Memorandum from Dr William Hale, School
of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
1. Turkey is important in Britain's external
relations mainly because of its size and its geo-strategic position
at the cross-roads between south-east Europe, the Black Sea, Transcaucasia
and the Middle East. Turkish agreement, and if possible active
co-operation, is a significant element for western policy in all
these regions. Through its membership of NATO, Turkey is the only
Muslim country in a formal military alliance with Britain and
the other western powers. Although its democratic credentials
are far from perfect, it is also a rare example of a Muslim nation
which has made a determined and sustained attempt to establish
and maintain a secular democracy. Apart from its geographical
position and the availability of vital bases and listening posts
on its soil, it is a significant military asset to NATO, as it
has the second largest army in the alliance and its forces are
now relatively well equipped with modern weapons. It is a co-guarantor,
with Britain and Greece, of the Cyprus settlement of 1960. Like
Britain, it participates in peace-keeping operations in Bosnia
and Kosovo, and can be expected to do so in Afghanistan. Its economy
has been chronically badly managed by successive governments,
and went through a severe crisis in 2001, but its GDP is still
around $200 billion at current exchange rates, with a population
of around 67 million. Its imports from Britain in 2000 (the last
year for which full data are available) were worth $2.7 billion
(£1.8 billion), and its exports to Britain $2.0 billion (£1.3
billion).
2. Since Turkey is a member of NATO and
the Council of Europe, and is ranked as a candidate for eventual
accession to the EU, it is hard to distinguish Britain's bilateral
relations with Turkey from these multilateral relationships, which
cover most of the important points at issue between the two countries.
In effect, Britain has to conduct its relationship with Turkey
in co-ordination with these organisations. In spite of some points
of friction, Turkey and Britain are fairly close on most major
issues of international policy. Britain has generally supported
Turkey's bid to become a full member of the EU eventually, provided
it meets the Copenhagen criteria. The two countries are generally
Atlanticist on defence and security questions, since both have
a close and generally co-operative relationship with the US.
3. Although the events of 11 September and
their aftermath have not necessarily enhanced Turkey's geo-strategic
importance, they have certainly increased international recognition
of it. Turkey has given full political support to the campaign
against terrorism. It has given logistical support to the intervention
in Afghanistan by allowing use of its airspace and airbases, besides
providing intelligence. It would have been prepared to send troops
to Afghanistan in support of "Operation Enduring Freedom",
had this been necessary, and is now expected to contribute to
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It has been
proposed that Turkey should take over command of ISAF from Britain
after three months, and the British government does not appear
to oppose this.
4. For Turkey, the most worrying aspect
of the current situation is that the US may extend the campaign
against terrorism to include military operations against Iraq.
Turkey has no friendship for Saddam Hussein but, like many other
countries, fears that any dismemberment of Iraq would upset the
balance of power in the area. It is also worried that this could
result in the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in
Iraq, with potentially serious implications for it own internal
Kurdish problem. Turkish reactions are not quite certain, however.
As an example, the Turkish Ambassador in Washington has suggested
that "if credible evidence is given that Iraq was behind
the terrorist attacks on the United States then Turkey would not
ignore the matter, it would review its standards vis-a-vis Iraq".
Currently, it is unclear what action (if any) the US intends to
take against Iraq. However it is important that Britain, like
Turkey, should stress to Washington that a clear link with the
attacks of 11 September should be proven, and that an alternative
and nationally acceptable regime must be on hand to prevent chaos
in Iraq if Saddam is toppled.
5. Apart from its security relationship
with the US, relations with the EU have generally been the most
important item on Turkey's foreign policy agenda in recent years.
Turkey signed an Association Agreement with the then EEC in 1963.
In accordance with this agreement, Turkey entered into a customs
union with the EU in 1996. In December 1999, the European Council
meeting in Helsinki decided that Turkey would be included as a
candidate for possible eventual EU membership, on the same terms
as the other candidate countries. However, before accession negotiations
could begin, Turkey would need to meet the political part of the
Copenhagen criteria. These specify that "membership requires
that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect
for and protection of minorities". Turkey was required to
settle its bilateral disputes with Greece, mainly over offshore
mineral rights and territorial waters in the Aegean, if necessary
by resort to arbitration by the International Court in The Hague.
