Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence



  This chapter will examine the need for the regulation of PMCs, review other countries' current regulations and their effectiveness, capture the views of some of the British PMCs opinions and recommendations for the Green Paper and then will attempt to justify the way forward for regulation from an overall PMC perspective. There has been much written about PMCs, PSCs, mercenaries and the current trend to privatise security. In a world where the end of the Cold War has meant the loss of superpower patronage for many states and a reduction in the world's military numbers, this has led to an unstable environment. The demise of the Soviet Union and long suppressed ethnic rivalries has meant that low intensity, intra-state conflicts now dominate the world. This power vacuum has led to the creation or evolution of Private Military Companies. The services these companies can offer spread across the military spectrum from transport to training, protection to actual combat. These companies have tended to develop in militarily advanced countries, using a surplus of military experience and expertise.


  The growth of PMCs and some of their more recent lethal operations in conflict zones as varied as Sierra Leone, Angola, the Balkans, Colombia and Papua New Guinea has raised the profile of these companies. This has led to increasing demands for some sort of regulation for them. PMCs have emerged in countries with a large pool of military expertise, due to military downsizing, early retirement incentives and the financial benefits of such work compared to regular military pay. However many of these countries in which PMCs are based are key players in the world arena and thus can find these companies a political embarrassment. Doug Brooks puts forward the opinion that "deliberate decisions by NGOs and other humanitarian agencies to exclude PMCs from conferences and discussions on the topic have resulted in a situation where occasional attempts to eliminate the industry have been overwhelmed by the worldwide demand for private security and military services".1 As has been described in the opening chapter these organisations can do more than provide passive assistance in areas of conflict. According to Sandline: "They can provide training and equipment to extend the capabilities of their clients military resources, providing them with the strategic or operational advantage that is necessary to suppress their opposition or going even further, play an active role alongside the client forces, as force multipliers".2


  PMCs state that they operate as a military hierarchy with the associated discipline, observe the laws and customs of the host nation and would adhere to the principles of the Geneva Convention and the International Law of Armed Conflict. There are some advocates who have therefore questioned the need for regulation. Indeed there is a strong argument that many PMCs already apply a degree of self-regulation that reduces the need for further oversight or control especially if excessive control meant that PMCs or some of their activities went offshore to avoid the harsh regulation. Some of the large companies such as ArmorGroup Services put forward a strong argument that they are already subject to legislation by being a public company. They are directly responsible to their shareholders, the Securities Exchange Commission, have an international board of directors, are audited by a major auditing company, come under the Data Protection Act and their accounts must go to Company House in London. Ex-officers and other professionals of developed world nations normally lead these companies and generally maintain strong links to their former professions and values, they would ask why should they suddenly lose these ethics and discipline just because they have moved into the private sector?


  PMCs have dismissed accusations that they may have been responsible for human rights abuses, prolong conflicts, work for disreputable or illegal states or governments, as it would act against them in the long run. They run their companies as a business and any loss of reputation or credibility through illegal activity would hurt their long-term interests and future contracts. However without formal ethical and legal accountability it is possible for PMCs to bend or even break the rules or conduct themselves in a way that the UN and developed nations would regard as unacceptable. Companies such as Control Risks and ArmorGroup believe they are already transparent otherwise the British and American governments would not already contract them.

  The writer Patrick Cullen argues that unregulated PMCs are neither accountable nor unaccountable for their actions—he states that "PMCs have three masters: their home government (the country they operate from and have connections with), the host or employing government, and the market".3 So the fact that currently formal rules and regulations might not be in place in this country does not mean that these companies do not have any form of accountability. An argument against regulation is the claim that there might be a great deal of influence and links between PMCs and intelligence services of their home states and that they can be useful as quasi-state agents however this has been totally refuted by ex members of the Security Service. This was supported by the argument that it would not be in a government's or their security service's interest to be associated with these so-called mercenary groups. However American PMCs such as MPRI and Vinnel have long been regarded as vital to the implementation of US foreign policy, by proxy, in places such as the former Yugoslavia and Saudi Arabia.

