security Council had passed two resolutions on the events of 11 September. UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) dated 12 September "calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable" and that they "decide to remain seized of the matter".[31] UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) on terrorism, dated 28 September, reaffirms Resolution 1368 (2001) and calls "on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased co-operation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism". [32] The United Nations represents 189 nation states, and as such should act as the forum for any response whether military or diplomatic. The United States believes that UN Security Council Resolution 1368 acts as sufficient support from the United Nations for the current military action, but there has been considerable discussion as to whether this is the case.

1.7 A number of analysts have suggested that the United States and the United Kingdom are trampling on international law in order to defeat terrorism[33]. However, rather the opposite seems to be the case—the UN mandate for military action seems far too broad. [34]Resolution 1373 appears to delegate to individual member states sweeping and open-ended authority to fight terrorism. As long as there is some degree of co-operation any measure "to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks" appears to enjoy the endorsement of the Security Council. There is no mention of needing the specific authorisation of the United Nations at each stage in the fight against terrorism, nor does the resolution limit itself to the defeat of the terrorists who were party to the attacks on 11 September.

It does not limit the fight against terrorism either by place or time. Unless the resolution is superseded it could be cited in years to come by any group of countries that get together to fight any form of terrorism.

The views of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the apparently sweeping provisions of Resolution 1373 would be very welcome. In addition, the Committee may also wish to explore how the United States and United Kingdom might further involve the UN Security Council and the Secretary General in this matter, both in terms of ensuring that this remains an internationally-endorsed operation against a specific terrorist atrocity and in developing a strategy for the long-term reconstruction of Afghanistan.

The role of NATO, the EU and OSCE

1.8 In a similar view, on 2 October, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) invoked Article 5 which is its principle of collective defence. [36]Article 5 states that an armed attack against one or more members of NATO shall be considered an attack against them all,

It is important to note that this is the first time in its 50-year history that NATO has invoked Article 5. During the Cold War era Article 5 was seen as a deterrent to the former Soviet Union, and yet it was a terrorist attack that brought NATO to invoke Article 5. In practical terms this support has resulted in five Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft (AWACS) being sent to the United States, and the deployment of NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) to the Eastern Mediterranean. [38]To date this is the only military hardware that NATO has committed to the campaign, but this may change as events warrant.

1.9 In the aftermath of 11 September, the international community responded en masse with communiqués and messages of support for the United States. Yet it was NATO that received much of the focus from the international media (rather than a number of other multilateral and intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations, the OSCE and the European Union). It is understandable that NATO sought to respond to the crisis, but it will be equally important to explore the roles of other international stakeholders in the war against terrorism. For example, on 11 October, the 55 states of the OSCE unanimously adopted a statement supporting the actions of the United States to counter terrorism, [39]while reminding the world of the humanitarian needs of refugees and internally displaced people. The Chairman of the OSCE, Romanian Foreign Minister, Mircea Geoana, called for an OSCE-wide plan of action for the fight against terrorism. He suggested such an action plan could be adopted at the upcoming OSCE Ministerial Council on the 3-4 December 2001. [40]

1.10 Similarly, the European Union called for a holistic response and has started to put in place a series of measures to combat terrorism, including increased police and judicial co-operation, improved air transport security and humanitarian aid and economic and financial assistance to Afghanistan. [41]While agreeing that the current response by the United States is legitimate, the European Union particularly stressed the importance of humanitarian aid for the Afghan people. [42]Among the more immediate law enforcement initiatives suggested by the European Union are: a wider array of measures against all forms of cross-border crime (including terrorism); drying up the sources of terrorist funding; and tightening EU laws on money laundering. [43]Also significant is the fast-tracking of the introduction of the EU's new Civil Protection Mechanism which will include the: "creation of a group of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) experts, available 24 hours a day to assist any country which requests help. The current network of 24-hour contact points for dealing with requests for, or offers of assistance has been reinforced".[44]

1.11 In addition, Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel (Belgium currently holds the Presidency of the EU), Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Piqué (Spain will take over the Presidency in January 2002), the High representative for the CFSP Javier Solana, and the Commissioner responsible for External Relations, Chris Pattern, visited Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria during the 24-28 September to present the position of the European Union on the crisis. [45]While much attention has focused on NATO's military response, far less attention has been given to the EU's diplomatic and judicial response. In light of the fact that the international coalition is built around notions of developing a comprehensive and all-encompassing response to the events of 11 September, the work of the European Union and OSCE in this regard should not be underestimated. It should also be borne in mind that the European Union (together with the United States) is the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. [46]As events unfold this support will become even more important.

1.12 The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan must be properly addressed as part of the long-term solution to the events of 11 September. However, in the short-term at least the humanitarian crisis has worsened as a result of the military attacks. Moreover, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees is threatened by funding shortages that seriously affects its ability to provide aid to Afghanistan. On 11 October, High Commissioner Lubbers stated:

The international coalition against terrorism and in particular the United Kingdom and United States, would be well served to make the humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan the primary focus rather than the military intervention. If the primary objective is a humanitarian one, the most appropriate action would to stop the military action as soon as possible and to utilise the assembled military capacity, together with UN and NGO efforts, to supply the food, medicines, clothing, shelter, water and sanitation equipment needed to enable as many as six million Afghans to survive the five month winter.

1.13 Finally, there are also serious concerns that the US response to the 11 September attacks includes a serious weakening in international arms control restraint—this issue is addressed in more detail in Section 4 below.

SECTION 2. THE US ADMINISTRATION'S PLANS FOR MISSILE DEFENCE

Background

2.1 Prior to 11 September, the proposed development of a national missile defence (NMD) system was seen as central to President Bush's foreign and defence policy. Over the past few months there has been much debate internationally on the system. In addition, NMD is particularly relevant to UK interests as it calls for upgrades to two RAF bases in Britain. Although there have been some consultations with allies and other interested parties (such as Russia), the overwhelming US policy thrust remains unilateralist.

2.2 During his campaign for the presidency, Bush proclaimed that he wanted a system that would "not only defend our country [but also] defend our allies, with whom I will consult as we develop our plans." [48]Since assuming office, the new administration has emphasised that development of NMD would not be hindered by outdated agreements such as the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and while consultations with other countries would take place, the United States would not allow objections by China or Russia to override the plans.

2.3 One of the first opportunities to inform allies of the new administration's plan for missile defence development was in February 2001, when Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld met with his counterparts at an informal global security conference in Munich. Supposedly, the administration wanted to lay the groundwork for exchanging information with its NATO allies on the system, but instead received largely negative feedback from Britain and other allies. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stressed, "New arms races must be avoided and further disarmament steps introduced". [49]

2.4 In the ensuring months, as Bush's team found its footing in Washington, administration officials stepped up statements stressing a US-centric decision on moving forward with NMD and, as one French embassy official in Washington privately protested, "their 'consultations' are more and more their telling us what they'll do". By the time Bush announced on 1 May that "deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation", Washington was set on its course of ABM Treaty rejection and unilateral pursuit of a missile shield. [50]

British Role Uncertain in US NMD Plans

2.5 Prime Minister Tony Blair has demonstrated support for the proposed missile defence scheme since the leaders' first meeting in Washington in Late February. As recently as July, during Bush's visit to Chequers. The Prime Minister approved of Bush's search for "new and imaginative solutions... Blair said that the solution had to encompass defensive and offensive systems. It was sensible and right to sit down and work a way through that. [51]

2.6 Later, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw affirmed his support for Bush's NMD plans in a briefing paper to Labour parliamentarians that upheld the US arguments to develop an extensive defensive system and noting. "The United States is far more likely to stay engaged internationally if it feels safe from attack from missiles." [52]

2.7 However, this acceptance of the Bush administration's reasoning for creating NMD and the means of deploying the system, including abrogation of the ABM Treaty, should be cause for great concern in the United Kingdom. Britain will likely play a fundamental role in NMD—as host to vital technical components for the system. RAF Menwith Hill and RAF Fylingdales are slated to provide early-warning launch detection, tracking and targeting information as components in a global radar system for US missile defence, as currently planned. Upgrade and use of these sites requires British government approval.

2.8 The UK Government should be wary of allowing the United States to use these bases in their system as a means to maintain the "special relationship". Prior to the attacks of 11 September, the Bush administration had been displaying unilateral tendencies and an uncooperative approach to allies, especially with regard to international arms control. How much this will be tempered by the need to develop a global coalition against terrorism is hard to determine, but it is worth noting that the Bush administration has reaffirmed its determination to press ahead with NMD, and indicated no significant change of policy on key arms control agreements. It would seem likely, therefore, that the United States will push ahead with NMD, brush aside the ABM Treaty, disregard or diminish other non-proliferation controls, and explore weaponisation beyond its national borders and into space.

Global non-proliferation efforts at stake

2.9 In order to deploy missile defences that reach across the entire United States, Washington will have to renegotiate or discard the ABM Treaty that it agreed with Moscow in 1972. The Treaty's original purpose was to hinder the two Cold War powers from deploying extensive ballistic missile defences so that the opposing superpower would not be moved to increase its own arsenal in an effort to overwhelm the system. The ABM Treaty was created to stem proliferation and, coupled with the SALT Treaty talks, actually moved Washington and Moscow toward nuclear reductions after two decades of horrifying build-up.

2.10 The Bush administration has made clear its intent to move beyond the ABM Treaty's constraints in order to facilitate rapid deployment of NMD. Most telling are current plans to begin work on a new test-bed facility in Alaska in spring 2002. The construction work would likely constitute a violation of the treaty as it currently stands. In attempting to move beyond the ABM Treaty, the United States is opening the door for a wider assault on arms control overall. Efforts to move the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force, as well as strengthen the Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), have been actively hindered by the US administration.

