APPENDIX 6
Memorandum from ArmorGroup Services Limited
A CONTRACTOR'S VIEW
This document is presented to the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the House of Commons sitting to consider the Green
Paper on Private Military Companies. It is a shortened version
of the positional paper submitted by the company to the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office in May 2002 and is directed at the two
key issues of "licensing requirements for bona fide suppliers
of services to the government of the United Kingdom" and
of "restricting uncontrolled elements". This paper is
offered as a brief to the Committee from an experienced provider
of contract security services. It is not a definitive paper, nor
does it represent any market view other than that held by ArmorGroup.
FOREWORD
1. The British Government has published
a Green Paper outlining options for the control of private military
companies which operate in territories outside the jurisdiction
of the British Government, in response to a recommendation for
such made by the Foreign Affairs Committee in its report on Sierra
Leone (HC116-1).
2. The Green paper is a discussion document
that encourages interested parties to engage in dialogue with
or to make comment on pertinent matters to the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office. The Green Paper discusses matters that are of interest
to ArmorGroup and the Green Paper specifically makes mention of
Defence Systems Limited ("DSL"), which is a subsidiary
company of ArmorGroup.
3. ArmorGroup welcomes the publication of
this Paper and accepts the inevitability of inaccuracy in its
content at this early stage of discussion. ArmorGroup also agrees
with the tone of the Green paper and sees it as a most suitable
catalyst for all-party discussion on the subject matter.
ARMOR DEFINITIONS
4. Armor Holdings Inc: a public company
registered in the United States of America, whose headquarters
is in Jacksonville, Florida and whose stock is traded on the New
York Stock Exchange under indicator "AH".
5. ArmorGroup: the security services
division of Armor Holdings Inc. Two other divisions, Products
and Mobile Security, produce less-than-lethal munitions, body
armour and other law enforcement products and armoured executive
saloons, police, cash in transit and military vehicles. ArmorGroup
is headquartered in Buckingham Gate, London and co-ordinates the
activities of its 40 regional offices, its 9,000 employees and
its service lines, which include risk management, guard services,
integrated security systems, investigation, landmine clearance
and humanitarian support services.
6. Armor Holdings Limited: the top
UK registered company in ArmorGroup, whose board of directors
co-ordinates the activities of Armor Group subsidiary companies
and operations.
7. Defence Systems Limited ("DSL"):
a company registered in England and Wales with its principal office
in Buckingham Gate, London. DSL is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Armor Holdings Limited and is the contracted security services
division of ArmorGroup. DSL was formed in 1981, was acquired by
Armor Holdings Inc in 1997 and provides some of the services that
are the subject of the Green Paper. DSL changed its name to "ArmorGroup
Services Limited" on 16 January 2002 to bring it in line
with Armor policy on marketing and integration.
8. For clarity this paper will refer to
DSL where that company was engaged in a historic context, and
to ArmorGroup in the present.
OTHER DEFINITIONS
9. Mercenaries: ArmorGroup is aware
that a great many media reporters and academics earn their living
and educational qualifications through their pursuit of "mercenary
matters". Each student of the subject has a unique interpretation
of the word. Intellectual institutions and international agencies
have endeavoured to define the word before and now, but ArmorGroup
accepts that the public perception of a mercenary is, and is likely
to remain, "a soldier of unreliable ethics hired in foreign
service to fight for significant reward". ArmorGroup will
not contribute to a futile debate on the definition of the word
mercenary. ArmorGroup does accept, for the purpose of this exercise,
the legal definition given in Article 47 of the First Additional
Protocol of 1997 to the Geneva Convention shown in clause five
of the Green Paper. ArmorGroup does come into contact with mercenaries
from time to time and has necessarily studied the character and
motives of mercenaries, who have on occasion operated in the same
theatre as ArmorGroup, albeit in a very different way and for
different reasons.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Overview
10. ArmorGroup is in favour of the regulation
of exports of military services through a system of licensing
contracts. It may be possible to tag this on to current legislation
for regulating arms exports rather than developing new legislation.
11. ArmorGroup contends that the use of
large-scale corporate entities to prosecute war is a phenomenon
that made only a brief appearance in the mid-1990s through the
now defunct Executive Outcomes. The prosecution of war for profit
is now largely the preserve of individuals or small groups from
poorly regulated national jurisdictions to other similar jurisdictions.
12. Despite the small scale of the illegitimate[13]
trade in military combat services[14],
ArmorGroup recognises the export and use of such services as morally
reprehensible, and, as such, the elimination of this trade is
the legitimate concern of government and public alike.
13. ArmorGroup does not accept that the
private sector can field "combat troops", but its experience
in the provision of support to the United Nations and UK Government
agencies clearly demonstrates that the private sector can provide
cost effective, efficient and accountable third line support to
legitimate military operations. This support includes the provision
of armed security guards for the protection of key persons and
installations to free up the government's "combat troops".
14. Nevertheless, ArmorGroup believes that
public Sector/private sector partnerships (PPP) can be successfully
employed to deliver legitimate peace support operations, to enable
and sustain legitimate security and law and order services, or
to train or support legitimate armed forces. Such partnerships
are to be encouraged as a means to build economically sustainable
capacity to help prevent conflict and to encourage peace and stability
world-wide.
15. However, ArmorGroup believes that so
long as the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate security
and military services remains unclear to either government or
the public, this will not be possible. Stereotyping, sensationalisation,
polemic and dogma unhealthily restrict the debate on private sector
involvement in the delivery of public sector or multilateral security
services. A focus on illegitimate "mercenary" activities
has characterised the debate and hindered objective research and
unblinkered analysis of the subject in recent times.
16. Therefore, ArmorGroup believes that
in addition to controlling illegitimate trade in combat services,
some form of regulation will help open up the debate on PPP in
the provision of UK supported international peace support and
security operations and dispel unfounded fears about the use of
commercial services to support, or in certain fields replace[15]
the use of public sector armed forces and security services. Most
importantly, it should neutralise misinformed or dogmatic positions,
ultimately allowing UK Government to make best use of contracted
services in support of initiatives to create or ensure international
peace and stability.
OPTIONS FOR
REGULATION
17. ArmorGroup has considered the options
for regulation broadly described in paragraph 7 to Annex C to
the Green Paper and holds the following views on each.
18. ArmorGroup considers Option (a)an
outright ban on military activity abroad to be uneconomic in terms
of British business, governmental and defence interests. It would
also be morally unjustifiable given a nation's right to defend
itself from aggression. Finally it would be ineffective where
organisations are registered and exist, or where "mercenaries"
reside outside UK jurisdication.
