Annex A
Updated: 14 Nov 2001
AFGHANISTAN—RECOVERY: AN EMERGENCY
PLAN FOR THE FIRST 100 DAYS
RATIONALE
1. Routine development mechanisms are notoriously
slow in responding to rapidly changing, chaotic post-conflict
situations. A sudden and chaotic influx of a horde of international
agencies can overwhelm and confuse intended beneficiaries. At
the same time, there is an urgent need to demonstrate the dividends
of peace and stability to a traumatised population. Confidence
in the intentions, credibility and effectiveness of the international
community (particularly the UN) in Afghanistan will hinge on visible,
early successes that meet immediate needs at a local level, and
create the foundation for longer-term rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Recent advances by the Northern Alliance/United Front underline
the urgency of this task.
2. The international community's agreed
principles on Afghanistan's future emphasise strong support for
the efforts of the Afghan people to establish a new and transitional
government that should be broad-based, multi-ethnic and representative
of all the Afghan people, that would respect human rights and
Afghanistan's international obligations, and cooperate fully in
international efforts to facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian
assistance.
3. Until such an interim government and
administration is established (with the support of the United
Nations and in consultation with the Afghan people), the international
community should marshal its efforts and resources into achieving
tangible successes, wherever it has access, within an ambitious
time scale. Useful lessons have been learned from successes and
failures in Cambodia (UNTAC), Kosovo (UNMIK), East Timor (UNTAET)
and Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).
Assumptions
4. The following mixture of conditions,
assumed for planning purposes, remains valid. However, more information
has emerged in the light of recent developments:
— Uncertain political authority: the
Taliban have withdrawn from key strategic areas across the North
of the country, ceding military control to Northern Alliance/United
Front forces who may assume political roles until a transitional
government is established. Other areas may remain under Taliban
control; authority will be weak in many areas as allegiances shift.
— Variable security conditions: anarchy,
looting, violence intermittently or in pockets around the country—decreasing
as Afghan and/or international monitors, peacekeeping forces and
civilian police are deployed to provide a security/protection
umbrella. Security may improve, but will not be guaranteed: some
risk taking will be necessary.
— Continued serious humanitarian needs:
food, warmth (in winter), shelter, healthcare, water & sanitation.
— Devastated public infrastructure:
health facilities, schools, power, communications, transport etc.
— Population Movements: Large numbers
of displaced people returning home or moving about as security
conditions improve or fluctuate.
Objectives for the First 100 Days
5. A simultaneous start needs to be made
on the following key tasks:
— Providing interim security and protection
measures (perception will be as influential as reality)
— Re-establishing the presence of UN
regional coordination officers, field security officers and agency
staff, an integrated human rights presence and international NGOs
in safe areas inside Afghanistan
— Practical/logistic support to UN
Political Offices inside Afghanistan
— Expanding the delivery of emergency
humanitarian relief: food, shelter, basic health facilities, water
& sanitation, protection
— Resettlement of returning refugees
and displaced people as part of the effort to rebuild communities
— Conducting emergency repairs and,
where necessary, demining, to improve access by enabling unimpeded
use of strategic roads, passes, bridges and airfields
— Setting up electricity and water
supply in large towns, along with telecommunications and a national
radio
— Identifying qualified Afghans for
key administrative and public services
— (Re)opening basic education facilities
in main population centres
— Addressing the risks of mines and
unexploded ordnance: demarcation, awareness, priority clearance
— Provision of start-up funds for small
businesses (eg bakeries)
— (Voluntary) disarmament, demobilisation
and care of former combatants, particularly child-soldiers; collection
and control of ammunition (as a pragmatic measure, recognising
the unwillingness of many Afghans to part with their weapons,
the large numbers of cached weapons, and the relative ease of
re-supply of weapons as opposed to ammunition, which is less profitable
and more bulky)
— Initiating systematic assessment
of long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction needs, priorities
and sequencing. Sectors include: governance; security; economy
(transformation from a wartime to a peace economy, private investment,
development of oil and gas reserves, development of key financial
institutions); agriculture (appropriate seeds and tools, irrigation,
demining); transport; legal (particularly criminal justice and
land rights); media and civil society
Programming Principles
6. As the political and security context
for recovery and rehabilitation efforts is likely to remain highly
fluid, planning will have to remain flexible. The UK approach,
often in partnership with others, is guided by the following principles:
— Pragmatism/Opportunism: No preconceived
sequence: accept uncertainties and work wherever security conditions
enable access. Focused on what is achievable at any one time,
according to defined priorities and within an agreed Strategic
Framework (see below).