2.11 Since entering office, Bush and US administration officials have indicated that they will not re-submit the CTBT to the Senate for ratification. During his campaign Bush asserted, "we can fight the spread of nuclear weapons, but we cannot wish them away with unwise treaties. [53]Rumsfield argued during his confirmation hearing that the treaty was flawed, stating that it would interfere with ensuring the reliability of the US nuclear stockpile, and that it was unverifiable.

2.12 The current administration has stated that it intends to uphold the testing moratorium put in place in 1992. However, there are various indications that this policy will not last forever. In June 2001, Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz noted that the United States may contemplate resuming nuclear testing "if we develop questions about the reliability or safety or our nuclear weapons".[54] Perhaps the most worrying news for the self-imposed test ban were recent reports Washington and Beijing might cooperate in an attempt to undermine the CTBT and resume nuclear testing if China were to drop its opposition to NMD. [55]

2.13 Attempts to negotiate a legally binding verification protocol to the BTWC have also been dealt a potentially fatal blow by Washington. On 25 July 2001, the United States not only rejected the draft Protocol text, but also dismissed the entire "approach" of the Protocol. The US announcement was the precursor to the complete collapse of the negotiations, and effectively derailed the Protocol process, undermining six years of work (see the more detailed discussion in Section 3 below).

2.14 However, no arms control regime will be threatened more greatly overall than the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While forbidding non-nuclear states from possessing nuclear weapons or participating in their development, it also constrains nuclear weapon states from acting in ways that would cause proliferation. US refusal to ratify the CTBT and efforts to undermine the ABM Treaty contradict the "practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts" to move toward nuclear disarmament, which were agreed by member states at the May 2000 NPT Review Conference. The Bush administration may argue that its commitments to the NPT will be met via the expected upcoming cuts to the US arsenal. Proposals for the US arsenal, including reductions to as low as 1,500 deployed strategic warheads, will be included in the Nuclear Posture Review, due to be released on 31 December 2001.

2.15 However, the NPT calls for "the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction". While US commitment to the reduction of its nuclear arsenal should be commended, the unilateral reductions that the administration is expected to propose fall outside the purview of key arms control treaties. This approach has limited value since it will not mandate verification of the cuts to the arsenal, and reducing nuclear numbers unilaterally suggests that the United States may one day decide to increase its nuclear weapons arsenal, also unilaterally. [56]

2.16 This range of suddenly-stymied arms control agreements reflect a dangerous unilateralist approach by the Bush administration that places the fragile international network of non proliferation regimes at risk. The vast matrix of treaties, agreements, and protocols that help guide government policy and decision-making for nuclear technology and material transfer has been shaken by the recent US decisions. The UK Government, which over the years has invested extensive time and energy to promote a "diplomacy first" policy for arms control, should be particularly troubled by Washington's recent statements and actions.

Britain confronts nuclear concerns

2.17 Several key UK officials and parliamentarians have voiced concerns about the broader impact that missile defence plans may have for Britain, and have supported measures to restrain the Prime Minister's enthusiasm for the US missile defence system. Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, Britain's most senior military officer, warned that UK military installations could become targets in an attack directed at the US system, and expressed grave doubts about funding the system, stating. "There's no point in completely impoverishing ourselves in order to provide ourselves with a defence against one particular system and not being able to do anything else".[57] The British government also remains undecided on whether it would willingly receive protection under NMD, conceivably as a trade-off for use of UK radar sites in the system.

2.18 UK public opinion on NMD has also widened the debate. An Early Day Motion (EDM) introduced in the House of Commons in June, which "expresses concern at President Bush's intention to move beyond the constraints of the [ABM] Treaty" and urges the UK Government to "voice grave doubts" about missile defence, has received an impressive 279 signatures to date. [58]The EDM closely follows recommendations made in the July 2000 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Report, "Weapons of Mass Destruction", which stated in part:

We recommend that the Government articulate the very strong concerns that have been expressed about NMD within the UK. We are not convinced that the US plans to deploy NMD represent an appropriate response to the proliferation problems faced by the international community. We recommend that the government encourage the USA to seek other ways of reducing the threats it perceives.

In addition, a poll of Britons conducted in June 2001 showed that 70 per cent of respondents believe that US missile defence system development "will encourage other countries to build more advanced nuclear weapons".[59] Over 60 per cent of those surveyed also believe that nuclear disarmament may be harder to achieve in the wake of US plans to deploy the system. This concern for global security as reflected in Britain was a surprising wake-up call to UK parliamentarians and government officials.

Defending arms control

2.19 In light of an extensive and widening debate on arms control, the UK Government should use this opportunity to work with its allies and Russia to foster and strengthen the diplomatic initiatives that have formed the backbone of successful non-proliferation efforts since the Cold War. In its time of need, the Bush administration turned to the world to build a coalition against terrorist aggressors that pose a threat not only to the United States, but to the democratic world. Clearly, the US administration is beginning to realise the benefits that international co-operation can bring. The UK Government should use every opportunity to stress to the Bush administration the benefits of building such co-operation in nuclear, biological and other non-proliferation efforts.

2.20 Several effective arms control tools can be employed when a state is actively engaged in the international community, many of which stem from long-term diplomatic measures. Arms control treaties often enhance transparency, which in turn can promote confidence-building and engender compliance with national and international arms control regimes in a number of ways. For example, ongoing dialogue or mutually-accessible records about arms reductions, disposal or destruction can provide reassurance to officials and governments co-operating or complying with the norms of the regime that all parties are acting in good faith. It can also deter officials and governments contemplating non-compliance or defection. Lack of codification of these measures, on the other hand, breeds distrust and uncertainty among states, and global instability for allies and neighbours alike.

2.21 The active engagement of the UK Parliament is crucial to the success of these and other measures to draw the United States back into international institutions and regimes as a productive partner. For example:

— The Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees should conduct a joint inquiry into the implications of participating in a missile defence system for UK defence and foreign policy, and the United Kingdom's emerging role within US NMD plans, especially the proposed use of RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill;

— no further permission should be given for the use of RAF Fylingdale's and RAF Menwith Hill in the NMD program without a full parliamentary discussion and vote;

— the Foreign Affairs Committee should scrutinise Britain's current role in critical non-proliferation regimes (these include, at minimum, the NPT, CTBT and BTWC) and the extent to which that role might be enhanced in order to strengthen those regimes. Particular scrutiny of Britain's own adherence to the NPT's principles and its diligence in promoting ratification of the CTBT should be a priority for the Committee. With a strong example from another nuclear weapon state and trusted ally, the United States is more likely to be drawn back into co-operation in these regimes;

— the Foreign Affairs Committee should also review how the United Kingdom might contribute to other programmes or initiatives designed to enhance international co-operation in nuclear non-proliferation, including the Putin/Chirac plan for P-5 Nuclear discussions; and the US Nunn-Lugar efforts to secure WMD materials, personnel and knowledge in the former Soviet Union. Developing an agenda for stopping proliferation problems at source may be preferable to reliance on expensive and unreliable missile defences; and

— Members of Parliament should remain vigorous in their questioning of the Prime Minister and other relevant government ministers in order to ensure greater transparency and parliamentary oversight of Britain's developing role in NMD.

SECTION 3. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

3.1 Public fear of the risk of biological warfare, and in particular of bio-terrorism, has grown markedly since 11 September. The confirmed cases of anthrax recently diagnosed in the United States have added to this alarm and have fuelled fears that the A1-Qaeda network may possess biological weapons (BW). There are dangers now that governments put under pressure by such public alarm will initiate uncoordinated, badly targeted or even counter productive policies, based upon inadequate risk and threat assessments, and will not use their resources to combat the major biological weapons threat to international security: the acquisition or development of such weapons by states.

3.2 To effectively combat the threat of BW proliferation and use—whether by state or non-state actors-the international community must construct a web of reassurance", [60] an interconnecting network of national and international initiatives to assure governments and their citizens that such weapons are totally prohibited and, if used, will have minimal effect. At the heart of such a web of reassurance lies a good national health care system and an effective disease detection and medical response programme. These should be coupled with resources for intelligence, anti-terrorism, civil bio-defence and emergency response programmes.

3.3 However no single government will be able, by itself, to totally protect its citizens from the nightmare of biological terrorism or warfare by these means alone. Countries must exercise the political determination to establish and enforce stringent multilateral controls on the transfer of biotechnology and must protect the absolute international prohibition on the development and use of biological weapons as enunciated in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The best defence against BW attack is to prevent terrorists, or more importantly States, from acquiring bio-weapons or their components in the first place.

3.4 However it is precisely in the construction of effective international BW security architecture where the differences in US foreign policy and UK/EU policy have been starkly delineated.

BTWC Protocol

3.5 In 1972 the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was opened for signature, prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of bio-weapons by State Parties. It was the first ever arms control convention to completely ban a whole class of weapons. But it had no compliance monitoring or verification mechanisms.

3.6 Seeking to address this omission, in 1995 under the Ad Hoc Group process, states began to negotiate a verification protocol to the BTWC. The UK government has consistently shown its support for the Ad Hoc Group process, the direction of negotiations and overall content of the Protocol. On 23 March 2000, the then FCO Minister Peter Hain addressed the Ad Hoc Group meeting in Geneva:

The draft BWC Protocol already contains all the essential measures and much of the necessary language . . .