19. ArmorGroup considers Option (b)a
ban on recruitment for military activity abroad misses the point
and will prove expensive to police for such a small-scale concern.
Better the threat of an International Tribunal for breach of human
rights in a conflict zone, or UK courts where British subjects
are alleged to have committed an offence under English Law.
20. ArmorGroup considers Option (c)a
licensing regime for military services to be the most feasible
and effective option. It should operate in a similar way to the
current regime for licensing military exports (indeed certain
military services can simply be added to current legislation).
However, as a note of caution, ArmorGroup recognises that a poorly
conceived[16]
or inadequately administered regime could easily cripple speed
of response, which is a key value of contracted security services.
21. ArmorGroup considers Option (d)for
registration and notification is too closely allied to Option
(c) for separate consideration. Notification without licence will
offer up another obstacle to UK companies engaged in a competitive,
time sensitive bid for legitimate services. This gives the edge
to foreign organisations, particularly from the US who can act
on immediate response from the US government within the context
of their licence.
22. ArmorGroup considers Option (e)a
general licence for PMCs/PSCs to be closely allied to Option (c)
but less effective. An open licence might be no more relevant
than a New York vehicle licence plate in Mogadishu. Why bother?
It is the nature of the proposed activity allied to the identity
of the region and context that is the issue, not the entity. It
must be the context that is regulated, therefore, not the participant.
AmorGroup would certainly see an open licence for services provided
to designated organisations including the United Nations, European
Commission, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or UK Ministry
of Defence and/or their respective subsidiary agencies.
23. ArmorGroup considers Option (f)self-regulation:
a voluntary code of conduct to be attractive in as much as a code
may be easily followed, or not followed dependent upon the mood.
Nevertheless, such a regime would fail to meet the needs of the
government, and fail to placate critics of PMCs and mercenaries.
This Option is therefore discounted.
24. Consideration has been given to licensing
the individual participant rather than the company, which is not
seen by ArmorGroup to be practical. It is the company that enters
into a contract with the client and the company that must enforce
standards of performance of its employees. The maintenance of
a contingent of licensed and prospective employees is not feasible
where the company is not certain what trades it will be requested
to provide. In Yugoslavia ArmorGroup provided support staff from
24 countries under nearly 100 different job descriptions ranging
from communications, through civil engineering to quality assurance,
as well as drivers, mechanics and security staff. Individual licences
simply could not be granted in the short time that they are required
(days on occasion, rather than weeks) by the client to deploy.
LICENSING MECHANISMS
25. ArmorGroup does not view itself as a
Private Military Company. ArmorGroup is a risk management company
and there is nothing whatsoever illegitimate or "mercenary"
(in the popular sense of the term) about its contracts, services
or employees. ArmorGroup, and in particular its subsidiary ArmorGroup
Services Limited (formerly Defence Systems LimitedDSL)
is a provider of contracted risk management services; services
that are limited in extent by the controls and guidelines imposed
by itself or upon it by others.
26. In supporting an initiative to licence
military services, ArmorGroup acknowledges the UK Government's
interests, while recognising that no other option described will
have any impact on the "mercenaries", yet every other
option promises to waste time, energy and cost to no effect. The
process of legal definition will itself consume the careers of
lawyers and the government's budget, without satisfactory result.
It is, after all not necessary to register a company to fund,
recruit for and conduct a war.
27. ArmorGroup will leave it to the government
to define categories of military service to be licensed, but is
itself concerned with the fine, yet distinct line between legitimate
commercial security and/or military support services, and the
supply of uniformed and armed soldiers for the expressed purpose
of engaging in combat to alter a prevailing political or military
balance. It is, after all, the latter activity that gives rise
to public expression of concern.
28. ArmorGroup recommends that licences
for military activities be given in blanket form for services
provided to and carried out under the auspices of the UN, EC or
UK Government. Military services provided to US agencies should
be free from restriction save for a requirement for the company
to duly inform UK Government of its intention to provide certain
services to a US government agency before they are delivered.
29. ArmorGroup considers that parties like
the UN and EC will never be able to respond to an emergency if
key service providers are delayed by a ponderous bureaucracy seeking
to process a complex application. Any mechanism established to
administer regulation must be the subject of published performance
criteria so that a contractor may expect an answer to its application
within, say, 10 working days. Commercial bidding is an expensive
process, so it will be important for contractors to know that
their time-sensitive applications will be dealt with in a prompt
manner.
30. ArmorGroup considers that the introduction
of a self-regulating code of conduct will prove relatively straightforward
and a reasonable step towards regulation. Regulation will take
time to prepare and the subsequent establishment of controls even
slower.
31. Meanwhile, a voluntary code can clearly
lay down national expectation in line with the nation's moral
stance. British engagement in troubled regions is not the sole
prerogative of the British government. The general population
has its say with each citizen supporting the actions of humanitarian
agencies and NGOs, military units and negotiators, as they will.
The implications of a breach of a morally justifiable voluntary
code will prove to be a major motivator for compliance by any
company concerned for its reputation. Publicly broadcast breach
will lead to isolation and loss of business for offenders. Illegitimate
and/or immoral companies and individuals, for whom, and for whose
clients the matter of reputation is of lesser concern than the
promised financial return will continue their activities regardless
of national regulation.
32. ArmorGroup offers its resources to the
continuing debate on this matter and its relevant expertise to
the detail of any draft regulation.
33. ArmorGroup long ago reached the conclusion
that it needed to be clear about its business practices and its
ethics and it subsequently put in place clear guidelines and controls
to secure its reputation as a provider of quality, ethical services.
ArmorGroup is confident that it is a properly managed and entirely
compliant company offering premium services to respectable clients.
34. ArmorGroup clients, together with professional
bodies and academic institutions associated with it, including
the UK Government's Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department
for International Development, have reached the same conclusion
and make best use of the opportunity presented by a quality contractor
to supplement government resources.
35. ArmorGroup provides a range of services
unparalleled in the security industry. On the one hand it provides
contract security personnel and management and explosive ordnance
disposal services to commercial enterprise (mostly in an international
context). On the other hand it provides training, equipment and
facility management to armed forces. Finally it has particular
expertise in providing all these services to diplomatic missions,
UN agencies and NGOs.
