APPENDIX 3
Memorandum from the Afghanistan Studies
Forum
AFGHANISTAN: HOPES AND CHALLENGES
I. HOPES
The Afghans welcomed the outcome of the Bonn
Conference as a first step, in spite of some serious reservations,
as they believe every political process has to start from somewhere.
There was another reason for such optimism, as the UN might have
been given power to find a just and comprehensive solution to
the Afghan problem, keeping in mind that this organisation did
not play any constructive role in the past 10 years in the cause
of Afghanistan. Due to the circumstances the Afghans expect the
UN and the US in particular to help them in the following:
(a) Security
The long imposed bloody war resulted in the
looting of property, honour and life of most of the Afghans. They
desperately need security in their country to resume their normal
lives. Moreover, many of them were forced to leave their homes
and are dispersed all over the world. They also need conditions
in the country to be conducive for their return and to live there
without fear of another war. They need the warlords to be disarmed
and wish to see Law rule the country. Neither can a government
function effectively nor reconstruct a country if there is no
security.
(b) Representative government
In the last 23 years the Afghans did not have
any chance to choose their leaders or have any say in who should
rule them. Leaders were imposed upon them one after another. They
and their families suffered a great deal in each change of power.
Now, the Afghans expect the international community to help them
in establishing a system through which they can choose their government
and see a peaceful transformation of power.
(c) Reconstruction
Nearly all of the infrastructure in the country
have been destroyed. People have little choice for their survival
other than to join warlords or cultivate poppies. If the international
community wants to see the cultivation of poppies eliminated and
Afghans not seeking a life in fighting, nor to see Afghanistan
a safe haven for extremists/terrorists anymore, then the Afghans
must be given opportunity to engage in the reconstruction of their
country.
II. CHALLENGES
The UN convened the Bonn meeting on Afghanistan
without proper preparation and contrary to all its previous stand
of a broad based government for Afghanistan. For two decades the
UN cried for a broad based government in Afghanistan and criticised
the Taliban and Rabbani governments for not having such a government.
Astonishingly, when given the opportunity in Bonn, the UN did
worse than the Taliban and Rabbani did. The Bonn conference was
composed of four groups. The question as to why only four groups
were invited there remains unanswered. It is more probable that
the UN might have invited these four groups to represent the interests
of the neighbours of Afghanistan, as the UN was used to so doing
in the past two decades. All four groups were actually moving
around two axis; the Northern Alliance and Rome. The Northern
Alliance had much more weight since majority members of the Rome
group were also pro-NA.
A major shortcoming of the conference, which
will have long standing negative implications, was virtually no
representation of the Pashtuns who constitute a majority of the
Afghan population. In Bonn, the Northern Alliance was headed by
Younus Qanuni; the Cyprus group by Humayon Jareer; the Rome group
by Sattar Sirat and the forth group led by Hamid Gailani. None
of these are Pashtun; in addition the first two are of Tajik ethnicity,
even coming from the same village. Furthermore, out of 28 members
of the conference, only seven were Pashtuns. All major positions
such as the ministries for defence, foreign affairs, interior
affairs, security, press and culture, education, planning reconstruction,
trade, agriculture, etc went to the Northern Alliance and/or its
supporters. Six important ministries, including the ministries
of defence, foreign affairs, interior affairs and security were
all given to people of one party and within the party to one district,
namely Panjsher. The Afghans do not want their country to be another
Lebanon and thus strongly reject the distribution of governmental
positions on the basis of ethnicity and ask that the right people
are given the right jobs. It was always the Northern Alliance
who protested for the rights of ethnic minorities and therefore
one would expect them to respect the rights of others too.
The Rome group was invited to the Bonn conference
on the assumption that the former King of Pashtun descent would
represent the Pashtun majority, while the NA claimed to be representing
the minorities. By inviting the Rome group, the UN might have
wanted to balance the ethnic composition of Afghan society. Ironically,
the former King by sending pro-NA non-Pashtuns to the conference
not only actively supported the Northern Alliance but also misrepresented
the Pashtuns. Thus, the Northern Alliance was given more weight
as the Pashtun majority was deprived from their due representation.
The Afghans expected the UN envoy, Mr Ibrahimi, to correct this
imbalance but instead, while acknowledging these weaknesses he
turned a blind eye to it. When asked by the BBC correspondent
in Tokyo why so many important key government positions had been
given to people from one village, Dr Abdullah, Foreign Minister
who himself belong to that group, replied: "yes, there are
many such shortcomings that needed correction. We are new to the
job and need time to correct them". In spite of the above
shortcomings the majority of Afghans accepted the Bonn accord
as an emergency step bearing hope that these weaknesses will be
corrected in due course. Their main concern is:
(a) Security
The Bonn conference brought to power the well-known
warlords and criminal gangs whose human rights abuse records are
known to the UN and all concerned international human rights organisations.
