CHAPTER 3—THE UNITED NATION'S PERSPECTIVE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Increased international instability, the end
of the Cold War and the reluctance by first world nations to engage
in problems that do not affect their vital national interests
has led some companies and nations to view PMCs as an effective
solution to the security challenges that confront them. Simultaneously
PMCs and their advocates have been quick to point out the failure
of the UN to control the many crises that have dominated the changing
security environment of the 1990s. Furthermore they have also
argued that the private sector could perform many tasks that have
in the past been conducted either by UN agencies or Peacekeeping
troops contributed from Member States.
3.2 AIM
This chapter will explore the arguments that
PMCs can provide useful military capabilities to the UN to support
its peace operations, and determine how these capabilities can
fit into the UN's current methods of handling crises. The chapter
will then examine what type of regulation would transform PMCs
into a politically acceptable military/security capability that
could be utilised by the UN.
3.3 SCOPE
The UN has been widely criticised for failing
to meet the challenges of a changing security environment. As
a result of such attention it has commissioned several studies
to suggest improvements to its methods of operation. The most
recent major study was the Brahimi report that was commissioned
by the UN Secretary General and published in August 2000. Chaired
by the former Foreign Minister of Algeria, Mr Lakhdar Brahimi,
the panel reviewed United Nations peace and security activities
and presented a set of recommendations to assist the United Nations
in conducting such activities in the future. Although not infallible,
this report is widely accepted certainly within the UN, as the
best way forward. It therefore makes sense to use the panel's
most relevant recommendations as a method of ascertaining whether
PMCs can in fact enhance the UN's peace and security activities.
This chapter then analyses the unique nature
of the UN and attempt to explain why PMCs may find it difficult
gaining approval and acceptance by the UN. Finally it suggests
ways in which PMCs could adjust their structures and practices
to gain political acceptance (and perhaps business) from the UN.
The chapter then concludes by examining what type of regulation
would transform PMCs into a politically acceptable military and
security capability that could be utilised by the UN.
3.4 THE BRAHIMI
REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS
3.4.1 INTEGRATED
CONFLICT PREVENTION
The Brahimi report stressed the need for a more
integrated approach to conflict prevention; it went on to specifically
endorse the Secretary-General's remarks on closer collaboration
between nations, UN organisations and the corporate sector.1 This
recommendation may not at first sight be strictly relevant to
the employment of PMCs but it is worth highlighting Kofi Annan's
inclusion of the corporate sector in conflict prevention. Corporations
may of course be biased in either their reporting or actions in
crises, dependent as they could be on the goodwill of their own
government or that of the country within which they conduct their
business. Nonetheless business needs a secure environment in which
to thrive and clearly a healthy economy is a major contributor
to the prevention of conflict. It could therefore be argued that
PMCs who are providing such a secure framework for a corporation
are already indirectly assisting in the conflict prevention goals
of the UN.
Where perhaps this factor can be enhanced is,
as mentioned by the Brahimi report, in ensuring that the efforts
of the corporation and it's PMCs are not running contrary to the
conflict prevention strategy of the UN (for instance by an industry
and its PMC strengthening a belligerent country to the alarm of
its neighbours). Additionally PMCs admit themselves that they
can only provide military or security solutions to a country's
problems and that the underlying causes of the conflict would
have to be addressed if a lasting peace is to be achieved. This
is one area where closer cooperation between the UN and PMCs may
be successful in transforming a PMC's local and temporary security
success into a more permanent peace. It is this lack of cooperation
that meant that EO's temporary military successes in Angola and
Sierra Leone were not fully capitalised by the UN. Despite these
historical lessons there is still no meaningful dialogue between
the PMCs and the UN, the reasons for this are explored later on
in this chapter.
3.4.2 PEACE
BUILDING STRATEGIES
The report emphasised the need for coherent
post conflict peace building strategies.2 One area where PMCs
may well have a useful function to play is in the disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. All of
these could in theory be conducted by PMCs, it is however debatable
whether PMC troops could perform demobilisation and disarmament
better than the peacekeeping troops of many Member States. Reintegration
is however a task that may suit the first world background of
many of the PMC personnel, in particular training an Army for
"democratisation" is a capability that many troops from
third world countries would struggle to achieve. This training
programme would necessarily be a long term and perhaps an unwelcome
task for some Member States and therefore one that PMCs could
valuably accomplish. A precedent for PMCs fulfilling these tasks
has been set by MPRI who are currently running very similar programmes
in both Nigeria and Croatia.3
3.4.3 CLEAR,
CREDIBLE AND
ACHIEVABLE MANDATES
The panel recommended that no mission go forward
unless it is properly resourced, they believed that "to deploy
a partial force incapable of solidifying a fragile peace would
first raise and then dash the hopes of a population engulfed in
conflict or recovering from war, and damage the credibility of
the United Nations as a whole."4 Given the growing reluctance
of nations to deploy forces into areas with complex problems there
is therefore scope for PMCs to make up the balance of peacekeeping
troops and allow the operation to go ahead. The PMC contribution
need not simply be troops but could include the provision and
maintenance of items of equipment.
