Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence



  This section will aim to draw on the conclusions of the four stakeholder chapters and integrate the key deductions to provide answers not only to whether, when and where regulation is required, but also to the shaping features of that legislation to make it acceptable and pragmatic to all the stakeholders. It will then consider the merits of each of the Green Paper's options for regulation and some other pertinent options for regulation which have been found in the course of our research. The African states who refuse to see the difference between post-colonial mercenarism and modern PMCs, the UNSECOORD restriction on UN agencies using PMCs, MSF who abrogate any security issue and PMCs who will never subject themselves to any form of regulation; all have trenchant views on this subject but to bend to their demands would be to cripple the legislation in the eyes of the majority of stakeholders. Our aim is therefore to produce a pragmatic and succinct legislative framework that is broadly acceptable to all.


  Many answers have been put forward in the course of our study as to why the FCO has chosen this time to bring forward the Green Paper. Erstwhile parliamentary lobbyists questioned on this subject have sensed the hand of arms suppliers, the defence industry or even liberal academics behind the debate.1 Although they will want to oversee the drafting of the bill to promote consistency of national objectives abroad between themselves and PMCs, they will be reluctant to be the base for any regulatory authority, which they may see sits best in the DTI. The FCO would, however, wish to retain the power of veto over contracts and notifications.


  There is little doubt that the momentum for this Green Paper has followed the Sandline "Arms for Africa" affair of 1998, in which the FCO's reputation was damaged. The Daily Telegraph referred to "the catalogue of mistakes," at the FCO, "ranging from the hopelessly inadequate briefing to gross failure to communicate."2 The subsequent Foreign Affairs Select Committee report said:

    "A considerable number of mistakes were made. The crisis caused by the Sandline Affair at the heart of the FCO was palpable. Ministers were suspected of misleading parliament and the Foreign Secretary has himself recently been quoted as saying that it took its toll of his standing as a minister."3

  The report concludes by asking the FCO to draft a Green Paper to regulate PMCs. It is apparent amongst stakeholders that the time is ripe for UK legislation. Owing to the global remit of PMCs, most stakeholders would prefer the legislation to be through the UN or another international body but detailed research has shown that this solution is at an impasse; the nature of which will be summarised in the next section.

  "Modern" PMCs want legislation now because by giving them state endorsement, this will differentiate them from the post-colonial mercenaries of yesteryear. There are, of course, shades to their acquiescence. At one extreme, PMCs with lethal capability are keen to have limited regulation in order to gain a certificate which they can display to the outside world which shows they have been given a clean bill of health from the UK government, thus boosting their credibility worldwide in the search for lucrative contracts. At the other extreme some non-lethal PMCs accept the idea of regulation in order to distance themselves from the PMCs capable of using lethal force, in order to lose the insinuation that all the companies in this corner of the market are just the re-branding of the same unwholesome past.

  The UN would like to see more countries legislate unilaterally in order to build up a body of best practice which will move the UN debate on PMCs inexorably closer to fruition. South Africa and the US are the only countries that have regulated in a meaningful way so far, with some varied consequences discussed in earlier chapters which have advanced the debate. For some progressive elements within the UN, the sooner regulation is enforced, the sooner they consider that an ethical, highly competent string of PMCs will emerge who have a role to play in the security issues of tomorrow. NGOs will concur with the rationale behind this reasoning; more open, accountable PMCs give NGOs more options in their quest to meet their particular security requirements. For the MOD, working next to today's unregulated PMCs in trouble spots is a risk, so they also would like to regulation as soon as possible.


  It has been made clear to our study by the UN itself, and by aid agencies working with UN departments that there is neither the appetite nor the support for legislation on PMCs at the moment. The UN exists only with the agreement of the Member States, whose thinking on this subject has not advanced to where the UK now stands. In the UN there is a significant lobby, mainly African, whose memory of post-colonial mercenarism still prohibits an unprejudiced approach to this issue. The last attempt by the UN to regulate saw three of the paltry nineteen signatories to the 1989 anti-mercenary convention, Angola, Yugoslavia and the Congo subsequently use mercenaries. The different interests of the UN prevents progress and this explains their interest and support for the smaller bricks of member state laws which if proven to be effective, can help to build the structure of subsequent international legislation. The timeframe for substantive UN action on PMCs is estimated to be five years at the earliest, with twenty years being seen as more likely. Thus for the UK to drop proposals to regulate in favour of waiting for the UN is not an option. As the FCO desk handling this Green Paper sits within the FCO's UN Department, this will be a well-recognised fact. The time appears right for legislation and the UK is the right place for it to be enacted.