36. ArmorGroup is part of a truly pan-Atlantic
commercial corporation which engages with the authorities of both
the United States of America and the United Kingdom, but which
maintains distinctly separate reporting lines to preserve the
national interests of either state. Collectively, however, ArmorGroup
is able to weigh up the relative merits of its role from the national
perspective of each state and is aware that US practice is further
developed when it comes to contracting out security and para-military
activity than it is in the UK.
37. ArmorGroup has the global presence to
observe private/commercial military activity first-hand in the
territories in which it operates, yet ArmorGroup does not believe
that there is a significant issue at the time of writing. Very
little significant "mercenary" activity currently takes
place and there appear to be very few actors on the corporate
stage. The EO and Sandline burst of activity in the early 1990s
appears to have subsided.
38. Thus, attention should now focus on
future developments; the single most important issue appears to
be the UK dilemma over the government's option to contract-out
military or security functions to the private sector. ArmorGroup
respects the dilemma posed and the safeguards that government
offices must require in the public interest. It is ArmorGroup's
experience that these functions can safely be contracted out to
the private sector without loss of state control. Examples of
success are myriad, while failures have been very few. One factor
that remains consistent throughout is cost with the private sector
offering significant reduction in cost over government services
(the one caveat to this being the need for the private sector
to be able to harness the expertise of former government servants.
A significant reduction in the numbers of a standing army has
a knock-on effect on the subsequent recruitment of basically trained
former soldiers by the private sector. This may be less of a problem
for states that have retained compulsory military service).
ENGAGEMENT
39. ArmorGroup welcomes the Green Paper
and the initiative created by it whereby interested parties are
invited to comment on the matter of the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office and Foreign Affairs Committee.
40. The Voluntary Code of Conduct is supported
by ArmorGroup, which by way of consultancy participated in the
preparation of the code. Again it is noteworthy that ArmorGroup
was not invited to comment on the code, or to participate in the
exercise as ArmorGroup in its own right even though ArmorGroup
is considered a major provider of the very services that are the
subject of the code.
41. ArmorGroup is a supplier of services
to UK Government agencies and to the United Nations and to many
of its established agencies and temporary missions, yet there
is still confusion within the offices of both organisations as
to whether ArmorGroup is a company of suitable standing to engage
with, let alone contract to. ArmorGroup is not viewed with ambiguity
by the US Departments of State and Defense.
42. ArmorGroup has maintained a policy of
positive engagement with interested parties since 1998 and decries
any attempt by any party to misuse information on the company
for any purpose, or to publish any erroneous material on the company,
or to make any defamatory statement about or accusation of any
kind against the company without having first given the company
an opportunity to comment on the matter. In line with this policy,
ArmorGroup routinely engages in dialogue with the following interested
parties.
(a) National: the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (UK), the Foreign Policy Centre (UK), The Department for
International Development (UK), The Department of State (USA)
and the Department of Defense (USA).
(b) Supra national: The United Nations and
its agencies, the European Union and its agencies.
(c) Human Rights: International Committee
of the Red Cross, Human Rights Watch, International Alert and
Amnesty International (restricted engagement).
(d) Others: Selected academia as individual
researchers and as institutions such as Cranfield University at
Shrivenham, objective media such as The Financial Times
and professional journals including Janes Information Group Limited.
ArmorGroup will only engage with parties
taking an impartial approach to a given subject with a view to
producing an objective conclusion. ArmorGroup will not engage
with parties seeking to support a pre-conceived opinion or to
publish subjective material. This necessarily rules out political
parties, certain pressure groups and non-government organisations
and irresponsible media.
EXPERIENCE AND
MISCONCEPTIONS
43. ArmorGroup believes that core issues
raised in the Green Paper for discussion cannot be successfully
tackled in an atmosphere of uncertainty and mistrust. Much has
been written of "mercenaries", "private military
companies" ("PMCs"), and "Private security
companies" and most of it is grossly exaggerated and inaccurate.
It is the very stuff of fantasy and thrives on the mystery ascribed
to it by uneducated commentary. The orderly archives of the company
and its relatively low turnover of senior executives ensure that
corporate memory is comprehensive and accurate. The company is
bound by confidentiality clauses with its clients, but is able
to disclose the type and location of its contracts and thus it
is prepared to disclose to approved interested parties the precise
nature of activity it has engaged in pertinent to the Green Paper.
By operating a policy of disclosure the company promotes free
debate on its business. The Green Paper attaches an Annex A that
describes mercenary/PMC interventions in Africa since the 1950s,
yet the list contains as many inaccuracies as are necessary to
invalidate its worth for anything other than a broad illustration
and introduction to the subject.
44. ArmorGroup therefore maintains its own
Annex A describing business activity in Africa that it feels may
be relevant to the debate, while excluding contracts that are
clearly of a commercial security nature only. Where similar activity
took place in other theatres outside Africa this too is included
as relevant to the debate.
45. Annex A is submitted to the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office for their record and to dispel the fears
of officials who may for lack of information have applied the
term "mercenary" to past DSL activity in Africa.
46. ArmorGroup takes exception to its inclusion
in Annex A to the Green Paper under a column entitled "Mercenaries
involved". ArmorGroup has no doubt those similarly legitimate
businesses will feel equally annoyed at this unjustifiable labelling.
A more appropriate heading might have been "Participants".
47. In addition to disclosure on its activity,
ArmorGroup can demonstrate a responsible attitude towards its
business through an explanation of key corporate functions. These
may not address the issue of licensing of PMCs et al, but
they do help explain why it is that ArmorGroup has been able to
steer clear of unethical and/or immoral activity, or any activity
that is contrary to the interests of the governments of the United
Kingdom and United States or to international human rights.
PERSONNEL AND
RECRUITMENT
48. ArmorGroup operates a quality management
system that features policies on employment and, in particular,
on recruitment. This latter policy is approved by the Board of
Directors of Armor Holdings limited and is managed by the Vice
President, Human Resources and Administration in conjunction with
a Human Resource Manager. The Vice President, Human Resources
and Administration is also the Company Secretary of all UK registered
group subsidiaries and sits on the executive management committee
of ArmorGroup.
49. This degree of participation in ArmorGroup
business by the Human Resources function reflects the value placed
by the board on the quality of manpower employed by the company.
The Human Resource function abides by the Recruitment Policy,
which specifically prohibits the recruitment of persons suspected
of mercenary activity and other such persons with a colourful
past, whose demonstrated personal conduct and morals displayed
abroad may be considered unreliable and whose assignment to a
client may prove an embarrassment to that client.
