Memorandum from William Park, King's College,
London
INTRODUCTION
1. The aspiration to join the European Union
specifically, and be accepted as European generally, is central
to Turkish foreign policy and to the identity of the country's
governing elite. Concretely, over 50 per cent of Turkish trade
is with the EU, and this percentage has steadily grown. Much of
the rest of the country's trade is with non-EU European states,
in the Balkans and the Former Soviet Union. Turkey is already
a member of almost all Europe's institutions and of NATO, and
provides entrants to the Eurovision song contest and European
(rather than Asian) football and other sporting competitions.
Turkey's legal system is derived from European practice and tradition,
and along with the political system is officially secular.
2. To some others in Europe, notably continental
Christian Democrats, Turkey's European self-identity can appear
questionable. Geographically, only the small area of Thrace is
unambiguously located in Europe (but then, in which continent
are Cyprus, or the numerous Greek islands just a few miles from
the Turkish coastline, located?). Turkey's population is Muslim,
it is economically much less developed than EU Europe, and aspects
of its political culture and practice (such as human rights limitations
and the political role of the military) and of its economic management
(a bloated public sector and large scale corruption) are at odds
with European expectations as defined by the EU.
3. On the other hand, Turkey is readily
differentiated from other Islamic states. In contrast with neighbouring
Iran, Iraq, Syria and Azerbaijan, for example, Turkey is economically
developed, possesses a diverse and dynamic private sector, and
enjoys high levels of political pluralism, freedom of speech,
and democratisation. Indeed, in many ways Turkey feels uncomfortable
in its neighbourhood, and its closest regional ally is Israel.
4. In short, there is some substance to
Turkey's European self-identity, even if within Europe Turkey
might be seen as more Balkan than anything else. In fact, Turkey's
President Sezer has recently suggested that Turkey be bracketed
with Romania and Bulgaria in terms of its EU application, and
Turks frequently question whether their country's political and
economic drawbacks are really greater than those of its Balkan
neighbours, who unlike Turkey are deemed ready to enter into EU
accession negotiations.
THE EUROPEAN
UNION
5. Overall, Turkish-EU relations are often
tetchy. Although accepted as a EU accession candidate in December
1999 (and even then only after much diplomatic tension) Turkey
is the only one of 13 such states with whom accession negotiations
have not begun. For the EU, the obstacles are Turkey's handling
of its Kurdish problem and the human rights shortcomings that
are often associated with it, the domestic political role of the
military, economic underdevelopment and mismanagement, and the
Cyprus issue.
6. Domestically, Turkey has embarked on
a far-reaching economic and political reform programme, inspired
by a National Programme drawn up in response to the EU's accession
requirements. The sheer energy with which this programme has been
tackled is testimony to the depth of Turkey's EU aspirations.
Some have argued, however, that a truer test will come not with
the passing of new laws but with their full implementation.
7. In any case, some of the core issues
look particularly hard nuts to crack. For example, Ankara sees
the Kurdish issue primarily as one of terrorism, territorial integrity,
and regional stability. In this perspective, the problem can only
approach resolution with victory in the fight against terrorism,
an end to external interference and "support" for Kurdish
separatists both by European and neighbouring states, regional
economic development, and internal migration that will enable
Kurds to enter the mainstream of Turkish national life. Turkish
nationalists and elements in the military are unconvinced that
in the current situation an extension of "human rights"
will help resolve the conflict, and point to the very nature of
the PKK, regional factors, and examples such as the Basques and
others, to support their argument.
8. The Turkish military is a highly esteemed
institution amongst the population at large, and is respected
and trusted far more than are civilian politicians and officials.
Its involvement in domestic politics, even where this has taken
the form of military coups, is often regarded as an essential
corrective to the corrupt and irresponsible behaviour of civilian
elites and the broader social instability that has on occasion
seemed to derive from this. The historical track record lends
some credence to this perspective. It will not be easy to prise
domestic political influence away from the military. Although
this might not accord with EU expectations and ideals, it is an
open question whether an end to the military's domestic political
role would necessarily lead to a Turkey that the EU would be happy
with.
