APPENDIX 8
Memorandum from Action for Southern African
(ACTSA)
1. ACTION FOR
SOUTHERN AFRICA
1.1 Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) is
the successor organisation to the Anti-Apartheid Movement. As
a mass movement mobilising and representing progressive internationalist
opinion amongst the British public, we have a long history of
solidarity with the people of Southern Africa in their struggles
for democratic self-government.
1.2 Since the end of apartheid we have continued
to work closely with the governments and people of the region
to promote peace, democracy and development within the Southern
Africa Development Community (SADC). Our main focus is on lobbying
the British Government, the EU and other international bodies
to secure progressive policies towards the region.
1.3 ACTSA has worked with Zimbabwean civil
society organisations to raise awareness within the UK of their
perspectives on the crisis. We have hosted a number of delegations
of key civil society representatives to the UK and Brussels—including
representatives from the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA),
the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Crisis in
Zimbabwe Coalition (CZC). We have organised for these delegations
to:
— address public meetings;
— brief civil society groups in the
UK, including Churches, Trade Unions and NGOs;
— brief the media, Parliamentarians,
Ministers and officials representing the FCO and DFID in the UK,
the EU and the Commonwealth.
1.4 ACTSA welcomes the Foreign Affairs Committee's
decision to carry out an inquiry into UK Foreign Policy towards
Zimbabwe. We would like to submit, for the Committee's consideration,
the following comments. These comments do not purport to represent
the views of the above-mentioned Zimbabwean organisations, although
they are informed by ACTSA's relationships with them. We would
encourage the Committee to seek submissions of evidence directly
from Zimbabwean Government, Opposition and civil society sources.
2. UNDERSTANDING
THE CRISIS
IN ZIMBABWE
2.1 History hangs heavily over Zimbabwe.
The current political struggle within the country is deeply informed
by differing understandings of the political legacy of the liberation
struggle—a struggle which lives vividly in the minds and
lives of many Zimbabweans, who continue to work for the realisation
of its goals. These goals however, are hotly disputed between
those who focus principally on "redistributive" aspects,
particularly on land reform, and those who also focus on the civil
and political "rights"—to free association, speech
and the vote. The current impasse between these two traditions
involves an attempt to dominate historical memory of the causes
and demands of the struggle. Engagement with the situation therefore
requires a sensitive understanding of the dynamics of this debate.
2.2 This submission therefore presents a
sketch of the development of the crisis, including an analysis
of the role played by international actors, before providing a
number of recommendations for UK policy towards the country. UK
policy needs to be informed by a clear analysis of the historical
roots of the crisis—and the responsibilities and lessons
for future policy which this history implies. It is therefore
tragic that the crisis has been portrayed in the British media,
and in much parliamentary debate, primarily as a question of "Mugabe
versus the white farmers". This analysis misreads the extent,
nature, causes and, therefore, solution to the crisis.
2.3 The diplomatic policies which the UK
should adopt to contribute to the international isolation of an
illegitimate regime and the solution of the crisis will be undermined
if Britain fails to learn the lessons of history. This implies:
— Respecting the need for a solution
to the crisis that results from an internal political process
reflecting the needs and perspectives of Zimbabwean people.
— Recognising that a solution to the
crisis will not be achieved through Euro-American pressure and
that international engagement with Zimbabwe must be led by regional
actors and multilateral bodies.
— Respecting the deep suspicions within
the region towards British motives in Zimbabwe, resulting from
its colonial legacy and its continuing economic stake in the minority
white domination of key parts of the economy.
— Recognising that inequality and underdevelopment,
for which the international community bears a significant responsibility,
must be addressed if a lasting solution is to be found. Future
economic support for reconstruction and development should be
provided without attaching the kind of strict economic conditions
which have contributed to Zimbabwe's economic collapse.
3. LIBERATION
STRUGGLE CONTEXT
3.1 The overthrow of white minority rule
in Rhodesia was not only a victory for the Zimbabwean liberation
movements, but a critical turning point in the other struggles
in the region. Up to 80,000 Zimbabweans died in the fight for
freedom (which also included military action against the apartheid
regime and the Rhodesian-sponsored Renamo terrorism in Mozambique).