50. Candidates are vetted to determine their
reliability and ethical orientation and suitable employees then
fully documented. The Company traditionally employees former servicemen,
or skilled tradesmen and professionals whose worth has been proven
in hazardous circumstances through services with humanitarian
organisations. The company does not expose the unexposed to hazardous
conditions and the fallout rate of employees encountering conditions
that they cannot endure is minimal. The company also briefs new
employees on the reality of the situation to which the employee
is to be assigned and does not apply an unrealistic "gloss"
to the conditions, nor endeavour to "sell" the job.
51. ArmorGroup employees are recruited from
parts of the armed forces and government agencies that have required
them to be signatories to the Official Secrets Act. This degree
of confidentiality is owed to the government and is respected
by the company, which positively encourages compliance. ArmorGroup
does not knowingly employ actual or would-be authors, whose acts
or intentions mark them down as unreliable.
52. ArmorGroup is a popular employer, whose
employees tend to remain with it year after year. It is considered
to be a reliable payer, to be meticulous in the insurance arranged
for employees and to be supportive of employees in difficult times.
The effort put into employee conditions by the company pays dividends
in the recruitment of and the subsequent performance of quality
employees.
53. The conclusion reached by a number of
ill-informed "experts" that ArmorGroup is a private
military company by virtue of the quantity of former servicemen
employed on uniformed security tasks is countered by the company;
which cites the NGOs of countries (Scandinavia for example) that
continue to require their citizens to undergo compulsory military
service, as having a far greater proportion of former military
amongst their employees, yet which are not deemed to be military
companies. Indeed, the success of many NGO operations today may
be due to the mix of employee background including greater numbers
of commercial and former military managers to supplement logisticians.
PERSONAL CODES
OF CONDUCT
54. Employees of ArmorGroup are bound by
strict conditions to ensure that they are aware of their responsibilities
and aware of the consequences if conditions are breached. The
following measures are taken to ensure the standards of employee
performance:
(a) Service Agreement: issued to
all employees, this contract of employment defines the standard
of behaviour expected of employees and the disciplinary measures
that may be applied in the event of non-compliance.
(b) Staff Handbook: issued to all
employees, lays down rules and regulations governing the day-to-day
activity of employees at work.
(c) Code of Conduct: issued to all
employees serving outside the UK and US, lays down in ten pages
strict conditions for compliance with the laws of the host nation,
for respect of its culture for the issue and use of firearms,
and for the prohibition of any offensive action. The company commits
to assisting the host nation investigate breach of law and the
company commits to assisting international war crimes investigators.
(d) Client Codes: issued to employees
engaged by the company in support of United Nations peacekeeping
operations, or by UK Government departments. These codes and regulations
are comprehensive and any breach of them by an employee results
in disciplinary proceedings monitored by the client. Serious breaches
may give way to investigation by the authorities of host nations
and such investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the
degree of protection afforded the employee by the client's memorandum
of association or diplomatic status.
(e) Records: of employees, including
date of birth, National Insurance number, passport number and
address are maintained and can be used to support investigation
into subsequent allegation of breach of law by employees whilst
in the service of the company.
Conditions of service are strictly applied.
Offenders are warned of the consequences of repeated breach and/or
are discharged in accordance with their terms of employment. The
company does not hesitate to enforce carefully considered conditions
of service to protect its own reputation or that of its clients.
The company is also committed to co-operation with international
criminal investigators.
CORPORATE CODES
OF CONDUCT
55. The company further reinforces its moral
position by compliance with a number of published or self-expressed
codes of conduct.
(a) Code of Conduct of the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent: ArmorGroup voluntarily subscribes
to this code of conduct for humanitarian operators to demonstrate
its support for these principles of field operation. While the
company is not an NGO, and cannot therefore technically register
its support, the matter has been discussed with ICRC and its endorsement
approved in principle.
(b) Foreign and Corrupt Practices Act:
compliance is required of the parent company by the US government
and all ArmorGroup executives likely to be exposed to business
decisions governed by the Act are required to sign up to the Act.
(c) Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001: reinforces the above and creates an offence where
inducements are offered in any territory regardless of whether
it is within UK jurisdiction.
(d) Voluntary Principles on Security
and Human Rights: proposed by the Department of State and
seconded by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office this is a code
that was contributed to and which has been supported by ArmorGroup
every bit as much as it is by its designated overseers who comprise
a number of the company's major clients in the oil and gas extraction
sector.
(e) United Nations Mine Action Procedures:
the company helped compile these in 1995 and has been an exponent
of them and of the UN's pre-eminent position in this field of
activity ever since. The company's excellent safety record has
justified compliance with regulations to the letter.
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
56. ArmorGroup has evolved through several
marked stages since its establishment in 1981, from private ownership,
through UK corporate ownership, through ownership by management
and into public ownership with a US quoted corporation (www.armorholdings.com).
Its long-serving executives have been given the opportunity to
closely observe the effect of different management structures
and are pleased to note an increase in accountability with public
ownership. Thus, irrespective of new legislation brought in to
control the activities of mercenaries/PMCs, it can safely be said
that the following aspects of corporate life in a legitimate contractor
such as ArmorGroup will continue to provide the strictest degree
of accountability as is presently the case.
(a) Board of Directors: of Armor
Holdings Inc. and Armor Holdings Limited are principally drawn
from American and British executives who have no military background.
Indeed, the majority are professionally qualified lawyers or accountants.
Directors are now charged by law to be personally accountable
for all manner of matters including health and safety.
(b) Management: of ArmorGroup is
vested in an Executive Committee comprising core corporate executives
and regional management numbering twenty, whose nationalities
presently include American, British, Russian and New Zealand and
whose past service includes senior appointments in the military,
diplomatic and security services of those countries as well as
with international humanitarian agencies and NGOs. Such diversity
has its strength in that any deviation from corporate ethics on
the part of one or more would lead to rapid censure by the others.
(c) Shareholders: of Armor Holdings
Inc. take a closer interest in their investment of choice and
will not tolerate unethical activity. Armor Holdings stock presently
receives many recommendations from market analysts as an investment
of choice and it is a choice that attracts serious corporate investment.
(d) Auditors: always one of the big
five and presently PricewaterhouseCoopers. A complex international
structure spread across a number of tax regimes and using a multitude
of foreign currencies attracts a more diligent approach to audit
than lesser straightforward operations. ArmorGroup Services Limited
in particular has changed ownership three times in the past ten
years, attracting detailed due diligence by potential owners and
their lawyers, and necessitating the close scrutiny of every aspect
of the company and its activities.