  Writers such as Juan Carlos Zarate argue that the potential problems for PMCs are in their lack of accountability and transparency. Lt Colonel T Spicer formally of Sandline and now with Strategic Consulting International (SCI), whilst welcoming the need for regulation of reputable private sector companies states that his company already goes some way to being accountable for the following reasons. They come under both current international and national laws, face media scrutiny, are controlled by market forces that can have an affect on them if they are not accountable (future contracts could be lost if a PMCs credibility was questioned) and a formal contract has to be met as well. They have shown that they have a growing role in international peace and security especially as the western powers have become less willing to get involved in many of the worlds problem areas. Some companies such as ArmorGroup believe that any regulation should make a distinction between lethal and non-lethal force capability as strict regulation for all firms whatever services they provide would mean that either companies would evade it or less scrupulous foreign competition will step in to undercut or outmanoeuvre the burdened British companies.

  PMCs have the ability to train a formerly autocratic country's forces to function within civilian, democratic regimes and to fight under internationally accepted principles of engagement such as the current work being conducted by MPRI in Nigeria where they are doing just such work. When interviewed General (Retd) H Soyster stated that the Nigerians would not have placed a contract if the US government did not regulate them. In addition PMCs give client governments the military capability to bargain from a position of strength and bring an opposition to the bargaining table. The combat missions conducted by Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone and Angola support this. The current disadvantages of unregulated PMCs is that how they achieve these advantages is not directly accountable to anyone and whom they employ is not transparent. Currently these companies have no formal link to their home government but can operate in areas that affect the British foreign policy. They are able to employ whoever they wish to conduct their work and in the case of EO it is claimed that they used ex-members of some of the most notorious and ruthless commando units of the South African Apartheid regime. The fact that some of the companies offer combat raises the question of their accountability in the field especially in the cases of human rights abuses.


  It is also claimed that PMCs are closely tied to other companies with diverse economic interests such as energy and mining companies. As a result it appeared that EO and other companies were engaging in conflicts to obtain contracts and concessions. It is also well known that Tony Buckingham of Sandline has many other companies including industrial ones that he is linked to and these may influence the work his PMC is contracted for. This link between PMCs and economic interests can give the impression of corruption and may influence the internal dynamics of a client country which would be well beyond the contract the PMC was brought in to achieve. Lt Col Spicer is quite adamant here that PMCs are military providers with payrolls to meet, overheads to pay for and a cash flow to maintain and that extractive mineral concessions do not directly provide this and often require a great deal of development, resources and investment in order to be lucrative. Thus he states, "A mineral concession is worthless to a PMC".4 However there is a large amount of evidence provided by researchers that some of these companies often enjoy ties with major multinational, especially mineral, companies who provide much of the initial funding and political contacts. An example here would be the well-documented link between EO and Heritage Oil in Angola.

  Without the accountability and transparency of some form of regulation PMCs will also be subjected to claims that they are able to traffic in arms, smuggle drugs and support or train terrorist groups. In fact the PMC DynCorp was linked with human trafficking and drugs in Kosovo. Whilst the well-known and reputable PMCs may and may not conduct such activities, there is evidence of an underworld of groups of mercenaries who have fewer scruples and are more cash influenced. They are much more likely to aggravate conflicts and give military life to illegitimate regimes. It is known for them to have been operating in countries such as Ethiopia, the Congo, Zaire and even for the rebel forces in Sierra Leone. Former members of this country's Intelligence Agencies have supported this statement. This highlights the needs for regulation to distinguish between reputable private military companies and private mercenary company groupings. Lt General Soyster of MPRI was quite clear in stating that it was important for PMCs to work with the support of its home government rather than try to operate without their knowledge.5


  However there is an opposing argument that regulation might, according to Juan Carlos Zurate, "simply legitimise the profession of mercenaries and allow them to operate with the backing of the law".6 This argument has been heavily refuted by many academics such as Herbert Howe who claim that the elimination of mercenary behaviour is impossible and probably undesirable as they can, when regulated, offer many useful services. There is also the problem that many Africans have a great distrust of what they will always call mercenaries and there is still a feeling that they are remnants of the white post-colonial forces out to strip Africa of her wealth. This view is still held and has considerable support amongst African states in the UN. However, despite these feelings African governments have still been employing PMCs in areas such as Sierra Leone, Angola and the Congo.

  Despite these viewpoints PMCs have continued to grow in number and ability, and are able to provide services, which governments may approve of but are unable to support themselves because of political, military or financial costs. Herbert Howe points out "not coincidentally, the rise of these companies is coinciding with the pullback of western nations and the UN from peacekeeping and peace enforcing".6 They also have the ability to aid humanitarian groups and NGOs who may require protection when operating in countries where there is no UN or western support. In order to prevent corruption and prevent the loss of these hugely important relief supplies, professional PMCs can reduce the need for governments and their military forces to have to deploy in support of aid agencies. This theme will be continued in later chapters looking at the use of PMCs by NGOs and the UN.

