CHAPTER 2—THE PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES
PERSPECTIVE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine the need for the regulation
of PMCs, review other countries' current regulations and their
effectiveness, capture the views of some of the British PMCs opinions
and recommendations for the Green Paper and then will attempt
to justify the way forward for regulation from an overall PMC
perspective. There has been much written about PMCs, PSCs, mercenaries
and the current trend to privatise security. In a world where
the end of the Cold War has meant the loss of superpower patronage
for many states and a reduction in the world's military numbers,
this has led to an unstable environment. The demise of the Soviet
Union and long suppressed ethnic rivalries has meant that low
intensity, intra-state conflicts now dominate the world. This
power vacuum has led to the creation or evolution of Private Military
Companies. The services these companies can offer spread across
the military spectrum from transport to training, protection to
actual combat. These companies have tended to develop in militarily
advanced countries, using a surplus of military experience and
expertise.
2.2 WHY THEN
THE NEED
FOR NATIONAL
REGULATION?
The growth of PMCs and some of their more recent
lethal operations in conflict zones as varied as Sierra Leone,
Angola, the Balkans, Colombia and Papua New Guinea has raised
the profile of these companies. This has led to increasing demands
for some sort of regulation for them. PMCs have emerged in countries
with a large pool of military expertise, due to military downsizing,
early retirement incentives and the financial benefits of such
work compared to regular military pay. However many of these countries
in which PMCs are based are key players in the world arena and
thus can find these companies a political embarrassment. Doug
Brooks puts forward the opinion that "deliberate decisions
by NGOs and other humanitarian agencies to exclude PMCs from conferences
and discussions on the topic have resulted in a situation where
occasional attempts to eliminate the industry have been overwhelmed
by the worldwide demand for private security and military services".1
As has been described in the opening chapter these organisations
can do more than provide passive assistance in areas of conflict.
According to Sandline: "They can provide training and equipment
to extend the capabilities of their clients military resources,
providing them with the strategic or operational advantage that
is necessary to suppress their opposition or going even further,
play an active role alongside the client forces, as force multipliers".2
2.2.1 IS
REGULATION REQUIRED?
PMCs state that they operate as a military hierarchy
with the associated discipline, observe the laws and customs of
the host nation and would adhere to the principles of the Geneva
Convention and the International Law of Armed Conflict. There
are some advocates who have therefore questioned the need for
regulation. Indeed there is a strong argument that many PMCs already
apply a degree of self-regulation that reduces the need for further
oversight or control especially if excessive control meant that
PMCs or some of their activities went offshore to avoid the harsh
regulation. Some of the large companies such as ArmorGroup Services
put forward a strong argument that they are already subject to
legislation by being a public company. They are directly responsible
to their shareholders, the Securities Exchange Commission, have
an international board of directors, are audited by a major auditing
company, come under the Data Protection Act and their accounts
must go to Company House in London. Ex-officers and other professionals
of developed world nations normally lead these companies and generally
maintain strong links to their former professions and values,
they would ask why should they suddenly lose these ethics and
discipline just because they have moved into the private sector?
2.2.2 ACCOUNTABILITY
AND TRANSPARENCY
PMCs have dismissed accusations that they may
have been responsible for human rights abuses, prolong conflicts,
work for disreputable or illegal states or governments, as it
would act against them in the long run. They run their companies
as a business and any loss of reputation or credibility through
illegal activity would hurt their long-term interests and future
contracts. However without formal ethical and legal accountability
it is possible for PMCs to bend or even break the rules or conduct
themselves in a way that the UN and developed nations would regard
as unacceptable. Companies such as Control Risks and ArmorGroup
believe they are already transparent otherwise the British and
American governments would not already contract them.