Independent Zimbabwe's continuing solidarity with the struggles
in South Africa and Namibia cost it dear in more lives and economic
hardship.
3.2 This history stands in stark contrast
to many of the western nations who stood by or actively supported
the apartheid regime, but are quick today to comment on "defending
democracy" in the region. It continues to cast a heavy shadow
over international attempts to promote democracy and human rights
in the region.
3.3 Zimbabwe made significant strides in
social provision and economic development in the period after
independence—little of which is recognised in the current
public debate about Zimbabwe. Between 1980 and 1990, real spending
on health more than doubled, on primary education nearly tripled,
infant mortality fell from 88 to 61 per 1,000 and literacy levels
increased dramatically. Government support for the vast expansion
of peasant-produced maize became a model quoted for famine-wracked
African states. Throughout this period, Zimbabwe facing destabilisation
from the apartheid regime in South Africa (implying a 10 per cent
of GDP defence spend), and the burden of paying off what many
consider the "odious debts" racked up by the UDI regime
(a further 5 per cent of GDP). Despite this, Zimbabwe enjoyed
economic growth rates of between 4-5 percent throughout the 1980s.
4. STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT, POLITICAL
OPPOSITION AND
ESCALATING REPRESSION
4.1 From 1987, Zimbabwe's donors, led by
the UK and US, started to use the country's aid dependency to
press for economic liberalisation. As the debt crisis bit in the
early 1990s, Zimbabwe was forced to engage with the IMF. ESAP
1, the country's first Structural Adjustment Programme arrived
in 1992.
4.2 The impact of liberalisation on the
Zimbabwean economy and people has been utterly devastating. Draconian
prescriptions resulting from ESAP led to food and fuel price increases,
massive private and public sector job cuts, a collapse in manufacturing
output, drastic cuts in public spending and soaring inflation
and interest rates. Between 1990 to 1995, Zimbabwe's GDP collapsed
20 per cent, and massive de-industrialisation drove unemployment,
the decimation of wages, and a rapid shift to the informal sector.
In the same period, indebtedness increased 55 per cent. Between
1994 and 1998, the debt treadmill sped up. In that period, Zimbabwe
paid $910 million more than it received in new loans, but the
debt itself went up from $4.52 billion to $4.72 billion. In 1998,
the last full year in which Mugabe authorised repayment of the
foreign debt, there was only one other country in the world (Brazil)
paying higher debt-servicing charges in relation to ability to
earn exports.
4.3 The process of adjustment and recession
imposed on Zimbabwe reversed post-independence social and economic
gains for ordinary Zimbabweans. It was the response to these growing
social hardships that gave birth to popular mobilisation against
the government, led by the trade unions through the ZCTU. As then
ZCTU and SATUCC secretary-general Morgan Tsvangirai told the 1998
ACTSA Trade Union Seminar, long before the birth of an opposition
party was on the agenda: "For Southern African trade unions,
confronting globalisation has meant not only raising the conditions
of workers, but of the poor as a whole—and so to wider struggles
over public accountability and human rights. When they do this,
unions are harassed and accused by governments of going outside
their traditional role of negotiating wages. New labour struggles
in our region are for national and international reforms to give
the marginalised a just share of resources."
4.4 Ever since independence, ZANU adopted
a wide range of measures to secure its political hegemony in the
new state vis-a"-vis the other liberation movement organisations.
Political conflicts had been a serious feature going back to the
split from ZAPU in 1963—including the brutal 1982 to 1987
repression of unrest in Matabeleland by the Zimbabwean army's
notorious Fifth Brigade.
4.5 Despite the privations experienced by
the majority of Zimbabweans under ESAP, in the absence of effective
political opposition. Zanu-PF had found a mass-based constituency
surplus to requirements. In response to growing protests in the
1990s, the Government did appear to waiver in its support for
structural adjustment, but decided to continue, and instead to
meet opposition with growing restrictions. Such moves were, if
anything, approved by developed countries—again the same
ones who now praise the same civil society for its defence of
democracy against government repression. All this laid the ground
for the serious further deterioration into the current crisis.