  The demand for PMCs has grown over the last 10 years. Most commentators explain this growth by linking it to the rise in global insecurity following the end of the Cold War and withdrawal of superpower support for weak regimes. This continued withdrawal of support by the developed world to ailing regimes follows the unsuccessful operations in Somalia and initially in Yugoslavia by the international community in which intervention went disastrously wrong or failed to prevent a bloodbath. Since those operations, the developed world has declined to involve itself in conflicts of no direct strategic importance. This market gap for security is being filled by PMCs, and this is often referred to as the privatisation of security. This trend of global insecurity is growing. As Kim Richard Nossal concludes in an article, "Global Governance and National Interests: Regulating Transnational Security Corporations in the Post Cold War Era:" "Many of the civil wars of the 1990s, in Afghanistan, Chechnya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Indonesia and Yugoslavia, for example, are not over and other conflicts lie on the horizon. Given this, it is safe to conclude that there will continue to be a demand for security services by humanitarian NGOs, businesses, and, most importantly, governments that recognise that TSCs (PMCs) can provide a relatively cheap force multiplier in certain conflict situations."4

  However when one examines the specific activities of PMCs for which there is demand, there has recently been a shift of emphasis away from combat operations towards the less contentious areas such as training, mine clearance, logistic support and guarding of both installations and NGOs. In our study there was no evidence that large combat contracts had been offered to or taken on by PMCs since Sandline in Sierra Leone in 1998. In a wider perspective, war-fighting roles have dried up but the requirement for lower order security is growing rapidly. Kim Richard Nossal argues that market forces, and the questionable ethics and practices many people associate with the EO and Sandline sort of company have put them out of business.5 This self-regulation by market forces he advances as a more attractive solution than the problems linked with bringing forward legislation. Our study does not agree that self-regulation is enough. There will always be the chance of these companies re-appearing under different names and the "Arms for Africa" affair happening again. This cannot be allowed to happen and therefore this opportunity for regulation, encompassing the full spectrum of employment that a PMC could get involved in, must be grasped now.


  As has been argued in the previous section, the reason for the timing of this Green Paper is because of the lack of accountability of UK based PMCs. Where some, like the journalist Michael Bilton, claim that by not regulating, PMCs are deniable by the government which can be very useful for the state6, the facts do not agree. The FCO did not succeed in its attempt to deny its links with Sandline in the "Arms for Africa" affair, and was roundly blamed for its complicity. Globalisation has shown that the irresponsible actions of British based companies, wherever they operate in the world, affect the British Government. There is some regulation, both national and international, to which PMCs are already subject. These manifest themselves as UK company regulation, which will be covered later, and international conventions and protocols on human rights, neutrality and parties to a conflict. But the mechanisms for prosecuting this justice are still only used in extreme cases such as genocide and war crimes. The International Criminal Court and The Hague tribunal are not yet sufficiently mature for them to be considered the correct forum for trying UK based PMCs. PMCs are not fully accountable and thus further UK based legislation is the only answer.


  Most stakeholders are in favour of regulation; it is only in the degree of regulation that they differ. At one end of the scale PMCs with lethal capability would like a company licensing system, but not to have to get a licence for each deployment. For reasons, they argue, of speed of response, licensing each deployment would hamper their ability to intervene quickly in disputes and thus they lose business. However there is little evidence to suggest that they have been required in the last few years to intervene in a conflict with alacrity, and there is also no reason why the individual deployment licences could not be issued by the Government in a timely fashion. At the other end of the scale are some NGOs and developing countries who refuse to accept that PMCs are necessary and would prefer to see them all banned. These are the poles of opinion, but fortunately they represent only a very small percentage of the stakeholders. For the vast majority, regulation is welcomed and the following represent the main thrusts they would like to see implemented.


  This distinction has been made throughout this paper, and it is seen as a useful method of separating those companies who are unlikely to be involved in contentious work and therefore require little regulation from those PMCs from whom the UN and NGOs would like to see more transparency and over whom the UK Government wish to have more regulatory power.


