Examination of Witness (Questions 160-177)
DR ROSEMARY
HOLLIS
TUESDAY 26 FEBRUARY 2002
Mr Hamilton
160. Obviously the Middle East Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is a running sore and it is a source of extreme anger
to many people in the Arab and Muslim world. One of the many attempts
at a way of bringing both parties back to the peace table has
been the efforts of the French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine
on 9 February. One of the things he has tried to do is support
the Palestinian elections which he felt would uphold the Palestinian
Authority's popular legitimacy in its efforts to crack down on
extremists. His proposal is that there should be general elections
or perhaps even a vote for a legislative council and that that
would prepare for presidential elections once a Palestinian state
had been established. Obviously part of that would mean troops
on the Israeli side would have to withdraw to positions they held
before September 2000. In your opinion, could Palestinian elections
help to re-start a peace process or would they further radicalise
Palestinians? Do you think the proposals set out on 9 February
by the French Government are viable at all?
(Dr Hollis) Calling for elections has two useful purposes
even if they do not occur immediately. One is that it is a signal
to the Israelis that they are not in charge of choosing who the
Palestinian leadership is and that if they choose not to deal
with Yasser Arafat, then the international community should indicate
they will be ready to hold new elections. Then if he is re-voted
in, you have to deal with him. It is useful to head off any notion
that the other side in the conflict can determine who is acceptable
as the leadership of the Palestinians. Also it serves a purpose
in drawing attention to the fact that it would be very difficult
to have free and fair elections under the current circumstances
because of where the tanks are, because of the interruption in
Palestinian communications. The Palestinians themselves tell me
that they are fearful that the elections would not be free and
fair.
161. Why not? Is that because of the overwhelming
power of Yasser Arafat and his colleagues, or is that because
of the situation of occupation by the Israelis?
(Dr Hollis) Both. They anticipate that there would
be collusion. These are Palestinians who think that the Israeli
leadership under successive Labour governments colluded with Arafat
and his cohorts to do a peace deal which turned a blind eye to
corruption, in fact probably encouraged corruption in the Palestinian
Authority and expected of the Palestinian Authority that they
would exercise police powers on behalf of Israeli security. So
you have frustrations on the Palestinian side that they would
like to express in terms of being able to vote for representatives
who did not necessarily come from the Arafat camp. That does not
throw them all into the Hamas camp either. There is a new breed
of young leadership candidates who do not have this history of
engagement with the Israelis, who do possibly represent a threat
to the Israelis in that sense because they want to tough it out,
they want to fight it out, but who also represent a camp which
would settle for a two-state solution, which is not about the
elimination of Israel.
162. What do you think actually are the necessary
conditions for achieving the two-state solution in this conflict?
(Dr Hollis) I would suggest that there are those in
the Israeli community, as well as in the Palestinian community,
who would respond positively if Europe and the United States together
could put some flesh on the bones of Colin Powell's suggestion
that a two-state solution is required and that a viable Palestinian
state is necessary for peace, could flesh it out a bit more. They
could thereby invite those who would like peace on both sides
to galvanise around such an initiative but not to impose a solution.
I believe this could give a plank to those people frustrated with
their leaderships on both sides. Israelis tell me that if Sharon
ever got his seven days complete quiet, he would not know what
to do with it. For the time being he can prevent it ever getting
to that point by requiring something that it would seem that Arafat
cannot 100 per cent deliver. He can get close, but he cannot do
exactly what Sharon wants. Ideally one would entice populations
to find leaderships that would galvanise around a plan that would
represent a two-state solution.
163. Israel is a democratic society, a democratic
country. We have seen the recent peace rally in Tel Aviv—and
not before time really. Do you think that support for Sharon's
policies is waning? I know a recent opinion poll shows that. Is
the evidence of 15,000 Israelis gathering in Tel Aviv for this
peace rally and the revolts by the Israeli defence force soldiers
recently evidence that Sharon's path is the wrong path and that
there is a growing consensus inside Israel for the kind of two-state
solution we have discussed?
(Dr Hollis) The short answer is yes.
Mr Illsley
164. One of my questions follows on from that.
Are the refuseniks, the Israeli soldiers who refused to serve,
having an effect within Israel?
(Dr Hollis) I believe so. When it first came to light
I heard from a couple of Israelis that this happened during the
first intifada that reservists were refusing to do a second tour
of duty in the West Bank or Gaza because they did not like it
on moral grounds as well as practical grounds. That in itself
told me that this is something which gains momentum. It is when
they are called back for the second tour of duty, in other words
we have to wait this out; facing a third tour of duty even more
of them will refuse. The futility of suppression of the Palestinians
without a political vision becomes increasingly clear over time
and therefore this business of reservists being called back and
refusing to go reveals that stage by stage.