The BWC Protocol is the mechanism by which we can make this aspiration real.

3.7 This position has been supported by the UK Parliament, as voiced in an Early Day Motion of 10 July 2001, proposed by former FCO minister Tony Lloyd with cross party support. The EDM:

The 24th session of the AHG began on 23 July with States Parties responding to the Chair's composite text. Over the next three days over 50 states out of the 55 engaged in the Protocol negotiations spoke—to varying degrees—in favour of the composite text. Whilst many States Parties would have liked to see differences in the compromises adopted, they believed the text would provide a Protocol that all could agree.

3.8 However, on 25 July 2001, US Ambassador Donald Mahley, special negotiator on chemical and biological weapons, shattered this consensus when he made known the US position:

After extensive deliberation, the United States has concluded that the current approach to a Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention...is not, in our view, capable of achieving the mandate set forth for the Ad Hoc Group, strengthening confidence in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

Following Ambassador Mahley' statement, there were initial discussions within the Ad Hoc Group on whether negotiations should continue without the United States via the AHG process or indeed whether a Special Conference should be called to finalise the document. Neither option was felt to be viable without the United States. "Quite a number of delegations would be reluctant to engage in continued negotiations among themselves in the absence of a major negotiating partner, that is the United States of America", explained AHG Chairman Tibor Toth. [64]The AHG subsequently agreed without objection to Tibor Toth's recommendation that they suspend their negotiating efforts for this year.

3.9 The work of the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a draft Protocol text for presentation to a Special Conference of States and thereby fulfil its mandate to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BTWC has not been completed. It should be. The need for such a Protocol, which establishes an effective BTWC verification regime, is great. The Chair's Composite text should be the basis on which future negotiations continue. The text has the support of the vast majority of states involved in the AHG process and is a balanced document. Although the Composite text could be strengthened during the course of negotiations—on areas such as the remit, role, resources of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons (OPBW), transparency and investigatory visits—starting with the Composite text as drafted gives the best chance for success.

3.10 Every effort must be made to encourage US re-engagement in this process now or at a later date. The danger of US isolationism here is very real, and the negative effects should not be minimised. If the United States is not present at the negotiating table there is a danger that a number of key states may not agree to continue negotiating. Some with developed biotechnological and pharmaceutical industries may be concerned at the "lack of a level playing field", fearing that the US industry may gain the advantage by remaining outside the Protocol regime. Other countries may be distrustful of US BW research and development programs—especially in the light of the recent revelations[65]—and may consider a compliance regime that does not include the United States as dangerous to their security. Although this danger exists, this should not be a reason for the international community to refuse to attempt to continue negotiations. For such talks to be successful they must have a clear timeframe for completion and a recommencement date not too far distant.

3.11 Last year the Foreign Affairs Select Committee recommended that:

As a co-depository of the BTWC and close ally of the United States, the United Kingdom is well placed to encourage the US administration to reconsider its position on the draft BTWC Protocol. It is NOW critical that an effective regime is erected to aid compliance by State Parties to the BTWC. The draft Protocol gives States the basis for such a regime. The United Kingdom has a pivotal role to play to ensure that such a regime comes into being and that the United States is persuaded to play a constructive role in shaping this process.

BTWC Review Conference

3.12 The principal mechanism for articulating and defining the norm of bio-weapon prohibition is the BTWC. The Convention was negotiated nearly 30 years ago and in order to ensure that it remained applicable in subsequent years a process of five-yearly Review Conferences was established. The BTWC States Parties will gather in Geneva from 19 November to 7 December 2001, for the Fifth Review Conference. In the light of the collapse of the Protocol negotiations and the resulting discord, a successful Review Conference will be important for the strengthening of the biological weapons control regime. In particular, progress on the following areas needs to be made:

Reaffirm determination to maintain and rigorously enforce existing norm prohibiting possession of bio weapons, ensuring that the Final Declaration is comprehensive in its scope of coverage.

The Fifth Review Conference will be an excellent opportunity for the States Parties to address possible weaknesses in the Convention and will also allow states the opportunity to review scientific and technological developments relevant to the effectiveness of the BTWC. The Conference should ensure that there are no omissions or exclusions that might be exploited in a way that is inconsistent with the objectives of the Convention. Issues which the Review Conference should address include:

Article I: It is important that the Review Conference Final Declaration unequivocally reaffirms that the coverage of the prohibition in Article I, the general purpose criterion, is all embracing. Examples of issues that should be addressed relate to genetic recombinations and to bio-regulators, which are essential for normal bodily functions but can cause harm if administered in unusual quantities. Further concerns have been raised over the potential use of anti-material biological agents [67] and the use of biological agents in enforced drug eradication programmes such as that funded by the United States. [68]

Article III: Under Article III each State Party "undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever...any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of this Convention". Given the increased concern, expressed in many States about the possible use of biological agents and toxins by terrorist groups following the 11 September attacks, the Fifth Review Conference should elaborate upon and strengthen understanding of Article III in the text of the Final Declaration.

Establish an interim BTWC Oversight Committee and secretariat to promote adherence to the BW Convention and to aid implementation of the politically binding confidence building measures (CBMs) for information exchange agreed at previous Review Conferences.

The development of supportive institutions that would nurture the BTWC regime in the five years between Review Conferences has been an aim of many analysts since the late 1980s. The institutional deficit of the BW Convention has been a long-term problem that has hampered its evolution and damaged its health. The case for reinforcing the BW regime in this way was widely discussed by States Parties in 1990 and 1991. But there was no agreement on developing institutional supportive structures. Such institutional structures are now needed more than ever.

In the long-term the answer is to develop an organisation similar to the OPCW for the Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPBW is a central component of the draft verification Protocol. However the development of such an OPBW in the short term is unlikely following the stalling of the Protocol negotiations.

The proposal[69] for the Review Conference to mandate a representative Committee of Oversight, supported by scientific and legal advisory panels and a small dedicated secretariat, should be strongly supported by the UK Government. These bodies would be interim institutions, with their initial mandate running only until 2006, when the Sixth Review Conference might amend or renew it. When and if the OPBW comes into being following the completion and entry into force of a BW Protocol then this body would take over the functions of the Committee of Oversight. This process would probably not be completed until 2011 at the earliest.

Urge the Continuation of the biological weapons verification Protocol Negotiations.

There is a danger that arguments and recriminations over the failure of the Protocol negotiations will contaminate the climate of the Review Conference. It is imperative that all parties to the Review Conference ensure that this does not occur. Mahley recognised this danger in his testimony to a US Congressional subcommittee earlier this year, stating that "if there is no sense during the Fifth Review Conference in November that a Protocol . . . is in sight, we can expect a very troublesome Review Conference . . ." [70]To try and offset such dangers, the Review Conference could simply note the failure of the Ad Hoc Group to finalise a Protocol text and consequent failure to fulfil its mandate from the 1994 Special Conference of States Parties. The Fifth Review Conference should request that the AHG reconvene to fulfil its mandate, presenting a Protocol text to a Special Conference of BTWC States Parties.

Facilitate the initiation of a process to develop a legal framework to ensure that breaches of the BTWC by individuals or groups are treated as an international crime.

Since the Fourth Review Conference, proposals have been made by the Sussex-Harvard Programme and others to strengthen the prohibition regime against biological and chemical weapons through the international criminalisation of breaches of the BTWC. [71]Work on such weapons by individuals should be dealt with in a similar manner as violations of the international Conventions against piracy, torture and hijacking.

The proposed treaty would make it an offence for any person—including government officials and leaders, commercial suppliers, weapons experts, and terrorists—to order, direct, or knowingly render substantial assistance in the development, production, acquisition, or use of biological or chemical weapons. Any person, regardless of nationality, who commits any of the prohibited acts anywhere in the world would face the risk of prosecution or extradition should that person be found in a state that supports the proposed convention. Such individuals would be regarded as hostes humani generis—enemies of all humanity.

The development of such a treaty would create a new dimension of constraint against biological and chemical weapons. The norm against using chemical and biological agents for hostile purposes would be strengthened, deterrence of potential offenders, both official and unofficial, would be enhanced and international cooperation in suppressing the prohibited activities would be facilitated. The UK Government should recommend to the Fifth Review Conference that the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly further examine these proposals with a view to the negotiation of an international jurisdiction treaty.

3.13 As assessment of the threat of biological weapons proliferation and use, and the best way to prevent and combat such threats, is the subject of a forthcoming BASIC research report.

SECTION 4. CONTROLLING THE WEAPONS TRADE

The US response to 11 September attacks and the dangers of weakening arms control regime

4.1 As a response to 11 September and as part of its "war on international terrorism", there have been moves by the Bush administration to "liberalise" US arms controls to facilitate arms transfers to allies fighting the Taliban regime. There have also been reports of arms transfers by some of the allies in the anti-terrorist coalition to the Northern Alliance, despite its poor human rights record. Finally there are growing concerns that other nations engaged in the broader fight against terrorism might be recipients of future US arms, despite ongoing concerns about the human rights record of these security forces.

(1) Afghanistan

(a) Arms transfers to the Northern Alliance

4.2 Amnesty International has raised concerns that members of the US Congress have proposed legislation that would provide up to $300 million of direct US government military assistance to the United Front and other "eligible Afghan resistance organisations" without providing for rigorous monitoring and reporting on compliance with international human rights standards and international humanitarian law. [72]By authorising assistance "notwithstanding any other provision of law", the legislation could negate existing US laws, including Sections 116 and 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended), which prohibits foreign assistance to "the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights" and the Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Operations Act and the Defense Appropriations Act, which prohibits military assistance:

to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless... the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.