3.4.4 UNITED
NATIONS CAPABILITY
TO DEPLOY
OPERATIONS RAPIDLY
AND EFFECTIVELY
The failure by the United Nations and the international
community to deploy appropriately sized forces to Rwanda in time
to prevent the genocide between the Tutsis and the Hutus has been
used by many critics as an example of the UNs weakness in this
area. PMC advocates have been quick to suggest that the private
military sector could deploy faster than the UN and therefore
have a role to play in enabling the UN to respond more effectively
in crises.5 There are however a number of arguments to this proposal.
Firstly, it appears that PMCs and their advocates have been exaggerating
their own capabilities and they do not currently have the wherewithal
to maintain a significant body of troops at a constant state of
high readiness. To do so would be prohibitively costly and it
would not make either economic or business sense for them.6 That
they can deploy small reconnaissance or negotiating teams into
a crisis spot is not disputed, nor more importantly is it unique!
Both the UN and many Member States can do so without requiring
full political approval. Therefore Member State forces will remain,
in the absence of a UN standing force, the best medium for the
UN to deploy troops into theatre quickly. If PMCs are, as some
of their lobbyists, have suggested going to work under a UN peacekeeping
mandate (and therefore presumably paid for by the UN) then their
speed of deployment will still be dictated by the political will
and urgency of the Security Council and Member States. For PMCs
to suggest an alternative method of operating under the UN is
disingenuous and ignores the most fundamental aspect of the UN
charter, Member State collective responsibility. It is also worthwhile
pointing out that on occasions the UN has reacted swiftly. In
1956 during the Suez crisis the UN deployed troops to police the
ceasefire between the Anglo/French and Egyptian forces within
36 hours.7 The solution therefore to the UN's slow response is
not to replace Member State troops with PMCs but to speed up the
UN's authorizing process. This clearly is no small undertaking
and would require radical change within the UN. It is also worth
pointing out that a PMC is not an altruistic "force for good"
and will only deploy if there is a financial profit to be made.
This will not only slow their deployment down as they wait for
the financial backers to assemble but could exclude them from
entire regions of the globe where there is no substantial monetary
interest in resolving the conflict.
Where PMCs may have a role to play in increasing
the UN's speed of response is in the maintenance and improvement
of the UN's existing standby proposals. The Brahimi report raised
the problem of ensuring the quality of military personnel nominated
by troop contributing countries to deploy under the UN Standby
Arrangement System (UNSAS) system. The report highlighted some
of the problems:
"Some countries have provided soldiers
without rifles, or with rifles but no helmets, or with helmets
but no flak jackets, or with no organic transport capability.
Troops may be untrained in peacekeeping operations, and in any
case the various contingents in an operation are unlikely to have
trained or worked together before. Some units may have no personnel
who can speak the mission language. Even if language is not a
problem they may lack common operating procedures and have differing
interpretations of key elements of command and control and of
the mission's rules of engagement, and may have differing expectations
about mission requirements for the use of force."8
PMCs could have a role to play in verifying
the military capability of the Member State's force, this could
be achieved by an external auditing process similar to the OPEVAL
system used by the British Army. PMCs could also assist in the
peacekeeping training of some Member state forces, this would
require delicate handling for it was apparent in several interviews
that some Member States, for reasons principally of pride, would
resent this.9
A further recommendation of the Brahimi report
is the provision of an "on call list" of about 100 officers
who would at short notice deploy as UN military observers with
appropriate modifications. The formation, training and assessing
of this group may also be a useful role for a PMC to undertake.
3.4.5 INFORMATION-GATHERING,
ANALYSIS, AND
STRATEGIC PLANNING
CAPACITIES
The Brahimi reports recommended the creation
of a Executive Committee for Peace and Security Information and
Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS). Many member states felt
that this would be too intrusive into their national affairs and
consequently the proposal fell on stony ground.10 There is however
greater acceptability by Member States for intelligence to be
gathered by the UN in support of a specific mandate. Some PMCs,
such as Penumbra, have successfully combined surveillance and
investigative skills normally associated with government and could
therefore answer some of the of the UN's information requirements.
