Memorandum from Philip Stephens
A CONCLUSION
1. HMG's role in the international coalition
against terrorism has been a diplomatic and political success.
The defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the destruction
of the al-Qaeda network in that country quite obviously serve
the UK's national interest. The Government has exercised measurable
influence in America's conduct of the campaign and helped mould
the wider European response. It has strengthened the transatlantic
alliance while exercising political leadership in Europe. The
UK acted quickly and decisively in support of the US and as a
consequence, to borrow a cliché, has punched significantly
above its weight. Its public solidarity with Washington allowed
HMG to reinforce the instincts of those in the Administration
who wanted a proportionate response and who recognised the importance
of distinguishing between Islamic terrorists and Islam itself.
2. But. This success in what has
been called the first phase of the campaign does not assure the
same outcome in subsequent stages. Afghanistan provided an immediate
and discrete focus for America's response to the events of September
11. Removal of the Taliban and defeat of al-Qaeda were objectives
around which a large number of governments could quite quickly
coalesce. Similarly, international action to clamp down on al-Qaeda
cells in Europe, to strengthen anti-terrorism laws and to tighten
financial controls against terrorist funds have been relatively
uncontroversial. The second and subsequent stages of the US campaign,
however, are less straightforward. George W Bush's State of the
Union address with its references to an "Axis of Evil"
has widened the scope of possible US military action. The effectiveness
in Afghanistan of high-precision and "smart" weaponry
and the limited number of US casualties has tilted the balance
in favour of conservative hawks in the Administration. In the
immediate aftermath of September 11, Mr Bush identified two threats
to US security, namely: terrorists with international reach and
the countries that harbour them. The State of the Union added
a third: hostile regimes such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea which
are developing weapons of mass destruction. While there is clearly
a common western interest in preventing proliferation of such
weapons, there is no consensus on how such countries can best
be restrained. The preference of some in the US Administration
for a military response—particularly against Iraq—will
clearly strain the international coalition. And there are evident
differences between the US and European approaches to Iran and
North Korea. It is not at all clear what influence HMG will have
in shaping these subsequent phases and whether, if the hawks in
Washington prevail, Britain can avoid a rift with either the US
or with its major European allies. The limits of British influence
have already been shown by the refusal of the US Administration
to adopt a more even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. While HMG has rightly emphasised the role of nation-building
and conflict resolution, America's victory in Afghanistan has
encouraged those in Washington who see the fight against terrorism
as essentially military.
3. The coming months will offer a formidable
test not just of UK diplomacy but of the cohesion of the international
coalition. US efforts to destroy al-Qaeda cells in Somalia, Yemen
and the Philippines may prove relatively uncontroversial. Military
action to remove Saddam Hussein would be deeply divisive and carry
great risks, military and political. The Prime Minister often
portrays the UK as a bridge across the Atlantic. That strength
of that bridge may well be severely tested in coming months.
PHASE ONE
4. The UK has had a pivotal role in the
international coalition against terrorism since the attacks on
New York and Washington on September 11. HMG has been seen in
Washington as America's closest ally and, in Europe, as the most
influential outside voice in the White House.
The military campaign against al-Qaeda and the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan was carried out overwhelmingly by
American forces. But British troops, notably the SAS, played a
significant part in the most dangerous ground fighting. The RAF
also has provided important in-flight refuelling for US aircraft.
The firing of British submarine cruise missiles early on in the
campaign was largely an act of political symbolism. British forces
at present comprise the most important element in the international
stabilisation force in Afghanistan. Several dozen senior office
and military planners from the UK are presently based at Centcom
in Florida, the headquarters of the US military campaign.
5. On the diplomatic front, the Prime Minister
has travelled extensively to build support for the coalition,
particularly among Islamic countries. He has attempted, with limited
success, to put the terrorist threat in the wider context of the
conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and, to greater
effect, to help stabilise relations between India and Pakistan.
The prime minister has used his influence in Washington to urge
a considered, cautious approach to a widening of the fight against
terrorism and to press the case for the broadest possible coalition
including the acceptance by the US Administration of military
contributions from other European states. Downing Street also
took a lead role in the establishment of the international media
campaign to explain and promote the aims of the coalition.