Recent supplies to the United Front have been reportedly sent from Iran and the Russian Federation via the Central Asian states, especially Tajikistan, as well as from the Slovak Republic, although the Central Asian states have denied involvement. Furthermore, there are reports that the Russian Government is planning further deliveries of up to US$45 million worth of arms to the United Front which are not conditioned to any human rights criteria. The shipments reportedly include Soviet-era T-55 tanks, combat vehicles, small arms, and ammunition. Russian Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters could also be included. [73]

4.3 As an important partner in the 40 nation anti-terrorist coalition, the UK Government should do all it can to ensure that:

— The US administration or other governments in the Alliance do not sanction the transfer of military, security or police equipment, weaponry or training to the Northern Alliance that is likely to be used to facilitate human rights abuses, endanger regional or national security or be at risk of diversion:

— Any potential arms transfers to the Northern Alliance should go through the standard screening and oversight procedures, and should be subject to stringent end use certification and monitoring procedures. If there are reliable reports that such equipment is being used by the Northern Alliance to commit human rights abuses or breaches of International Humanitarian Law, all such transfers should be halted; and

— That stringent national and international controls are put in place, adequately resourced and implemented to ensure that no arms or military equipment is transferred to the Taliban or the Al' Qaeda network.

(b) the possible use of landmines in Afghanistan

4.4 The Ottawa (Mine Ban) Treaty was opened for signing in 1997. The treaty prohibits the use, production stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel landmines under any circumstances and requires destruction of stockpiled and emplaced mines. The United Kingdom ratified the Ottawa Treaty in July 1998, introducing the Landmines Act 1998. The Ottawa Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. At present some 140 nations have now signed the Treaty. However, one country notable for its absence has been the United States.

4.5 On 11 October 2001 The New York Times reported that American B-52 and B-1 bombers dropped "area munitions" including CBU-89 Gators. The CBU-89 Gator is a mixed mine system containing both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. Reports of GATOR use have not been confirmed at the time of writing. However, if subsequently confirmed, these drops would mark the first time the United States is known to have used anti-personnel mines since the Gulf War ten years ago. [74]

4.6 According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), if the United States or other non-signatory forces were to use antipersonnel mines in a joint operation, this could put State Parties such as the United Kingdom at risk of violating the Mine Ban Treaty. [75]Article 1 of the treaty stipulates that they should not "assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention."

4.7 In the light of these reports and concerns, the UK Government should make every effort to ensure that landmines are not used at all in the joint US/UK operation in Afghanistan. The UK Government should also press the United States to accede to the Ottawa Treaty as soon as possible.

(c) Pakistan

4.8 A draft bill is now going through Congress "to authorise the President to exercise waivers of foreign assistance restrictions with respect to Pakistan through 30 September 2003, and for other purposes. [76]This bill is being considered despite ongoing concerns about restrictions on free speech, civil liberties, the independence of the judiciary and continuing human rights violations committed by the Pakistan security forces. [77]Such concerns seem to have been swept aside in the fight against international terrorism.

4.9 This draft bill gives the President power to exercise waivers on foreign assistance restrictions with respect to Pakistan that had previously been agreed in the aftermath of the military coup. It exempts Pakistan from:

any provision of the foreign operations, export financing, and related programs appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002, or any provision of such Act for a prior fiscal year, that prohibits direct assistance to a county whose duly elected head of government was deposed by decree or military coup.

the President is authorised to waive, with respect to Pakistan, any provision of the foreign operations, export financing, and related programs appropriations Act for fiscal year 2003 that prohibits direct assistance to a country whose duly elected head of government was deposed by decree of military coup, if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such waive would facilitate the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan; and is important to United States efforts to respond to, deter, or prevent acts of international terrorism.

Although this draft bill includes some limited provision to ensure that the President consults with congressional committees at least five days before such assistance is given, such consultation is not an effective safeguard. The UK Government should raise these concerns with the US administration and request the adoption of adequate controls to ensure that no US arms transfers to Pakistan are agreed which are likely to facilitate human rights violations by the Pakistani security forces.

(2) The broader "war against terrorism"

(a) Turkey

4.10 Concerns are mounting that the US administration may soon approve the transfer of attack helicopters to Turkey, despite fears that such equipment may facilitate human rights violations in that country. The US company Bell-Textron previously won a $1.5 billion tender for the sale of 50 advanced attack Cobra helicopters to the Turkish military and is currently negotiating with the Government of Turkey over the contract. Leading human rights organisations such as Amnesty International, [78]Turkish and western press and even the US State Department[79] have previously documented the Turkish military's use of such helicopters to attack Kurdish villages in Turkey and to transport troops to regions where they have tortured and killed civilians. Despite repeated assurances, the Turkish Government has been slow to implement mechanisms to protect human rights in the country.

4.11 Currently, the helicopter contract has run into complications over Pentagon resistance to the transfer of related sensitive computer technology. However, if these complications are overcome Bell-Textron will apply to the US State Department for an export license. If the State Department grant the license, Congress will have two weeks to review it. Congress has never previously stopped an arms transfer. The UK Government and other EU Member States should raise concerns with the US Government regarding the human rights implications of such transfers and call on the United States to halt such transfers until sufficient safeguards are in place to ensure that the helicopters will not be used to facilitate human rights violations.

(b) Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill and the Andean Regional Initiative

4.12 The 2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations bills passed by the US House of Representatives and approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee include substantial funds for the Bush Administration's "Andean Regional Initiative" (ARI)—a financial follow on to last year's $1.3 billion support for Plan Colombia and other regional counter narcotics efforts. The Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (HR 2506) passed by the House on 24 July 2001 includes some $676 million for the counter drug portion of the ARI, which includes military training and equipment.

4.13 According to the Federation of American Scientists, while the percentage of funds designated for military and police assistance as a whole is less than under Plan Colombia, the ARI dramatically increases the amount of military aid designated for individual South American countries. [80]Brazil for example will receive an estimated 345 per cent increase in its military aid. Moreover, the quantity of military aid in absolute terms remains significant—$252 million is presently earmarked for narcotics and security aid for Colombia alone. Although the Senate version of the Bill does contain human rights conditionality with a "no waiver" clause, there are still grave concerns that it could result in military equipment or training facilitating human rights abuses in the Andean region.

4.14 In Colombia, for example, there have been well documented reports from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other human rights organisations of persistent and widespread collusion between Colombian military and right wing paramilitaries accused of gross human rights abuses. In their latest report, the Sixth Division, HRW state that: "Colombian military and police detachments continue to promote, work with, support, profit from and tolerate paramilitary groups, treating them as a force allied to and compatible with their own." [81]In the light of such reports, the UK Government should raise concerns with the US administration over the ARI initiative and seek assurances that there are effective safeguards to ensure that no military, security or police equipment, weaponry, personnel or training is transferred as part of the ARI package to any country where it is likely to facilitate human rights abuses by either government security forces or by paramilitary groups or non-state actors acting with compliance of such government forces.

NATIONAL CONTROLS: UK EXPORT CONTROL BILL

4.15 In a recent interview, the UK Prime Minister stated that to be effective the fight against terrorism must be waged on many fronts and should include measures to halt arms transfers to terrorist groups:

A crucial tool in ensuring that the illicit trade in conventional weapons is effectively combated, and that arms are not placed in the hands of terrorists, human rights abusers or criminals is a comprehensive and stringently enforced national and international arms control architecture.

4.16 In June 2001, the UK Government introduced the draft Export Control and Non-proliferation Bill. This draft Bill seeks to comprehensively update and improve the existing UK control regime which has been governed by emergency legislation over 40 years old—the Import, Export and Customs (Powers) Defence Act 1939. BASIC has strongly welcomed this initiative.

4.17 In the light of these changes, the United Kingdom is ideally placed to construct an effective export control system which will eliminate the existing weakness and loopholes which can be used by unscrupulous individuals and companies to transfer arms to human rights abusers, criminals and terrorist organisations. In the light of the 11 September terrorist attacks, the need to ensure that no UK arms flow to such recipients is starkly evident. In tightening up its control regime, the United Kingdom can usefully gain from US experience and best practice in a number of key areas.

(1) Controlling arms brokers and transport agents

4.18 BASIC and other NGOs have detailed how arms brokers and transportation agents have, in the past, facilitated the transfer of arms and security equipment to human rights crisis zones and regions of conflict. [83]The proposals for controlling arms brokering in the draft Bill are welcome, therefore. However, concerns remain that the controls as they are presently framed will not be able to adequately control the activities of UK arms brokers. To be truly effective such controls need to have an extra-territorial dimension. Without such extra-territorial powers, UK citizens could evade controls by simply stepping out of the country to conduct their arms brokering deals. In developing its own legislation, the United Kingdom should consider US attempts to control such brokers.

4.19 Following the adoption of the brokering amendment to the US Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and its enactment in law, the US control system explicitly requires that all brokers—individuals or organisations involved in negotiating or arranging contracts, purchases, sales or transfers of defence articles or services—must register with the US government. [84]This requirement includes US nationals or companies wherever they are located, as well as non-US nationals or companies located in the United States or otherwise subject to US jurisdiction. Such registered arms brokers then must apply for government licenses for specific brokering activities, regardless of where the arms brokering activities take place. Although there have been problems with enforcement of this legislation, anecdotal evidence suggests that it has proved to have an important deterrent effect in preventing US nationals from undertaking illicit brokering activities.