There is indeed already a precedent of private companies providing
intelligence to prosecute embargo breakers, when in 2001 Kroll
associates was used to investigate diamond money laundering by
UNITA. Though there is perhaps some scope for PMCs to be involved
in some of the more routine embargo monitoring tasks and in providing
intelligence on specific subjects on a case by case basis, it
is likely that the use of PMCs to provide surveillance and intelligence
support to the UN on a more general basis will remain a politically
contentious issue and one many Member States will remain wary
of.
3.5 THE LIMITATIONS
OF PMCS
IN THE
UN CONTEXT
Supporters of PMCs have been strongly advocating
their potential utility in conflict resolution and crisis management
for some years now. It should however be pointed out that PMCs
do carry a lot of political baggage with them and possess certain
unique characteristics that will limit their likelihood of being
employed by the UN.
3.5.1 PERCEPTION
Despite a plethora of literature from lobbyists
highlighting the differences between modern PMCs offering lethal
services and the mercenaries of the 1960s and 1970s, many Member
States and individuals within the UN staff perceive PMCs as deeply
flawed organisations. This view is most commonly, though not exclusively,
held amongst the developing countries. Assertions by the PMCs
that they are more accountable and responsible than their predecessors
have yet to convince many people. Indeed many Member States and
staff at the UN take the view that PMCs are immoral organisations,
who have traditionally served autocratic and unpopular governments
and whose operations are littered with human rights abuses.11
There is also a perception amongst staff and Member States from
the Third World that they are also inherently racist. It is not
altogether surprising that there should be a clash of cultures
between the staff of an idealistic institution whose dedicated
purpose is to prevent the world from the scourge of war and the
members of a business whose primary aim is to make a financial
profit from conflicts wherever they may occur. Many Member States
retain a conviction that the employment of a soldier whose motivation
to fight is financial carries an inherently greater risk of human
rights abuses than his regular counterpart whose duty and loyalty
remains with the state. Whilst there are many reasons to believe
that modern PMCs are different to their predecessors and that
some of the views held by Member States and staff at the UN are
anachronistic the current situation still remains that for many
PMCs are politically unacceptable. It seems for the foreseeable
future as if the UN Security Council and General Assembly will
only countenance the use of PMCs for non lethal capabilities.
3.5.2 THE
POLITICAL NATURE
OF WARFARE
Clauswitz's "war is an extension of politics
by other means" emphasises the point that from the UNs perspective
the most effective form of peacekeeping is the implementation
of military capability combined with political pressure. The UN
asserts that the combined influence of troops at the tactical
level and political pressure from the troop contributing country
at the strategic level is the key to successful accomplishment
of UN mandates.12 Regardless of military capability it is easy
to see that a UK battalion deployed into Sierra Leone carries
much more political authority than a mercenary battalion paid
for by private business. This political context must always be
borne in mind when PMCs compare costs of operations as it can
make such comparisons misleading and disingenuous. The employment
of a PMC on a military task financed by the UK government may
well retain some political weight and therefore have merit, this
has been demonstrated by the use of MPRI to train the Nigerian
Army paid for by the US state department. By the FCOs admission
however, the use of such PMCs rather than national forces for
peacekeeping tasks "cannot yet be envisaged".13
3.5.3 THE
CULT OF
THE MEMBER
STATES
Advocates of PMCs either fail to recognise or
choose to ignore that the UN is not a multi-national private sector
company and should not pretend to act like one. The UN is obliged
to conduct its business through the member states and ensuring
those member states are engaged as actively as possible in collective
security is the principal raison d'etre of the UN. Some members
of the UN and it's organisations perceive the rise of PMCs within
the west and the ensuing debate over their regulation and utility
as part of a deliberate policy by western governments to avoid
peacekeeping tasks in complex environments.14 They therefore almost
automatically reject the use of PMCs believing it will speed up
the withdrawal of a hesitant West from both peacekeeping duties
and political engagement in solving conflicts in the developing
world. These members within the UN believe that the only realistic
scenario where a PMC could be employed on peacekeeping duties
within a UN mandate on peacekeeping duties is by working under
the auspices of a Member State to whom that unit would be entirely
accountable; the unit could therefore be treated in exactly the
same way as a normal troop contribution. It should be added that
the UN still sees this as a poor substitute to the deployment
of a country's own armed forces.