CYPRUS
9. The Cyprus issue has served as a serious
obstacle to more harmonious Turkish-EU relations, and to the acceptance
of Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. The Greek-governed,
internationally recognised part of Cyprus is a front-runner for
EU accession, which the EU has insisted need not necessarily be
held up by a failure to resolve the issue of the island's division.
On the other hand, the Greek side is nervous that the EU might
hesitate to incorporate a member part of whose territory is under
occupation by the forces of another (applicant) state. They are
also uneasy about Turkish hints that it might annex northern Cyprus
should Nicosia's accession to the EU go ahead. Athens has indeed
threatened to veto any enlargement should the Cypriot case be
refused. For its part, Ankara fully appreciates the consequences
for its own EU prospects of a worsening of the Cypriot situation.
Furthermore, Turkish Cypriots are unhappy with the economic consequences
of their isolation from the rest of the island and of the associated
international embargo. They would also like to reap the benefits
of EU membership. These pressures have led to a recent resumption
of inter-communal talks, under UN auspices, after a four-year
break.
10. The outcome of these talks is unclear,
but the Cyprus story as a whole has served to intensify still
further Ankara's perception that it is misunderstood and excluded
by Europe. From the Turkish perspective, Greek atrocities against
the Turkish minority on the island, and the Athens junta's attempts
to engineer enosis with the Greek mainland, triggered Turkey's
treaty rights as a guarantor state to mount the 1974 operation.
Ankara also notes that the 1960 constitution of independent Cyprus
forbade the island from joining any international organisation
from which either Greece or Turkey is excluded. Turks remain mistrustful
of Greek attitudes towards the island's Turkish minority, and
suspicious of the relationship between Nicosia and Athens. They
generally fail to understand why Europeans so frequently fail
to share or sympathise with this perspective.
TURKEY AND
ESDP
11. More recently, the European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP) issue has again served to bedevil Turkish-EU
relations, and intensify Turkey's feelings of exclusion. Turkey's
objection has been to the EU's attempt to construct a "European
pillar" based on EU rather than NATO membership. By its very
nature, ESDP—declared "operational" at the EU's
Laeken summit in December 2001—discriminates between EU
members and non-members. Turkey, as a long-standing and active
European NATO member with no immediate prospects of joining the
EU, resents this. Its exclusion from the ESDP led Ankara to threaten
to veto the access of any future EU force to NATO assets. This
would either severely limit the scope for EU operations, or force
the EU to expensively duplicate assets already available to NATO.
This would in turn add to the prospects for a strategic decoupling
of Europe from North America. It is thus hardly surprising that
Ankara's apparent readiness to disrupt both NATO and ESDP caused
considerable anguish.
12. In addition to its preference that the
European pillar be constructed under NATO's wing, Turkey has also
been unhappy that Greece, and perhaps Cyprus in the near future,
would as EU members be in a position to obstruct the participation
of non-member Turkey in a EU-led operation. Furthermore, although
non-EU states (and non-NATO states such as Russia) will have the
right to contribute to EU-led operations and, should they decide
to so contribute, would enjoy the same rights as EU members in
the day-to-day conduct of operations, a central feature of ESDP
has been the insistence on the autonomy of EU decision-making.
In other words, it was agreed that non-members might participate
in EU-led operations only at the invitation of the EU, and in
operations the very existence and objectives of which would already
have been determined by the EU Council.
13. Ankara feels that this development reflects
scant recognition of Turkey's Cold War contribution to European
security or its current security significance and capacity. Given
that 13 of the 16 potential crisis scenarios identified by NATO
are in Turkey's geographic vicinity—the Balkans, the Caucasus,
the Middle East etc—Ankara has thus feared the possibility
of EU military activities being conducted in areas deemed vital
to Turkey's national security but from which Turkey could be excluded.