  PMCs operating at the lethal capability end of the market generally work with a small number of permanent staff and have a list of personnel who can be called for different contracts. SCI has a permanent staff of 12 and has around 150 personnel on their books who are not employed full time but who may be available for work. It is claimed that EO had a permanent staff of 30 but reportedly could raise a battalion of 650 within 15 days. By only paying for these personnel when required saves a great deal on overheads. However, there is no transparent vetting of the personnel that these companies employ and this has lead to much of the bad press about PMCs and mercenaries. The concern is that they will employ people with no regard for the law and human rights. Reputable companies such as PBS security and SCI claim to take a great interest in who they employ and have their own personal vetting procedures. This however is not enough to placate the cynics who would require government vetting as part of a greater oversight on these companies activities. It is also important to regulate these companies to stop them just forming for contracts and then dissolving again before re-emerging under a different name for another contract.

  A number of member states in the UN have supported Britain's push towards possible regulation of PMCs, not least because many of the PMCs themselves have sought to maximise their legitimacy in order to expand their markets to governments, international organisations and multinational companies. Most of these companies do not actually provide armed combat but concentrate more on military advice and training, arms supply and procurement, guard services, intelligence gathering and logistics. However they must still be considered for regulation as they have the ability to widen their capabilities to combat roles for the right price. An example would be Control Risks, which started out dealing in kidnap and ransom advice and then developed into a general military and security company. They do not offer any lethal capabilities but currently there is nothing to stop them if they felt they were able and it was cost effective.


  PMCs that provide combat services such as Sandline and SCI also claim that they can provide a speed of reaction or deployment where a national government or international group may be unable to for political or bureaucratic reasons, thus enabling prevention of loss of life and human rights abuses. They are also willing to work in areas where national governments do not have a major foreign interest. It was noted by C Spearin that in Sierra Leone the host nation's military stated that PMCs "did a positive job...we did not consider them mercenaries but as people bringing in some sanity".8 Ian Douglas, a retired General from Canada and then a UN advisor for peace missions declared, "EO gave us stability. In a perfect world, of course, we would not need an organisation like EO, but I'd be loath to say they have to go because they are mercenaries". It is therefore important that any regulation takes into account PMCs capabilities and does not only concentrate on potential human rights abuses by these companies but also on their ability to prevent abuses occurring by rebels, insurgents and military forces.


  Several countries have brought in legislation that seeks to regulate or ban mercenary activity. However by looking at the national approaches of South Africa and the United States it clearly shows the considerable differences and difficulties in using national legislation to regulate PMCs.


  During the Apartheid era the only illegal activities were to be a mercenary whilst a member of the country's military and also for trying to recruit mercenaries for that purpose. However the arrival of the post apartheid government meant that the focus was suddenly put on PMCs, which had close links with the former apartheid regime. Not surprisingly, EO's activities in Angola and Sierra Leone attracted considerable attention especially from the South African Government and African Human Rights Organisations. The greatest problem they had in drafting the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (FMAA) was how to define mercenary activity and how to put enforceable and realistic limits on operations overseas. The Act was finally passed in 1998 and covered two main areas—stopping mercenary activity by preventing "direct participation as a combatant in armed conflict for private gain including the training, recruitment and use of mercenaries" and secondly by requiring approval of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee for offering of military assistance overseas. These strict regulations have even limited the South African government's own ability to make constructive use of local companies providing military services.

  On 1 January 1999 EO closed down and it is believed that this occurred for two reasons. Firstly, no major contracts were forthcoming to EO especially following the media outcry after Sierra Leone and Angola. Secondly, it is argued that the FMAA was too restrictive for EO to operate within. Nic Van Der Berg of EO claimed the new legislation was unworkable and highly restrictive supported this notion.9 Despite gaining a licence, EO seemed unable to operate under the Act and dissolved its operations. Whilst on the outside this seems a victory for those who would wish an end to PMCs and mercenary activity in Africa, it does beg the question of what happened to many of the hundreds of personnel on EOs books and what are they up to now: have they moved on to more respectable jobs or have some just joined smaller, less noticeable, non-registered or regulated, offshore PMCs? This theory is again supported from sources who support that there are still a number of mercenaries and private companies operating in conflict areas in Africa.