Most of these warlords were to be tried in the International Court
of Justice for their crimes against humanity. However, the Afghans
accepted the Bonn accord hoping it will serve as medicine for
an ill Afghanistan, though it appears more apparently poison.
It was decided in Bonn that the new administration will disarm
the warlords and set up an Afghan army. The UN force was assigned
to replace the warlords and enforce security in Kabul and big
cities till the Afghan army comes into being. It will restore
the credibility of the Interim Government, allow millions of Afghan
refugees to return home and will encourage the technocrats living
abroad to go to Afghanistan for reconstruction. The overwhelming
majority of Afghan people supported the UN force for this very
purpose. Neither security nor refugees will return to Afghanistan
and no major reconstruction programmes will take place if warlords
control the country. Unfortunately, not only have the warlords
not been replaced by the UN force in Kabul and other cities, but
they are consolidating their positions. The Northern Alliance
is still responsible for the security of Kabul while the UN force
on their side acts in a junior role. The NA, with UN support,
may soon expand its control over the areas outside Kabul. Also,
it is evident that even a group within the NA is working to disarm
the whole nation under the name of the "the formation of
the Afghan army" and will channel all other groups according
to its own long-term agenda. Certainly, other warlords such as
Dostum, Kayan, Ismail, Qadeer, Gul Agha, etc will stand against
such designs and thus security will not return to Afghanistan.
Consistent reports are coming out from many
parts of Afghanistan that the country is rapidly devolving into
the factionalism and warlordism that gripped the country during
1992-96. Repeated factional fighting in Baghlan, Kunduz, Ghazni,
Paktya and Kandahar are sketchy. In addition, thousands of Pashtun
families have been forced to leave their homes in Ser-i-Pul, Jozjan,
Faryab and Herat provinces as part of the ethnic cleansing. It
is another serious problem for the US and the UN. The Governor
of Kandahar, Gul Agha, and other people in southwest Afghanistan
have repeatedly claimed that Ismail of Herat has forced thousands
of Pashtun families to leave their homes in order to, first, suppress
the remaining Pashtuns and, second, open a corridor for Iran between
the Iranian border and Sheite Hazarajat. Ismail is also alleged
to have distributed a large amount of money and weapons received
from Iran, in western provinces to move against the US presence
in Afghanistan and to destabilise the Karzai government. The mulas
(priests) in Herat mosques have been told to preach that the Americans
are infidels who have invaded Afghanistan and provide slogans
against the US such as the Iranians, "death to America",
"the USA is the Devil". The local chiefs are fighting
in Gardez to oust the Kabul appointed governor, Bacha Khan Zadran.
In Kunduz there is a bitter fight between the forces of the Defence
Minister (Fahim) and his Deputy (Dostum) over the control of Kala-i-Zal.
Similarly, in Baghlan, there is an armed tension between Sayed
Kayan, a cabinet minister and Defence Minister forces. In Laghman,
the local chiefs warned the Kabul authorities not to interfere
in their provincial affairs. The same is true in Kunar. Most of
these occurred at the same time that the international donor states
met in Tokyo to put together an aid package for Afghanistan.
Security, law and order are being broken apart
in Afghanistan by the very components of the government, faster
than the new government is coming together. It is becoming increasingly
unlikely that leaders in Kabul will be able to establish a promised
degree of authority in the country. This puts extended reconstruction
plans at risk and will encourage the industrialised world to step
away from its involvement in Afghanistan, especially, if a hot
spot is found in another part of the world. Those groups that
are represented in the new Interim Government attempt to keep
a lid on factional and ethnic infighting only long enough to receive
Western aid. Neither has any affection for each other, but all
are likely to realise the benefits of keeping open warfare to
a minimum in the coming months in order to squeeze more financial
assistance out of the international community. They also know
that international donors will tolerate a low level of violence
between these warlords. But outright warfare will quickly turn
off the financial taps. Once it appears that the international
aid well has finally run dry, these warlords who are currently
pillars of the government will fall back into their old habits.
Though the current clashes between warlords may seem relatively
unimportant in regard to Afghanistan's future, the cast of characters
in the fight and the powers across the borders that support these
warlords highlight important trends in the country's politics
as well as regional and global rivalries.