(e) Security Exchange Commission:
the governing body of quoted US corporations, adds another layer
of control by requiring quarterly reporting in compliance with
strict conditions of trading protocol.
(f) National legislation: in the
US and UK, where the majority of Armor subsidiaries are registered,
requires proper disclosure of the details of stock holding, directors
and officers and of annual reports and accounts producing another
element of transparency. This is repeated overseas where Armor
subsidiary offices are required to comply with host nation legislation.
The company is also registered to comply with UK legislation governing
Data Protection and complies with laws on Employment, Health and
Safety.
(g) National security: ArmorGroup
has confidential contracts with sovereign governments that require
senior company executives to be given security clearance to high
levels. Possession of security classification is in itself a measure
of the reputation of management.
(h) Legal Counsel: is maintained
by Armor Holdings Inc. in-house, backed by firms of lawyers of
high repute in both UK and US jurisdictions. Thus the company
is properly represented and properly advised.
(i) Tax: is paid in the UK and US
and in all countries where subsidiaries are registered to comply
with host nation regulation. The company requires its tax liabilities
to be transparent.
(j) Insurers: are selected for their
reliability and market standing. The company places its insurance
requirements through the world's second largest broker and with
insurers having the expertise to properly rate the company's risk
and the capacity to withstand the liability. Armor Holdings maintains
high levels of insurance, the liability component of which is
placed with the world's largest carrier. Armor Holdings adopts
a policy of complete disclosure to its insurers, and has retained
its present broker for the past ten years.
(k) Clients: who exert the single
most powerful influence over the company's activity. "Reputation"
has become the key watchword in business and the need to protect
a reputation is the prime motivator towards legitimate and ethical
performance and service delivery. Loss of reputation is, in ArmorGroup's
business, always followed by a significant loss of business.
BUSINESS APPROACH
57. ArmorGroup, as a public company, is
required by its shareholders to bid for as much profitable business
as can be commercially handled and as can be managed to the high
standards adopted by the company without damage to reputation.
58. ArmorGroup is usually required to qualify
to bid for the majority of its business, on the strength of its
practical experience, its financial and resource base and its
excellent references going back several years. It then bids in
open competition for corporate and government contracts. The majority
of clients adopt strict and transparent bid assessment processes.
Where ArmorGroup wins a contract, that contract takes the form
of a written agreement, a copy of which must be made available
to company auditors.
59. ArmorGroup does not accept all work
offered to it. ArmorGroup has turned down requests to provide
pipeline security in a country where there was perceived to be
a conflict with human rights; to transport gold and diamonds where
the matter of ownership was unclear; to investigate individuals
where to do so would break the law; and to supply non-lethal equipment
to governments, where there was a chance that they may be used
to suppress democratic movements.
60. Competitive bidding ensures that costs,
including profit, are controlled by market forces. Salaries of
individual contractors are similarly competitive. Arrangements
for travel and accommodation are similarly modest. In addition
to low start-up and running costs, those for winding up the contract
are most advantageous to the client who will issue notice under
the terms of the contract and incur no further liability. Employees
will be laid off after due notice and repatriated. There are no
complex pension arrangements to wind up, nor expensive redundancies.
Employee salary rates will have included a provision for self-administered
pension contributions and an attraction to long-serving contract
staff employed in remote regions may be the possibility of exemption
from UK income tax if they qualify for that status.
PRINCIPLES OF
OPERATION
61. ArmorGroup has laid down a set of operating
principles to protect itself from reputational issues and to comfort
full-time and contract employees that they will not be asked to
undertake any activity, nor be associated with the same, that
may cause them moral or ethical dilemmas. These principles are
laid out below:
62. The company and its employees may not
undertake any activity that would be formally censured by the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, or US Department of State.
63. The company and its employees may not
plan or actually conduct or in any way participate in offensive
military operations.
64. The company and its employees may not
seek to, nor actually alter the prevailing political or military
balance in a host nation (except in so much as the presence of
sound commercial security may inevitably stabilise a geographical
region or economy).
65. The company may not supply lethal equipment,
nor its employees bear arms except for those carried for personal
defence with the agreement of and possession of a licence from
the host government.
66. The company will not unnecessarily expose
employees to danger and the company promotes its Health &
Safety policy and provides safety garments and basic healthcare
for all employees, local and expatriate.
67. The company will comply with the direction
of shareholders that the business is essentially one dedicated
to defensive measures (vehicle and body armour and security services)
and a less-than-lethal approach (less-than-lethal munitions sales
and protective security).
68. The company will not engage in any activity
that falls outside its insurance umbrella.
69. The company will comply with host nation
laws and establish transparency by registering subsidiary companies
with local participation in management and by paying local taxes.
CONTROVERSIAL ACTIVITY
70. ArmorGroup does provide services that
are the subject of this Green Paper, but only the ill-informed
would find sufficient fault with these services as to consider
them to be controversial. Each of these contracts is conducted
in accordance with the company's principles and codes of conduct,
is known to the British Embassy or High Commission in the territory
concerned and is conducted with the expressed permission of the
host nation.
Such activities include:
(a) The training of military personnel of
the defence forces of countries committed to non-aggression and
in non-lethal activities including parachuting, navigation and
communications.
(b) The training of para-military personnel
in tactics and weapon handling, where the force concerned will
not be employed in offensive action (eg Game Wardens).
(c) The training of law enforcement officers
and of tactical intervention units for ministries of justice and
police forces in all disciplines including counter hi-jack tactics
and firearms handling.
(d) The provision of civilian support personnel
to peacekeeping forces, including trades and a degree of involvement
described in the UNPROFOR exercise described below.
(e) The provision of security management,
or of armed, uniformed and trained local security guards to protect
sovereign embassies and legitimate commercial activity in high
risk areas, subject to strict compliance with orders for opening
fire and the carriage of defensive weaponry (eg shotguns, bolt
action rifles and handguns).
(f) The clearance of landmines and unexploded
ordnance as part of a humanitarian or post-conflict reconstruction
programme, but not in support of military planning or manoeuvre.
71. It has been suggested that the efforts
of "PMCs" have no lasting impact. This is not ArmorGroup's
experience. ArmorGroup training of local landmine clearance teams
in Bosnia Herzegovina and Mozambique on behalf of international
donors has left a sustainable capability not dependent upon complex
technologies.
72. DSL's training of commercial protection
forces in Mozambique in the late 1980s, in conditions of civil
war, facilitated the reconstruction of a country-wide economy,
thereby contributing to the peace process. These security forces
secured projects of utmost economic importance around the country,
reassured international investors, provided pockets of stability
that allowed the establishment of schools and clinics and the
return of refugees, secured lines of communication and contributed
to the process of peace and reconciliation for this newest member
of the British Commonwealth.