The writer Patrick Cullen argues that unregulated
PMCs are neither accountable nor unaccountable for their actions—he
states that "PMCs have three masters: their home government
(the country they operate from and have connections with), the
host or employing government, and the market".3 So the fact
that currently formal rules and regulations might not be in place
in this country does not mean that these companies do not have
any form of accountability. An argument against regulation is
the claim that there might be a great deal of influence and links
between PMCs and intelligence services of their home states and
that they can be useful as quasi-state agents however this has
been totally refuted by ex members of the Security Service. This
was supported by the argument that it would not be in a government's
or their security service's interest to be associated with these
so-called mercenary groups. However American PMCs such as MPRI
and Vinnel have long been regarded as vital to the implementation
of US foreign policy, by proxy, in places such as the former Yugoslavia
and Saudi Arabia.
Writers such as Juan Carlos Zarate argue that
the potential problems for PMCs are in their lack of accountability
and transparency. Lt Colonel T Spicer formally of Sandline and
now with Strategic Consulting International (SCI), whilst welcoming
the need for regulation of reputable private sector companies
states that his company already goes some way to being accountable
for the following reasons. They come under both current international
and national laws, face media scrutiny, are controlled by market
forces that can have an affect on them if they are not accountable
(future contracts could be lost if a PMCs credibility was questioned)
and a formal contract has to be met as well. They have shown that
they have a growing role in international peace and security especially
as the western powers have become less willing to get involved
in many of the worlds problem areas. Some companies such as ArmorGroup
believe that any regulation should make a distinction between
lethal and non-lethal force capability as strict regulation for
all firms whatever services they provide would mean that either
companies would evade it or less scrupulous foreign competition
will step in to undercut or outmanoeuvre the burdened British
companies.
PMCs have the ability to train a formerly autocratic
country's forces to function within civilian, democratic regimes
and to fight under internationally accepted principles of engagement
such as the current work being conducted by MPRI in Nigeria where
they are doing just such work. When interviewed General (Retd)
H Soyster stated that the Nigerians would not have placed a contract
if the US government did not regulate them. In addition PMCs give
client governments the military capability to bargain from a position
of strength and bring an opposition to the bargaining table. The
combat missions conducted by Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone
and Angola support this. The current disadvantages of unregulated
PMCs is that how they achieve these advantages is not directly
accountable to anyone and whom they employ is not transparent.
Currently these companies have no formal link to their home government
but can operate in areas that affect the British foreign policy.
They are able to employ whoever they wish to conduct their work
and in the case of EO it is claimed that they used ex-members
of some of the most notorious and ruthless commando units of the
South African Apartheid regime. The fact that some of the companies
offer combat raises the question of their accountability in the
field especially in the cases of human rights abuses.
2.2.3 TIES
WITH ECONOMIC
INTERESTS
It is also claimed that PMCs are closely tied
to other companies with diverse economic interests such as energy
and mining companies. As a result it appeared that EO and other
companies were engaging in conflicts to obtain contracts and concessions.
It is also well known that Tony Buckingham of Sandline has many
other companies including industrial ones that he is linked to
and these may influence the work his PMC is contracted for. This
link between PMCs and economic interests can give the impression
of corruption and may influence the internal dynamics of a client
country which would be well beyond the contract the PMC was brought
in to achieve. Lt Col Spicer is quite adamant here that PMCs are
military providers with payrolls to meet, overheads to pay for
and a cash flow to maintain and that extractive mineral concessions
do not directly provide this and often require a great deal of
development, resources and investment in order to be lucrative.
Thus he states, "A mineral concession is worthless to a PMC".4
However there is a large amount of evidence provided by researchers
that some of these companies often enjoy ties with major multinational,
especially mineral, companies who provide much of the initial
funding and political contacts. An example here would be the well-documented
link between EO and Heritage Oil in Angola.
Without the accountability and transparency
of some form of regulation PMCs will also be subjected to claims
that they are able to traffic in arms, smuggle drugs and support
or train terrorist groups. In fact the PMC DynCorp was linked
with human trafficking and drugs in Kosovo. Whilst the well-known
and reputable PMCs may and may not conduct such activities, there
is evidence of an underworld of groups of mercenaries who have
fewer scruples and are more cash influenced. They are much more
likely to aggravate conflicts and give military life to illegitimate
regimes. It is known for them to have been operating in countries
such as Ethiopia, the Congo, Zaire and even for the rebel forces
in Sierra Leone. Former members of this country's Intelligence
Agencies have supported this statement. This highlights the needs
for regulation to distinguish between reputable private military
companies and private mercenary company groupings. Lt General
Soyster of MPRI was quite clear in stating that it was important
for PMCs to work with the support of its home government rather
than try to operate without their knowledge.5
2.2.4 WOULD
BANNING PMCS
BE THE
POPULAR OPTION?