Ankara has frequently drawn attention to the possibility that
so-called "non-Article 5" (Petersberg-type) missions
could escalate into full-blown international crises. NATO's Article
5, which can be interpreted as obliging NATO members to come to
each other's aid, would commit Turkey and other non-EU NATO members
to become involved in situations—including situations in
which Turkey feels it has a major stake—from which the EU
had earlier excluded it. Perhaps more concretely, Ankara also
feared that the EU might be pressured to engage against Turkish
interests in Cyprus or in the Aegean. Greek-Turkish conflicts
could be transformed into EU-Turkish conflicts.
UK-US-TURKISH NEGOTIATIONS
14. Keen that ESDP should not pose a threat
to NATO's cohesion, the British took it upon themselves to broker
a UK-US-Turkey meeting in Istanbul on May 27 2001. This arduous
meeting was followed up by comparably tough negotiations in Ankara
on October 24, London on 7 November, and Ankara again on 27 November.
Washington's presence at discussions focusing on an aspect of
EU-Turkey relations is worthy of note. Although sharing much of
Ankara's discomfort with ESDP, Washington has essentially been
neutral in the EU-Turkey impasse. The US is keen to encourage
the EU to take on more of the overall security burden, and has
partly been persuaded (not least by London) that the ESDP might
encourage this. It has also been fearful that continuing Turkish
obstructionism might offer France and other EU states the opportunity
to intensify their quest for greater independence from the US.
However, along with Ankara's other friends, Washington has become
progressively more irritated with what it regarded as Ankara's
uncompromising and confrontational approach to the issue. Ankara's
disappointment with the US position also became more explicit
as time passed. Similarly worthy of note is the fact that the
British never enjoyed a formal, cast-iron EU mandate to negotiate
(or, to put it more accurately, to renegotiate agreements already
painstakingly arrived at and finally agreed at the Nice summit
of December 2000) on behalf of the EU as a whole. During the negotiations,
Ankara explicitly doubted London's authority in this regard, and
in particular questioned the readiness of Athens and perhaps Paris
to sign off any agreement that emerged from the talks. It was
evident, however, that informally the EU did support London's
efforts.
15. These meetings helped tease out the
precise details of Ankara's demands. Central to them was the right
to participate at all stages, including the initial decision-making,
of any EU-led operation relying on NATO assets. As Foreign Minister
Ismael Cem expressed it, it should be NATO as the donor of assets
rather than the EU as recipient that sets the terms of the transaction.
Ankara also sought the right to participate in any EU-led operation
not requiring recourse to NATO assets but which Ankara deemed
as affecting its vital national interests—notably, operations
in Turkey's geographic vicinity. Ankara additionally sought a
secure pledge that the EU would not involve itself in disputes
between NATO allies—that is, between Greece and Turkey.
16. Clearly, Ankara's demands struck at
the very autonomy of decision-making that the EU is so insistent
on, and would substantially erode the distinction between EU members
and non-members. ESDP does discriminate between members
and non-members, and British proposals sought to preserve that
distinction whilst responding to some of Ankara's concerns. One
British proposal was to appoint non-EU NATO "interlocutors"
who would have access to the EU's Political and Security Committee
and thus be in a position to "shape" but not directly
make initial decisions on any EU-led mission. Throughout much
of 2001, Ankara did not seem prepared to content itself with this
"decision-shaping" role. A second idea was to upgrade
Turkey's role on the so-called "committee of contributors",
which would be formed (from EU members plus other likely contributors)
whenever a military mission was under active consideration. British
proposals would guarantee Turkey's seat on such a committee where
NATO assets were likely to be called upon, and deem Ankara's presence
"of particular benefit" where Turkey deemed its vital
interests were at stake. Ankara argued for a greater and more
or less standing role for such committees than the EU had hitherto
been prepared to contemplate, on pre- as well as post-planning
for any EU-led force.