4.6 The period 1997-2002 marked a significant
rupture in Zimbabwean politics. Tensions inherent in the post-colonial
settlement; between democracy and authoritarian leadership of
Zanu-PF, between non-racialism and an increasingly desperate appeal
for land-redistribution, and between a declared socialist orientation
and broadly liberal economic framework (shaped by ESAP) have unravelled
spectacularly. The state, itself chronically weakened by ESAP,
has been unable to respond and a broad-based "anti-Mugabe"
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has engaged Zanu-PF in a
tense political struggle.
4.7 Facing an unexpected electoral contest,
the regime finally reversed the direction of travel, defaulting
on international debts, abandoning and denouncing ESAP and adopted
a series of economically contradictory measures designed to shore-up
electoral support and elite unity:
— Veterans of the liberation war, who
had become disgruntled at their own political marginalisation
within Zanu-PF, took to the streets in a series of political protests,
forcing the Government to cut a deal with the leadership of the
war veterans.
— Zanu-PF attempted to remobilise the
peasantry around the demand for land reform. The politics of land
were increasingly defined in political debate as the core issue
of Zimbabwean politics. Militarised war veterans and youth brigades
were employed to lead land invasions, whilst police and the armed
forces looked on. This process represented a desperate attempt
to try and show the rural poor that—after all the broken
promises of land redistribution—real action was now going
to be taken. And, perhaps more importantly, that as a number of
white commercial farmers had started to declare their support
for the MDC, political opposition to Zanu-PF control would be
blocked.
— Zimbabwe engaged in an economically
ruinous regional security expedition in the Congo war—securing
interests for the state elite, and winning significant regional
solidarity within the SADC Security Organ.
— The Government also engaged in a
process of heightening racialised rhetoric, for both domestic
and international consumption, defining domestic and international
opposition as racially motivated. Specifically, the Government
pointed up white domestic and international contacts and backing
for the new opposition.
4.8 Throughout this period, civil society
mobilisation increased and political repression intensified. The
Parliamentary elections and the Constitutional Referendum in 2000,
and most seriously the March 2002 Presidential elections were
marred by state sponsored processes of torture, intimidation and
political violence directed at opposition supporters. This process
has been well documented, and we will not attempt to detail it
here. Suffice to say, it seems clear that we cannot accept the
legitimacy of the current Zimbabwean Government and that international
community, including the UK Government, should work towards its
diplomatic isolation.
5. LAND
5.1 Fundamental to the roots of the crisis
is land. A history of land seizures by whites—which included
major further phases as late as the 1940s and 1950s where hundreds
of thousands of black people were evicted from white farms—meant
that by 1980 over half the country's land was owned by 6,000 white
commercial farmers in the prime areas. These included large areas
of un- or under-utilised land. Most of the black population was
crowded into Native Reserves (now Communal Areas) on low quality
land. The drive to overturn this grotesque injustice was at the
heart of the liberation struggle, the political objectives of
all the liberation movements and the negotiations for the final
independence agreement.
5.2 Critical here was the insistence of
the then new Thatcher government on the Zimbabweans guaranteeing
existing property rights (so freezing the legacy of colonial injustice)
and that land would only be exchanged on a "willing seller,
willing buyer" basis within the 10 year Lancaster House agreement.
In exchange the British would pay for half the costs of the land
transfer programme. Only under-utilised land could be compulsorily
acquired—but at the full market price and paid in foreign
exchange. In addition the question of British aid for the costs
of the critical infrastructure and support needed to make any
resettlement programme real is the subject of much dispute and
allegations of duplicity by the British—given the broad
assurances that were given by British and US officials at the
time and the figures which were discussed, but never tied down,
at the time.
5.3 The terms of the agreement put forward
by the British severely constrained the practical scope for any
significant land reform—a point that, again, is rarely mentioned
in public debate about the issue. Combined with the new Zimbabwean
Government's policy of reconciliation with the whites in a bid
to stop the mass exodus experienced in neighbouring post-independence
Mozambique, land programmes were slow—though some did show
success.
5.4 After the expiry of the Lancaster House
Agreement, a cycle of increasing government rhetoric about speeding
up land reform featured at politically significant points, especially
elections, but in practice progress remained slow. Increasingly
grants of land to politically-favoured large-scale farmers also
took place. In 1996 a Zimbabwean land commission produced further
proposals and in 1998 the Government and donors signed up to a
further programme of reform and the principles upon which it should
be based. This did produce a practical plan for a phased expansion
of land reform—though fundamentally it was still framed
within the same rules of the game established at Lancaster House.