  M Muller states "that a dual accountability problem would serve a deathblow to PMCs in South Africa: The South African Government was held accountable for EO and was pressed to increase state control. EO was held accountable for the activities of its former employees".10 In February 1996 the ANC declared, "We cannot be the exporters of war, as a people who believe in democracy. Our duty is to ensure that the continuity of peace, not only in the region but also throughout the continent". This despite the fact that EO had brought temporary stability and peace talks to their neighbour Angola and had been fully praised by that legitimate Angolan Government.


  The United States has gone for a different approach in dealing with PMCs. They are less concerned in trying to define mercenaries or mercenary activity. The focus of the US regulatory regime is on the transfer of knowledge, services and goods. The key piece of legislation is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which requires anyone in the US dealing in the "manufacturing or exporting of defence articles or furnishing defence services" to register through the Office of Defence Trade Control (ODTC). The ODTC is part of the State Department to which the president has delegated authority and they also must approve almost all contracts over $50 million. Defence services include "the furnishing of assistance (including training) to foreign persons, whether in the US or abroad in the design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operation, demilitarisation, destruction, processing or use of defence articles".

  A contractor like MPRI, according to General Soyster, must follow very strict submissions to the ODTC, which then sends the request to the appropriate departments in government with an interest such as: Navy, Joint Chiefs, Defence, Africa Bureau in the State Department, Human Rights.11 If all these agencies concur then a licence is issued however, if even one does not concur then no licence is issued. He then stated that most licences take 2-6 months although one did take as long as 18 months to come through. These timelines do not fit easily with many PMCs who see their ability to react quickly as vital to their niche in the market. Whilst PMCs are not restricted from employing non-US personnel and MPRI could employ a number of ex British and Canadian former military, very few PMCs in the US recruit from abroad. MPRI have informed the UN they could provide a combined team if required for a joint contract. Obviously overseas personnel would also have to be in the contract submitted to the State Department. The main problem of companies passing through ITAR is the assumed tacit US government approval for their activities. Therefore anything that passes the strict regulation will be considered to be part of US foreign policy, which will make the government part of the ensuing problem. This has been highlighted by the MPRI training and advice carried out in Croatia two months before they heavily defeated Serb forces in the Krajina and thus this raised the mercenary link with the US government.

  MPRI operate slightly differently to many PMCs in that they have very close links with the US military and provide a great deal of domestic training and advice for the US military. An example of a contract being carried out by MPRI is one currently being conducted in Nigeria. This is a Defence Department contract to restructure and develop the Nigerian Armed Forces. MPRI were introduced to the Nigerian leadership by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defence and US Ambassador and it was highlighted to the Nigerians that the work was on behalf of the US Government. The US Ambassador (through the Defence Attaché) monitors the program and he was also a key consultant before the licence was issued.

  Finally US PMCs are very unlikely to gain a licence to carry arms or have a combat role and this type of regulation would certainly affect the type of work that some of the PMCs wishing for regulation in Britain would wish to be considered in such regulation.


  Throughout the 20th century Britain has been a major supplier of private military expertise, and this has been with or without the British governments approval. However it is only after the media interest in Sandline's and Executive Outcomes operations in Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone and Angola that has pushed the government to look at the possibility of regulation. This is especially true after the problems between Sandline and the Foreign Office over the Arms to Africa Affair raised a long asked question, who is responsible for the misconduct of non-government military forces? Is it the individuals committing them or the home state tolerating them? The Legg Report in 1998 produced the following direction:

    "Private military companies are in a business which can have a direct and sensitive impact on Government policy and international relations, and on Parliamentary and public opinion. We think there is a case for giving officials more explicit guidance on how to manage relations with these companies". The key point is that this report does not call for the banning of such companies and this is probably due to the fact that the British government seems to set apart reputable PMCs from mercenaries and other activities. In the same report it was stated, " these companies are on the scene and look likely to stay on it".12

  During this time Sandline also called for regulation of PMCs probably to distance itself from its mercenary image. The need to legitimise itself is understandable after the huge media coverage it had received much of which was inflammatory and unresearched. PMCs are now supporting the requirement for regulation as they believe that by gaining this legitimacy and thus their own nation support they will open up further markets, which have previously been closed to them. Areas such as protection for humanitarian aid, support to UN operations and even peacekeeping contracts are more likely to become available to them through the means of regulation.

