CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION
1.1 REASONS FOR
UNDERTAKING THE
STUDY
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has
released a Green Paper called "Private Military Companies:
Options for Regulation" to solicit the views of Members of
Parliament, NGOs, companies, other organisations and individuals
with an interest in the options for the regulation of Private
Military Companies (PMCs). Whilst there has been a growth in the
PMC market, apart from the United States and South Africa, no
country has produced practicable regulation to control and regulate
PMC activity. Thus some PMCs continue to operate around the world
unaccountable to anyone.
In the current world climate of numerous small
wars and unstable states there has been a growing demand for PMCs
services, however many people and organisations still very much
link them with the mercenary image of the 1960s and 1970s. Following
the Sandline Affair and with no imminent prospect of any UN legislation,
the British Government decided to formulate its own regulation
for Private Military Companies based in Britain. The Green Paper
released in February 2002 does not attempt to propose policy but
states, "One of the main reasons for considering the option
of a licensing regime is that it may be possible to distinguish
between reputable and disreputable private sector operators, to
encourage and support the former while as far as possible, eliminating
the other."1
1.2 AIMS AND
OBJECTIVES
The aim of this paper is to develop a reply
to the FCOs Green Paper "Private Military Companies: Options
for Regulation". This paper will consider the options for
regulation and will put forward an answer to the Green Paper by
the deadline 6 August 2002. This will be achieved by investigating
the views of the four key stakeholders involved:
— Private Military and Security Companies.
— Non-Governmental Organisations and
Humanitarian Aid Agencies.
— Other Government Departments.
1.3 HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION
It is important to place PMCs in their correct
historical context in order to determine their true nature and
thus better understand the modern state response to mercenaries
and the regulations and conventions adopted by countries to control
or outlaw their activity.
1.3.1 EARLY
HISTORY
The vilification of mercenaries is a 20th century
phenomenum; prior to this mercenaries had been routinely employed
in warfare throughout history. Indeed the very earliest rulers
of empires and regimes are recorded as using mercenaries, Xenephon
recounted the use of 10,000 mercenaries by Cyrus, a pretender
to the Persian throne in 401 BC and it is also known that Greek
City states used mercenaries in the same epoch.
In the middle ages kings and noblemen found
their knights and subjects were neither willing nor obliged to
fight for their rulers, conducting military expeditions abroad
therefore presented acute manpower problems. For these medieval
sovereigns the use of mercenaries was both a convenient and reliable
solution and to meet this demand the mercenaries often combined
to form "free companies". The Byzantine Emperor hired
the first such company, the Grand Catalan Company, to fight the
Turks. This company's soldiers were recruited from the Aragon
region of Spain and commanded by a German, Roger Von Blum.
Many view the halcyon days of organised mercenaries
as coinciding with the Italian renaissance. In this period the
Italian City states hired mercenary outsiders to lead and conduct
military operations against their rivals. This avoided the problem
for rulers of creating a powerful military leader, and therefore
rival, amongst their citizens and from causing unnecessary disruption
to the economy by the employment of their productive workforce
as soldiers. The mercenaries who were known as "Condottieri"
also brought a measure of control to the battlefield, as impartial
outsiders for instance they were less concerned in achieving a
senseless slaughter of enemies but more interested in simply winning
and the acquisition of prisoners which of course could always
be ransomed.
Technological innovations, particularly the
development of light firearms, meant that the Condottierri began
to give way to national armies composed of both citizens and mercenaries.
The 17th and 18th centuries witnessed many national armies supplementing
their own national forces with bands of mercenaries from another
country. The British Army was reinforced during the American War
of Independence by the Hessian Brigade, arguably the most efficient
and well trained of the German mercenary forces. Even as late
as the nineteenth century the British were still engaged in the
practise of recruiting mercenaries to support the war effort:
In 1854 for instance Britain hired 15,600 Germans, Italians and
Swiss mercenaries to fight in the Crimean War.
