APPENDIX 14
Memorandum from the Campaign Against Arms
Trade
1. The Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT)
is opposed to all military exports, but recognises that, despite
its negative effects on human rights, security and the economy,
the arms trade will not end overnight.
As an interim measure, therefore, CAAT is seeking
an export licensing policy with an emphasis on restraint, especially
on exports to governments which violate human rights or to countries
in areas of conflict. This leads CAAT to focus its campaigning
on sales to particular countries, one of them being Turkey.
2. The leading role of the armed forces
within Turkish society and government; its occupation of northern
Cyprus in 1974; its long established military rivalry with Greece,
notwithstanding their mutual membership of NATO; its poor record
on human rights, and its harsh treatment of the Kurdish people
who live within its boundaries, and, indeed, over the Iraqi border,
are well documented. They will, no doubt, be the subject of submissions
by organisations better qualified to comment on them than ours.
3. The UK government considers military
export licence applications against the Consolidated EU and National
Arms Export Licensing Criteria.
Amongst the eight criteria are Criterion Two which
covers "The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms
in the country of final destination"; Criterion Three "The
internal situation in the country of final destination as a function
of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts"; and Criterion
Four "Preservation of regional peace, security and stability".
Sales to Turkey do not meet these criteria.
4. CAAT believes that Turkey's strategic
geographical position, situated between Europe, the Balkans, the
Middle East, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as well as,
historically, the Soviet Union, has led the UK and other western
governments to overlook its negative attributes when considering
military relations.
5. Through its military collaboration, the
UK is giving Turkey's military a respectability it does not deserve,
and undermining those working for justice and human rights.
6. Some of the UK-supplied equipment is
directly used in human rights abuses. For instance, the Akrep
vehicle, produced locally in Turkey under licence from the UK
company Landrover, saw service against the Kurdish people in northern
Iraq. (Independent on Sunday, 25 June 1995)
7. Turkey's military links with Israel,
cemented by arms industry co- operation and military training
pacts in 1996, are seen as threatening by other countries in the
region, particularly Syria. These ties have also been seen as
a way for Turkey to circumvent the restrictions that the United
States and some European countries, such as Germany, have from
time to time imposed. (Progressive magazine, December 1998)
SPENDING ON
ARMS
8. According to the United States' Department
of Defense's "Report on Allied Contributions to the Common
Defense", March 2001, Turkey's military expenditure as a
proportion of GDP rose during the 1990's whilst that of most NATO
member countries fell.
MILITARY SPENDING AS PER CENT OF GDP
| | 1990
| 1995 | 1996
| 1997 | 1998
| 1999 | 2000
| Change
1990-2000 |
| Turkey | 5.1
| 4.8 | 4.8
| 4.7 | 4.8
| 5.3 | 5.7
| +11.4% |
| UK | 4.2 |
3.0 | 2.9
| 2.6 | 2.6
| 2.5 | 2.4
| -42.3% |
| NATO avg | 4.3
| 3.1 | 2.9
| 2.8 | 2.6
| 2.6 | 2.5
| -40.8% |
9. As a result of a major economic crisis and the devaluation
of the Turkish lira in 2001, the International Monetary Fund has
put pressure on the Turkish government to make cuts in its military
expenditure.
(Defense News, 17-23 September 2001) Turkey's total budget
for the fiscal year 2002 is $54.4 billion; $20.4 billion less
than in 2000. The Ministry of National Defence gets the largest
share, $5.6 billion. This, at more than 10 per cent, is a greater
proportion than before and is to help Turkey pay its debts to
foreign contractors. (Jane's Defence Weekly, 31 October
2001)
10. Additionally, arms procurement benefits from monies
the Turkish Defence Industries Undersecretariat (SSM) receives
from the Defence Industry Support Fund. Since 1985 this Fund has
received revenue generated by the imposition of a luxury tax on
alcohol, tobacco, petrol and gambling, together with a small percentage
of the interest earned on all Turkish Lira bank accounts. This
Fund has also been hit by the downturn in the economy, receiving
$500 million in 2001 against an anticipated $1 billion. It expects
to receive $700 million in 2002. (Jane's Defence Weekly,
9 January 2002)
BUILDING A
TURKISH ARMS
INDUSTRY
11. In the mid-1980s Turkey started to establish a huge
military- industrial complex and to purchase sophisticated military
hardware. The Turkish government wanted to modernise and re-equip
the country's armed forces and to lessen their dependence on military
imports.