However there is an opposing argument that regulation
might, according to Juan Carlos Zurate, "simply legitimise
the profession of mercenaries and allow them to operate with the
backing of the law".6 This argument has been heavily refuted
by many academics such as Herbert Howe who claim that the elimination
of mercenary behaviour is impossible and probably undesirable
as they can, when regulated, offer many useful services. There
is also the problem that many Africans have a great distrust of
what they will always call mercenaries and there is still a feeling
that they are remnants of the white post-colonial forces out to
strip Africa of her wealth. This view is still held and has considerable
support amongst African states in the UN. However, despite these
feelings African governments have still been employing PMCs in
areas such as Sierra Leone, Angola and the Congo.
Despite these viewpoints PMCs have continued
to grow in number and ability, and are able to provide services,
which governments may approve of but are unable to support themselves
because of political, military or financial costs. Herbert Howe
points out "not coincidentally, the rise of these companies
is coinciding with the pullback of western nations and the UN
from peacekeeping and peace enforcing".6 They also have the
ability to aid humanitarian groups and NGOs who may require protection
when operating in countries where there is no UN or western support.
In order to prevent corruption and prevent the loss of these hugely
important relief supplies, professional PMCs can reduce the need
for governments and their military forces to have to deploy in
support of aid agencies. This theme will be continued in later
chapters looking at the use of PMCs by NGOs and the UN.
PMCs operating at the lethal capability end
of the market generally work with a small number of permanent
staff and have a list of personnel who can be called for different
contracts. SCI has a permanent staff of 12 and has around 150
personnel on their books who are not employed full time but who
may be available for work. It is claimed that EO had a permanent
staff of 30 but reportedly could raise a battalion of 650 within
15 days. By only paying for these personnel when required saves
a great deal on overheads. However, there is no transparent vetting
of the personnel that these companies employ and this has lead
to much of the bad press about PMCs and mercenaries. The concern
is that they will employ people with no regard for the law and
human rights. Reputable companies such as PBS security and SCI
claim to take a great interest in who they employ and have their
own personal vetting procedures. This however is not enough to
placate the cynics who would require government vetting as part
of a greater oversight on these companies activities. It is also
important to regulate these companies to stop them just forming
for contracts and then dissolving again before re-emerging under
a different name for another contract.
A number of member states in the UN have supported
Britain's push towards possible regulation of PMCs, not least
because many of the PMCs themselves have sought to maximise their
legitimacy in order to expand their markets to governments, international
organisations and multinational companies. Most of these companies
do not actually provide armed combat but concentrate more on military
advice and training, arms supply and procurement, guard services,
intelligence gathering and logistics. However they must still
be considered for regulation as they have the ability to widen
their capabilities to combat roles for the right price. An example
would be Control Risks, which started out dealing in kidnap and
ransom advice and then developed into a general military and security
company. They do not offer any lethal capabilities but currently
there is nothing to stop them if they felt they were able and
it was cost effective.
2.2.5 SPEED
OF DEPLOYMENT
PMCs that provide combat services such as Sandline
and SCI also claim that they can provide a speed of reaction or
deployment where a national government or international group
may be unable to for political or bureaucratic reasons, thus enabling
prevention of loss of life and human rights abuses. They are also
willing to work in areas where national governments do not have
a major foreign interest. It was noted by C Spearin that in Sierra
Leone the host nation's military stated that PMCs "did a
positive job...we did not consider them mercenaries but as people
bringing in some sanity".8 Ian Douglas, a retired General
from Canada and then a UN advisor for peace missions declared,
"EO gave us stability. In a perfect world, of course, we
would not need an organisation like EO, but I'd be loath to say
they have to go because they are mercenaries". It is therefore
important that any regulation takes into account PMCs capabilities
and does not only concentrate on potential human rights abuses
by these companies but also on their ability to prevent abuses
occurring by rebels, insurgents and military forces.