By the 19th century Europe had begun to consolidate
into nation states and the concept that the employment of violence
was a state monopoly and not a private business opportunity took
root. Nations began to impose neutrality laws forbidding their
citizens to serve foreign armies and mercenaries became increasingly
marginalized as politically troublesome rather than simply independent
agents selling their services on the market. Nations continued
to recruit foreigners into their armies but this was conducted
on a much more permanent and organized basis, examples of this
are the employment of Gurkhas with the British at the Treaty of
Segauli in 1816, and also the Foreign Legion with the French in
1831.
1.3.2 MODERN
HISTORY
The modern perception of mercenaries has evolved
since the Second World War and has been dominated by the use of
mercenaries in Africa:
"When they first appeared in Africa, these
independent mercenaries hired outside the constraints of the twentieth
century nation-state system and seemingly motivated solely by
pecuniary interests, were seen as a shocking anachronism".2
Some of these mercenary operations of the 1960s
and 1970s involving Mad Mike Hoare, Bob Denard and Jacques Schramme
were either seen as an attempt by western capitalists to retain
control of a mineral rich region or as colonialists attempting
to retain power. Thus Africans especially distrust private firms
although numerous states and insurgents have hired them.
In recent years there has been the evolution
of PMCs, with the end of the Cold War and its consequent surplus
of ex-military personnel on the market and numerous low-intensity
wars following the withdrawal of superpower support. Examples
of these are Sandline and Executive Outcomes (EO) who were very
involved in fighting rebel forces in Sierra Leone and Angola,
Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) from the US
had former Special Forces (SF) personnel training and equipping
the Bosnian Federation's military force and the Vinnel Corporation
currently has about one thousand men training the Saudi National
Guard.
1.4 DEFINITIONS
In his 1997 report the UN Special Rapporteur
on mercenaries showed his concern about the growth market in mercenary
activity:
"In what appears to be a new international
trend, legally registered companies are providing security, advisory
and military training to the armed forces and police of legitimate
Governments. There have been complaints that some of these companies
recruit mercenaries and go beyond advisory and instruction work
to become involved in military combat and taking over political,
economic and financial matters in the country served".3
These firms have become known as Private Military
Companies but there continues to be a debate as to whether they
provide any form of mercenary activity under any existing national
or international legislation. The Oxford English Dictionary defines
a mercenary as "a professional soldier serving a foreign
power". This is a wide definition, which would include many
people engaged in legitimate activities, for example the Gurkhas
in the British and Indian Armies and members of the French Foreign
Legion. The Green Paper calls them 'soldiers of fortune, sometimes
misguided adventurers and often disreputable thugs'. Article 47
of the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
has six criteria that must all be met before a person can be considered
a mercenary. This definition has generally been found to be impractical
due to the difficulty in proving the motivation of those accused
of being mercenaries. They were clearly written to target the
small number of Europeans involved in Africa in the 1960s and
1970s.
The 1989 Additional Protocol Convention moved
this legislation forward by making the use of mercenaries illegal.
Article 2 makes it an offence to recruit, use, and finance or
train mercenaries, Article 5 binds signatories not to do the above
and Article 9 obligates them to punish violations. So far only
19 countries have ratified the convention and a further 9 have
signed but not ratified. Moreover it should be noted that at least
3 of the signatories, the governments of Angola, Yugoslavia and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo have engaged or used mercenaries
or PMCs since they signed. The Organisation for African Unity
(OAU) has made political declarations against mercenaries and
has growing support from idealists on the African continent and
a lot of support in the UN from developing countries. The 1989
Convention Ratifiers and Signatories are shown below.