165. In the evidence you supplied you gave three
possible scenarios. One was a cease-fire, the second was years
of the status quo in terms of conflict carrying on until people
get fed up with the two leaderships and the third one was a complete
escalation to involve Jordan and perhaps other countries in a
much wider conflict. Which one of those three do you think is
the more likely, bearing in mind what you said about leaderships?
My own view is that Sharon is simply taking no notice of anyone
internationally and is simply carrying on with his own agenda.
I was interested when you said he would not know what to do with
a seven-day cease-fire and I probably would agree with that. Is
his ambition basically to destabilise Arafat to the point where
Arafat is just destabilised as leader and cannot continue?
(Dr Hollis) On the last point, I think he could never
be brought to talk peace with Arafat personally. Secondly, it
is not only worrying that he thinks he can determine who should
replace Arafat, but I believe he is misguided in thinking that
a replacement which has his blessing would have any street credibility.
Yes, he is caught up in trying to change the Palestinian leadership
as a tactical way out of the current situation, but I do not see
it delivering any particular hope for the ending of the conflict.
I really do not rate highly the chances of implementation of a
cease-fire along the lines of Tenet and then the recommendations
of Mitchell, and I think I made it clear in my written submission.
It is clear that if we hold out for that we could hang out for
a couple of years. In the meantime there probably will be a change
in the Palestinian leadership and maybe in the Israeli leadership
and not necessarily to the benefit of peace. It is a tossup between
a long and drawn out conflict when they exhaust themselves or
escalation. It teeters on the brink of both. Israelis have explained
to me that as far as they are concerned escalation would be the
re-occupation of Palestinian towns and these house-to-house searches
which some members of the Israeli Cabinet are calling for. Disarm
the Palestinians physically. My sense is that that actually does
not produce peace either. Another version of escalation: The worst
scenario for escalation being floated is that if there is a war
on Iraq, this is the moment for those who would like to transfer
members of the Palestinian population across the river to find
some way of doing that in the chaos. That is pretty far fetched.
166. Do you mean complete expulsion?
(Dr Hollis) A new refugee crisis on the Jordan river,
put it that way, which creates a crisis for Jordan, especially
if it is facing a campaign to change the regime in Baghdad. Jordan's
stability depends on having at least one stable neighbour out
of Israel and Iraq. If both of them are in turmoil, Jordan's stability
is increasingly fragile.
Mr Chidgey
167. Just to pick up on your point about definition
of escalation, could you give me your views on what you feel is
the actual agenda of Sharon in terms of a military solution as
you might see it or a military approach to the problem compared
to a political approach? Would you subscribe to the view that
Sharon's agenda might well be to reduce Palestine in its wider
sense to just a number of enclaves which could then be militarily
controlled and not really pursue at all any concept of two states
living in harmony or whatever?
(Dr Hollis) I have tried quite hard to visualise how
Sharon might see this thing panning out. He does concede a Palestinian
entity as part of a long-term solution, but that entity would
be very much smaller than the 1967 lines and it would be disarmed
and ideally the Israelis would still have some capacity to enter
on search and destroy missions, maybe justified in the name of
preventing car theft or something. No, that is putting it too
far. They would expect to co-operate with the Palestinian police
on that. But Sharon would reckon that the Palestinians can have
their own civil state but they cannot have a normal sovereign
state in the sense of having regular armed forces and capabilities.
As a result of this intifada he would probably say they cannot
even have firearms for the time being.
168. I should like to ask a number of questions,
if I may, just to expand on your comments about Europe and the
United States and their effectiveness in trying to establish some
peace process. Do you believe that the best prospect for making
peace in the Middle East is in fact a united line of assistance
between the EU and the US? Do you feel that is fundamental that
the EU and the US have to work together in presenting a possible
solution?
(Dr Hollis) Yes, but the EU could shoulder more of
the burden with the tacit support of the United States. It would
be no good to go directly up against the US. They do not want
to get heavily involved, they do not see any mileage in it, but
at least if Europe were prepared to get more involved, they would
need the US blessing as opposed to US opposition.
169. Do you see any prospect of such a joint
initiative?
(Dr Hollis) Maybe with this ruminated Saudi proposal.