3.5.4 ACCEPTABLE
TASKS
While PMCs may wish to conjure up combat roles
for themselves under a UN mandate, they are unlikely to receive
them. The Brahimi report confirmed the pattern of the last decade
that any requirement identified by the Security Council for peace
enforcement would be entrusted to a coalition of member states
to execute. PMCs would therefore be better advised to seek the
less glamorous and yet more realistic non-lethal tasks. According
to UNDPKO the UN suffers from a shortage of movement controllers,
communications experts, logistic personnel and logistic engineers.
Troops from developing nations are particularly short of these
skills.15 Recent lessons learnt from UN operations have shown
that this capability gap is having a detrimental effect on the
UN's ability to respond to a crisis. This is an area to which
staff from PMCs are well suited and could make a real difference
to the conduct of UN activities with a minimal political impact.
Additionally there is a growing acceptance that PMCs may adopt
some of the more routine security tasks. A leading African Diplomat
in a recent interview with the author thoroughly condemned PMCs
as little better than the mercenaries of the 1960's yet he conceded
that properly structured and politically accountable they could
have a role to play within organisations such as the United Nations
Guard Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI), an organisation tasked with
the protection of humanitarian convoys in Iraq.
3.5.5 SOURCE
OF REVENUE
Additional opposition to the UN's use of PMCs
as peacekeepers would come from the developing world troop contributing
nations. Some developing countries see UN peacekeeping tasks as
a valuable source of revenue. In addition other commentators have
commented that developing country governments may also see it
as an effective way of keeping an otherwise bored military occupied,
thus preventing them from meddling in their own domestic politics.
These countries would therefore not welcome the prospect of PMCs
taking such tasks away from them.
3.5.6 DEFENCE
DIPLOMACY
Some within the UN would also be reluctant to
see peacekeeping tasks contracted out to the private sector because
of the valuable relationships that are created between military
personnel on such tasks. It would be naïve to suggest that
peace-keeping operations create enduring harmony between member
states. However they do go a considerable way to breaking down
some of the areas of mutual suspicion between member states and
generally foster a spirit of co-operation. Additionally the experience
for military personnel working in UN headquarters though often
frustrating undoubtedly broadens the individuals horizons and
many nations consider it to be a valuable and necessary experience
in an individual serviceman's career.
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
3.6.1 THE
FUTURE ROLE
OF PMCS
UNDER THE
AUSPICES OF
THE UN
PMCs possess a powerful lobby group who naturally
enough see UN peace activities as a possible source of future
business. It is however apparent that the political outlook to
see PMCs deployed independently in a peace enforcement or peacekeeping
role is not present amongst the General Assembly. A change in
political outlook is seen as highly unlikely without the support
of the member states, a significant proportion of whom have yet
to be convinced that PMCs offering lethal capabilities are fundamentally
different from the mercenaries of the 1960's.
Current UN thinking believes that the solution
to international crises in the world lie with regional power blocs
working under the auspices of the UN and bolstered by first world
peacekeeping battalions.16 The recent operations by ECOWAS and
ECOMOG in West Africa are an example of the method of peace activities
that the UN would like to follow. Supporters of these Regional
organisations are suspicious of PMCs primarily because of the
reasons outlined earlier in this chapter, but also because they
feel some of the resources being invested into the regional organisations
may be diverted to the financing of PMCs. Despite this attitude
there is a growing belief that "complex emergencies"
such as Sierra Leone and the Congo are defying solutions. A growing
number of individuals within the UN recognise that the West is
unlikely to provide peacekeeping Battalions in sufficient numbers
and that many of the developing countries' troops do not have
the required skills and resources and are therefore simply not
up to the task. These practitioners believe that there may be
a role for PMCs, but are perhaps more realistic about the prejudice
felt by many member states against PMCs and conclude that non
lethal military tasks are a more likely proposition than the imagined
combat or peacekeeping roles the PMC lobbyists would prefer.
Similarly there is a growing realisation within
the UN that field operations by organisations under the UN umbrella
require security, especially where there are few or no UN peacekeeping
forces deployed. On occasions this security requirement is filled
by locally recruited soldiers, many of whom are ill-disciplined
and perhaps associated with one of the warring factions. On other
occasions the organisations have recruited members of a multi-national
security company who are better disciplined, trained, neutral
and probably provide a superior level of security. The growing
acceptance that PMCs have a part to play in armed security tasks
would appear to have as much to do with responding to actual practices
than a deliberate policy change by the UN in New York.
There is much the PMCs themselves can do to
ensure themselves greater business from the UN. Firstly they must
accept the political outlook of the UN and take measures to prove
the prejudices against their performance are incorrect. They should
then cease demands for combatant roles for the time being and
concentrate upon providing non-lethal military tasks. In the future
were the PMCs able to point to a successful track record of support
to regional organisations and the UN, then they may indeed be
entrusted with greater responsibility and armed security tasks
similar to the activities of the UNGCI. Should these in turn prove
a success then there may well even be the possibility of providing
peacekeeping troops responsible to a Member State but working
under a UN mandate. It is hard to envisage a more independent
role at present, indeed this would require fundamental changes
to the principles and structures of the UN.