  Most stakeholders agree that this is a useful method of ensuring best practice from the PMCs, an ability to disbar unethical PMCs from the marketplace and the potential that licences can be revoked or suspended to allow allegations of malpractice to be investigated. There must be two distinct criteria for award of this Licence. Firstly, there should be a commitment by the company to certain codes of conduct and secondly a vetting of the company propriety and personnel by the professional authority. In order to ensure that Licensing is seen as transparent and not in the gift of a particular party or government, we suggest that an existing code of conduct for companies working abroad is drawn on as the rules by which the PMCs must operate on deployment. The joint UK and US "Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights"7 is an excellent code of conduct for this which PMCs should be made to sign on a mandatory, not a voluntary, basis. It was formulated to ensure propriety and ethical behaviour by multinationals, mostly in the extractive and energy sector, in far-flung corners of the developing world. The main stipulations of the section of the Code dealing with security require PMCs to:

    —  Observe ethical conduct and human rights and promote the observance of international humanitarian law.

    —  Act in a lawful manner and exercise restraint and caution regarding the local use of force, including using rules of engagement.

    —  Practice in a way that should be capable of being monitored by independent third parties.

    —  Allegations of human rights abuses by private security should be recorded and investigated.

    —  Not employ individuals implicated in human rights abuses, not violate the rights of individuals.

    —  Investigate properly when physical force has been used.


  Although not popular with PMCs capable of lethal force, they admit that they could live with this stipulation as long as it could be done speedily, which is taken to mean less than a fortnight. As far as the NGOs, FCO, MOD and DFID are concerned, this is an inalienable cornerstone of the legislation ensuring that ethical, and hopefully therefore British, interests are sacrosanct. A body would have to be formed which had the task of checking the fine detail of each contract and then endorsing each one.


  PMCs do not feel that this is necessary regulation, however once more the UN, DFID, MOD and NGOs see this as an important part of regulation, limiting the chances of renegade behaviour in foreign parts going unpunished.


  PMCs wish to maintain client confidentiality because if there is a risk of a client or contract being exposed, clients will not be forthcoming and they will simply go out of business. On the other hand, for a PMC to be fully acceptable to the NGO community, NGOs wish to be able to examine a PMCs history and ongoing operations to ensure that there is no conflict of interest. Putting the PMCs out of business is not believed to be the intention of the Green Paper, so we endorse the proposition that client confidentiality should only be broken to the regulating authority who would be legally bound not to disseminate the information further. This may pave the way for a new type of PMC, specifically tailored to the NGO community, who would be seeking NGO clients who were not concerned about their own client confidentiality and thus they could operate as a fully transparent PMC. This open and less contentious type of PMC may well find that there are many potential employers keen to use their services.


  Superficially this would seem to aid transparency and regulation, but in practice it is problematic. Many clients of PMCs would specifically forbid the deployment of UK Government monitors for reasons of confidentiality, safety and operational security. Anyone who has served in a peacekeeping operation will know how difficult it is to monitor trouble spots, because fighting can be over in a matter of minutes, well before a monitor has had time to react. There is also the question of who would conduct this task, how they would show their neutrality without giving away the operation and how it would be funded. The most pragmatic way to approach this issue is to make provision in the regulation for monitoring, but only in extremis and when the client is content that this should happen. If the client is not content, then he must realise that the UK government may terminate their licence for a contract at any stage that they fear human rights interests or British interests are being harmed. The initial point of contact for oversight in country should be the British Defence Attach«e.

6.5.7  COST

  Foremost in the mind of any company operating for profit, is fixed overheads like the cost of a licence to practice. The government also is keen to demonstrate the best return for taxpayers' money thus an expensive licensing regime benefits no one. In order to be fair, costs should be split, as both parties benefit from regulation. Our stakeholder integration concludes that it would be fair for PMCs to pay for their licence to practice but for the government to pay for the cost of licensing any individual contract. Monitoring would be not only an expensive, but also a dangerous business. The costs for this would have to fall to the Government as it is an extension of the licensing for each contract.