The Helsinki conclusions also included important provisions regarding
Cyprus, which are returned to below (para 11).
6. All the parties currently represented
in the Turkish parliament support Turkey's eventual accession
to the EU as a general principle, although the pro-Islamist Prosperity
Party (SP) is probably less enthusiastic than its rivals. Similarly,
public opinion polls suggest that a large majority of Turks support
the idea of eventual accession. For example, a poll carried by
the Piar-Gallup polling organisation in August 2000 found that
69 per cent of respondents favoured the idea, with only 10 per
cent opposed (mainly for religious reasons) and the remaining
21 per cent classed as "don't knows". Among the political
parties, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which is the second
partner in the present coalition government, supports accession
in principle, but in practice it is reluctant to enact some of
the political reforms which would be necessary to achieve this
(see below, para 9).
7. In November 2000 the EU Commission issued
an Accession Partnership Document for Turkey outlining, among
other things, the political reforms which Turkey is required to
take before accession negotiations can start. These included,
in particular, the strengthening of legal guarantees for the freedom
of communication, association and assembly, and the legalisation
of broadcasting in Kurdish. Kurdish language instruction "in
the field of education" would also be required as a medium-term
measure. The government would be obliged to prevent the regular
use of torture by the police, to improve prison conditions, to
abolish capital punishment, and sign and ratify Protocol 6 of
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) to this effect.
As a further medium-term reform, the EU required constitutional
and legal changes to reduce the independent political role of
the military—in particular, by bringing the powers and functions
of the military-dominated National Security Council into line
with the practice of EU member-states.
8. In the autumn of 2001 the Turkish parliament
began the job of implementing these reforms by legislating a package
of 34 amendments to the constitution, which were promulgated by
the President on 17 October. The most important of these, affecting
freedom of communication, association, and peaceful assembly and
demonstrations, bring the constitution into alignment with Articles
10 and 11 of the ECHR—in fact, at several points, the new
wording follows that of the Convention. These amendments are a
significant step towards bringing Turkey into conformity with
democratic norms. Parliament now needs to give effect to these
changes, by altering a number of existing statutes—notably
Articles 159 and 312 and other Articles of the Turkish Penal Code,
and Article 8 of the "Law for the Struggle against Terrorism"
of 1991. The existing Press Law and the Law on Criminal Court
Procedures will also require amendment. By altering Article 118
of the constitution, parliament changed the composition of the
National Security Council so as to provide for a majority of civilian
members, stipulating that its decisions would purely "advisory"
for the government, although it will probably be some time before
the armed forces' political position is changed in practice.
9. The government has promised legislative
reforms to give effect to the constitutional changes. Two serious
sticking points are likely to remain, however. First, an alteration
to Article 38 of the constitution has abolished capital punishment
"except for cases in time of war, the imminent threat of
war and terrorist crimes". Protocol 6 of the ECHR allows
the first two exceptions but not the third. Second, regarding
Kurdish cultural rights, references to "any language prohibited
by law" have been deleted from the constitution, but this
does not by itself allow broadcasting in Kurdish, which is still
forbidden by the existing Broadcasting Law. Permission for Kurdish-language
education, if granted, would require further changes to other
legislation. These points are important primarily because the
MHP wishes to retain parliament's right to order the execution
of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, who is currently in prison
under sentence of death. On the language issue, the MHP has resisted
the idea of allowing Kurdish-language broadcasting or education.
The two other ruling parties, Búlent Ecevit's Democratic
Left Party and the Motherland Party led by Mesut Yilmaz, both
favour complete abolition of the death penalty, but a re-alteration
of Article 38 to bring it into line with Protocol 6 will be hard
to achieve since it will require a two-thirds majority in parliament.
Similarly, to alter the Broadcasting Law the government will probably
have to arrange for support from the opposition parties.