  The claim by PMCs is that as a business they are necessarily more cost effective than many UN operations. Lt Col Spicer in his book states, "UN involvement in Angola cost $1 million a day—$365 million a year—and achieved absolutely nothing. Executive Outcomes charged the Angolan government $80 million for two years and got UNITA to the conference table, putting an end to the war in a couple of months".13 The cost of the UN operation in Sierra Leone is well over half a billion dollars a year and it is questionable whether the results achieved are worth that amount of money.

  It is clear therefore that the more open and reputable PMCs support some form of external regulation but what sort of regulation would they like to see is unclear. Firstly they will argue that it must be manageable and should not affect their legitimate commercial aspirations and operational effectiveness. From this perspective there will need to be a balance between the extent of the oversight required by the government and media that can be practically managed on the ground and that which will be acceptable to the PMCs and also their client governments which does not turn them away from a contract. SCI worry that overly prescriptive regulations will negate much of the speed and flexibility of legitimate PMCs thus putting them out of business. It could also be argued that an extremely strict regulation would push some companies overseas or underground, which would be to no-one's advantage.

  In regards to the transparency issue Lt Col Spicer put forward the following ideas to the FCO Select Committee on 11 June 2002. He believes transparency should be on two levels. Firstly that information required by any normal UK corporate registration, which would be in the public domain, should be processed. Also that all UK licensed registered PMCs should be based in the UK. Secondly that there would be confidential information relating to ownership, vetting of personnel, finances, training and competence standards, identities of employers which should be disclosed to certain departments only. Lt Col Spicer argues that this would come within normal privacy rules but is also key due to the fact that many of his personnel are former SF or intelligence service personnel who have had sensitive careers and therefore it would be unfair and dangerous to require full public disclosure of this information.14 Other companies such as ArmorGroup believe that any vetting should be conducted by the companies themselves therefore putting the obligation on that company to check its own employees and saving the government money.

  SCI believes that a general licence to operate after a full vetting of the PMC and its personnel would have most PMCs support. They argue that the application procedure, and waiting for a licence for each contract is "too restrictive, time consuming, expensive, slow and would put British firms at a disadvantage".15 This type of regulation has proved to be a slow process in the United States and certainly does not favour those firms who believe that their speed of reaction and deployment are key to their effectiveness. Other companies believe that a licence for particular services is the way forward and only contracts involving the carriage of arms should need to go through the government. It is also put forward that PMCs and the government should have a much closer working relationship where the government could retain the right to intervene to prevent a contract going ahead where it felt it necessary for genuine reasons of national interest. Governments could even provide a list of countries and activities, where PMCs could not operate, which would help with their speed of deployment when a possible contract is required but could also be updated regularly to deal with situations and changes in British interests as they happen.

  Those who state that the future of solving internal conflicts is with regional forces such as ECOWAS and well trained state military forces, and not with PMCs are being idealistic according to Doug Brooks who states" that due to tribal bias, shameless political manipulation, or lack of wages, African militaries have proven to be a far greater menace to the welfare of their own citizens than to the rare external threats to their states".16 Here there is evidence that PMCs in Sierra Leone and Angola have stopped human rights violations rather than perpetrated them.

  In fact, it is clear that through regulation that PMCs could play a greater part in UN operations and this legitimacy is sought by PMCs and the UN. Brooks again argues that "With a depressing dearth of nations volunteering to send more competent troops, the UN is forced to rely on these inept militaries to do their peacekeeping and peace a result the UN is often left with the world's least competent soldiers to do the world's most difficult peace missions, almost ensuring failures and setbacks such as Angola and Sierra Leone".17 Regulation therefore would not only allow PMCs to play a greater role in these operations from logistics, transportation, training and tactical insight but also a more active role in ensuring peace. This would need to be registered in any regulation especially the potential requirement for the carriage and use of arms by PMCs.


  Whilst there has been a major growth in the private military arena, there have been no major combat operations by PMCs since Angola and Sierra Leone and so it is important to understand that only a small amount of the work offered by these companies actually involves combat. They can offer much more to help stability and peace in countries affected by internal, low intensity conflicts. Their use has been made legitimate in the United States where PMCs are employed to advance national foreign policy goals as shown by MPRIs work in the Former Yugoslavia and Nigeria, and also by ArmorGroup and Vinell.