  Having integrated the desires of the stakeholders, these deductions now need to be examined in the light of the available options for legislation in the Green Paper and three other pertinent legislative courses of action open to the Government. It will then make a recommendation on the best course of action and suggest necessary details and mechanisms that would make the regulation more effective and acceptable to the various stakeholders.


  For many within the UN as well as various human rights organizations the UK Government's inactivity in controlling PMCs has been seen as condoning their actions. Whilst it may be comparatively easy for the government to distance themselves from a PMCs activity abroad, it could be argued that allowing them to live and work from Britain would bestow tacit approval on the organizations. Additionally the view of many organizations under the UN umbrella as well as NGOs is that retention of the status quo would not provide accountable, transparent and respectable PMCs with whom they feel they could do business. The MOD and DFID do not object to PMCs in principal and recognise that they may be required to work with them on a growing basis in the future and desire that PMC organizations and activities are better controlled. Most of the PMCs support regulation; particularly those who offer lethal capabilities such as SCI and wish to distance themselves further from the mercenaries of the past; they believe that regulation is another step towards increased respectability. However the PMCs who provide less contentious capabilities see regulation as an unnecessary burden and it is therefore important that any regulation implemented has a greater impact upon those providing a lethal capability than those who do not.


  A ban on military activity abroad may be attractive to those who perceive no difference between a PMC and a mercenary and wish to put the PMCs out of business, but for many this is seen as an unreasonable step. Realists within the UN and NGOs distinguish a role for PMCs in areas such as security, logistics, de-mining and fear that this type of draconian legislation would hamper individuals and PMCs from fulfilling some of these roles. The MOD and DFID would object for similar reasons; they would be concerned that this option may preclude the support they receive from contractors when deployed overseas. The PMCs would clearly be alarmed at the prospect of being legislated out of business. Proponents of such a regulation would argue that it could be directed at old style individual mercenaries and not at PMCs, distinguishing between the two is legally difficult. Indeed the definition of what constituted a mercenary bedevilled the South African PMC legislation for several years. Having defined what is and is not a mercenary, those enforcing the law would face the difficulty in gathering sufficient evidence that a law had been broken based upon events in another part of the world where Britain may have little visibility. Other observers comment that as well as precluding any opportunity to create respectable and responsible PMCs, a total ban will also force them offshore and underground where there will be little visibility or control over their actions.


  Similar arguments would apply to a total ban on military recruitment abroad. In addition it may raise problems for citizens who join the French Foreign Legion and it could be perceived as hypocritical. Were Nepal to adopt such legislation the status of the Gurkhas would be illegal. Additionally such a ban would put many PMCs out of business, dependent as they are upon recruiting personnel from a wide variety of countries including the client state. Both a ban on recruitment and a ban on military activity abroad would be assessed as relatively cheap.


  A licensing regime for military services would require the PMCs to gain UK government approval for every contract that is signed. This form of regulation would not be popular with some PMCs; not only do they argue that it would slow their deployment process but it also does not bestow accountability, transparency and respectability on the organization but upon the task. The NGOs would similarly be dissatisfied with such an arrangement because they could not be certain that the PMC they wished to employ was of the required standard. The MOD, DFID and the UN would also object that the quality of PMCs themselves was not being judged. They would however approve that this form of regulation would ensure the UK government checks that the PMC tasks were not running contrary to their interests and strategies. The MOD, DFID and the UN would probably concede that for PMCs that are tendering for contracts where lethal force is not a service then simple notification, as defined in the Green Paper, may be more appropriate. This solution would be moderately expensive.


  PMCs would view this as the most desirable solution; registration would grant them a measure of respectability in order to attract clients but require the absolute minimum of bother to them. They would also be gratified because notification is a less bureaucratic process than a licensing regime for military services and would therefore not slow down their deployment speed. For the UN, NGO's, the MOD and DFID this form of regulation would be seen as too light and they would argue it does not ensure the quality of PMCs was sufficient or that simple notification is a robust enough measure to ensure PMCs activities were not opposed to their interests. They would probably accept that for those PMCs who do not offer lethal capabilities then registration and notification might be suitable. It could therefore be a method of easing the cost and regulatory burden and allow licensing authorities to concentrate upon the more contentious PMCs offering lethal capabilities.