10. The Presidency Conclusions of the European
Council meeting in Laeken of December 2001 accepted that the recent
constitutional reforms have "brought forward the prospect
of the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey". The
Turkish coalition leaders have recently indicated that they hope
that a date can be set for the start of accession negotiations
between Turkey and the EU by the end of this year. This may be
too optimistic, but the EU currently aims to conclude negotiations
with the "first wave" of candidates by the end of 2002,
and to achieve their accession in 2004. Assuming that Turkey has
conformed to the Copenhagen political criteria, that negotiations
over Cyprus are successful, and that bilateral disputes with Greece
have been resolved, it may not be possible for the EU to put off
accession talks with Turkey for long after that. These negotiations
will almost certainly last some time, so that accession—assuming
it happens—will probably be some way down the road.
11. The dispute between Turkey and the EU
over the proposed European rapid reaction force now seems to have
been resolved, although the formula negotiated between Britain
and Turkey has encountered Greek objections, with as yet uncertain
results. This leaves Cyprus as the major stumbling block against
progress towards accession. In the Helsinki conclusions and the
Accession Partnership Document, Turkey was required to "support
strongly" the efforts of the UN Secretary-General to bring
about a settlement of the problem. However, the Helsinki conclusions
also included the following passage: "The European Council
underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession
of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached
by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision
on accession will be made without the above being a precondition.
In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors".
Subsequently, EU spokesmen have confirmed that Cyprus could be
admitted to the EU even if there is no prior settlement between
the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and the British government appears
to have adhered firmly to this line.
12. The Helsinki statement seems ambiguous,
besides creating a host of problems, since it is hard to see how
the question of whether or not an internal settlement has been
achieved can be anything other than a "relevant factor".
If it is not (as the preceding sentence implies) then it is quite
unclear what the other "relevant factors" might be.
Moreover, if the present Republic of Cyprus were admitted to the
EU in advance of an internal settlement, then it is difficult
to envisage how it could carry out its full obligations under
the acquis regarding freedom of movement and establishment
without renouncing sovereignty over the northern part of the island,
which it is most unlikely to do. It is said that some formula
might be worked out to avoid this, but without explanations as
to how this could be done. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots also
argue, with some justification, that although the EU says it wants
a settlement of the problem, by telling the Greek Cypriots that
the Republic of Cyprus can be admitted to the EU anyway, even
if it does not settle its differences with the Turks first, it
provides them with no incentive to do so.
13. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail
Cem, recently stated that Turkey would take an "extremely
costly" decision if the EU admitted Cyprus to the Union in
advance of an internal settlement. Prime Minister Búlent
Ecevit elaborated this by saying that if this happened Turkey
might either annex the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)
or establish a "special relationship" with it, making
it an autonomous part of Turkey. However, Turkey might not do
this if it also thought that there was a reasonably good chance
of gaining accession itself, since such a reaction would almost
certainly scupper any chances of this. The improvements in the
prospects for eventual Turkish accession probably explain why
Mr Denktash has agreed to re-start direct negotiations with Mr
Clerides, without insisting that the sovereignty of the TRNC must
first be accepted. In supporting these efforts, it is important
that Britain and the EU recognise that it takes two to tango,
and that the Greek Cypriots—not just the Turks—must
be given incentives to be flexible. For instance, it could be
made clear to the Greek Cypriot government that its policies and
attitudes in the inter-communal negotiations would be an important
"relevant factor" in the EU's decision as to whether
Cyprus can be admitted to the Union.
14. Given the importance of its relations
with Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, Britain cannot afford to be anything
other than neutral in the Cyprus dispute. Apart from this, it
will almost certainly gain from further progress in Turkish-EU
relations. In urging Turkey to meet the Copenhagen criteria, it
should avoid giving the impression that this arises purely out
of concerns over the position of the Kurds, since improvements
in the human rights regime will benefit all Turkish citizens,
regardless of ethnicity. Britain should be concerned with universal
values, not just the interests of particular groups. It is also
important that it should not just stand on the sidelines, criticising
Turkey for its failures over human rights and other issues, but
be actively involved in helping the authorities to implement the
needed reforms.
Dr William Hale
January 2002
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