Not only are all these factions who have made
the Interim Government enemies amongst each other but also there
are bitter rivalries within each group. As an example, the group
that with help of the US was given control of 80 per cent of the
government is bitterly divided within itself. Mr Rabbani, head
of this group and his close supporters, Daoud, Ismail and Sayyaf
are opponents of Fahim, Qanoni and Abdullah. Rabbani held the
Northern Alliance presidency for most of the last decade but was
rather unceremoniously dumped when a new regime was installed
by the US after the Taliban's collapse. Rabbani and others in
his party and those outside the party who are either not included
in the new government or did not receive what they wanted have
a vested interest in making the Interim Government look as inept
as possible. Still using the Presidential palace (8 February 2002),
Mr Rabbani has appointed thousands of his supporters so far in
different ministries after he left his office into Karzai while
putting under his signature the date prior to 22 December 2001.
In addition to Russian support, Iran already supported the Sheite
Hezb-i-Wahdat and Rabbani group in kind and cash to destabilise
the Kabul administration and prepare for hit-and-run warfare against
the Americans in future. As such, sowing dissent between the ethnic
groups and spreading insecurity in the country may slow down the
influx of aid, rendering the new government ineffective and allowing
Rabbani to return to power.
The Russians still consider Afghanistan in the
sphere of her influence and wishes the Americans to acknowledge
this. Recently, the Russians went to Afghanistan without even
an apology for their invasion of Afghanistan nor an offer to pay
compensation. They came to Afghanistan without permission from
Afghans and before the Afghan blood that was shed by them has
dried up. The Russians have strong allies in the region such as
Iran, India and Central Asian states. The Central Asian states
may not like the Russians wholeheartedly but since their leaders
at home are former communists and brutal dictators they cannot
survive without Russian collaboration. They need Russia for many
reasons. As in the nineteenth century, the Russians again cannot
go forward towards the west in Europe but can push towards east
and south without major obstacles. The US is busy in its military
campaign against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and has left the security
and political sides of the problem to the UN who never knew where
to go. If the situation continues, the Russo-Indo-Iranian camp
will gain more ground gradually in Afghanistan when compared to
the Western coalition.
Afghanistan is already on the road to the dark
era of 1992-96 in spite of the optimistic speeches, promises and
frequent visits to Kabul by Western leaders; as the reality on
the ground is no promising peace and no real government in Afghanistan.
The strong appeal of Mr Karzai time and again for more UN force
in Afghanistan proves there is a serious security problem in the
country. Poor Afghans are hopeful that the UN/US may take bold
steps to bring peace and security to their war torn country and
may pave the way for a representative government.
(b) Representative government
Currently all key government positions are at
the hands of the warlords of the Northern Alliance; Karzai has
little or no power, except the expected UN money. NA warlords
could monopolise the situation and they are in a position to force
Mr Karzai to do what they like. Currently, they pressurise Karzai
to appoint their supporters to important positions in the ministries
and government institutions, especially the army and police. They
will certainly pressurise him to channel the UN funds to them.
Karzai will abide by what he is asked since he has no military
power on the ground to give him strength. The rejection of his
appointments in Kabul and the provinces is a clear indication
of how powerful he really is. However, he has to try to show he
is successful in his job and has control over affairs, though
unrealistic, and will try his best to convince the donors to be
patient and release their funds.
As we said earlier there is neither security
nor properly functioning government institutions. However, the
people have accepted these brutal conditions hoping they will
return to normal gradually. They are waiting for the coming Loya
Jirga, to represent hopefully all segments of Afghan society.
They further hope the coming Loya Jirga will appoint a broad based
government which in turn will draft a fair constitution to pave
the way for a better and democratic Afghanistan. By this, they
expect stability to return to Afghanistan and Afghans will be
allowed to follow a normal life. But their hopes vanished when
Karzai announced on 25 January 2002 the 21 member committee responsible
for the calling of the Loya Jirga; nearly all of them supporters
of the Northern Alliance and most of them had close co-operation
with Russians during their occupation of Afghanistan. He announced
that the list was made only by the UN and he had no input in it
at all. The list is unrepresentative, biased and worse than that
which happened in Bonn. Of course, its outcome is predictable,
a bleak future for Afghanistan. It is evident from the list that
the future Interim Government is a continuation of the present
administration and will draft a constitution for Afghanistan as
it wishes to shape the future of the country for generations to
come. It seems either the UN has no capability of finding a just
solution to the Afghan problem to give Afghans a normal life or
is being dictated to. Otherwise, there is no reason to believe
why major errors have to be repeated and why the way for a representative
government should be intentionally blocked. Everybody asks why
the Bonn accord is repeatedly violated by the UN? Serving the
interests of the regional powers, it seems the UN is trying hard
to give legitimacy to the warlords to rule the country for ever
and forces the Afghans to live the way these gangs and war criminals
see fit for them. It seems in the eyes of the UN that the hope
of the Afghans for having a representative government is simply
unrealistic.
