MISREPRESENTATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S
ZIMBABWE POLICY
34. In the words of Feargal Keane,
"One of the problems has been, and we in
the media must take this on the chin as well, that we were seen
to act and seen to be concerned when it was white farmers who
were being attacked. Thus it became very easy for Robert Mugabe
to portray this as a colonialist intervention by the British Government
and to portray Western media interest as ethnocentric. In other
words we cared, in Mugabe's own famous phrase, because they were
our kith and kin. There was an unfortunate lack of public profile
given both by our politicians and by the media to the true victims
of what was happening and they are the Zimbabwean people on impoverished
smallholdings, peasants who have to walk for miles to get maize,
the people I talked to you about earlier. We mis-presented our
concern."[34]
35. Mr Keane went on to say,
"if you look at our newspapers and others
since the election, there has been scant coverage and, one has
to say, on the part of our politicians scant reference to what
has been happening in Zimbabwe. I would ask you what kind of message
that sends. To be seen to act, in terms of our government and
our opposition, and to be seen to be concerned only in the run-up
to an election and then to fall silent afterwards sends a rather
dangerous message."[35]
36. We do not accept that Mr Keane's strictures are
entirely justified. Ministers have made statements in Parliament
on Zimbabwe;[36] the
official Opposition has devoted some of the limited Parliamentary
time at its disposal to a debate on Zimbabwe;[37]
many other Members of both Houses have raised Zimbabwe through
Parliamentary Questions and other means. Like so much of Parliament's
day-to-day proceedings, these occasions have not been widely reported.
37. However, we do accept that the United Kingdom's
concern for the people of Zimbabwe has been misrepresented, mostly
by Mr Mugabe and his supporters. Britain has been portrayed as
the white, colonial power protecting its own. This is unfortunate
and deeply regrettable. To the extent that it lies within the
power of the Government to counter misrepresentation of its motives,
all steps must be taken to portray what truly motivates the United
Kingdom to declaim on Zimbabwe and to seek to assist its people:
a real concern for those who are hungry, disadvantaged, disenfranchised,
oppressed and abused, whatever their colour, and whatever their
history. A dignified, diplomatic silence is no response to allegations
of partiality or indifference. We recommend that the Government
act wherever possible to prevent misrepresentations of the United
Kingdom's policies and motivations towards Zimbabwe by ensuring
that it explains its policies clearly to all concerned, that it
briefs the press fully and frequently, and that it counters in
the strongest terms all misrepresentations of its position whenever
they come to its attention.
THE POST-ELECTION SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE
38. Post-election, the reality in Zimbabwe is that
Robert Mugabe remains in power. However, that he had to resort
to illegal and violent methods in order to remain in power demonstrates
his weakness. Beset by a strong, if battered, political opposition,
by a failing economy, by the effects of drought and of his own
policies on food supply, and by pressures from other African leaders,
he knows that sooner or later he must either cede power or reach
an accommodation with his opponents. Talks between ZANU-PF and
the MDC began shortly after the election, were adjourned, but
then were not resumed on 13 May as had been planned.[38]
39. It appears that neither ZANU-PF nor the MDC was
committed to the talks process. Richard Dowden suggested that
"It is purely imposed from the outside. I would have thought
Mr Mugabe would be happy to accept that, if that is the price
he has to pay, if as a consequence of outside pressure he has
to delegate someone to talk to the MDC. Neither the MDC nor ZANU
has any interest in these talks whatever. There is no internal
dynamic which should bring them together, the MDC sticks to its
line that it wants the election re-run under international supervision
and it will not join a government of national unity."[39]
The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative told us that "Neither
party is much interested in genuine power-sharing."[40]
40. In a Report produced in June 2002, the International
Crisis Group recommended that the international community should
"focus efforts... on getting ZANU-PF back to the table with
the MDC and both parties to negotiate in good faith" to hold
fresh elections.[41]
However, we fear that the well-intentioned efforts of the Presidents
of South Africa and Nigeria to broker a deal between two unwilling
parties were probably doomed to fail. It is clear from the words
of a prominent member of the MDC in evidence to us that the opposition's
patience is running out:
"If we are denied a re-run of the elections...