— Targeting: Vulnerable populations
(women, children, elderly, disabled), and the communities to which
displaced people are returning. While it may be more practical
to begin activities from major urban areas, programmes will need
to reach out to rural areas (where needs are most acute) as quickly
as possible (see below).
— Balance: Care should be taken not
to exacerbate tensions and instability by favouring certain groups
simply because they are more easily accessible or better organised
to capture or divert available resources. This will be an important
factor while only a limited number of areas are considered sufficiently
secure to re-establish an international presence. Over-concentration
of aid in, eg, Mazar-I-Sharif, could cause disruptive population
movements from surrounding rural areas. Mazar should instead be
regarded as a key initial supply base for expanded humanitarian
and recovery efforts across provinces and into the central highlands.
Similarly, Herat and Kabul would be regional hubs for servicing
their respective surrounding areas.
— Flexibility: Adapt methods to circumstances
in different areas—where field commanders are accepted as
de facto local authorities, seek ways to make them accountable
to local communities. Give them a stake in stability and a desire
for legitimacy. Establish and agree a workable framework of conditionality,
monitoring and accountability.
— Participation: Irrelevant interventions
can sometimes do more harm than good. Involve beneficiaries, including
women, in assessments, planning, implementation and monitoring.
Build on traditional solutions, support local initiatives.
— Local resources: Contribute to the
local economy, get value-for-money and achieve long-term effectiveness
by using skills, casual labour and goods from local communities.
Credit/grant mechanisms and safe transit will be essential. Support
nascent local community organisations and NGOs. Begin to establish
key institutions, invest in human resources through skills training
and carefully managed reintroduction of diaspora. NB: The UN and
INGOs will be the largest employers in Afghanistan, potentially
undermining the attempt to establish local institutions and a
government by offering better wages.
— Benefit Afghanistan's neighbours:
Where goods and services need to be procured, give preference
to neighbouring countries (Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, China) so that they see the benefits of developing
Afghanistan. Opium cultivation and trafficking will remain the
primary concern of many neighbouring states, but it will take
time to phase these activities out and support economic alternatives
on a regional basis.
— Integrated information strategy:
Keep local populations informed while managing expectations and
promoting stability. Experience suggests that a combination of
local-level meetings and local language radio is more effective
at spreading credible word-of-mouth reports of positive activities
than a `foreign' UN radio station. A strategy to communicate the
intentions and early activities of the international community
to the national, regional and international media will also be
required.
Planning, Implementation and Delivery Arrangements
7. An Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF),
comprising senior representatives of key UN Departments and Agencies,
has been set up at the UN Headquarters in New York. Working under
the supervision of UNSRSG Brahimi, a mirror of the IMTF (a 'Transition
Recovery Office') should be set up inside Afghanistan to be responsible
for field delivery. To help the IMTF, a Planning Task Group has
been established (DFID cofunded) at the New York University Center
on International Cooperation. The IMTF could produce a joint Strategic
Framework building on the above outline and existing data. This
would set out the detailed roles and responsibilities of international
actors, and a work programme. The IMTF is monitoring the rapid-response
readiness of the key UN agencies. For illustration, roles of UN
and other agencies (often in partnership with NGOs) could be as
follows:
— UNDP (United Nations Development
Programme)—Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery—working
closely with DPKO (Department for Peacekeeping Operations) and
DPA (Department for Political Affairs): civilian/military security
arrangements; resettlement and reintegration of displaced people
and former combatants; institution building; supervision of human
resources for municipal administration; administrative support
to interim government
— UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan
(as part of the Office of the UN Coordinator for Afghanistan):
mine/UXO awareness, demarcation and clearance
— WFP (World Food Programme): food
delivery and distribution; supplementary feeding centres in hospitals
and children's centres; common logistic services (transport, communications)
— UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees): continue to care for refugees in camps; protection;
monitoring of population movements; transport, logistics and community
resettlement of returnees
— FAQ (Food and Agriculture Organisation):
food security; agriculture rehabilitation
— UNICEF (United Nations Children's
Fund): delivery of emergency winterisation supplies; child protection;
primary education (with UNESCO); medical supplies and establishment
of clinics for primary and maternal healthcare (with WHO and UNFPA/Population
Fund); nutrition (with WFP)
— WHO (World Health Organisation):
disease control; public health; hospital day supplies; essential
medical supplies; training of health workers
— OCHA (Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs): information mapping system for all needs
assessments and agency/NGO activities
— QHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights): human rights and gender integration into all
recovery activities; begin consideration of the case for different
types of reconciliation/justice mechanisms
— UNCHS (Centre for Human Settlements
(Habitat)): housing, water and sanitation in urban areas
— IOM (International Organisation for
Migration—NB not a UN agency): repatriation of qualified
Afghan nationals; registration, assisted transportation and resettlement
of displaced people
— ICRC (International Committee of
the Red Cross): detainees; protection; provision of relief supplies
and support to health services
— INGOs (International Non-Governmental
Organisations): service delivery in all the above areas, acting
under the Strategic Framework
— EC (European Commission): financing;
use of Rapid Reaction Mechanism to support infrastructure repair,
demining, and local policing; humanitarian aid delivery (ECHO);
administrative support to interim government
— Bilateral Donors: flexible financing
and technical assistance to UN agencies, coordinated by the IMTF
(see below).