2.3 THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF CURRENT
OVERSEAS LEGISLATION
ON PMCS
Several countries have brought in legislation
that seeks to regulate or ban mercenary activity. However by looking
at the national approaches of South Africa and the United States
it clearly shows the considerable differences and difficulties
in using national legislation to regulate PMCs.
2.3.1 SOUTH
AFRICA
During the Apartheid era the only illegal activities
were to be a mercenary whilst a member of the country's military
and also for trying to recruit mercenaries for that purpose. However
the arrival of the post apartheid government meant that the focus
was suddenly put on PMCs, which had close links with the former
apartheid regime. Not surprisingly, EO's activities in Angola
and Sierra Leone attracted considerable attention especially from
the South African Government and African Human Rights Organisations.
The greatest problem they had in drafting the Regulation of Foreign
Military Assistance Act (FMAA) was how to define mercenary activity
and how to put enforceable and realistic limits on operations
overseas. The Act was finally passed in 1998 and covered two main
areas—stopping mercenary activity by preventing "direct
participation as a combatant in armed conflict for private gain
including the training, recruitment and use of mercenaries"
and secondly by requiring approval of the National Conventional
Arms Control Committee for offering of military assistance overseas.
These strict regulations have even limited the South African government's
own ability to make constructive use of local companies providing
military services.
On 1 January 1999 EO closed down and it is believed
that this occurred for two reasons. Firstly, no major contracts
were forthcoming to EO especially following the media outcry after
Sierra Leone and Angola. Secondly, it is argued that the FMAA
was too restrictive for EO to operate within. Nic Van Der Berg
of EO claimed the new legislation was unworkable and highly restrictive
supported this notion.9 Despite gaining a licence, EO seemed unable
to operate under the Act and dissolved its operations. Whilst
on the outside this seems a victory for those who would wish an
end to PMCs and mercenary activity in Africa, it does beg the
question of what happened to many of the hundreds of personnel
on EOs books and what are they up to now: have they moved on to
more respectable jobs or have some just joined smaller, less noticeable,
non-registered or regulated, offshore PMCs? This theory is again
supported from sources who support that there are still a number
of mercenaries and private companies operating in conflict areas
in Africa.
M Muller states "that a dual accountability
problem would serve a deathblow to PMCs in South Africa: The South
African Government was held accountable for EO and was pressed
to increase state control. EO was held accountable for the activities
of its former employees".10 In February 1996 the ANC declared,
"We cannot be the exporters of war, as a people who believe
in democracy. Our duty is to ensure that the continuity of peace,
not only in the region but also throughout the continent".
This despite the fact that EO had brought temporary stability
and peace talks to their neighbour Angola and had been fully praised
by that legitimate Angolan Government.
2.3.2 UNITED
STATES
The United States has gone for a different approach
in dealing with PMCs. They are less concerned in trying to define
mercenaries or mercenary activity. The focus of the US regulatory
regime is on the transfer of knowledge, services and goods. The
key piece of legislation is the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR), which requires anyone in the US dealing in
the "manufacturing or exporting of defence articles or furnishing
defence services" to register through the Office of Defence
Trade Control (ODTC). The ODTC is part of the State Department
to which the president has delegated authority and they also must
approve almost all contracts over $50 million. Defence services
include "the furnishing of assistance (including training)
to foreign persons, whether in the US or abroad in the design,
development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing,
repair, maintenance, modification, operation, demilitarisation,
destruction, processing or use of defence articles".
A contractor like MPRI, according to General
Soyster, must follow very strict submissions to the ODTC, which
then sends the request to the appropriate departments in government
with an interest such as: Navy, Joint Chiefs, Defence, Africa
Bureau in the State Department, Human Rights.11 If all these agencies
concur then a licence is issued however, if even one does not
concur then no licence is issued. He then stated that most licences
take 2-6 months although one did take as long as 18 months to
come through. These timelines do not fit easily with many PMCs
who see their ability to react quickly as vital to their niche
in the market. Whilst PMCs are not restricted from employing non-US
personnel and MPRI could employ a number of ex British and Canadian
former military, very few PMCs in the US recruit from abroad.