THE UNPROFOR EXPERIMENT
73. In considering where the limit of involvement
of contract personnel provided by a commercial company might be,
it is worth considering the UNPROFOR experiment conducted by the
United Nations in circumstances of dire need. New by British standards,
the exercise was considered routine by US competitors, the like
of DynCorp, which competed with DSL and provided a similar service
to UNPROFOR.
74. In 1992 the United Nations sought to
establish a significant peacekeeping presence in the former Yugoslavia
and, finding that it did not have the ability to field sufficient
support staff from its own resources, the United Nations contracted
five companies to identify, employ and administer (ultimately
2,000) skilled international civilian staff. The need for so many
international staff arose from the complexity of the conflict
zone, where the prospect of deploying locally recruited staff
across the many front lines was considered to be too dangerous.
75. DSL was asked to bid to provide support
staff and subsequently maintained for UNPROFOR a strength of 425
international staff from 24 nations, including planning officers,
quality assurance, architects, civil, mechanical and electrical
engineers, plant operators, drivers, communicators, computer programmers
and network installers, facility and camp managers in addition
to traditional DSL personnel including security officers assigned
to crime prevention, crime detection, close protection and border
security duties. This contact continued for four years till 1996,
when NATO forces assumed primary responsibility from the UN.
76. As the mission grew, so did the diversity
of tradesman supplied by DSL. Of particular relevance to the Green
Paper is the provision of drivers and mechanics for armoured personnel
carriers ("APCs"). The deployment of peacekeepers from
Asia and Africa, without their own indigenous armour, required
UNPROFOR to acquire surplus armoured (OT64) vehicles from the
Czech Republic. These infantry battalions also lacked the expertise
to maintain and operate the APCs, so UNPROFOR instructed DSL to
supply APC mechanics and drivers, which it did from the Czech
Republic. Thus DSL became engaged in operational peacekeeping
duties with DSL drivers in armoured vehicles, maintained and fuelled
by DSL support teams, out of bases constructed and maintained
by DSL and co-ordinated by DSL planners in Zagreb. Many of the
DSL employees were recruited from Scandinavia where, typically,
a volunteer would complete a six-month uniformed military peacekeeping
tour, then return to the region as a contractor in his professional
capacity with DSL. It was a case of employing fully qualified
and experienced personnel to fill gaps created by the dearth of
regular UN civil and military personnel.
77. DSL employees were, during the four-year
exercise, deployed throughout the region in conditions of extreme
danger and discomfort. They wore civilian pattern UN uniform with
UN badges and identification papers and were fully integrated
into the UNPROFOR organisation. They did not serve six-month tours
as regular soldiers did; instead serving up to four years and
becoming the experts on local situations, safety and security.
Much publicity was given to the more glamorous (not that there
was much glamour in Bosnia Herzegovina) blue helmets, but very
little to the support staff, who prepared their barracks, established
theatre communications and delivered fuel, rations and ammunition
into bases (sometimes under small-arms and artillery fire). UN
medals were awarded to every participant in the mission, with
the exception of contract staff. Certain nations (notably Australia)
have now recognised the contribution of these men and women with
national awards for service with UNPROFOR. DSL found that its
employees, whose average age was some ten years greater than for
regular troops, were motivated by the desire to make a difference
in this tragedy and that their levels of dedication and of personal
and team performance equalled or exceeded those of regular UN
employees and peacekeepers.
78. The United Nations considers the exercise
to have been a complete success. Skilled international staff could
be rapidly deployed, effectively administered and their performance
and compliance with UN practice and procedure adequately controlled.
These contractors merged seamlessly with the UN regular operation
at every level and were necessarily given access to classified
information. When it came to winding up the mission these contacted
employees were given one month's notice and laid off without further
liability for benefits or pension.
79. DSL determined, from its experience,
that it is prepared to provide qualified close protection officers,
uniformed security guards, police officers and combat support
elements (for transport, maintenance communications and engineering
roles) for UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions, but draws the line
at "combat troops" and "vehicle turret crew".
80. By way of precedent, ArmorGroup has
now provided security and logistic support to UN missions in Yugoslavia
(UNPROFOR), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), Angola (UNAVEM) and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (MONUC). ArmorGroup closely followed NATO intervention
in Kosovo to provide emergency landmine and unexploded ordnance
clearance on behalf of the UK Government and has provided similar
services to UN and EC agencies across the Balkans, Africa and
the Middle East.
CONCLUSION
81. ArmorGroup long ago reached the conclusion
that it needed to be clear about its business practices and its
ethics and it subsequently put in place clear guidelines and controls
to secure its reputation as a provider of quality, ethical services.
ArmorGroup is confident that it is a properly managed and entirely
compliant company offering premium services to respectable clients
since 1981.
82. ArmorGroup clients, together with professional
bodies and academic institutions associated with it, including
the UK Government's Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department
for International Development, have reached the same conclusion
and make best use of the opportunity presented by a quality contractor
to supplement government resources.
83. ArmorGroup does not view itself as a
Private Military Company. ArmorGroup is a risk management company
and there is nothing whatsoever illegitimate or "mercenary"
(in the popular sense of the term) about its contracts, services
or employees. ArmorGroup, and in particular its subsidiary ArmorGroup
Services Limited (formerly Defence Systems LimitedDSL)
is a provider of contracted risk management services: services
that are limited in extent by the controls and guidelines imposed
by itself or upon it by others.
84. ArmorGroup provides a range of services
unparalleled in the security industry. On the one hand it provides
contract security personnel and management and explosive ordance
disposal services to commercial enterprise (mostly in an international
context). On the other hand it provides training, equipment and
facility management to armed forces as do may US logistics companies
and one or two major players in the UK. Finally it has particular
expertise in providing all these services to diplomatic missions,
UN agencies, NGOs and peacekeeping missions.
85. ArmorGroup has determined that it will
not act unilaterally in conflict zones. ArmorGroup will only operate
in conditions of armed conflict under mandate from and with active
participation of "allied" governments, who shall provide
diplomatic support, operating parameters and first line medical
support including facilities for air evacuation.
86. ArmorGroup is part of a truly pan-Atlantic
commercial corporation which engages with the authorities of both
the United States of America and the United Kingdom, but which
maintains distinctly separate reporting lines to preserve the
national interests of either state. Collectively, however, ArmorGroup
is able to weigh up the relative merits of its role from the national
perspective of each state and is aware that US practice is further
developed when it comes to contracting out security and para-military
activity than it is in the UK.