Table 1
THE 1989 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL CONVENTION
| The following nineteen states have ratified the Convention:
| The following nine states have signed but have yet to ratify the Convention:
|
| Azerbaijan | Angola
|
| Barbados | Congo
|
| Belarus | Democratic Republic of the Congo
|
| Cameroon | Germany
|
| Cyprus | Morocco
|
| Georgia | Nigeria
|
| Italy | Poland
|
| Maldives | Romania
|
| Mauritania | Yugoslavia.
|
| Qatar |
|
| Saudi Arabia |
|
| Senegal |
|
| Seychelles |
|
| Suriname |
|
| Togo |
|
| Turkmenistan |
|
| Ukraine |
|
| Uruguay |
|
| Uzbekistan. |
|
The Green Paper describes PMCs as companies that provide
a range of services and at one extreme they can provide forces
for combat. Their more customary services include advice, training,
logistic support, supply of personnel for monitoring roles and
demining. Their definition of Private Security Companies (PSCs)
is one that provides security services abroad, for governments
and for other bodies, including the UN and NGOs. A key problem
for the government in drafting any future legislation will be
their actual definition of PMCs as it is extremely difficult to
draw a line between the work of PSCs and PMCs. In truth most security
companies cover a broad spectrum and although they may have expertise
in certain areas such as advice, security or even combat, they
can supply any service for the right price. An example is Gurkha
Security Guards in Sierra Leone who were brought in to provide
security services until 1994 when they started training the local
armed forces. For this dissertation and in our recommendations
to the British Government, we believe that no distinction can
be made between PMCs and PSCs and that they all should be considered
for some form of regulation. We have therefore considered regulation
of these companies from the position of lethal and non-lethal
capabilities, which is whether or not their employees carry arms.
It was felt that this was the key area where many agencies and
individuals found it difficult to distinguish between PSCs, PMCs
and mercenaries.
Table 2
PMC CAPABILITIES
| Non-Lethal Capabilities | Lethal Capabilities
|
—Logistics
—Mine clearance
—Risk Consulting
—Unarmed security
—Military Training
—Military Intelligence
—Coastguard
| —Armed security
Indutrial Sites
Convoy Escorts
Embassy Protection
Anti Piracy
—Offensive Combat
—Any activity with weapons
|
PMCs with lethal and non-lethal capabilities when used throughout
this paper draw their distinction from the above table. The prohibitions
against mercenaries were not formulated to deal with companies
employed by recognised governments. Neither were they meant to
take away a country's right to self-defence by recruiting foreign
personnel in order to restore order or to provide security within
their country. We have therefore also made a distinction between
PMCs and mercenaries and in this paper we will argue that whilst
PMCs may or may not necessitate greater transparency and oversight,
we do not believe they should be banned for being mercenaries.
Lt Col (Retd) T Spicer OBE, formerly of Sandline, has his
own definition of mercenaries,
"A mercenary will be an individual, recruited for a specific
task. He is not part of a permanent structure . . . he subscribes
to no doctrine or collective training standards and his ideas
on discipline, the rule of law and human rights may well be short
of those required by the Law of Armed Conflict." He then
states on the other hand that "PMCs are permanent structures,
corporate entities, which are run as a business. They have a clear
hierarchy, are run on military lines and operate to high disciplinary
standards and within the Law of Armed Conflict, with a particular
concern for human rights".4
As long as PMCs continue to work in support of sovereign
states and protect the rights of the population to self-determination
they should not be considered mercenaries. As long as there is
war, there will be the need for military expertise, however modern
PMCs have realised that their survival relies on positive perceptions
and approval for their actions by their home governments and by
the international community.
1.5 ASSUMPTIONS AND
LIMITATIONS
The following assumptions and limitations were made when
formulating this paper:
— Specific dispensation has been given to this project
to answer the UK Green Paper rather than produce an academic dissertation
based on technology, doctrine and management.
It is desirable that those reading this paper would have
previously read the Green Paper and have some knowledge about
the ongoing debate and the options proposed.
— The paper does not look into great detail into
legal complexities or contractual detail but concentrates on the
practical issues of regulating PMCs.
— Many interviewees have only spoken to us under
"Chatham House rules" and therefore their comments must
remain unattributable. This detracts somewhat from the authenticity
we have strived for, and some of our arguments may not appear
to be reinforced by example.
— Only 5 weeks were available for this study.