5.5 But, by this point, the wider popular
pressure on the Government was growing, as charted above. In 1997
the first major moves by the Government to take land more directly
occurred with proposals to acquire 1,471 farms—which sent
shock waves out internationally, but ran into legal obstacles.
Then the Government's attempt to push through constitutional changes
to allow appropriation of land were thwarted by the "no"
vote in the February 2000 referendum. The process has since escalated
significantly with the official sanctioning of the violent farm
occupations by the war veterans and the Government's announcement
of the implementation of a "fast-track" land-redistribution
programme. There has been little planning or resources for the
infrastructure needed to make it work in practice—sparking
fears that those settled will not be able to farm properly and
of a major breakdown in food production. Thousands of farm-workers
have also been displaced from the commercial farms and face severe
economic hardship.
5.6 The chaotic and politicised nature of
the current process should not blind us to the massive land problem
in Zimbabwe, the necessity of finding a long-term solution to
the problem and vital British responsibility to support the process.
DFID's present position is that "the principles agreed in
the 1998 Land Conference should be observed. The UK is prepared
to fund schemes that are focused on helping the poor and are transparent".
But the scale of the cash commitment by Britain to back this is
still unclear. As the Financial Times noted recently: "The
total international assistance has fallen well short of the $2
billion once envisaged and donors refuse to put a figure to the
amount that could be available. Mr Mugabe has let them off the
hook by mismanaging the economy and allocating farms to henchmen
and cronies, but the spirit, if not the letter, of the Lancaster
House agreement has been broken." The Crisis in Zimbabwe
Coalition recently noted that, "the Government has the high
moral ground in some ways, given the inability of the British
Government to respect its commitments from the Lancaster House
Conference which opened the way for Zimbabwean independence. The
process continues therefore to be stuck between the British dodging
of its commitments, government's lack of transparency, the commercial
farmers' blinkered view of the issue and a large but voiceless
majority in favour of redressing the ills of the past."
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR UK POLICY
TOWARDS ZIMBABWE
6.1 We have made the argument that the greatest
mistake the UK could make in relation to Zimbabwe would be to
ignore the lessons and impacts of history and to fall into a "colonial"
pose. To do so plays into the hands of the regime. As was seen
during the election campaign, Mugabe can effectively motivate
political support by demonising the UK's historic and contemporary
role. It is therefore deeply concerning that Members contributing
to debates within Westminster Hall have approached this issue
as though it were an academic concern driven by liberal sensitivities.
Members have allowed these debates to be dominated by the concerns
of British land-owners, businesses and passport holders, involving
at their worst, comparisons between Mugabe and Hitler, and demands
for armed intervention in the country. Zimbabwe's independence
struggle was extremely bitter, and the memory of the period lives
vividly in the minds of many Zimbabweans. To dismiss such concerns
as post-colonial hang-ups displays a chronic insensitivity.
6.2 Happily, British Ministers have broadly
recognised this reality, and have generally respected the fact
that careless rhetoric can have damaging diplomatic and political
outcomes. Foreign Office Ministers have described five principles
underlining British policy towards Zimbabwe. They can be paraphrased
as follows:
1. Britain is interested in seeing a stable,
prosperous and democratic Zimbabwe.
2. Zimbabweans deserve and should get the
help of the international community.
3. Zimbabwe's future prosperity depends on
respect for the rule of law and an end to political violence.
4. Britain will help Zimbabwe to achieve
prosperity through successful land reform.
5. The future of Zimbabwe should be left
in the hands of the people of Zimbabwe. They should be given a
genuine opportunity to make their voice heard.
6.3 Ministers have also recognised the importance
of taking a multilateral approach to dealing with Zimbabwe. The
Foreign Secretary addressing the Commons on 8 January 2002, recognised
the danger of playing "into Mugabe's hands so that he can
parade himself as the anti-colonialist hero against the former
colonialist power." And argued, "I have been trying
to ensure that Zimbabwe, not Britain, is isolated for the terrible
actions that President Mugabe and his henchmen are taking. Our
approach has been to internationalise the issue, while taking
a firm lead within all the international forums in which we speak."