87. ArmorGroup has the global presence to
observe private/commercial military activity first-hand in the
territories in which it operates, yet ArmorGroup does not believe
that there is a significant issue at the time of writing. Very
little significant "mercenary" activity currently takes
place and there appear to be very few actors on the corporate
stage. The EO and Sandline burst of activity in the early 1990s
appears to have subsided.
88. Thus, attention should now focus on
future developments and the single most important issue appears
to be the UK dilemma over the government's option to contract-out
military or security functions to the private sector. ArmorGroup
respects the dilemma posed and the safeguards that government
offices must require in the public interest. It is ArmorGroup's
experience that these functions can safely be contracted to the
private sector without loss of state control. Examples of success
are myriad, while failures have been very few. One factor that
remains consistent throughout is cost with the private sector
offering significant reduction in cost over government services
(the one caveat to this being the need for the private sector
to be able to harness the expertise of former government servants.
A significant reduction in the numbers of a standing army has
a knock-on effect on the subsequent recruitment of basically trained
former soldiers by the private sector. This may be less of a problem
for states that have retained compulsory military service).
RECOMMENDATIONS ON
PROCESS
89. ArmorGroup recommends to the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office that it consider the following matters
in connection with the general debate on PMCs and their regulation.
90. Engage with interested parties, including
those that are the subject of the Green Paper to ensure that as
many as possible of the facts necessary for deliberation of key
issues are verified as being accurate.
91. Avoid expending valuable time and resource
endeavouring to define terms the like of "mercenary"
or "PMC" when a thousand journalists and ten thousand
academics will continue to do it for themselves. Press articles
published in the wake of the Green Paper only serve to support
this view as self-styled experts leap to their feet to deliver
more ill informed comment.
92. Advance core and related issues, including:
Restriction on the proliferation of small arms,
the major instruments of terror and death in Africa from countries
like Bulgaria and the Ukraine.
Restriction on the scale of combat vehicles and
aircraft from those same countries into Africa. As the pan-African
song goes "there are more tanks than food in the Ogaden;
looks like Russia got it wrong again".
93. Centrally collate information on private
individuals and companies offering "controversial" or
"quasi-military" services and equipment, much in the
same way as law enforcement agencies now share intelligence, to
ensure that relevant departments have timely access to relevant
data.
94. Investigate (with the Department of
Trade and Industry) the activities of British individuals or companies
offering "controversial" or "quasi-military"
services and equipment wherever and whenever they are reported
to be operating in territories outside UK jurisdiction and where
the registration of companies and accounts is not open to public
inspection.
95. Accept that British subjects will continue
to volunteer for military service in search of excitement and
gain. Some will find their place in legitimate activities, while
the wilder "Walter-Mitty" will find himself in circumstances
like those with the Croatian Army from 1991 to 1994-engaged in
an ever dirtier war and likely to be investigated by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
96. Accept that its citizens may wish to
offer security to people in distress as much as they might food
or shelter. Lack of security is acknowledged to be a root cause
of poverty or starvation and the right to contribute to a degree
of security through the short-term sponsorship of private security
may be preferable to long-term expense in vulnerable aid such
as food, medicine and shelter.
97. Support the establishment of a permanent
International Criminal Tribunal, for this is the proper forum
for the trial of alleged war criminals. Nothing is more likely
to curb the illicit activity of "mercenaries" than the
very real prospect of an international trial if they come close
to breach of human rights.
98. Acknowledge the principle that when
time dictates that "something must be done" in rapid
onset complex emergencies (eg Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Bosnia
Herzegovina), then a rapid and professional private response must
not be hindered by academic debate, nor cumbersome bureaucracy.
Governments and self-styled experts produced a thousand reasons
why not to take firm action in Bosnia Herzegovina when there was
only one good reason to go into relieve grievous human
suffering.
99. Act positively to ensure that the valuable
"enabling" capability provided to the UK Government,
commercial investors, humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts by
contractors in times of dire need is not unnecessarily restricted.
RECOMMENDATIONS ON
REGULATION
100. ArmorGroup is in favour of regulation
through licensing contracts.
101. ArmorGroup contends that the use of
large-scale corporate entities to prosecute war is a phenomenon
that made only a brief appearance in the mid-1990s through the
now defunct Executive Outcomes. The prosecution of war for profit
is now largely the preserve of individuals or small groups from
poorly regulated national jurisdictions to other similar jurisdictions.
102. Despite the small scale of the illegitimate[17]
trade in military combat services[18].
ArmorGroup recognises the export and use of such services as morally
reprehensible, and, as such, the elimination of this trade is
the legitimate concern of government and public alike.
103. ArmorGroup does not accept that the
private sector can field combat troops, but its experience in
the provision of support to the United Nations and UK Government
agencies clearly demonstrates that the private sector can provide
cost effective, efficient and accountable third line support to
military operations.
104. Nevertheless, ArmorGroup believes that
public sector/private sector partnerships (PPP) can be successfully
employed to deliver legitimate peace support operations, to enable
and sustain legitimate security and law and order services, or
to train or support legitimate armed forces. Such partnerships
are to be encouraged as a means to build economically sustainable
capacity to help prevent conflict and to encourage peace and stability
world-wide.
105. However, ArmorGroup believes that so
long as the distinction between legitimate security and illegitimate
military services remains unclear to either government or the
public, this will not be possible. Stereotyping, sensationalisation,
polemic and dogma unhealthily restrict the debate on private sector
involvement in the delivery of public sector or multilateral security
services. This focus on illegitimate "mercenary" activities
has characterised the debate and hindered objective research and
unblinkered analysis of the subject in recent times.
106. Therefore, ArmorGroup believes that
in addition to controlling illegitimate trade in combat services,
some form of regulation will help open up the debate on PPP in
the provision of UK-supported international peace support and
security operations. It will also dispel unfounded fears about
the use of commercial services to support, or in certain fields
replace[19]
the use of public sector armed forces and security services. Most
importantly, it should neutralise misinformed or dogmatic positions,
ultimately allowing UK Government to make best use of contracted
services in support of initiatives to create or ensure international
peace and stability.
107. ArmorGroup has considered the options
for regulation broadly described in paragraph seven to Annex C
to the Green Paper and holds the following views on each.