6. Much of the diplomacy has been at head
of Government level—a characteristic of modern international
relations. But in spite of the expansion of the cabinet office
and the Prime Minister's office in recent years, the infrastructure
for this diplomacy is still provided by the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office. The Foreign Secretary has also travelled extensively and
the FCO's role has been important in framing many of the international
agreements which represent the diplomatic response to September
11. At the United Nations, for example, HMG took the lead in the
passage on September 28 of Resolution 1373. This was a ground-breaking
initiative that imposed obligations on all member states to suppress
terrorist financing and deny terrorists safe havens. HMG's representative
in New York, Jeremy Greenstock, chairs the Counter Terrorism Committee
set up to implement the resolution. The FCO was similarly at the
forefront of efforts to frame Resolution 1378 which provided for
international recognition of the interim government of Hamid Karzai.
Nato's decision on October 2 to invoke Article 5 of its founding
charter in support of the US was in part at least a response to
UK diplomacy. Within the European Union, the UK gave strong backing
to measures to tighten anti-terrorist measures, including the
agreement on a common arrest warrant. HMG was the strongest advocate
of the establishment of a military stabilisation force in Afghanistan
following the fall of the Taliban. British troops provided the
backbone of that force.
7. The critical pressure on Pakistan to
withdraw its support from the Taliban and al-Qaeda came from the
US Administration. But HMG has been active in reinforcing the
subsequent rehabilitation of the Musharraf government and in helping
to ease tensions with India over Kashmir. The relationship with
Saudi Arabia has been more difficult to manage, in spite of a
visit by the Prime Minister. Similarly, the refusal by the Iranian
government to accept a new British ambassador in Teheran has undercut
efforts to engage the administration of President Khatami. The
inclusion of Iran in the axis of evil reflects a view in Washington
that the hard-liners led by Ayatollah Khomeini control the military
and security apparatus of the Iranian state—a view reinforced
by Israel's interception of a large shipment of Iranian arms destined
for the Palestinians.
On the other hand, both the Prime Minister and
the foreign secretary took an active part in encouraging Russia's
Vladimir Putin to see the aftermath of September as an opportunity
to join the mainstream of western policymaking. Elsewhere, the
US administration was initially reluctant to involve the Group
of Eight in the international counter-terrorism effort but at
the UK instigation's it has broadened the remit of its Financial
Action Task Force to include action to halt the flow of terrorist
funding.
8. Beneath the public solidarity there have
been occasional semi-public differences between HMG and the US
Administration. Washington was initially reluctant to accept military
contributions, albeit token, from other European nations and some
in the Pentagon are said to have opposed even a UK contribution.
American experience during the Kosovo campaign, a Nato operation,
has persuaded the Pentagon that it must retain absolute control
and command of military operations in which it is taking the lead.
On the UK side there has been occasional frustration with the
extent to which the White House passed control of the Afghanistan
campaign to its military commanders, at the expense sometimes
of the wider political picture. Donald Rumsfeld and General Franks
were the principal opponents of the establishment of the international
stabilisation force and for a time the White House was reluctant
to over-rule them. This division of responsibilities may be part
of a continuing reaction to the Vietnam War, when micro-management
of the US military by politicians was widely seen to be seriously
damaging. More broadly, HMG has had to steer a path between the
rivalries in the US Administration, notably between the Rumsfeld-led
hawks and the more cautious State Department under Colin Powell.
But in so far as it is possible to see from the outside, these
occasional hiccups have not disturbed the strong relationship
between Mr Blair and Mr Bush. The Prime Minister is expected to
meet again with the president in the spring.
COMPETING PHILOSOPHIES
9. Behind this evidently strong relationship,
however, there are clear differences of emphasis in respect of
the shape of what all agree will be a lengthy campaign to defeat
international terrorism. While HMG has stressed that military
action can be only one element in a broad-based effort including
new international aid strategies and a commitment to help rebuild
"failed" states, the tendency in Washington has been
to focus on the military response. As one senior member of HMG
has remarked, aid and nation-building are not words that strike
chords in Washington.