17. Given the atmosphere that had accompanied
the talks, it came as some surprise when, within days of the 27
November meeting, following a high-level gathering in Ankara on
2 December attended by the Chief of the Turkish General Staff
as well as the heads of the coalition parties and the relevant
ministers, Ankara announced that it was now satisfied with what
was on offer and that the ESDP now had its blessing, even where
it might wish to call upon NATO assets. The Turkish authorities
offered little in the way of explanation of what had enabled them
to alter their stance, such that some parliamentary deputies have
called for an open debate and there have been allegations that
Ankara has climbed down on its demands. Details have indeed been
sketchy, but in any case it seems that Turkey is now reassured
that the EU would not involve itself in disputes between NATO
allies, and that the distinction between EU members and non-members
with respect to decision-making has been blurred sufficiently
to allow a satisfactory degree of Turkish involvement in any decision-making
leading up to the conduct of an operation in geographical areas
and issues deemed vital to Turkey's security interests, even where
NATO assets are not called upon. By and large, it appears that
the British proposals have been accepted.
18. Unfortunately but perhaps predictably,
Athens is now resisting the logic of this agreement. Athens has
argued that the enlarged consultation mechanisms offered to Turkey
serve to undermine the autonomy on which the EU had been so insistent,
and just as Ankara did, has queried the status for other EU members
of an agreement negotiated by the British, Turks and Americans.
UK-TURKISH RELATIONS
19. The UK's role in the ESDP saga demonstrates
that the British share with Washington an appreciation both of
Turkey's strategic significance and a commitment to NATO's pre-eminence
as a security institution. Turkish foreign policy places great
emphasis on the country's strategic value to the West, and Ankara
is aware of and appreciates the UK's recognition of this. Turks
are inclined to contrast it with the policy incoherence or lack
of interest in strategic issues that it otherwise attributes to
the EU and many of its members. Furthermore, Ankara can be said
to envy the close strategic partnership London enjoys with Washington,
and seeks to emulate it.
20. With respect to Turkey's EU aspirations
too, the UK is generally regarded as one of the more sympathetic
member states. Partly this is explained by the value London attaches
to strategic issues, but it is also seen to stem from Britain's
more general support for EU enlargement. Itself uneasy with the
concept of a tightly-bound and deeply-integrated EU, the British
are seen as more relaxed about membership criteria—certainly
than, say, the French. The UK also lacks that strand of Christian
Democracy to be found in parts of continental Europe and that
sometimes regards Europe as in some way synonymous with "Christendom".
21. On the other hand, Germany is Turkey's
most important economic partner and, with France, has probably
had more cultural impact on Turkish development than has the UK.
Turks are generally suspicious of west Europeans, partly as a
consequence of a historical record that is seen to include profound
hostility to the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic threat to Europe,
economic exploitation of that empire as it progressively weakened,
and a desire to dismember Anatolia in the wake of the Ottoman
collapse. In all of this, the British are regarded as having been
at the forefront. The British occupation of Istanbul, and Lloyd
George's support for Greek expansion into Anatolia, are especially
remembered. But it does not appear that these, sometimes bitter,
memories are allowed too much influence over current Turkish policy.
22. From a Turkish perspective, the British
have a mixed record where Cyprus is concerned. Generally supportive
of the Turkish minority during British possession of the island,
and protective of its interests in the run up to and negotiations
for Cypriot independence, the UK is regarded as having been neglectful
of its responsibilities since independence. In 1974 in particular,
the British have been criticised by Turks for their unwillingness
to fulfil their treaty obligations to preserve the independence
of Cyprus from Greece and protect the security of the island's
Turkish minority. However, the sentiment appears to be more one
of regret and resignation than anger and bitterness. On the other
hand, Turks can perhaps be forgiven for believing that the crisis
over the island's fate might not have reached the state that it
did if the British had shown a more pro-active sense of responsibility
towards the terms of the essentially tripartite agreements that
established Cyprus as an independent state.
23. The UK is a country respected by Turkey,
generally because it is part of that western civilisation with
which Turks aspire to merge, and specifically because of the strength
of its institutions, its political stability, its civic culture,
its historical achievements, and of course its language. However,
in relation to the EU, and notwithstanding the role the British
have played recently in squaring the circle of Turkey's participation
in the ESDP, UK-Turkish relations are for the most part conducted
multilaterally, via NATO, the EU or other institutions.
William Park is the Senior Lecturer with
the War Studies Group, King's College, London, and at the Defence
Studies Department, Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC),
Watchfield
William Park
January 2002
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