1.6 METHODOLOGY
In examining this subject we have combined best civilian
management practice with the British army's decision-making tool,
the formal estimate. We have then sought to investigate all the
factors, or as we have termed them, "the stakeholders"
in order to develop the widest possible understanding of all the
issues, including attending both Parliamentary Foreign Affairs
Select Committee Hearings and attending the FCO Seminar to discuss
the Green Paper at Birmingham University. We have then integrated
the stakeholder opinions to produce the key features of regulation
and examined these in the light of the courses of action for regulation
identified by the Green Paper, and other courses of action created
by the group during the research phase. We have then debated and
decided on our preferred course of action and this has formed
our conclusion. This research is based on a wide range of reading
and interviewing, designed to show the broad base of opinions
that have been gathered. After that the results of various management
models used to inform the group in how to approach the problem
are shown with their results.
1.6.1 PRIVATE
MILITARY COMPANIES
In the investigation of PMCs and their perspective of future
UK regulation a wide spectrum of opinions were consulted. Senior
representatives of PMCs who supply services across the military
and security spectrum were interviewed and these included: Lt
Gen (Retd) H Soyster of MPRI, Lt Col T Spicer of SCI (formally
in Sandline), C Beese of ArmorGroup Services Ltd (formally known
as DSL), Mr Nic van den Berg of Executive Outcomes, Sir Graham
Burton of Control Risks, Mr P Brown of PBS Security and finally
Mr J Wiseman of Penumbra. These people represented a reasonable
cross-section of the services PMCs provide and were constructive
in helping define the key areas and services that required regulation.
Many contacts were established with respected academics who have
written much on PMCs and several who have already replied to the
Green Paper: Dr K O'Brien of RAND Europe, D Brooks from the International
Peace Operations Centre in the US, C Spearin from the Centre for
the International and Security Studies in Canada, and Dr C Coker
from the London School of Economics were spoken to in order to
gain an objective academic viewpoint.
1.6.2 THE
UNITED NATIONS
For the UN the most contentious issue is whether to employ
PMCs or not. Debate on this subject is still in progress and there
are wide differences of opinion amongst the staff in New York,
the Member States and lobbyists. The debate on regulation is less
controversial and there is a large degree of common ground between
the various viewpoints. To analyse these views it was necessary
to conduct a number of interviews with individuals who represented
the differing viewpoints. These interviews therefore included
senior members of UNDPKO, UNSECOORD as well as Diplomats and Military
Advisers representing both developed and developing countries
in the UN in New York. It was also important to ascertain the
views of various lobby groups and UN "think tanks" who
influence current UN thinking. Interviews were therefore held
with members of the International Peace Academy and International
Alert. The utility and regulation of PMCs is still a very contentious
issue in the UN and for this reason many of those interviewed
wished to remain off the record.
1.6.3 NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANISATIONS
The unique importance of capturing the views of NGOs in this
debate will be discussed in the chapter on NGOs. PMCs and NGOs
work next to each other in dangerous environments and NGOs are
often forced to employ PMCs in order to ensure the security of
themselves, their beneficiaries and their supplies. Capturing
the myriad views of NGOs with differing mandates and missions
is impossible, therefore having read the key texts, a representative
cross-section of NGOs with specific expertise in security were
interviewed. The formative texts in the NGO security debate are
by Koenraad Van Brabant, Damian Lilly, Kim Richard Nossal, Chaloka
Beyani and Gilles Carbonnier. To reinforce these views with practical
experience Janet Lim, the head of security for the UNHCR, has
been interviewed in Geneva, as well as Alexandre Faite, one of
the ICRC's legal team, whose specialisation has been human rights
and UN legislation. UNOCHA were also questioned. To capture the
views of the NGOs at "the sharp end of conflict, the Centre
for Humanitarian Dialogue were interviewed as well two larger
mainstream NGOs, Tearfund and MSF. The NGO renowned for its security
training and policy is Red R, and their head of security was interviewed.
Lastly two leading consultants providing security advice to NGOs,
with deep experience in the defence and aid agency worlds, Martin
Read and Barney Mayhew answered questions. The subject of PMCs
is still a vexed issue for many NGOs and all interviews were conducted
under Chatham House rules, thus few direct quotes from interviews
can reinforce this part of the argument.