There is also much that the PMCs could do to
improve their image if they wish to be employed by the UN more
frequently. They will need to consider recruiting from a wider
range of countries to make them more politically acceptable and
be prepared to adopt a greater degree of transparency and accountability.
Regulation is clearly a useful aspect in achieving this and would
allow the PMCs to answer the accusations of many of their critics.
Finally by opening a dialogue between the UN and themselves they
could ensure that much of what they achieve fits into the conflict
prevention and resolution strategies of the United Nations. Increased
cooperation would lay to rest many of prejudices and negative
views held by the UN against PMCs.
3.7 THE CASE
FOR REGULATION
Many of the Member States as well as organisations
like the International Peace Academy believe that by allowing
groups such as SCI to operate from Britain the UK government are
condoning their operations. The UN therefore sees regulation as
a method of controlling their behaviour and consequently a positive
step. International regulation is certainly not a realistic proposition
for the next 10 years and so members of the UN generally approve
of national governments producing their own legislation. There
is also a cynical feeling amongst some UN staff members that many
governments would either ignore international regulation when
it suits their interests or in some cases be incapable of enforcing
it.17
Of the regulation options available both member
states and staff members at the UN believe that a General License
combined with a contract licensing regime for military services
is the preferred option for PMCs offering lethal capabilities.
The UN would be less happy with either registration and notification
or self-regulation, because they believe that it allows lethal
PMCs too much freedom (they would however accept such systems
for non lethal PMCs). They would not be content with a General
License by itself as there would be no check to ensure that a
contract awarded to a PMC would not run contrary to UNSC interests,
resolutions and embargos. Similarly whilst a licensing regime
by itself would verify the suitability of a contract it would
not be effective in ensuring the quality and standards of the
PMC itself.
Whilst some believe that regulation will simply
drive the disreputable individuals underground or offshore, many
hope that an efficient system of regulation would make PMCs more
accountable and transparent, and create a greater air of political
acceptability and respectability around PMCs. This could perhaps
encourage a higher quality of personnel to join PMCs including
more respected senior military members on retirement. This it
could be argued has already occurred in the US, there is for instance
clearly a strong contrast to be made between the seniority of
personnel heading the regulated MPRI and those heading the unregulated
SCI. It is this regulated type of organisation which the UN family
would be prepared to do business with.
REFERENCES
1 Lakhdar Brahimi, Report of the Panel
on United Nations Peace Operations, 17 August 2000, page 6,
paragraph 33.
2 Lakhdar Brahimi, Report of the Panel
on United Nations Peace Operations,17 August 2000, page 7,
paragraphgraphs 35,36 &37.
3 Interview with General (Retd) Soyster,
Washington 31 May 2002.
4 Lakhdar Brahimi, Report of the Panel
on United Nations Peace Operations, 17 August 2000, page 11,
paragraph 60.
5 Lt Col T Spicer, Unorthodox Soldier,
Peace and War and the Sandline Affair, Mainstream publishing
1999.
6 Interview with General (Retd) Soyster,
Washington 31 May 2002.
7 Various, The Blue Helmets, a review
of United Nations peacekeeping, Chapter 3, page 52.
8 Lakhdar Brahimi, Report of the Panel
on United Nations Peace Operations, 17 August 2000, page 18,
paragraph 108.
9 Interviews with various Member State Mission
military advisors to the UN 28-30 May 2002.
10 Interviews with senior members of UNDPKO
and UNSECOORD 28-30 May 2002.
11 Interviews with members of Country Missions
to the UN and Adekeye Adebajo of the International Peace Academy
28-30 May 2002.
12 Interviews with a senior member of UNDPKO
28-30 May 2002.
13 Response of Dr Denis MacShane, Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to questions
from the Foreign Affairs Select Committee 13 June 2002.
14 Interviews with members of Country Missions
to the UN and Adekeye Adebajo of the International Peace Academy
28-30 May 2002.
15 Interviews with senior members of UNDPKO
and UNSECOORD 28-30 May 2002.
16 Various regional meetings, Refashioning
the Dialogue: Regional perspectives on the Brahimi Report on UN
Peace operations 2001. International Peace Academy and the
Center on International Co-operation page 4.
17 Interviews with senior members of UNDPKO
and UNSECOORD 28-30 May 2002.
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