6.4 Whilst ACTSA is broadly supportive to
these lines, it is essential to recognise that where pride, a
sense of moral superiority or defence of perceived British interests
in Zimbabwe have been allowed to influence policy pronouncements,
damaging mistakes have been made. Similarly, the line between
"taking a firm lead" in international forums, and risking
accusations of imperial arrogance can be a fine one.
6.5 For example, the EU's high-handed approach
to be process of election observation in Zimbabwe and stubbornness
over the selection of particular nationalities and personalities
within the EU team played into the hands of the Zimbabwean Government.
It is unclear what the British role in this process was, but the
withdrawal of the observer mission resulted in considerably less
effective process of election observation than might otherwise
have been the case. The episode clearly reflected the predominance
of the political needs of EU member states over the clearly expressed
wishes of the Zimbabwean opposition and civil society organisations
to have observers in place to limit violence and abuses during
the election period.
6.6 Similarly, the adoption and promotion
by the UK of an "aggressive" positioning ahead of CMAG
negotiations enabled Mugabe to claim that "non-white"
countries within the Commonwealth were being railroaded into support
for suspension. This trend was also evident in reports that the
UK had used heavy-handed threats to the funding of the New Partnership
for African Development (NEPAD) to lever South Africa towards
agreeing to suspension. The actual or perceived black-white split
resulting from this approach has damaged the effectiveness of
the Commonwealth in relation to Zimbabwe and has informed subsequent
failure of other international diplomatic processes. Moves within
the UN human rights machinery were frustrated by African nations
in the face of what appeared to be overwhelmingly Western Government
and non-governmental pressure. Appearance are important.
6.7 ACTSA believes that the UK should, in
the short-term, continue to support efforts to isolate Zimbabwe
within the international arena. This needs to involve the maintenance
of a strategy of "quiet diplomacy". UK policy should
be informed by ongoing dialogue and consultation with a wide range
of Zimbabwean stakeholders, including particularly representative
groups within civil society and the labour movement.
6.8 The UK must allow a domestic political
process to drive the ongoing inter-party dialogue. This should
include resisting the temptation to increase diplomatic pressure
on African mediators of the inter-party dialogue through threats
to Western support for NEPAD at the G8 meeting in June.
6.9 The UK should encourage the international
humanitarian and diplomatic community to remain engaged with the
country. This will involve supporting efforts to secure the safety
of the large number of displaced people in the country. The UK
should provide famine relief, taking appropriate steps to ensure
distribution occurs in a non-partisan manner. The UK should not
seek to use the humanitarian crisis as a lever in political negotiations.
6.10 The UK should prioritise the following
concerns in discussions over the conditions for Zimbabwe's future
re-admittance to the Councils of the Commonwealth:
— the immediate return to respect for
human rights and the rule of law;
— the establishment of institutional
arrangements suitable for the realisation of the democratic rights
of the Zimbabwean population;
— the immediate cessation of all organised
violence and torture;
— the immediate disbanding of all militia
and in particular youth militia;
— the restoration of non-partisan enforcement
of the law by the police;
— the prosecution of all those involved
in human rights violations;
— the repeal of all draconian legislation,
including the Public Order and Security Act, the Access to Information
and Protection of Privacy Act, and the "Harmonised"
Labour Act;
— the suspension of the use by the
President of his powers under the Presidential Powers (Temporary
Measures) Act.
6.11 These diplomatic policies will be undermined
if Britain fails to learn the lessons of history. This implies:
— Respecting the need for a solution
to the crisis that results from an internal political process
reflecting the needs and perspectives of Zimbabwean people.
— Recognising that a solution to the
crisis will not be achieved through Europe-American pressure and
that international engagement with Zimbabwe must be led by regional
actors and multilateral bodies.
— Repecting the deep suspicions within
the region towards British motives in Zimbabwe, resulting from
its colonial legacy and its continuing economic stake in the minority
white domination of key parts of the economy.
— Recognising that inequality and underdevelopment,
for which the international community bears a significant responsibility,
must be addressed if a lasting solution is to be found. Future
economic support for reconstruction and development should be
provided without attaching the kind of strict economic conditions
which have contributed to Zimbabwe's economic collapse.
Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA)
May 2002
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