1.6.4 OTHER
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
The key stakeholders within the United Kingdom were initially
identified as the Government departments of FCO, MOD and DFID.
It is the FCO who are exploring the various options open for the
regulation of PMCs but tied in closely to that, through the Conflict
Prevention Fund is DFID and the MOD. It soon became apparent,
that when we looked at what it was that PMCs wanted to do, and
where they wanted to do it, many more subsidiary stakeholders
with critical issues had come to the fore. Within the MOD there
were many interested parties, but of particular note are the UK's
Defence Attaches, DESO, D Dip, the Overseas Secretariat linking
in to the UK's mission in the UN in New York, the Defence Advisory
Team, Cranfield University Academics, Joint Services Command and
Staff College and finally the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre.
Besides the security tasks that most PMCs want to carry out, it
was also clear that some wanted to be able to supply arms. This
would involve applying for export licences from the Department
of Trade and Industry, compliance with EU legislation and ensuring
that the companies would not fall foul of any UN mandates. Within
the Government departments it proved that both DFID and MOD were
positive in their outlook.
1.7 STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
AND MAPPING
When considering the stakeholder analysis and mapping for
PMCs and the security industry it became apparent that the industry
was large. In order to examine possible ways of regulating this
industry it is important to recognise the key stakeholders in
this field in order to give the industry the credible regulation
and legislation that it requires for successful operation in the
eyes of not just the Government but also the public, as this quote
by Henry Mintzberg5 shows:
"as the corporation grew to very large size, its economic
actions came to have increasing social consequences. The giant,
widely held corporation came increasingly under the implicit control
of its managers, and the concept of social responsibility—the
voluntary consideration of public social goals alongside the private
economic ones—arose to provide a basis of legitimacy for
their actions".
1.7.1 CAUSES
AND INFLUENCES
ON PRIVATE
MILITARY COMPANY
REGULATION
It was important to understand early on what were the driving
factors behind not only the requirements and need for PMCs, but
also what critical issues lay behind the Governmental interest
in regulation. Diagram 1 depicts a "Rich Picture" examining
the influential organisations and their inter-relationships from
within the United Kingdom. It also allows us to follow an audit
trail of national resources, causes and influences against cross-departmental
objectives, international impact and priorities.
1.7.2 GENERAL
OVERVIEW ON
POSSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS
AND THEIR
IMPACT
Diagram 2 gives a general overview on possible stakeholders
and their impact. When identifying the stakeholders it was not
enough to focus on the formal structures of the organisations
that lay before us. It was necessary to have a look at informal
and indirect influences as well as both inter and intra departmental
relationships. This diagram imagines the stakeholders as a set
of inner and outer circles. The inner circles stand for the most
important stakeholders who have the highest influence, and also
show how the PMC inter-relationships interact with each stakeholder.
1.7.3 STAKEHOLDER
MAPPING TOOL
The final diagram is based on the "Boston Box"
management tool. In this case it evaluates those departments and
organisations that are critical to PMC regulatory success against
those with varying degrees of interest in the proposed solution.
It is necessary to keep in mind that this model is basic but it
helped us identify those activities necessary for success in producing
a well-informed and coherent response to the Green Paper.
REFERENCES
1 House of Commons Green Paper, "Private Military
Companies: Options for Regulation", The Stationary Office,
Feb 2002.
2Zarate, Juan Carlos, The Emergence of a New Dog of War,
Private International Security Companies, International Law and
the New world Disorder', Stanford Journal for International Law,
Vol 34, No 1, 1998.
3 Isenberg D, "Regulated Private Military Companies
have a role", IASNA News, March 2002.
4 Lt Col (Retd) T Spicer OBE, "An Unorthodox Soldier",
Mainstream Publishing, 1999.
5 TheManager.org, "Stakeholder Management"
http://wwwthemanager.org/resources/Stakeholder%20/Management.htm
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