  Many PMCs that seek regulation operate from Western countries where the media and governments already provide some control over their activities. Regulation will benefit them by distancing PMCs from less reputable groups. It is important to note that any regulation will have little impact on those who are truly defined as mercenaries and if that were the real aim of the legislation it is likely fail—just as all the Criminal Legislation Acts have not completely eradicated crime in this country. Any regulation must be balanced and not just overly restrictive in order to allow British companies to compete fairly on the open market and also to be able to act in a timeframe that can make a difference.

  International Regulation is often stated as the key requirement to stop the nomadic ability of some companies to move where they consider the regulation to be most appropriate. However the UN certainly is unable or unwilling to produce any legislation for the foreseeable future and no other world organisations currently appear prepared to enter the debate. It therefore is important for Britain to take the lead in appropriate legislation that does not drive PMCs out into the wilderness but regulates those who wish to be accountable and transparent. This will then open up new markets and opportunities for these PMCs who are enthusiastic to work within a fair legal framework and in support of UK foreign policy.

  Many PMCs have declared a wish for regulation and in general will support the registration of their services. Where a number perceive problems is with specific contract approval as those who offer immediate support and advice to in the short term believe that the lengthy bureaucratic process will be too slow for them to operate effectively and would give unregulated overseas firms an advantage. However they are happy to allow oversight through observers if required (and if the client country allows it) and understand that an enforcement capability must be in place for the regulation to work. Therefore the key problems that will require resolution prior to regulation is how much client confidentiality and speed of reaction the government will allow compared to the time required and contractual information needed if contract approval is required. It is also important that any regulation takes into account that some firms such as Penumbra only offer advice, investigations and analysis, do not consider themselves to be PMCs and are very much at the low threat end of the general PMC spectrum. Should they therefore have to come under the same legislation as SCI and Sandline who offer an offensive capability?

  Britain, with a few PMCs, has taken a step forward in seeking to regulate non-state military activity and there are a number of countries watching with interest at this development. There should be no doubt that any regulation will prevent some PMC contracts from being undertaken in the future. However the regulation itself should open up a much more lucrative market to PMCs with such organisations as the UN and NGOs. Herbert Howe from Georgetown University sums it up well when he writes "rather than engaging in futile attempts at legally eliminating `mercenary behaviour' or ignoring this growing phenomenon, the world community should channel these companies' capabilities into assisting world security".18 This view is fully supported by those PMCs actively seeking regulation and although the UN may not be ready to "privatise peace"; it is right for Britain to seek to regulate "military and security activities".


  1  D Brooks, Protecting People: the PMC Potential, June 2002.

  2  Sandline International, Private Military Companies—Independent or Regulated? March 1998.

  3  Patrick J Cullen, Keeping the new dog of war on a tight leash: Assessing means of accountability for Private Military Companies, Conflict Trends—No 1/2000.

  4  Lt Col (Retd) T Spicer OBE in an interview with FCO Select Committee in House of Commons, 11 June 2002.

  5  Interview with Lt Gen (Retd) H E Soyster, MPRI in Washington, USA, 29 May 2002.

  6  Juan Carlos Zurate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder, Stanford Journal of International Law 75, 1998.

  7  Herbert Howe, Global Order and Security Privatisation, Institute for National Strategic Studies, No 140, May 1998.

  8  C Spearin, Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone: A Human Security Assessment.

  9  Interview with Mr Van Der Berg of EO at Government Seminar on the Green Paper at Birmingham University, 24 June 2002.

  10  M Muller, Explaining the Emergence of Private Military Companies (PMCs), Freie Universitat Berlin, May 2002.

  11  Interview with Lt Gen (Retd) H E Soyster, MPRI in Washington, USA, 29 May 2002.

  12  Lt Col T Spicer OBE, An Unorthodox Soldier, Mainstream Publishing, 1999.

  13  Extracted from K R Nossel, Global Convergence and National Interests: Regulating Trans national Security in the Post Cold War Era, Melbourne Journal of International law, Vol 2, 2001.

  14  Lt Col T Spicer OBE in interview with FCO Select Committee in House of Commons, 11 June 2002.

  15  Interview with representative of SCI on 04 May 2002.

  16  D Brooks, Protecting People: the PMC potential, June 2002.

  17  D Brooks, Protecting People: the PMC potential, June 2002.

  18  Herbert Howe, Global Order and Security Privatisation, Strategic Forum, Institute For National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, No 140, May 1998.

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