4.20 UK legislators should consider following the US brokering model. Controls should be extended to the activities of all UK passport-holders even if operating wholly on foreign soil. Furthermore, these provisions should also be extended to cover individuals or companies transporting such weapons. In the wake of 11 September, it is now more vital than ever to ensure that British companies cannot arrange deals or freely transport weapons to terrorist organisations or to governments that violate human rights.

(2) Controlling Licensed Production

4.21 BASIC and other NGOs and journalists have reported on the dangers arising from the lack of adequate regulation of UK and European licensed production agreements. [85]Such licensed production agreements are increasingly supplementing or replacing direct exports, however UK control of such agreements is presently inadequate. In the United Kingdom at present it is only where components, machine tools or other technology is solely for the production of controlled goods that a license is required. This potentially omits from the UK controls a wide range of licensed production agreements for the manufacture of equipment used in security operations. Furthermore under the present export control system, once a UK company has agreed a licensed production deal, the UK government effectively relinquishes control of where such products end up.

4.22 Again, it would be useful to examine "best practice" in the United States, where licensed production (or manufacturing license) agreements are treated as physical exports requiring prior approval from the US State Department. The US licensed production contracts usually limit production levels and prohibit sales or transfers to third countries without prior US government consent. There is also provision, albeit limited, [86]for prior Congressional approval of licensed production deals. [87]Building on such best practice, the UK Government should introduce legislation that requires UK companies to seek prior licensing approval for all licensed production agreements for the manufacture of controlled goods. The criteria used by the UK Government for such export license determinations should be as stringent as for direct arms exports.

4.23 In addition, these licensed production agreements should contain strict limits on the quantities of arms that can be produced under these contracts. The lifetime or duration of such agreements and details of intended end-users should be clearly defined. These agreements must also contain a clause that prohibits sales or transfers to third countries of either arms or licensed production technology, without the prior consent of the UK Government.

4.24 UK legislation should include provision for the monitoring of such licensed production agreements. Where there is evidence that arms resulting from a licensed production agreement have been misused (eg for human rights violations) in the licensee's home country or have been exported to destinations not subject to agreement (eg to terrorist organisations), the licensed production agreement should be immediately revoked. In such cases all provision of related machine tools, parts, training and technology should be halted.

(3) Effective end use monitoring

4.25 The steps that the UK Government has taken to improve the process of risk assessment at the licensing stage and the pre-sales checks on exports are welcome. However, concerns remain that the UK Government has not brought forward adequate provisions to establish a strong end use monitoring and control system. For many years the lack of such a system has contributed to UK arms and security equipment being misused for human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law, and contributed to the danger of them being diverted to proscribed end users such as terrorist organisations.

4.26 When considering the development of stringent end use certification and monitoring systems, the UK Government should consider best practice in other countries, including elements of US controls. The US Government controls end-use and employs retransfer restrictions by requiring exporters to submit a "non-transfer and use certificate" with export license applications. [88]During the approval process, the details of the final end-user and country of destination must be provided, and the intermediary importer, the final end-user, and the importing government must certify that they will not resell or re-export the equipment outside the final destination country or to any other person or organisation without prior permission of the US Government. When the end-user is a foreign military agency, they must certify that they will only use the equipment in accordance with US law, or for purposes specified in bilateral or regional defence agreements. The sales agreement may also specify approved use of the equipment. [89]

4.27 The US Government verifies compliance with rules on retransfers and use of US arms via two programmes, one run by the State Department for Direct Commercial Sales, and the other by the Pentagon for government-to-government sales. The State Department's "Blue Lantern" programme involves pre-screening of export licence applicants for risks of diversion based upon a set of "red flag" criteria and post-sale on-site inspection to ensure the equipment has remained with the identified end-user and is being used for agreed-upon purposes. [90]

4.28 In the light of best practice from the United States and elsewhere[91], and as a minimum, end-use certification and monitoring system must be standardised and strengthened, so that:

— End use certificates take the form of legally binding contracts, containing a list of proscribed uses—specifically those in breach of human rights standards and international humanitarian law. Contracts should contain a named recipient. There must also be requirements for detailed information on transit routes and shipping agents and pre-notification of importing and transit states. Such agreements should also include a prohibition on unauthorised transfer of end user or re-export.

— Provision should be made in such contracts for follow-up checks of end use. Qualified embassy staff in the recipient country could carry these out. Such monitoring should be standardised in line with systematic risk assessments of likelihood of misuse. Priority for end use monitoring, should be given to those types of arms and security equipment such as small arms, light weapons and riot control equipment which are most readily utilised in human rights violations. Similarly, priority, in terms of monitoring, should be given to those countries and particular end-users such as internal security forces and paramilitary police, where the danger of misuse is deemed to be highest. Failure to honour the terms of an end-use contract should result in the revocation of the licence and a halt in further supplies, provision of spares or other forms of support.

Developing regional and international conventional arms control architecture

4.29 While updating national UK export controls is crucial to ensuring that UK arms are not transferred to countries where they will facilitate human rights abuses, undermine regional stability, international security or be diverted to terrorist groups, this is at best only a partial solution. The danger that other countries with less progressive export control policies than the United Kingdom or indeed the United States will undercut these two countries and send arms in their place must be countered. To do this, the United Kingdom must play an active role nurturing effective arms control architecture through a number of regional fora, multi-lateral organisations and international control regimes. In doing this, the UK's relationship with the United States will be crucial and the role it can play convincing the United States to play an active part in these processes, a key determinant in their success or failure.

(1) REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL FORA

(a) European Union (EU)

4.30 In June 1998 during the UK Presidency, the EU Member States' agreed the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Export—a first major step towards the development of a common, responsible approach to exports of military equipment and dual-use goods from the European Union. The Code requires EU Member States to consider requests for exports of military equipment (including SALW) on a case-by-case basis, assessing their compatibility with eight criteria including respect for human rights; the internal situation of the recipient; regional stability; international security, attitudes towards terrorism and the risk of diversion.

4.31 The EU Code also contains operative provisions aimed at harmonising its application by Member States, increasing transparency, enabling consultation and preventing undercutting. Under these provision, Member States are required to notify each other of export licences they have refused under the criteria. Before any Member State can grant a licence that has been denied by another Member State for an essentially identical transaction in the preceding three years, it is required to consult the state that denied the licence. Although the final decision to export in such cases remains with individual Member States, if a licence is granted in these circumstances, the licensing state will have to provide a detailed explanation of its reasoning. The Code of Conduct also imposes an annual reporting obligation on states.

4.32 Operative provision 11 of the Code commits Member States to encourage other arms exporting states to subscribe to the principles of the Code. As a result, the EU Code has subsequently been endorsed by the EU Associate Countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Cyprus, the EFTA countries, members of the European Economic Area and Canada. One of the key nations for the European Union to try and engage in this regard should be the United States. And an important development was the reference to the Code in the EU-US Small Arms Declaration of December 1999. In developing further US support, the European Union should seek to build upon previous initiatives within the United States to develop a national and an International Code of Conduct. These resulted in a US International Arms Sales Code of Conduct Act of 1999 that committed the US President to take steps to begin negotiations aimed at establishing an international arms sales code of conduct. Subsequently, in a joint declaration issued at the December 2000 EU-US summit, it was stated that the United States and the European Union share a common vision on the question of arms exports, that they had special responsibilities in this respect, and that they were committed to promoting the highest possible standards of conduct and enhanced export control practices. The 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers and the 1999 US International Arms Sales Code of Conduct Act must be further developed and widened.

4.33 These embryonic moves towards development of international norms and standards for export control criteria must be continued and widened. Such initiatives can built upon and feed into parallel processes such as the Nobel Laureates Convention on International Arms Transfers and the export control language to be found in the UN 2001 Small Arms Conference Programme of Action.

(b) Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

4.34 The OSCE first began to explore small arms issues in November 1998 when the governments of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland in association with BASIC organised an exploratory workshop on small arms at the OSCE headquarters in Vienna. Following a series of seminars and inter-governmental meetings, the OSCE Member States agreed to develop a consensus document. The resulting OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons was adopted on the 24 November 2000. While the Document is a statement of political commitment rather than a legally binding instrument, it has considerable importance. OSCE participating States account for just over half of the world's legal exporters of small arms, including three of the four biggest exporters—the US, the Russian Federation, and Germany. At the same time, OSCE countries—especially in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and South Eastern Europe—are directly affected by the problem of small arms proliferation and misuse.

4.35 Equally significant is the Document's comprehensive nature which aims to combat illicit small arms and light weapons trafficking in all its aspects. There is a strong focus on improving controls over legal manufacture and transfer, with provision made for marking, record keeping, and the harmonisation of import, export, and in-transit procedures and documentation. The Document also contains provisions for the regulation of international arms brokers and recommended criteria to be used in determining export licence applications. Furthermore, OSCE states also agree to provide assistance for stockpile management, weapons collection, and border control, and to incorporate small arms related measures—including the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants—into future OSCE missions and peacekeeping operations. The United Kingdom and the United States have committed themselves to these principles. It is crucial that they fully uphold them and facilitate the development of OSCE practical policies and programmes that bring them to life.