10. Mr Blair set out his approach in his
address to the Labour party conference last September and in subsequent
speeches, including at the Lord Mayor's Banquet in November. The
starting point is that the events of September 11 showed us the
dark side of globalisation: the interconnectedness that has swept
away barriers to trade, investment and technological progress
has also torn down the frontiers that once protected the west
from the consequences of chaos elsewhere. Failed states, poverty,
and military conflict are the breeding ground for international
terrorism. Mr Blair's doctrine says that a moral imperative to
act in support of the less fortunate is now matched by the practical
need to secure the west's security. September 11 ushered in one
of those rare periods in history when principles and realpolitik
sit in happy coincidence. Past wars had been fought over frontiers.
The fight against terrorism is about values.
11. The corollary of this approach is that
the defeat of terrorism requires a cohesive alliance between the
US and other liberal democracies. In the words of Chris Patten,
the former Conservative Party chairman and present EU Commissioner
for External Affairs, American leadership should be exercised
in partnership. Military victories over terrorism should be combined
with an international effort to tackle the chaos and poverty in
which terrorism thrives.
There are few echoes of this in Washington—even
though Mr Powell's State Department has consistently emphasised
the importance of the international coalition. For understandable
reasons—the shock of September 11 and the fear engendered
by the anthrax episode—the US focus is on what it perceives
as immediate threats and the instinct is to reply with military
force. There is no obvious appetite for the more arduous and inevitably
less immediate task of nation-building. As for the coalition,
Donald Rumsfeld has summed up the prevailing approach within the
Administration: the mission should determine the coalition, not
vice-versa.
12. HMG says that for the moment it is relaxed
with the present US stance, though there is visible irritation
with the refusal to take a more proactive role in encouraging
the resumption of peace talks in the Middle East. The UK government
shares the ambition of a regime change in Iraq. Any debate will
be about means. Mr Blair has noted the contrast between some of
the bellicose rhetoric of hard-line Conservatives in Washington
and the calculated, cautious approach taken by Mr Bush during
the Afghanistan campaign. The identification of Iran, North Korea
and Iraq as part of an axis of evil has not been followed by specific
military threats. Colin Powell has said that the Administration
is examining all options. And there are some powerful voices arguing
for pre-emptive military action against Iraq. But Mr Bush has
yet to weigh the risks of what would be a hazardous campaign involving
very large numbers of US troops as well as a rift with many of
America's allies. The undoubted unilateralist instincts now visible
in Washington do not yet betoken a serious breach with Europe.
Here, though, there is a certain emphasis on the word "yet".
ANOTHER CONCLUSION
13. It would be a mistake for Britain in
particular and Europe more generally to underestimate the extent
to which September 11 has changed the political climate in the
US. In many respects it marks the passing of the post-Vietnam
era—a long period following the fall of Saigon during which
the US was extremely loathe to risk its GIs in military entanglements
abroad. When it did so, as in the Gulf War, it was on the basis
that advanced technology and overwhelming force would minimise
US casualties. The perceived threat to the US from terrorism—and
from terrorists armed in the future with weapons of mass destruction—has
changed that calculation. Political and public opinion is far
more willing now to contemplate the deployment of US military
force—and the concomitant risk of casualties. The State
of the Union address made it clear that so-called "rogue"
states known to be developing nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons are now seen a major threat to the US homeland and, as
such, possible targets for military action. Key figures in the
Administration are content for such action to be taken unilaterally.
14. This change demands that America's European
friends take proliferation of weapons of mass destruction far
more seriously and work with the US to intensify the diplomatic
and economic pressure on those responsible. As far as Iraq is
concerned, a military campaign against the present regime would
be fraught with danger —the more so for as long as the US
is seen as supporting the hard-line stance of the present government
in Israel. But if Europe, and indeed the UK, are to persuade the
US to forestall, it must also be able to demonstrate that America's
security is best served by concerted action by the international
coalition: that for all its status as the single superpower, America
needs allies. There will be an important role here for HMG both
in persuading the US to continue to act with caution and proportionality
and in reminding other European governments that it is not enough
to carp about American unilateralism.
Philip Stephens
February 2002
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