  For some PMCs this is the preferred option, the responsible PMCs will achieve respectability as a result of such a licence and the irresponsible ones are likely to be forced underground or offshore. PMCs are also attracted to such a process because it will then allow them to fulfil contracts with no interference from the UK government. PMCs that do not offer a lethal capability believe a General Licence may be an unnecessary burden and see registration as more appropriate. Some NGOs would also support the General Licensing system by itself, as long as the 'Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights' are incorporated into the system while others, as well as the UN, MOD and DFID differ. They accept that a General licence would ensure the standards of a PMC but believe that this method does not control the PMCs activities sufficiently. They advocate that this method was used in conjunction with a licensing regime. This form of regulation would be relatively cheap.


  Many of the PMCs who would prefer to conduct the low order non-lethal military tasks such as unarmed security and logistics believe that this would be sufficient. PMCs who offer combat and operational support services believe that self-regulation is not sufficient and desire greater government endorsement. Whilst the other stakeholders may concede that stringent regulation is not necessary for PMCs offering non-lethal services they do believe that government control is necessary for PMCs who wish to offer the more contentious military services. Self-regulation would be unlikely to incur substantial costs.


  For most PMCs this is too much government interference and though content with the General licensing arrangements, they would be concerned that the contract licensing regime would slow down their potential speed of deployment thus significantly reducing their ability to win competitive contracts. They would argue that such a system is in place in the United States and approval for contracts can take from 2-6 months. The necessity of this speed of deployment by the PMCs is a debatable point as has been covered earlier, but if the bureaucracy slows the licensing of contracts PMCs will leave the UK, thus negating the regulation. It is probably fair to say that such a regime may be too stringent for PMCs providing low order non-lethal services. The UN and NGOs would be very satisfied with this course of action for it provides them with PMCs whose standards have been checked by the UK government, who will have had to sign up to comprehensive human rights stipulations and whose activities have the approval of all the relevant UK government departments. Though this regulation may seem burdensome to the PMCs they must be clear that without adopting these measures they will not have the confidence of the UN and NGOs and will find it very difficult to obtain contracts from these organizations. Similarly the MOD and DFID would be content with such regulation, as it allows them to employ or work alongside respectable PMCs and input into their activities to ensure PMCs do not run counter to their policies. This most thorough form of regulation, though the most efficient, is acceptable to most stakeholders and would be costly to run.


  It is recommended that the UK implement a Registration and Contract Approval regime to control PMC organizations that wish to offer a lethal capability and a Registration and Notification scheme for those PMC organizations that wish to offer non-lethal capabilities.

Table 5


Non-Lethal Capabilities Lethal Capabilities
Registration and NotificationRegistration and Contract approval
LogisticsArmed security
Mine clearance
Risk Consulting
Unarmed security
Military Training
Military Intelligence
      Industrial Sites
      Convoy Escorts
      Embassy Protection
      Anti Piracy
Offensive Combat
Any activity with weapons

  Further recommendations on the manner such regulation could be applied include:


  Most PMCs already conform to many forms of government and non-governmental regulation. ArmorGroup for instance are monitored by their shareholders, the securities exchange commission, an international board of directors, a major accountancy firm and send their accounts to Company House. They also conform to the US Foreign and Corrupt Practices Act, the Health and Safety At Work Act and the Data Protection Act. Despite this plethora of legislation it is important that the PMCs vet their personnel, preferably in line with an industrial 'Best Practice' as defined by an approved professional body. This reference would be to establish whether the individual is suitable and whether he has completed the appropriate military service and received an honourable discharge. Many PMCs already practice such a regime internally. To reduce the burden of time and cost it is proposed that if a PMC wished to a employ a member with the intention of deploying him overseas without the requirement to carry a weapon then the company will not be required to vet those employees. The cost of this would be reflected in the cost of the registration.

  In addition to the checking of personnel it would be in all stakeholders interests if the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights agreed between the US and UK governments were incorporated into the government's regulatory framework, the PMCs charters and the business practices as part of the general licensing process. These principles would act as a mandatory code of conduct; they are already widely used by the energy extraction industry as a guideline on their behaviour.


  The setting up of a contract's terms should not require regulation. This will allow PMCs to travel to potential client states and determine the business arrangements. It would be a draconian measure to prevent from conducting such trips; it would also be an unnecessary regulation as many PMCs would "book in" with the FCO prior to departure to ensure the submission of a contract would be likely to be received favourably.