12. Since then, many of Turkey's military contracts have
been co- production deals with foreign investments in local companies
averaging $300 million annually. (Jane's Defence Weekly,
28 February 2001) A model for these was the $4.5 billion "Peace
Onyx" programme agreed in 1983. Under the programme, 160
General Dynamics F-16s were to be built under licence in Turkey.
A joint US/Turkish company, Turkish Aerospace Industries, employing
1,600 staff, was set up on a site at Murted. General Dynamics
transferred aircraft manufacturing know-how and set up management
systems, whilst the labour was primarily indigenous. (Flight
International, 15 July 1989)
13. Such deals continue. Turkey hopes to obtain work
for local industry in respect of the $200 billion Joint Strike
Fighter programme in return for a contribution of $1 billion towards
the fighter's development. (Defense News, 5-11 November
2001)
14. The desire to develop a Turkish arms industry has
sometimes been said by the military to be responsible for procurement
delays. In the face of such criticism, a SSM official reaffirmed
the priorities: "In our contract negotiations with foreign
defence companies, the SSM always seeks to maximise local industry
input, offsets, and technology transfer". (Defense News,
10-16 December 2001)
UK MILITARY LINKS
15. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), the UK was the fifth largest supplier of major
conventional weapons to Turkey between 1996 and 2000, accounting
for just over 1 per cent of the total:
| Supplier | US$ million
|
| USA | 3,295
|
| Germany | 1,464
|
| France | 406
|
| Russia | 100
|
| UK | 69
|
| Other | 330
|
| SIPRI Yearbook 2001 |
16. The UK government's Annual Reports on Strategic Export
Controls, which includes all military goods, gives the following
figures for exports to Turkey.
Military equipment deliveries identifiable under EC Tariff
Codes in given year:
| Year | Value in
£million
| Per cent of total
UK sales by value
| Rank as
UK customer |
| 2000 | 6.11
| .04 | 23rd
|
| 1999 | 9.55
| .97 | 17th
|
| 1998 | 84.15
| 4.28 | 5th
|
| 1997 | 25.42
| .76 | 13th
|
Single Individual Export Licences on the Military List granted
in given year—actual export may or may not take place.
| Year | Export licences
granted
| Value in
£million
|
| 2000 | 105
| 34.0 |
| 1999 | 99 |
188.0 |
| 1998 | 94 |
not available |
| 1997 | 101
| not available |
17. The Annual Reports show that the licences issued
included those for sniper rifle training equipment, thermal imaging
equipment, components for missiles, military aero-engines, software
for the use of military communications equipment. More detail
of some of the deals is to be found in the military press. Examples
are given below.
18. MKEK and the manufacture of sub-machine guns.
MKEK is a Turkish company that manufactures small arms and ammunition.
It is a fast growing arms company. In 1999 it was the 60th largest
arms company in the world, selling US$480 million of weapons and
making a profit of US$38 million. (SIPRI Yearbook 2001) In 1997
it was the 84th largest arms company with US$360 million worth
of arms sales and US$12 million profit. (SIPRI 1999). In1997 50
per cent of sales were military, now it is totally military.
19. Turkey ordered 200,000 HK33 5.6mm assault rifles
from Heckler & Koch, a German subsidiary of BAE Systems' Royal
Ordnance subsidiary in January 1998. Assembly of these rifles
took place at a factory run by MKEK near Ankara. In October 1998
the number ordered rose to 500,000 despite serious concerns of
the rifles being used for internal repression by the Turkish military.