MPRI have informed the UN they could provide a combined team if
required for a joint contract. Obviously overseas personnel would
also have to be in the contract submitted to the State Department.
The main problem of companies passing through ITAR is the assumed
tacit US government approval for their activities. Therefore anything
that passes the strict regulation will be considered to be part
of US foreign policy, which will make the government part of the
ensuing problem. This has been highlighted by the MPRI training
and advice carried out in Croatia two months before they heavily
defeated Serb forces in the Krajina and thus this raised the mercenary
link with the US government.
MPRI operate slightly differently to many PMCs
in that they have very close links with the US military and provide
a great deal of domestic training and advice for the US military.
An example of a contract being carried out by MPRI is one currently
being conducted in Nigeria. This is a Defence Department contract
to restructure and develop the Nigerian Armed Forces. MPRI were
introduced to the Nigerian leadership by the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Defence and US Ambassador and it was highlighted
to the Nigerians that the work was on behalf of the US Government.
The US Ambassador (through the Defence Attaché) monitors
the program and he was also a key consultant before the licence
was issued.
Finally US PMCs are very unlikely to gain a
licence to carry arms or have a combat role and this type of regulation
would certainly affect the type of work that some of the PMCs
wishing for regulation in Britain would wish to be considered
in such regulation.
2.4 REGULATION—THE
PMC PERSPECTIVE
Throughout the 20th century Britain has been
a major supplier of private military expertise, and this has been
with or without the British governments approval. However it is
only after the media interest in Sandline's and Executive Outcomes
operations in Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone and Angola that has
pushed the government to look at the possibility of regulation.
This is especially true after the problems between Sandline and
the Foreign Office over the Arms to Africa Affair raised a long
asked question, who is responsible for the misconduct of non-government
military forces? Is it the individuals committing them or the
home state tolerating them? The Legg Report in 1998 produced the
following direction:
"Private military companies are in a business
which can have a direct and sensitive impact on Government policy
and international relations, and on Parliamentary and public opinion.
We think there is a case for giving officials more explicit guidance
on how to manage relations with these companies". The key
point is that this report does not call for the banning of such
companies and this is probably due to the fact that the British
government seems to set apart reputable PMCs from mercenaries
and other activities. In the same report it was stated, "
these companies are on the scene and look likely to stay on it".12
During this time Sandline also called for regulation
of PMCs probably to distance itself from its mercenary image.
The need to legitimise itself is understandable after the huge
media coverage it had received much of which was inflammatory
and unresearched. PMCs are now supporting the requirement for
regulation as they believe that by gaining this legitimacy and
thus their own nation support they will open up further markets,
which have previously been closed to them. Areas such as protection
for humanitarian aid, support to UN operations and even peacekeeping
contracts are more likely to become available to them through
the means of regulation.
The claim by PMCs is that as a business they
are necessarily more cost effective than many UN operations. Lt
Col Spicer in his book states, "UN involvement in Angola
cost $1 million a day—$365 million a year—and achieved
absolutely nothing. Executive Outcomes charged the Angolan government
$80 million for two years and got UNITA to the conference table,
putting an end to the war in a couple of months".13 The cost
of the UN operation in Sierra Leone is well over half a billion
dollars a year and it is questionable whether the results achieved
are worth that amount of money.
It is clear therefore that the more open and
reputable PMCs support some form of external regulation but what
sort of regulation would they like to see is unclear. Firstly
they will argue that it must be manageable and should not affect
their legitimate commercial aspirations and operational effectiveness.
From this perspective there will need to be a balance between
the extent of the oversight required by the government and media
that can be practically managed on the ground and that which will
be acceptable to the PMCs and also their client governments which
does not turn them away from a contract. SCI worry that overly
prescriptive regulations will negate much of the speed and flexibility
of legitimate PMCs thus putting them out of business. It could
also be argued that an extremely strict regulation would push
some companies overseas or underground, which would be to no-one's
advantage.