  All PMCs are concerned about the time required for the issue of a contract licence, and this paper argues that contract licensing or refusal must happen within two weeks. For companies like ArmorGroup engaged in unarmed security advice abroad it is accepted that notification is an appropriate mechanism for control. If a PMC however wished to send armed personnel abroad as part of a contract it will need approval from the relevant government departments which should include the FCO, DFID, DTI, Home Office and MOD. To ensure such a contract does not run contrary to UK or UN interests the FCO should be the lead department in authorizing such a contract. The European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports could be used as a guide for PMCs as to what is and is not acceptable.


  Some PMCs clearly wish to retain client confidentiality and prevent the names of some of their employees from reaching the public domain. The government should therefore treat discretely any information passed by a PMC to obtain a general or contract licence or to register and notify. The requirement for security conflicts to some degree with the NGOs desire to have oversight of all PMC personnel records. In this instance it is recommended that NGOs are assured by the government licensing authority that the personnel employed by the PMC are acceptable.

6.7.4  COST

  A Registration and Notification regime is one of the cheaper regulatory options. It is recommended that the burden of this cost is split between the PMCs and the Government. PMCs should be made to pay for the cost of obtaining and any subsequent auditing of their Registration. Registration should not become a yearly event, however the regulatory authority should carry out inspections and verifications of the PMCs standards on an ad hoc basis. The Government would in turn pay for the cost of contract approval and any monitoring if required. For PMCs that do not offer a lethal capability and therefore only wish to notify their foreign contracts, the costs would clearly be lower.


  For the more contentious military services offered by the PMCs the licensing contract authorization may be linked to an ability to monitor if required. In the first instance the resident Defence Attaché could undertake a watching brief or oversight but in some cases he may require additional assistance. It is however hoped that with regulation, PMCs will ensure that they are better able to discipline themselves and ensure that their actions concur with required standards. Clearly many nations may resent and forbid the use of a monitoring team and therefore host nation approval would have to be established in the contract licensing period.


  The problem of regulating PMCs defies a perfect solution. It is however clear from analysing the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT analysis) that the advantages of our recommended solution considerably outweigh it's disadvantages.

Table 6


1.Allows the government to focus on lethal capability PMCs.
2.Low regulation for PMCs with non-lethal capabilities.
3.Comparatively easy to monitor and enforce on the ground.
4.Does not permanently exclude any military options or capabilities for PMCs or the Government. It therefore allows maximum flexibility.
5.Government has good oversight of PMC activity abroad.
6.Regulation is not overly expensive or burdensome compared to many solutions.
1.Some non-lethal activities such as Military training, logistics may have important military consequences but only require registration and notification from the PMC.
1.Raises the standards and therefore respectability of PMCs and increases their chances of employment with the UN and NGOs. 1. Approval from the UK government could slow PMC deployments, resulting loss of business or a delay in the effect the PMC can deliver. This may drive some PMCs offshore.
2.As new capabilities and services grow they can be easily reconciled with the lethal/non-lethal categories.   


  It is hoped that by adopting a regulation system that differentiates between the use of lethal force the burden on PMCs operating at the lower end of the scale will be reduced and that the licensing authorities will be better able to scrutinize the activities and structures of the PMCs who offer lethal force. It is hoped that an efficient regulatory system will afford greater respectability to PMCs and raise their standards; in so doing many nations and organizations may become more inclined to employ PMCs on appropriate tasks. There is therefore a clear incentive for PMCs to accept the additional burden of regulation in order to receive new contracts from new clients.


  1  Interview with former UK parliamentary lobbyist by the author 30 May 2002.

  2  Lt Col Tim Spicer OBE, An Unorthodox Soldier, London, Mainstream Publishing, page 217.

  3  Ibidem, page 213.

  4  Kim Richard Nossal, Global Governance and National Interests: Regulating Transnational Security corporations in the Post Cold War Era, Melbourne journal of International Law, Vol 2, 2001, page 474.

  5  Ibidem.

  6  Oral evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 11 June 2002.

  7  Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, December 20, 2000, and  rights/001220  fsdrl  principles.html.

Cranfield University

July 2002

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