20. In July 1998, the Turkish news agency Anadolu reported
that 500 Heckler & Koch MP5 sub-machine guns produced under
licence were to be exported to the Indonesian Police which has
a record of human rights abuses and extrajudicial killing. This
deal came a few months after licences for the direct export of
the guns from the UK were refused. MP5 machine-guns are also used
by the Indonesian Special Forces KOPASSUS. ("Running Guns",
Zed Books, 2000)
21. Matra BAe Dynamics and the sale of Rapier surface-to-air
missiles. In August 1999 the UK and Turkey signed a co-production
deal for Matra BAe Dynamics' Rapier Mk28 surface-to-air missiles
(SAM). Under the 10-year programme, both countries will establish
production lines. 840 missiles will be made for the Turkish Army
and Air Force and approximately 1,500 more for the UK Army and
Royal Air Force Regiment. (Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 September
1999)
22. Matra BAe Marconi Space was awarded a $100
million contract in September 1999 to build satellite communications
terminals. The contract included a requirement for 40 per cent
offset work for Turkish companies. (Jane's Defence Weekly,
25 August 1999 and 8 September 1999)
23. Racal. Racal Defence Electronics won a £9
million contract to supply its Sealion Electronic Support Measures
(ESM) system for a NATO navy's submarines. Industry sources say
it was for Turkish Type 209s. (Jane's Defence Weekly, 22
December 1999)
24. Landrover and Otokar. The Turkish company
Otokar uses the Landrover chassis for its armoured personnel carrier,
which "has proven itself in service of Turkish Military and
Security forces for many years". It also makes Landrover
Defender 90,110,130s and the AKREP attack/defence vehicle, which
has 70 per cent of its mechanical parts in common with a standard
Landrover 110. (otokar.com.tr)
25. Airbus Military Transport Aircraft. In 2000
the Turkish Government approved the acquisition of 26 A-400M transport
aircraft worth US$2.5 billion from the Airbus Military Company
(AMC), in which Turkish Aircraft Industries has a stake of 9 per
cent. Financial pressures led to the order being cut to 20 planes
in May 2001, and to ten less than a month later. Delivery is planned
for 2007-2014. (Defense News, 21 May 2001 and 11 June 2001)
26. Alvis armoured vehicles. In September 2001,
Alvis and FNSS Defense Systems of Ankara signed an agreement to
co-produce Alvis' Piranha armoured vehicle. (Defense News,
24 September 2001)
27. Joint Production Memorandum. In September
1998 a Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Turkey was
signed by the then UK Defence Secretary George Robertson and his
Turkish counterpart Ismet Sezgin. Although the terms of the MoU
are not known, it was said that the two countries would "identify
joint areas of arms production as part of the continuing rationalisation
of the European defence industry." (Jane's Defence Weekly,
23 September 1998)
28. Export Credits. Many of the military purchases
and joint ventures have been underwritten by the Department of
Trade and Industry's Export Credits Guarantee Department. The
value of ECGD guarantees issued in support of military-related
contracts to Turkey is:
| 1997-98 | £36 million
|
| 1998-99 | £0 million
|
| 1999-31 January 2000 | £208 million
|
(Hansard,
28 February 2000)
|
As of 11 July 2001, the outstanding exposure on ECGD guarantees
for military equipment to Turkey was £267 million. (Hansard,
20 July 2001)
29. Although full information about projects supported
by the export credits is not in the public domain, both the Landrover
supplies to Otokar (Hansard, 5 April 2000) and the air
defence missiles (Hansard, 27 January 2000) received ECGD cover.
30. UK training. The UK trains members of the
Turkish armed forces, a total of 52 Turkish personnel receiving
such training in the year to 31 March 2000. (Hansard, 21
July 2000)
31. A letter from Defence Minister Lord Gilbert to Lord
Rea dated 2 March 1998 gives some idea of the range of training
received. In the year prior to the letter, training included:
37 Turkish students received English Language Training; ten students
attended various Royal Navy courses; the crews of a Turkish frigate
and a submarine attended the Royal Navy Operational Sea Training
at Plymouth; and a number attended various command and staff courses.
32. UK visits to Turkey. From a consideration
of the year 2000, it would seem that frequent visits to Turkey
are made by UK military personnel.