(c) North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

4.36 As discussed in Section one, on 2 October 2001, NATO invoked Article Five of the Washington Treaty. Long before this Article was invoked, NATO members had already begun to combat terrorist attacks by attempting to combat the illicit trade in conventional weapons, particularly SALW, with which many terrorist groups readily arm themselves. [92]

4.37 Under the leadership of Canada, Norway and the United States, NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) began to address the spread of small arms in March 1999, forming an ad hoc working group on small arms in April 1999. This group subsequently drafted a work programme for the EAPC in the summer of 1999, which seeks to "identify ways in which EAPC/PfP might contribute to the challenge of small arms and light weapons". The programme places an emphasis on reinforcing existing initiatives rather than duplicating them, and identified three areas for examination:

— Stockpile management and security;

— National export controls, mechanisms, enforcement and arms embargoes; and

— Peacekeeping training and development

4.38 Since the establishment of the work programme, NATO has convened a series of workshops to further discuss and build consensus on areas such as best practice in export control and common systems of marking weapons. In addition, the Partnership Work Program Chapter, "The Challenge of Small Arms and Light Weapons" was agreed in February 2000. The chapter aims to initiate a response from EAPC countries on small arms and light weapons issues through dialogue on best practice. Furthermore, in terms of destruction of surplus stocks, the German Government worked within the EAPC framework to launch an initiative to help Albania destroy weapons.

4.39 NATO is well placed to take up the challenge of small arms control—in both political and practical terms. Politically, the 46 members of the EAPC, comprising the 19 NATO states and 27 participants in the Alliance's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, include many of the worlds most important suppliers of small arms and light weapons, several of which are not parties to the arms control regimes of the European Union or Wassenaar Arrangement. NATO can therefore play a key role in setting the arms control standards for EAPC countries, especially those seeking to join the Alliance. In practical terms, NATO is a well resourced organisation, equipped with established military structures and technical expertise that no other multilateral organisation working on small arms issues can hope to match. In addition, NATO can draw on the perspectives and expertise of military officers and defence officials—with direct experience of managing weapons and working with the arms industry—into a policy area thus far dominated by officials working for foreign affairs, development and justice departments.

4.40 The UK Government should play an active role in ensuring that the NATO/EAPC small arms work programme is carried out in full, by facilitating the provision of resources and nurturing political will within the United States, the PfP states and the Alliance as a whole. In addition, as a member of the European Union, the OSCE and NATO, the United Kingdom can play a crucial role in helping to ensure that the three organisations work programmes are synergistic, avoid duplication and play to the organisations' strengths.

(2) INTERNATIONAL PROCESSES

4.41 Following the 11 September attacks governments and multilateral organisations are acknowledging the importance of rigorously combating the illicit international trade in conventional weapons. In recent months two important advances have been achieved in combating the illicit smalls arms trade—the negotiation of a UN Firearms Protocol and the holding of the first UN Conference on combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. It is crucial now that the UK Government encourages allies, and most importantly the United States, to fully engage in follow up and implementation measures around these two initiatives.

(a) UN Firearms Protocol

4.42 While multilateral efforts to curb small arms proliferation and misuse are still relatively new and untested the law enforcement approach to the problem with its focus on combating illicit weapons trafficking has garnered widespread support by governments culminating in the negotiation of the UN Protocol against the Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition. The Protocol, supplementary to the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime, was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 31 May 2001.The Protocol is a legally binding treaty that commits states to: [93]

— promote common international standards for the import, export and in-transit international movement of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition;

— encourage co-operation and information exchange at the national, regional and global levels, including on firearms identification, tracking and tracing; and

— further international cooperation on firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition by developing an international regime for the management of commercial shipments.

The UK Government should ratify this convention at the earliest possible opportunity, encourage ratification by the United States and others, and work to ensure that it is fully implemented.

However, it should be noted that the UN Firearms Protocol only applies to commercially traded firearms and ammunition, and excludes state-to-state transactions or transfers for the purposes of national security. Other control mechanisms must be developed to ensure that such exempted state transfers are adequately regulated and do not facilitate human rights abuses.

(b) UN 2001 Conference

4.43 The United Nations recently concluded the first global conference to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The "Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects", held in New York from 9-20 July 2001, produced a Programme of Action (POA) for states to implement at the national, regional and international levels. It is now important that the United Kingdom and other EU Member States work to implement the POA. Furthermore, the UK Government can once again play an important role in facilitating the re-engagement of the United States in the multilateral follow up and implementation process. The following are among the areas where the United Kingdom, European Union and the United States can work together to combat the proliferation and misuse of small arms:

Capacity building.

Controlling arms brokers.

Marketing and tracing.

Export criteria and controls.

Arms to non-state actors.

SECTION 5. NATO EXPANSION (BOTH GEOGRAPHIC AND THEMATIC)

5.1 In the post-Cold War era, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has undertaken a number of new roles often under the de facto leadership of the United Kingdom, the United States or their combined leadership. Both countries actively seek to shape NATO in accordance with their own national (and in the case of the UK, EU) values and interests, and in the past, there has been a great deal of synergy in those interests. This might now be changing, however. While the UK government continues to view NATO as the cornerstone of its defence policy[96], and has worked tirelessly to engage NATO in many of Europe's recent security problems and regional conflicts (especially peace enforcement, peacekeeping and weapons collection in the Balkans) an increasingly disinterested US administration appeared to be drawing back from engagement in NATO more generally and in such "soft" security activities in particular. While all this may now change after the events of 11 September, on current readings there are a number of issues on the NATO agenda which might exacerbate UK-US differences. These include the role of peacekeeping and other "soft" security tasks (such as protecting human rights monitors and weapons collection); changing relations with the European Union as it pursues a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP); and NATO enlargement. The UK Parliament should play an active role in scrutinising these developments.

Peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention and crisis management

5.2 The Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is a viable alternative to NATO as a stable European security structure not based on military alliances. The OSCE provides the best options for trans-European conflict prevention policies and for improving confidence and understanding between states. It is also important to recognise the strong part played by US and UK officials at an operational level (as election and human rights monitors, area specialists etc.) within the OSCE. It is important that the United Kingdom and United States continue to play a strong role in the OSCE. At the same time, NATO has been working to broaden its role from collective military defence to a more inclusive form of collective security, and has done so to largely good affect in terms of its contribution to peacekeeping and crisis management. As such, in many aspects of European security in recent years, the OSCE, NATO—and even more recently the European Union as well—have acted together in a concerted and complementary fashion. While much more needs to be done to overhaul this security architecture, it would certainly not be in Britain's interests, therefore, for the UK Government to pull back from contributing troops, logistics and know-how in some of the more delicate crisis situations in Europe at the moment, especially in the Balkans.

5.3 European governments are not in a position to cope with an increased number of conflict management tasks at this stage. European NATO countries recently took the lead in the disarming of rebels in Macedonia, but this was a small-scale operation. Although the United Kingdom maintained a prominent role in Operation Essential Harvest—actually contributing the majority of the 400 troops initially sent to Macedonia—the United States continued to supply most of the intelligence gathering, medical support and transportation. [97]

5.4 For the near future, NATO will remain engaged in Balkan peacekeeping operations and US support will be integral. In Macedonia, for example, 700 further NATO troops are joining those already present, not only to protect the civilian monitors who will be overseeing the peace plan in the country, but also to protect ethic Albanian villages from reprisals from the Macedonian security forces. [98]The recent instability in Macedonia (and the spill-over from conflicts within Kosovo and southern Serbia) suggests that some form of monitoring may be necessary beyond NATO's planned three-month operation. [99]

5.5 Furthermore, NATO remains the overwhelming contributor to the 20,000 Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 50,000 KFOR troops in Kosovo. [100]Although Washington has hinted at withdrawing its forces from these operations—and has actually done so in Bosnia, most recently decreasing its commitment from 4,400 to under 3,000 troops[101]—a complete US withdrawal would almost certainly lead to a resumption of serious hostilities. Although the United States has only 7,000 troops in Kosovo (about 15 per cent of the total of KFOR), for example, it is unlikely that the other contributing states would be able to fill the gap. [102](The United Kingdom, for example, already has almost 3,000 troops in Bosnia and almost 4,000 in Kosovo). [103]Given these persistent problems within the region, London and Washington will need to continue to work "shoulder to shoulder" in maintaining NATO's military presence in the region. For its part, the UK Government should continue to provide peacekeeping troops, logistics and know-how in some of the more delicate crisis situations in Europe, especially the Balkans.

5.6 In the longer term, however, investment of resources in other routes could spare Europe and NATO from military action at all. Britain, with its membership in the European Union, the OSCE and the United Nations, could build upon the considerable progress already made in these multinational bodies in the area of civilian crisis management. Specifically, Britain, in conjunction with these organisations, should push for the creation of integrated teams that pull together diffuse, but valuable, tools to mitigate conflict. Such intervention units should not be assembled during lengthy debate after the outbreak of violent conflict. Rather, these units must be capable of deploying on a moment's notice and be comprised of a mix of experts, including police, human rights monitors, humanitarian aid workers, among others. [104]Creating and deploying these units might be expensive, but would not be as costly as letting wars run their course. The EU's proposed Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) would intervene in crises before they become full-scale wars. This would also release NATO from participating in some military interventions. At the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 the "Headline Goal" was agreed upon stating that by 2003, the European Union should be capable of deploying 60,000 troops to a site within 60 days and also capable of maintaining a presence at that site for one year. [105]When a military operation takes place, it will happen under an EU Joint Action, which means that actions taken will remain under the political and strategic control of the European Union, even when NATO or other organisations' assets are used. [106]Cohesion of EU Member States in carrying out ERRF missions will be critical. In the end, national governments decide whether to contribute their troops to a particular ERRF deployment. [107]Overall, therefore, the mix of support between the EU-OSCE nexus (and predominantly non-military conflict prevention and civilian crisis management strategies) and the NATO-EU nexus (and predominantly military defence strategies) remains too far balanced in favour of the latter. The UK Foreign Affairs Committee should explore this issue in greater detail.

THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE

5.7 In an effort to improve Europe's ability to respond to security crises, EU leaders are attempting to create a substantial and independent military capability, including decision-making processes, institutions and military forces that are "separate" from NATO. Even though Washington has always complained of "burden sharing" within the Alliance, it has been wary of approaches that would dilute NATO both politically and militarily. However, the exact degree of separation from NATO remains a matter of some debate even within EU Member States: we are looking at a stronger `European Pillar' within NATO or the emergence of an autonomous European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)? The view in Paris and London is likely to differ quite markedly.

5.8 Either way, it can be seen in Washington as a direct challenge to US leadership and policy goals. The proposed EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), for example, has raised US concerns as a potential competitor to NATO. US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld has remarked that the RRF runs "the risk of injecting an instability into an enormously important alliance [NATO]". [108]Not all reactions from the States are negative, however. US Secretary of State Colin Powell has said, "In fact, I think it [the RRF] is our common belief that it will strengthen NATO".[109]

5.9 Such wide-ranging reactions in the United States are also reflected in Europe. A group of military officials from France and the United Kingdom expressed their fears in an editorial to The Daily Telegraph that the RRF will take away precious resources, including personnel, from Europe's national militaries. [110]The Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Robertson, on the other hand, has given his support for the RRF endeavour. [111]He remains sceptical, however, about Europe's ability to follow through with its commitments because of current defence spending levels. [112]Similarly, the UK Prime Minister has staunchly defended the RRF project, pointing to Europe's need for a special peacekeeping and humanitarian force that will intervene when NATO is unable or unwilling to do so. [113]

5.10 As NATO and the European Union continue to shape their respective roles and attempt to work together to ensure collective security, the UKs role as a bridge between US and European security interests will be more important than ever. It will certainly be reassuring for the United States to find the UK Government taking a clear lead on the ESDP. The reality of course is that it will take a decade or more for Europe to seriously change the actual balance between US and EU defence capabilities. The transition period is likely to be one punctuated by bouts of serious friction within the Alliance. However, Europe's interests would not be served by US isolationist or unilateralist policies during this period, and the UK Government should use the transatlantic relationship to solidify US support for the Alliance, and in particular, to strengthen some of the non-military crisis management institutions and capabilities on the European continent (as discussed above). Enhanced cooperation between the European Union, NATO, OSCE, Stability Pact and other conflict resolution and prevention mechanisms will be critical in the coming years, as will an enhanced and positive US role within them. The UK Parliament can work to ensure that this is done properly with regular hearings, increased parliamentary scrutiny, and requiring the Government to consult before committing additional resources to military options like the RRF.

NATO enlargement

5.11 NATO enlargement will be another pressing issue in the coming year. Since the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States, Washington has been seeking more co-operation with Moscow. Consequently, the United States in the short-term might decrease at least its rhetoric about the Alliance's eagerness to accept new members. [114]Nevertheless, the UK Parliament should be aware of some continuing challenges in expanding the Alliance in the long-term. These challenges include the potential for troubled relations with Russia over the membership of the Baltic States and the potential for weapons cascading from the Membership Action Plan (MAP) countries. [115]The expansion of NATO to include the Baltic States is controversial, not least since under collective Alliance security guarantees NATO-controlled nuclear weapons might one day be deployed close to Russian borders. This would understandably alarm Moscow, and existing promises not to station nuclear weapons in those states should be made more explicit. Similar guarantees should be given in respect of major offensive conventional weapons.

5.12 Overall, the Alliance should proceed with caution when considering the Baltic states for membership. The Russian response so far has been mixed. Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked at a recent news conference in Finland, "I underline that we don't see any objective reason for the Baltic States to become members of NATO".[116] Later that same month, while on a visit to Germany, however, Putin suggested that Moscow start talks on membership for his own country. [117]Ultimately, President Putin has re-iterated that Russia would be more amenable to NATO expansion in general if Moscow were to receive more of a consultative role. [118]How such consultation would move beyond Russia's participation in the Partnership for Peace Program and the Permanent Joint Council remains unclear.

5.13 Another potential dilemma with NATO expansion is the threat of increased arms proliferation, as cash-strapped aspirant countries seek to upgrade their militaries to meet the requirements of the alliance. There is a danger that surplus stocks will then be exported, with little control or oversight, in order to recoup valuable foreign currency. The experience from the first wave of applications suggest that some of these surpluses will end up in conflict zones around the world. Rebels in Angola's longstanding conflict recently imported Bulgarian and Romanian weapons in preparation for a renewed assault on the Angolan government. [119]Similarly, there have been reports of Bulgarian weapons being used by ethnic Albanian rebels in their conflict with the Macedonian government. [120]While there may not be a direct linkage between applications for NATO membership and these specific transfers, the potential for such destabilising transfers to take place is real enough and will need to be addressed. In particular, the MAP countries should be encouraged to destroy surplus stocks, or to agree to the conditions of the EU Code of Conduct in making such transfers. The United Kingdom and United States are well-placed to assert the necessary political pressure and to provide resources for destruction of surpluses, especially small arms and light weapons.

5.14 Some MAP countries also face difficulties with democracy and human rights. Corruption and instability still plague the Albanian government and reports of torture continue. [121]Macedonia has suffered from electoral fraud, and the Albanian minority endures unequal treatment in many sectors of society. [122]According to Human Rights Watch, beatings by police forces in Macedonia are "endemic".[123] Likewise, police abuse of the Roma minority in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia persist. [124]Because NATO is an organisation of high prestige and visibility, the United Kingdom and US Governments should ensure that such concerns are addressed during accession negotiations. The UK Parliament would be wise to ensure that they do, by scrutinising very closely the human rights and political situations of the MAP candidate countries as their leaders bid for NATO membership.

5.15 Finally, also on the issue of transparency, the UK Parliament and its Committees will have an important role to play. In particular, the Foreign Affairs Committee should regularly review developments in all the above three areas (peacekeeping, the US role in European security, and NATO expansion). In particular, the Committee should consult with experts and request hearings on how these developing issues will affect not only the UK-US special relationship, but also broader UK/EU security concerns. The rapidly changing security environment after the recent terrorist attacks on the United States, make UK parliamentary scrutiny on these and related topics all the more critical.

SECTION 6. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 The priorities of UK and US foreign policy have changed since 11 September. The most urgent priority is the military and humanitarian response in Afghanistan. As we indicated in Section 1, these two issues do not appear to be mutually reconcilable.

6.2 Prime Minister Blair stood firm as the strongest and most vocal supporter of US President Bush and his response to the events of 11 September. Both nations are refocusing their intelligence and security forces to counter terrorism, but they should not lose sight of the need for international cooperation and broader coalitions to address the causes of terrorism. UK and US foreign policy will undoubtedly continue to evolve over the coming months. International organisations have a vital role to play as events develop. The United Kingdom and the United States as central members of key international organisations and institutions should take a leading role in working towards developing and further strengthening multilateral conventions in a number of areas, including existing anti-terrorism conventions and other norms and standards which address terrorism in some form. Issues like extradition, use of military bases, liberalisation of arms transfers and security and intelligence cooperation should not be undertaken at the expense of human rights, international law and the UK Government's genuine progress in developing an "ethical dimension" within its foreign policy. These are some of the fundamentals that were often overridden during the Cold War, and (in the case of the US-UK arming of opposition groups in Afghanistan in the 1980s) a partial explanation of why we are now facing this current terrorist menace.

6.3 The UK Government should use every opportunity to encourage the Bush administration to reassess its foreign policy. Of late foreign policy analysts have commented that President Bush is appearing less isolationist in the aftermath of the events of 11 September. However, the coming months will more clearly show how US foreign policy is developing and whether the "coalition against terrorism" represents short-term expediency, or a genuine and progressive shift in policy. We hope it is the latter, but rather suspect it is the former.

6.4 The UK Government should make every effort to lead by example on a number of policy initiatives, as set out in this submission. In particular, the UK Government should work within international institutions to develop progressive policies on biological weapons, nuclear weapons, missile defence and other arms proliferation issues. The Government has done much in some of these areas in recent years (especially biological weapons and small arms control) to enhance effective international and stabilizing policies. It could and must do more, however.

6.5 It is vital that the international community continues to respond with one voice to the events of 11 September. The United Kingdom's special relationship with the United States becomes increasingly important in cementing international opinion. However, renewed emphasis will need to be placed on further developing and enhancing international conventions on terrorism and other international agreements (on arms control, good governance, human rights, the rule of law etc) that impact on the roots of terrorism.

Summary of Recommendations

The situation after 11 September and the war against terrorism

The United Kingdom has played a prominent role in the US response to the events of 11 September. It is right and proper that the United Kingdom should continue to do so. In so doing, however, the UK Government must act within the framework of international law and in the best interests of developing sustainable and long-term solutions to terrorism and other security threats (para 1.1).

The challenges of coordinating the fight against terrorism across North America, Europe and beyond are enormous. But any new measures will require careful examination, not least with regard to their potential impact on civil liberties and human rights, but also to evaluate their likely effectiveness in combating and preventing such threats (para 1.4).

Parliaments and civil society have a crucial role to play in monitoring the balance between effective security and law enforcement measures and civil rights, and in ensuring that appropriate transparency and accountability mechanisms and safeguards are developed alongside efforts to improve operational effectiveness in combating transnational terrorism (para 1.4).