— International Financial Institutions:
financing and technical assistance to UN agencies and interim
government
— Coalition forces: strengthened civilian-military
coordination arrangements, including two-way information exchange
and low-profile logistical support to relief/recovery operations
if required
8. As indicated already, the credibility
and chances of success of the recovery effort in Afghanistan will
require the involvement and leadership of Afghans themselves.
Work is ongoing to identify skilled Afghans in the regional and
wider diaspora who are willing to return to work on reconstruction
and recovery. Through IOM, DFID/CHAD will support the linkage
of existing diaspora networks into the UN/IMTF Planning Task Group
and the creation of a system by which to match and place qualified
Afghan nationals into opportunities as they arise (where appropriate
skills are lacking locally).
Resourcing
9. Multiple bilateral funding arrangements
are inefficient and impose an unacceptable administrative burden
on implementing agencies. However, UN and World Bank Trust Fund
arrangements have also proved inefficient and slow (because of
bureaucratic requirements and restrictions imposed by agencies
and donors). East Timor and Kosovo taught that the concept of
a single `catch-all' trust fund, however appealing on paper, only
hampers efforts in practice. One possibility (to speed up financing
processes) would be for donors to check with a Resource Allocation
Unit in the IMTF on where pledges should be directed. Once agreed,
donors would disburse directly to the agencies concerned. Whichever
combination of interim financing arrangements is decided upon,
the emphasis should be on effectiveness and efficiency (eg by
agreeing a single framework for reporting and accountability with
all donors), and mechanisms should allow a straightforward transition
to long-term resourcing. NB Initially, the lack of established
institutions will limit the quantities of funding that can be
disbursed and absorbed.
10. Reporting and accounting arrangements
should be as simple as possible. Proactive outreach officers could
be tasked to help local NGOs and community groups access funds
to meet identified needs, and to assist monitoring and evaluation.
11. The IMTF running costs would be met
through the UN Regular or Peacekeeping Budget (depending on whether
a Peacekeeping Force is established). The costs of an effective
Recovery Plan will be high: provisional estimates suggest $400m
would be required if all the scheduled activities of the 100 day
plan are fully implemented (the IMTF will be conducting its own
estimate, drawing on further analysis, for example from the World
Bank and UNDP).
Next Steps
12. DFID will continue to support the efforts
of Ambassador Brahimi and the IMTF to develop and implement their
plans (through agencies) as effectively and efficiently as possible.
Key UN agencies are making arrangements for rapid re-deployment
of international staff and equipment, following rapidly conducted
security assessments. DFID has offered practical assistance—logistics,
personnel, cash—to help the UN to move quickly into Afghanistan.
13. To back up the UN, DFID is pre-positioning
a field support team of six humanitarian specialists, with communications
and logistics equipment, in Termez, Uzbekistan, to move forward
to Mazar-I-Sharif as soon as security conditions allow. This team
will conduct emergency assessments, ensure the expansion of humanitarian
aid delivery and direct the initiation of quick impact programmes
along the lines described above. They will also provide practical
support to key UN agencies such as OCHA as they are established.
14. As the international agencies re-establish
themselves, DFID will continue the rapid assessment and funding
of key agencies' proposed activities in accordance with relief
and recovery priorities.
Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Dept
UK Department for International Development
London
13 November2001
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