In that year, there were visits by the Chief of Naval Staff,
the Commander in Chief Strike Command, and of UK officers to various
Turkish armed forces training establishments, as well as ship
visits and a platoon exchange. (Hansard, 10 January 2001)
33. "Blind Eye". Of grave concern are
the allegations, made by Dr Eric Herring of Bristol University,
that RAF pilots patrolling the "no-fly zone" in northern
Iraq are recalled to their base in Turkey in order to allow the
Turkish airforce to bomb the Kurdish people in Iraq. (New Statesman,
19 March 2001)
THE EUROPEAN
UNION DIMENSION
34. EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. In 2000,
Turkey declared itsubscribed to the European Union Code of Conduct
on Arms Exports andthat it would adjust its export policies accordingly.
Turkish arms exports amount to about $200 million a year and SSM
has formed a division to promote them. It made its first appearance
at the International Defence Exhibition in Abu Dhabi in March
2001. (Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 February 2001)
35. The experience to date is not encouraging. Algeria
bought 700 Akrep armoured vehicles (see paragraph 24 above), produced
by Otokar under licence from the UK company Landrover, in 1995.
"The buy is seen as an important element in equipping the
army for a counter-insurgency role".
(Defense News, 15-21 May 1995) The record of the Algerian
authorities gives rise to concern over human rights and it is
unlikely that any such export directly from the UK would have
taken place without much criticism in parliament and the press.
36. Turkey has donated or sold military equipment to
nearby former- Soviet states. In September 2001, 80 military vehicles
were given to Azerbaijan as part of "continued military co-operation
between the two states". (Jane's Defence Weekly, 3
October 2001) Since February 1992, Azerbaijan has been subject
to an Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe arms
embargo.
37. The "Six-Nation" Framework Agreement.
CAAT has already raised, in its submission to the Defence Committee
Inquiry 2001, its concerns regarding the Framework Agreement Concerning
Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the
European Defence Industry, signed in July 2000 and ratified by
the UK in March 2001. Although the Framework Agreement does not
include all the EU member states, it could well expand to include
them.
38. As Turkey is keen to develop its military industry,
and usually does so in co-operation with companies based in other
countries, it seems likely that Turkey would wish to become a
party to the Framework Agreement. Although this would undoubtedly
be welcomed by the military companies, when decisions on permitted
export destination lists are made it would further tip the balance
in decision-making away from those counties, such as Sweden, which
operate more restrictive export policies. It should be noted that
Sweden does not export military equipment to Turkey.
39. The Framework Agreement envisages the setting up
of Co-operative Armament Programmes (CAP) and that goods will
be exported to participants under Global Product Licences (GPL).
It has yet to be seen how this will work in practice. CAAT would
be unhappy if Turkey were to participate in the Framework Agrement,
but, were it to do so, it would be even more vital that there
is a system of checks to ensure that goods exported under GPLs
are incorporated in the relevant CAP and not otherwise.
40. STAR 21. In July 2001 the European Advisory
Group on Aerospace, STAR 21, held its inaugural meeting. This
group, which is dominated by representatives of the military companies,
says it is looking at ways to modernise or upgrade Europe's political
and regulatory framework to keep pace with the economic and technological
change in the aerospace industry. The group should be reporting
to the European Commission, Council of Ministers and European
Parliament shortly.
41. As with the Framework Agreement, CAAT is worried
that STAR 21 proposals may lead to weaker export controls at national
level, a disquiet that would be magnified if the European Union
expanded to include states such as Turkey. It is essential that
the debate on these issues allows for substantial input by parliamentarians,
national and European, as well as by interested civil society
groups.
CONCLUSIONS
42. Turkey's human rights record and the influence of
the military in Turkish society need to be addressed before Turkey
becomes an EU member state. These moral implications are of utmost
importance, but there are financial ones too. The country has
major economic difficulties yet the cuts elsewhere in the budget
are greater than those in military spending There is obvious distortion
of the economy by the Turkish military and EU citizens should
not be expected to financially underwrite it.
43. The lack of democratic input into European foreign
and security policies in general, and the integration of military
industry in particular, would almost certainly be exacerbated
if Turkey were to join the European Union.
44. As Turkey clearly fails to meet the Consolidated
EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, the UK government
should impose an embargo to cover all goods needing a licence
under Part III of Schedule 1 to the Export of Goods (Control)
Order 1994. It should encourage the other EU states to do likewise.
Campaign Against Arms Trade
January 2002
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