In regards to the transparency issue Lt Col
Spicer put forward the following ideas to the FCO Select Committee
on 11 June 2002. He believes transparency should be on two levels.
Firstly that information required by any normal UK corporate registration,
which would be in the public domain, should be processed. Also
that all UK licensed registered PMCs should be based in the UK.
Secondly that there would be confidential information relating
to ownership, vetting of personnel, finances, training and competence
standards, identities of employers which should be disclosed to
certain departments only. Lt Col Spicer argues that this would
come within normal privacy rules but is also key due to the fact
that many of his personnel are former SF or intelligence service
personnel who have had sensitive careers and therefore it would
be unfair and dangerous to require full public disclosure of this
information.14 Other companies such as ArmorGroup believe that
any vetting should be conducted by the companies themselves therefore
putting the obligation on that company to check its own employees
and saving the government money.
SCI believes that a general licence to operate
after a full vetting of the PMC and its personnel would have most
PMCs support. They argue that the application procedure, and waiting
for a licence for each contract is "too restrictive, time
consuming, expensive, slow and would put British firms at a disadvantage".15
This type of regulation has proved to be a slow process in the
United States and certainly does not favour those firms who believe
that their speed of reaction and deployment are key to their effectiveness.
Other companies believe that a licence for particular services
is the way forward and only contracts involving the carriage of
arms should need to go through the government. It is also put
forward that PMCs and the government should have a much closer
working relationship where the government could retain the right
to intervene to prevent a contract going ahead where it felt it
necessary for genuine reasons of national interest. Governments
could even provide a list of countries and activities, where PMCs
could not operate, which would help with their speed of deployment
when a possible contract is required but could also be updated
regularly to deal with situations and changes in British interests
as they happen.
Those who state that the future of solving internal
conflicts is with regional forces such as ECOWAS and well trained
state military forces, and not with PMCs are being idealistic
according to Doug Brooks who states" that due to tribal bias,
shameless political manipulation, or lack of wages, African militaries
have proven to be a far greater menace to the welfare of their
own citizens than to the rare external threats to their states".16
Here there is evidence that PMCs in Sierra Leone and Angola have
stopped human rights violations rather than perpetrated them.
In fact, it is clear that through regulation
that PMCs could play a greater part in UN operations and this
legitimacy is sought by PMCs and the UN. Brooks again argues that
"With a depressing dearth of nations volunteering to send
more competent troops, the UN is forced to rely on these inept
militaries to do their peacekeeping and peace enforcement...as
a result the UN is often left with the world's least competent
soldiers to do the world's most difficult peace missions, almost
ensuring failures and setbacks such as Angola and Sierra Leone".17
Regulation therefore would not only allow PMCs to play a greater
role in these operations from logistics, transportation, training
and tactical insight but also a more active role in ensuring peace.
This would need to be registered in any regulation especially
the potential requirement for the carriage and use of arms by
PMCs.
2.5 CONCLUSION
Whilst there has been a major growth in the
private military arena, there have been no major combat operations
by PMCs since Angola and Sierra Leone and so it is important to
understand that only a small amount of the work offered by these
companies actually involves combat. They can offer much more to
help stability and peace in countries affected by internal, low
intensity conflicts. Their use has been made legitimate in the
United States where PMCs are employed to advance national foreign
policy goals as shown by MPRIs work in the Former Yugoslavia and
Nigeria, and also by ArmorGroup and Vinell.
Many PMCs that seek regulation operate from
Western countries where the media and governments already provide
some control over their activities. Regulation will benefit them
by distancing PMCs from less reputable groups. It is important
to note that any regulation will have little impact on those who
are truly defined as mercenaries and if that were the real aim
of the legislation it is likely fail—just as all the Criminal
Legislation Acts have not completely eradicated crime in this
country. Any regulation must be balanced and not just overly restrictive
in order to allow British companies to compete fairly on the open
market and also to be able to act in a timeframe that can make
a difference.
International Regulation is often stated as
the key requirement to stop the nomadic ability of some companies
to move where they consider the regulation to be most appropriate.