we will have no other choice but to go onto the streets and confront
this government. We have striven for three years to avoid this,
we have held our members back from violence of any kindeven
self protection. But this option is now running out of time. Should
we be forced to take to the streets there will be bloodshed and
the image of southern Africa will be further tarnished. It will
also make a transfer of power through democratic means less likely."[42]
41. The probably irretrievable failure of the inter-party
talks symbolises the current disengagement between the parties
in Zimbabwe and the lack of a functioning political process through
which dissent can be channelled peacefully. There are no indications
of progress, no signs of hope that a process of dialogue can achieve
a peaceful transition of power. And all the indications are that,
in the words of Richard Dowden, "It is going to get much,
much worse. I do not think it is just going to go quiet. I think
it will all blow up again."[43]
42. As Feargal Keane told us: "In all of this
let us remember one fundamental: change in Zimbabwe, the change
of government in Zimbabwe, will be brought about by Zimbabweans."[44]
The central dilemma for the United Kingdom and other concerned
observers of the situation in Zimbabwe, is to decide what they
can do to assist the people of Zimbabwe, without being counterproductive.
We consider that dilemma and the role of the United Kingdom, the
Commonwealth and Zimbabwe's fellow African states in the following
sections.
6 See www.zanupfpub.co.zw/history.html. Back
7
Robert Mugabe was the leader of the Shona-dominated Zimbabwe
African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU-PF). The other
main armed faction, the mainly Ndebele Zimbabwe African Peoples
Union (PF-ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, eventually merged with ZANU-PF
in 1987. Back
8
See Ev 28. Back
9
Official Report, 12 May 2000, col 493. Back
10
Compulsory acquisition of land was neither a new concept in Zimbabwe,
nor a particularly old one. Cecil Rhodes acquired mineral rights
over huge areas of land in 1889 by means of an unequal treaty
with King Lobengula. In the 1930s, the colonial administration
in Southern Rhodesia passed the Land Apportionment Acts, which
allocated the most fertile areas of land for settlement by Europeans
only. The 1992 Act discontinued application of the willing buyer,
willing seller principle and provided for the Government of Zimbabwe
to list farms which would be subject to acquisition by the black
rural poor. Back
11
These facts and others in paragraphs 7 to 13 have been taken
from the FCO's country profile of Zimbabwe, the full text of which
may be found on the FCO's website at www.fco.gov.uk. The US State
Department profile is also useful and may be accessed from www.state.gov. Back
12
Minutes of Evidence taken on 22 May 2000, HC 1999-2000 447-ii,
Q125. Back
13
See Ev 23. Back
14
See Zimbabwe country profile on FCO website (www.fco.gov.uk). Back
15
According to the United Nations Development Programme: see www.undp.org/rba/pubs/landreform.pdf. Back
16
Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes of Evidence taken on 22 May
2000, HC 1999-2000 447-ii, Q125. Back
17
Ibid, Q126. Back
18
For the text of the Abuja Agreement and related documents, see
the Foreign Affairs Committee's Fourth Report, Session 2001-2002,
Zimbabwe, HC 456. Back
19
Q100. Back
20
QQ51-54. Back
21
Q80. Back
22
Q19. Back
23
QQ80-81. Back
24
See Fourth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session
2000-2001, Government Policy towards the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Wider Region following the Fall of Milosevic,
HC 246. Back
25
Q15. Back
26
According to the FCO country profile on Zimbabwe. See www.fco.gov.uk. Back
27
Q7. Back
28
Zimbabwe Presidential Election 9 to 11 March 2002, Report
of the Commonwealth Observer Group, Commonwealth Secretariat,
15 March 2002. Back
29
See Ev 25. Back
30
See Ev 49. Back
31
For a summary of countries and observer teams' reactions to the
elections see Official Report, 5 July 2002, col 635W. Back
32
Official Report, 14 March 2002, col 1035. Back
33
Official Report, 25 June 2002, col 810. Back
34
Q29. Back
35
Q19. Back
36
Most recently, on 14 and 21 March 2002. Back
37
On 25 June 2002. Back
38
See http://www.mdczimbabwe.com/currstmts.htm. Back
39
Q5. Back
40
See Ev 23. Back
41
Zimbabwe: what next?, International Crisis Group, 14 June
2002. Back
42
See Ev 23. Back
43
Q32. Back
44
Q45. Back