The views of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the apparently sweeping provisions of the two UN Resolutions would be very welcome. In addition, the Committee may also wish to explore how the United States and United Kingdom might further involve the UN Security Council and the Secretary General in ensuring that this remains an internationally-endorsed operation and in developing a strategy for the long-term reconstruction of Afghanistan (para 1.7).

It is understandable that NATO sought to respond to this crisis. It is equally important to explore the roles of other international stakeholders in the war against terrorism (para 1.9).

The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan must be properly addressed as part of the long-term solution to the events of 11 September. The UK Government should take further steps to address this issue and encourage other countries to do so (para 1.12).

The international coalition against terrorism, and in particular the United Kingdom and United States, would be well served to make the humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan its primary focus (para 1.12).

If the primary objective is a humanitarian one, the most appropriate action would be to stop the military action as soon as possible and to take all necessary steps to ensure the survival of as many as six million Afghans during the five-month winter (para 1.12).

The US administration's plans for missile defence

The Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees should conduct a joint inquiry into the implications for UK defence and foreign policy of participating in a missile defence system, and the UK's emerging role within US NMD plans (para 2.21).

No further permission should be given for the use of RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill in the NMD program without a full parliamentary discussion and vote (para 2.21).

The Foreign Affairs Committee should scrutinise Britain's role in critical non-proliferation regimes and the extent to which that role might be enhanced (para 2.21).

Particular scrutiny of the UK's own adherence to the NPT's principles and its diligence in promoting ratification of the CTBT should be a priority for the Committee (para 2.21).

Members of Parliament should remain vigorous in their questioning of the Prime Minister and other relevant government ministers in order to ensure greater transparency and parliamentary oversight of Britain's developing role in NMD (para 2.21).

Biological Weapons

As a co-depository of the BTWC and close ally of the United States, the United Kingdom is well placed to encourage the US administration to reconsider its position on the draft BTWC Protocol. It is important that the United Kingdom do all it can to ensure that such a Protocol comes into being, and that the United States is persuaded to play a constructive role in shaping this process (para 3.11).

The BTWC States Parties will gather in Geneva from 19 November to 7 December 2001, for the fifth Review Conference. The United Kingdom should work towards progress on the following areas:

— Maintaining and vigorously enforcing the existing norm prohibiting possession of bio-weapons;

— Establishing an interim BTWC Oversight Committee and secretariat to promote adherence to the BW Convention and to aid implementation of the politically binding confidence building measures (CBMs) agreed at previous Review Conferences;

— In the long-term, developing an Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons (OPBW) similar to the OPCW for the Chemical Weapons Convention. This OPBW is a central component of the draft verification Protocol. However, in the short term the proposal for the Review Conference to mandate an Oversight Committee, supported by scientific and legal advisory panels and a small dedicated secretariat, should be strongly supported by the UK Government;

— Urging the continuation of the biological weapons verification Protocol negotiations; and

— Facilitating the initiation of a process to develop a legal framework to ensure that breaches of the BTWC by individuals or groups are treated as an international crime (para 3.12).

Controlling the weapons trade

Arms transfers to the Northern Alliance

— The UK Government should do all it can to ensure that the US administration or other governments in the coalition do not sanction the transfer of military, security or police equipment, weaponry or training to the Northern Alliance that is likely to be used to facilitate human rights abuses, endanger regional or national security or be at risk of diversion (para 4.3).

— Any potential arms transfers to the Northern Alliance should go through standard screening and oversight procedures, and should be subject to stringent end use certification and monitoring procedures (para 4.3).

— Stringent national and international controls should be put in place to ensure that no arms or military equipment is transferred to the Taliban or the Al'Qaeda network (para 4.3).

The possible use of landmines in Afghanistan.

— The UK Government should make every effort to ensure that landmines are not used at all in the joint US/UK operation in Afghanistan (para 4.7).

— The UK Government should also press the United States to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible (para 4.7).

US controls and potential transfers.

— The UK Government should raise concerns that recent legislation allowing arms transfers to Pakistan and granting military aid to Andean countries may have insufficient safeguards to ensure that arms, military equipment or training is transferred to human rights abusers. The UK should call for strengthening of US legislation to prevent such transfers (para 4.9).

National Controls: UK Export Control Bill.

In tightening its arms export control regime, the United Kingdom can usefully gain from US experience and best practice in a number of key areas:

— Registration of UK arms brokers and requiring licences for each arms brokering transaction; extension of controls to the activities of all UK passport-holders even if operating wholly on foreign soil (para 4.20);

— Introduction of legislation to control licensed production, with strict limits on the quantities of arms that can be produced under these contracts; prohibition of sales or transfers to third countries of either arms or licensed production technology, without the prior consent of the UK Government; adequate provision for monitoring such agreements (paras 4.21-24);

— Improved end use monitoring, with end use certificates taking the form of legally binding contracts; provisions for follow-up checks of end use to be carried out by qualified embassy staff in the recipient country (paras 4.25-28).

The danger that other countries with less progressive export control policies than the United Kingdom or indeed the United States will undercut these two countries and send arms in their place must be countered. The United Kingdom must play an active role nurturing effective arms control architecture through a number of regional fora, multi-lateral organisations and international control regimes. Convincing the United States to play an active part in these processes will be a key determinant in their success or failure (para 4.29).

The EU Code of Conduct and US Code.

— The 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers and the 1999 US International Arms Sales Code of Conduct Act must be further developed and widened (para 4.32).

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

— It is crucial that the UK and US Governments fully uphold the principles contained in the 2000 OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons and develop practical policies and programmes to implement them (para 4.35).

NATO

The UK Government should play an active role in ensuring that the NATO/EAPC small arms work programme is carried out in full, by facilitating the provision of resources and nurturing political will within the United States, the PfP states and the Alliance as a whole (para 4.40).

UN Firearms Protocol

The legally binding UN Protocol against the Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 31 May 2001. The UK Government should ratify this convention at the earliest possible opportunity, encourage ratification by the United States and others, and work to ensure that it is fully implemented (para 4.42).

UN 2001 Conference

The "Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects", held in New York from 9-20 July 2001, produced a Programme of Action (POA) for states to implement at the national, regional and international levels. It is now important that the United Kingdom and other EU Member States work to implement the POA. Furthermore, the UK Government can once again play an important role in facilitating the re-engagement of the United States in the multilateral follow up and implementation process. The United Kingdom, European Union and the United States can work together to combat the proliferation and misuse of small arms through capacity building; controlling arms brokers; developing a legally binding convention on marking and tracing; and supporting efforts to develop an international regulatory framework for controlling arms transfers (para 4.43).

Consider developing an international norm of prohibition of small arms transfers to non-state actors (para 4.43).

NATO expansion (both geographic and thematic)

The UK Parliament should play an active role in scrutinising peacekeeping and other "soft" security tasks; the development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP); and NATO enlargement (para 5.1).

The United Kingdom and United States should continue to play a strong role in the OSCE (para 5.2).

The UK Government should continue to provide peacekeeping troops, logistics and know-how in some of the more delicate crisis situations in Europe, especially the Balkans (para 5.5).

The UK Government should build on the considerable progress made in the European Union, OSCE, and United Nations in the area of civilian crisis management (para 5.6).

The UK Foreign Affairs Committee should explore the mix of support between the EU-OSCE nexus (and predominantly non-military conflict prevention and civilian crisis management strategies) and the NATO-EU nexus (and predominantly military defence strategies) to determine where the balance should lie (para 5.6).

Enhanced cooperation between the European Union, NATO, OSCE, Stability Pact and other conflict resolution and prevention mechanisms will be critical in the coming years, as will an enhanced and positive US role within them. The UK Parliament should work to ensure that this is done properly with regular hearings, increased parliamentary scrutiny. The UK Government should consult widely before committing additional resources to military options like the Rapid Reaction Force (para 5.10).

NATO expansion brings with it the threat of increased arms proliferation from aspirant countries upgrading their armed forces and exporting surplus stocks with little control or oversight. The MAP countries should be encouraged to destroy surplus stocks or abide by the conditions of the EU Code of Conduct in making such transfers. The United Kingdom and United States are well-placed to assert the necessary political pressure and to provide resources for destruction of surpluses, especially small arms and light weapons (para 5.13).

The UK and US Governments should ensure that concerns about human rights and good governance are addressed during NATO accession negotiations (para 5.15).

British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

October 2001

30 See, for example, "Rethinking Security", Chris Donnelly, NATO Review, Winter 2000-2001 Back

31 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) S/RES/1368 (2001) www.un.org/terrorism/sc.htm Back

32 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) S/RES/1373 (2001) http://www.un.org/terrorism/sc.htm Back

33 See, for example, the article by Michael Mandel, professor of law at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto, "Say what you want, but this war is illegal", The Globe and Mail, 9 October 2001; Geoffrey Robertson QC, "America is wrong to shoot first, then ask questions about guilt later", The Independent, 26 September 2001. Back

34 This argument was made by Peter Kellner, "UN's blank cheque for war on terrorism", Evening Standard, 15 October 2001. Back

35 Ibid Back

36 On 12 September 2001 NATO stated that if sufficient evidence was presented that the attack of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was carried out by a force from abroad then it would invoke Article 5. After evidence was presented at NATO Headquarters on 2 October 2001 NATO officially invoked Article 5. Back

37 NATO and the Scourge of Terrorism "What is Article 5?" www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm Back

38 Deployment of NATO forces. 9 October 2001. NATO Update. http://www.nato.int/terrorism/deployment.htm Back

39 Press Release, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Permanent Council, 11 October 2001. "55 OSCE participating States in support of US led actions against terrorism". Back