However the UN certainly is unable or unwilling to produce any
legislation for the foreseeable future and no other world organisations
currently appear prepared to enter the debate. It therefore is
important for Britain to take the lead in appropriate legislation
that does not drive PMCs out into the wilderness but regulates
those who wish to be accountable and transparent. This will then
open up new markets and opportunities for these PMCs who are enthusiastic
to work within a fair legal framework and in support of UK foreign
policy.
Many PMCs have declared a wish for regulation
and in general will support the registration of their services.
Where a number perceive problems is with specific contract approval
as those who offer immediate support and advice to in the short
term believe that the lengthy bureaucratic process will be too
slow for them to operate effectively and would give unregulated
overseas firms an advantage. However they are happy to allow oversight
through observers if required (and if the client country allows
it) and understand that an enforcement capability must be in place
for the regulation to work. Therefore the key problems that will
require resolution prior to regulation is how much client confidentiality
and speed of reaction the government will allow compared to the
time required and contractual information needed if contract approval
is required. It is also important that any regulation takes into
account that some firms such as Penumbra only offer advice, investigations
and analysis, do not consider themselves to be PMCs and are very
much at the low threat end of the general PMC spectrum. Should
they therefore have to come under the same legislation as SCI
and Sandline who offer an offensive capability?
Britain, with a few PMCs, has taken a step forward
in seeking to regulate non-state military activity and there are
a number of countries watching with interest at this development.
There should be no doubt that any regulation will prevent some
PMC contracts from being undertaken in the future. However the
regulation itself should open up a much more lucrative market
to PMCs with such organisations as the UN and NGOs. Herbert Howe
from Georgetown University sums it up well when he writes "rather
than engaging in futile attempts at legally eliminating `mercenary
behaviour' or ignoring this growing phenomenon, the world community
should channel these companies' capabilities into assisting world
security".18 This view is fully supported by those PMCs actively
seeking regulation and although the UN may not be ready to "privatise
peace"; it is right for Britain to seek to regulate "military
and security activities".
REFERENCES
1 D Brooks, Protecting People: the PMC
Potential, June 2002.
2 Sandline International, Private Military
Companies—Independent or Regulated? March 1998.
3 Patrick J Cullen, Keeping the new dog
of war on a tight leash: Assessing means of accountability for
Private Military Companies, Conflict Trends—No 1/2000.
4 Lt Col (Retd) T Spicer OBE in an interview
with FCO Select Committee in House of Commons, 11 June 2002.
5 Interview with Lt Gen (Retd) H E Soyster,
MPRI in Washington, USA, 29 May 2002.
6 Juan Carlos Zurate, The Emergence of
a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International
Law, and the New World Disorder, Stanford Journal of International
Law 75, 1998.
7 Herbert Howe, Global Order and Security
Privatisation, Institute for National Strategic Studies, No
140, May 1998.
8 C Spearin, Executive Outcomes in Sierra
Leone: A Human Security Assessment.
9 Interview with Mr Van Der Berg of EO at
Government Seminar on the Green Paper at Birmingham University,
24 June 2002.
10 M Muller, Explaining the Emergence
of Private Military Companies (PMCs), Freie Universitat Berlin,
May 2002.
11 Interview with Lt Gen (Retd) H E Soyster,
MPRI in Washington, USA, 29 May 2002.
12 Lt Col T Spicer OBE, An Unorthodox
Soldier, Mainstream Publishing, 1999.
13 Extracted from K R Nossel, Global
Convergence and National Interests: Regulating Trans national
Security in the Post Cold War Era, Melbourne Journal of International
law, Vol 2, 2001.
14 Lt Col T Spicer OBE in interview with
FCO Select Committee in House of Commons, 11 June 2002.
15 Interview with representative of SCI
on 04 May 2002.
16 D Brooks, Protecting People: the PMC
potential, June 2002.
17 D Brooks, Protecting People: the PMC
potential, June 2002.
18 Herbert Howe, Global Order and Security
Privatisation, Strategic Forum, Institute For National Strategic
Studies, National Defence University, No 140, May 1998.
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