108. ArmorGroup considers Option (a)an
outright ban on military activity abroad to be uneconomic in terms
of British business, governmental and defence interests. It would
also be morally unjustifiable given the company's position in
paragraph 63 above. Finally it would be ineffective where organisations
are registered and exist, or where "mercenaries" reside
outside the UK jurisdiction.
109. ArmorGroup considers Option (b)a
ban on recruitment for military activity abroad misses the point
and will prove expensive to police for such a small-scale concern.
Better the threat of an International Tribunal for breach of human
rights in a conflict zone, or UK courts where British subjects
are alleged to have committed an offence under English Law.
110. ArmorGroup considers Option (c)a
licensing regime for military services to be the most feasible
and effective option. It should operate in a similar way to the
current regime for licensing military exports (indeed certain
military services can simply be added to current legislation).
However, as a note of caution, ArmorGroup recognises that a poorly
conceived[20]
or inadequately administered regime could easily cripple speed
of response, which is a key value of contracted security services.
111. ArmorGroup considers Option (d)for
registration and notification is supportable, but too closely
allied to Option (c) for separate consideration. Notification
without licence will offer up another obstacle to UK companies
engaged in a competitive, time-sensitive bid for legitimate services.
This gives the edge to foreign organisations, particularly from
the US who can act on immediate response from the US government
within the context of their licence.
112. ArmorGroup considers Option (e)a
general licence for PMCs/PSCs to be closely allied to Option (c)
but less effective. An open licence might be no more relevant
than a New York vehicle licence plate in Mogadishu. Why bother?
It is the nature of the proposed activity allied to the identity
of the region and context that is the issue, not the entity. It
must be the context that is regulated, therefore, not the participant.
ArmorGroup would certainly see an open licence for services provided
to designated organisations including the United Nations, European
Commission, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or UK Ministry
of Defence and/or their respective subsidiary agencies.
113. ArmorGroup considers Option (f)self-regulation:
a voluntary code of conduct to be attractive in as much as a code
may be easily followed, or not followed dependent upon the mood.
Nevertheless, such a regime would fail to meet the needs of the
government, and fail to placate critics of PMCs and mercenaries.
This Option is therefore discounted.
OPTION 7 (C)
114. In supporting an initiative to licence
military services, ArmorGroup acknowledges the UK Government's
interests, while recognising that no other option described will
have any impact on the "mercenaries", yet every other
option promises to waste time, energy and cost to no effect. The
process of legal definition will itself consume the careers of
lawyers and the government's budget without satisfactory result.
115. ArmorGroup will leave it to the government
to define categories of military service to be licensed, but is
itself concerned with the fine, yet distinct line between legitimate
commercial security and/or military support services, and the
supply of uniformed and armed soldiers for the expressed purpose
of engaging in combat to alter a prevailing political or military
balance. It is, after all, the latter activity that gives rise
to public expression of concern.
116. ArmorGroup recommends that licences
for military activities be given in blanket form for services
provided to and carried out under the auspices of the UN, EC or
UK Government. Military services provided to US agencies should
be free from restriction save for a requirement for the company
to duly inform UK Government of its intention to provide certain
services to a US Government agency before they are delivered.
117. ArmorGroup considers that parties like
the UN and EC will never be able to respond to an emergency if
key service providers are delayed by a ponderous bureaucracy seeking
to process a complex application. Any mechanism established to
administer regulation must be the subject of published performance
criteria so that a PMC may expect an answer to its application
within, say, 10 working days. Commercial bidding is an expensive
process, so it will be important for PMCs to know that their applications
will be dealt with in a prompt manner.
118. ArmorGroup considers that the introduction
of a self-regulating code of conduct will prove relatively straightforward
and a reasonable step towards regulation. Regulation will take
time to prepare and the subsequent establishment of controls even
slower.
119. Meanwhile, a voluntary code can clearly
lay down national expectation in line with the nation's moral
stance. British engagement in troubled regions is not the sole
prerogative of the British government. The general population
has its say with each citizen supporting the actions of humanitarian
agencies and NGOs, military units and negotiators, as they will.
The implications of a breach of a morally justifiable voluntary
code will prove to be a major motivator for compliance by any
company concerned for its reputation. Publicly broadcast breach
will lead to isolation and loss of business for offenders. Illegitimate
and/or immoral companies and individuals, for whom, and for whose
clients the matter of reputation is of lesser concern than the
promised financial return will continue their activities regardless
of national regulation.
120. ArmorGroup offers its resources to
the continuing debate on this matter and its relevant expertise
to the detail of any draft regulation.
121. Moving on from the "mercenary"
debate, ArmorGroup would like to see academic and Government dialogue
concentrate on the number of lives that can be saved through prompt
and decisive government action and to the development of "enabling"
capability to support that action. Indeed in this context there
is often no validity in the cry "lack of resources"
in responding to crises, as the common limiting factor is "cost".
ArmorGroup Services Ltd
17 June 2002
13 As against those which are provided within national
laws (of both the supplying nation and nations in which the intervention
takes place) and international humanitarian law (the Geneva conventions
and subsequent protocols) Back
14
Since the heydays of Sandline and Executive Outcomes in the early
to mid 1990s, most mercenary activities have been carried out
by small companies or individuals, operating from poorly regulated
jurisdictions. However, the illegitimate trade in military hardware
and non-combat services is highly significant. Back
15
In the training of allied nations troop contributions to UN or
coalition forces or the provision of logistics, communications
and rear area security, for example. Back
16
In particular, ArmorGroup suggests that contracts with certain
pre-approved clients be made exempt from such licensing. These
could include members of the UK's main strategic economic and
military alliances such as NATO, the EU and OECD. It should also
cover services delivered on behalf of official UK government or
United Nations agencies. Back
17
As against those which are provided within national laws (of
both the supplying nation and nations in which the intervention
takes place) and international humanitarian law (the Geneva conventions
and subsequent protocols). Back
18
Since the heydays of Sandline and Executive Outcomes in the early
to mid 1990s, most traditional mercenary activities have been
carried out by small scale or individual groups, operating from
pariah nations. However, the illegitimate trade in military hardware
and non-combat services is highly significant. Back
19
In the training of allied nations troop contributions to UN or
coalition forces or the provision of logistics, communications
and rear area security, for example. Back
20
In particular, ArmorGroup suggests that contracts with certain
pre-approved clients be made exempt from such licensing. These
could include members of the UK's main strategic economic and
military alliances such as NATO, the EU and OECD. It should also
cover services delivered on behalf of official UK government or
United Nations agencies. Back
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