The passage of time is producing a greater possibility of the
Europeans and the United States saying more about what a solution
would look like. We have been stuck for several months with everybody
just piling the pressure on Arafat and that route has run its
course and there is not much more to come from that source.
170. Looking at how the United States is reacting
or active within this scenario and how the EU is at the moment,
what impact do you feel there is on this prospect of a joint peace
initiative, the fact that the US is backing Israel politically
whilst the EU is to a degree funding Palestine? Are those mutually
exclusive or are they in fact compatible? Do you feel there is
some way that could be managed in pressure or encouragement or
whatever to both sides?
(Dr Hollis) Since it is so much the case, it is probably
better to try to find advantage in that division of labour than
to wish it were different. My sense is that actually with the
suicide bombings of 1 and 2 December US sympathy for the Israelis
was so profound that that was the moment at which they decided
that the Palestinian suicide bombers were part of the same enemy
that they were fighting themselves. Unless there is another episode
like that, the trend is towards the Americans feeling that Sharon
really does not have a plan and that however great their sympathy,
they are looking for more constructive leadership on the Israeli
side and with time I see that the trend is towards the United
States offering less uncritical support and perhaps more critical
support of the Israelis even if they do not say it very loudly
and openly.
Mr Maples
171. May I bring you back to Saudi Arabia and
Egypt because they seem to me to be the two key Arab countries
in the region? We and the United States are trapped into a policy
which we have often got trapped into of supporting pretty unattractive
regimes for fear of something worse. No doubt if you said to President
Mubarak or the leaders of Saudi Arabia that they should liberalise
more and have more democracy they would say "See what you
get. You get these fanatic extremists". It seems these people
in both those countries are tied into al-Qaeda, that most of the
muscle came from Saudi Arabia, the leader of the four pilots came
from Egypt, the leader of the Islamic Jihad in Egypt is bin Laden's
deputy, a lot of money comes from Saudi Arabia. It is in our interests,
it seems to me, to make sure that regimes evolve in these countries
which do not provoke this kind of extremism. You said yourself
that they really have nowhere else to go but the mosque in either
Saudi Arabia or in Egypt, they are politically disenfranchised,
Egypt is a failed state in terms of providing any standard of
living or work opportunities for its people and Saudi Arabia seems
to me to be going in the same direction. We were told by a witness
here that the GDP per head had halved or worse than that in Saudi
Arabia and job opportunities for young people are really non-existent.
Is there an alternative to propping up the two regimes that are
there? Is the only alternative that the religious extremists take
over or is there a channel—and I realise it would be a long
time frame—by which one could promote the gradual bringing
in of freedom of the press? For instance in Egypt the United States
have to put up with these diatribes in official Egyptian newspapers
against the United States, yet it is pouring billions of dollars
in to keep the regime alive. Is there an alternative to this?
Are there factions which one might call liberal or more enlightened,
who over a period of time one could encourage?
(Dr Hollis) We have left it a bit late. For what it
is worth, George Bush senior came up with a plan for the region
at the end of the Gulf War which if it had been followed could
have left us in a better state than we are now. It called for
a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of 242
and 338 and it was for ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction
and then seeing it re-integrated in the region. It was to do with
the US providing help from over the horizon for the local defences
but not doing it for them and imposing it on them. It was about
economic development and growth and boosting that. If that were
still the objective, if that set of objectives was still on the
table, plus consistency in the upholding of human rights and democratic
norms ... My perception is that the populations of most of the
Arab countries have no concept of the American values that the
Western world saw under attack on 11 September, no concept of
the benefits to be defended in defending America because they
have no experience of this, but it would constitute genuine revolution
if Western governments were now to reach over the heads of authoritarian
governments and say they are in favour of the human rights and
self-expression of the populations of these countries. That by
itself would do no good at all. It would alienate the governments
and it would not liberate the people unless all the other items
on the agenda, attributed to foreign intervention and in which
the West assumes having some responsibility, were addressed as
well.
172. Things you mentioned like the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
(Dr Hollis) Yes.
173. It seems to me that if you do start down
this path you have to start slowly. As you say, you cannot reach
over the heads of the regimes, but surely we have considerable
leverage, particularly the United States, definitely on Egypt
because it pays to keep the regime alive and I suppose in a way
that becomes a reverse leverage and then they threaten catastrophe
if you do not continue to keep them alive. Nevertheless the aid
the United States is pouring into Egypt must give the United States
considerable leverage with that regime. Saudi Arabia slightly
more difficult.