On a regional level, the present situation in
Afghanistan, created by the UN, serves mainly the interests of
the neighbours of Afghanistan such as Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Turkey, India and Russia, with the exception of Pakistan—even
through Pakistan joined the US coalition against Afghanistan and
offered its soil and intelligence to topple its allies, the Taliban.
Pakistan joined the US in attacking Afghanistan but closed its
borders to their fellow Muslims and neighbouring Afghans that
were made refugees by the attack. In spite of all these concessions
offered to the US, Pakistan is marginalized in Afghanistan. Meanwhile,
Iran, which is not part of the coalition and has always considered
the USA as "the devil", and has allegedly kept Al-Qaeda
leaders got a much bigger say in Afghan affairs. No doubt, the
present administration in Kabul is a bitter enemy of Pakistan.
If the UN continues its present policy of reluctance towards the
formation of a broad based/representative government in Afghanistan
that will have good relations with all neighbours, including Pakistan,
then, Pakistan in order to end its position of being a sandwich
between enemies (India and Afghanistan) may come to terms with
those who oppose the US presence in the region. Once the US leave
the area, Afghanistan will again be left to its greedy neighbours.
Here, Pakistan has the power to bargain as she did in the mid-1990s.
If the UN does not adopt a constructive policy towards Afghanistan
soon, by correcting its mistakes in the Bonn conference and the
committee for Loya Jirga, then Afghanistan will again become a
breeding ground for regional rivalries and security will not return
to this country for long. The country will again become a safe
haven for terrorists and a centre of opium production.
(c) Reconstruction
If the warlords are in power for long and there
is no representative government in the near future to bring peace
and stability to the nation and give clear account to the donors,
then, the industrial countries who wish to assist Afghanistan
will lose interest.
The donors must not be considered as milking
cows for warlords and cannot pay the money of their tax payers
to fatten the gangs. They will be reluctant to feed these warlords
for long and make them stronger and to further abuse of human
rights. Sentiments cannot rule forever and political priorities
often change. Afghanistan will not remain a priority forever.
The warlords dismissed nearly all government personnel of the
Taliban era accused of being pro-Taliban and filled the vacancies
with their supporters. Furthermore, they recruited as many personnel
as they could without any need and job description, just to increase
their supporters. There is big competition in recruitment among
ministers. Not only do most of these personnel not have any work
to do but also they are very harmful to the running of a healthy
administration. Why and for how long will the donors feed these
parasites? The sooner these circumstances change the better. The
circumstances can be changed only when there is peace and peace
can only come if there is a broad based/representative government.
Such a government can launch reconstruction programmes successfully,
can attract all those who are currently engaged in fighting under
the command of the various warlords and also activate those who
are sitting idle in government institutions.
If peace and security do not return to Afghanistan
and there is no opportunity for Afghans to work in the reconstruction
of their country, then, they will have no alternative other than
to continue working with warlords. Carrying a gun gives them and
their families a kind of security in war conditions and is a source
of income. Moreover, the more there is no security nor a popular
government the more Afghanistan will be a safe haven for extremists.
Afghans are not extremists by nature and hate terrorism. They
never resorted to terrorism in history. Every Afghan government
since 1992 pleaded the international community to help in the
reconstruction of Afghanistan. They argued that the creation of
jobs would divert Afghan youths from war to a normal and peaceful
life. But the international community did not respond. Similarly,
in the last 10 years Afghans did not receive any international
assistance for the rehabilitation of agriculture and livestock
in Afghanistan. Irrigation systems were destroyed and there were
little regular water supplies to cultivate traditional crops such
as wheat, corn, rice or cotton. The farmers and their families
had to survive with decreasing amounts of water. The poppy is
the only crop that brings money and needs little water. It can
be grown in semi-arid lands and hill-foots without modern irrigation
systems or technology given a little rainfall (three to five times
a year) is available. The Afghans do not like the poppy; it is
bad from the Islamic point of view and has little home consumption.
But they have had no other alternative for their survival. They
pleaded for years for the world community to help them in abandoning
this crop but had no positive response. Finally, the world community
has come to realise these important points and is willing to assist
but unfortunately the UN does not know how to fulfil this world
desire. The way the UN is working in Afghanistan is against the
wishes of the Afghans and the international community. Its illusive
stand confused the need for a broad based government and a more
representative administration, that can insure security and reconstruction
programmes in the country. Many ask why the UN is doing this?
This is the duty of all of us to work together to exploit to the
utmost the present favourable international conditions as early
as possible to pave the way for a broad based/representative government
in Afghanistan. It is good for Afghans, good for their neighbours
and good for the international community.
Afghanistan Studies Forum
February 2002
|