(Dr Hollis) As of 11 September the Egyptians said
"Told you so", "Could have told you so", "You
in London give safe haven to the kind of terrorists we are dealing
with now. We have always told you that you have to clamp down
and worry about terrorism". There is no meeting of minds
there. The Egyptians if anything would say that the lesson of
11 September is not that we need more democracy, it is that we
need to be tougher on terror.
174. You do not think this is a viable route
to try.
(Dr Hollis) Possibly the only way through this mire,
given that advocating democracy has a lot of mileage in theory
but in practice I do not see it happening, I think is via WTO
and economic restructuring. In other words, all the members of
the European Union as a key market for the Arab states should
offer as much help as possible in adaptation to the requirements
of WTO and trade liberalisation and greater transparency and accountability
within their domestic economic arrangements and hope that some
of that will free up some of the local population to exercise
their own rights as opposed to having it done for them from the
outside.
Mr Pope
175. We touched on the possibility, indeed the
likelihood of America engaging Iraq militarily with a view to
seeing the regime change. It seems incredibly likely to me that
will happen at some point this year. What effect do you think
that would have on neighbouring states? Is there any chance that
there is a credible alternative government for Iraq? It seems
to me that one of the advantages we had in Afghanistan was that
there was a ready-made government waiting to come in and there
does not seem to be an effective Iraqi opposition in Iraq for
obvious reasons, but even the exiled Iraqi opposition seems disorganised,
fragmented, incapable of running the country.
(Dr Hollis) Part of the problem we are facing now
is that there is a psychological war going on so it is difficult
to read the signals we are getting from the United States as to
what their intention is, because part of the plan is to pile on
the pressure on the Iraqi regime as is. I would imagine that they
would look for an alternative government from within the Iraqi
population as opposed to from any of the existing opposition groups
and that if they were to try to topple the regime they would be
seeking a way to invite those who already hold power at the mid
level to fill the vacuum, I would think. The attitude of Iraq's
neighbours is, certainly this is what the governments say, first
of all that you cannot attack Iraq because it is a sovereign state
and you have no basis on which to do it and it sets a very bad
precedent. If pressed, well supposing the Americans are going
to do it anyway, they say please do it quickly and painlessly.
They have not been asked the question "Supposing it takes
a year and it is extremely messy and it looks as if it is going
to go wrong before it goes right, how will you react then?".
They have not been asked that question. I suspect if they were
asked that question, they would say they would fear for their
own stability.
176. Do you think what the Americans are doing
in Afghanistan can change perceptions, not so much of America's
motives but what the outcome might be in Iraq? If the Afghanistan
adventure turns out to be a success and the new government is
clearly an improvement on what went before, it adds to regional
stability, it is delivering a better economic life for citizens
in Afghanistan, then neighbouring states might think that it has
worked in Afghanistan and they could see an improvement in Iraq
and this would be a good thing? Would what happens in Afghanistan
make any difference at all to perceptions of America in the region?
(Dr Hollis) So far the war in Afghanistan encouraged
the view that a lot can be done with existing US technology and
local support on the ground. I do not believe that the problems
with nation building, as the Americans call it, which are emerging
in Afghanistan are so far a deterrent for other actions in part
because I think they rely on the allies to do that job.
177. A simple question on Iran. There seems
to be a split between the European approach to Iran and the American
approach and interestingly this is a split in which the UK is
on the side of the Europeans for once rather than on the side
of the Americans. We seem to be wanting to engage with Iran and
encourage reform. President Bush has said clearly that it is part
of the axis of evil and the Americans point to the shipment of
arms which was intercepted. What difference has it made to the
balance of power in Iran? Are the reformers now in a worse position
since President Bush's axis of evil speech? Is there anything
we Europeans can do to assist the reformers in Iran or are they
now really on the back foot?
(Dr Hollis) Contrary to what the Americans expected,
that speech did actually play into the hands of the hardliners
in Iran and made it more difficult for the reformists. The Iranians
were tremendously helpful in the campaign with Afghanistan. It
is difficult to see how the US could contemplate a campaign in
Iraq with Iran totally hostile. Maybe there is an idea here that
they can be bullied into a more co-operative attitude, but I think
there is a complete misunderstanding of where the Iranians are
coming from. They are now beginning to feel they are surrounded
by the Americans. What the Europeans can do is very much as you
say, to keep the lines open and indicate that it would be most
unfortunate if the Iranians thought that everybody in the West
really did think that they were no better than the Iraqi regime.
That would be a disaster.
Chairman: You have covered a very wide canvas.
May I thank you very much on behalf of the Committee.
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