Select Committee on Home Affairs Memoranda


MEMORANDUM 72

Submitted by Jasper Woodcock

1.  ILLICIT DRUG USE AND SUPPLY CURRENTLY OUT OF CONTROL

  1.1  Despite international action since 1909, and increasing UK domestic initiatives since 1960s, the level of usage of illegal drugs has risen inexorably everywhere. (In 1968, there were about 3,000 heroin users in Britain: now there are 270,000).

  1.2  Attempts to eradicate the supply of drugs (crop substitution, crop destruction) have failed. Even if they became successful, the outcome would be the replacement of drugs of plant origin (cocaine, heroin and cannabis) by synthetically produced alternatives, of which there are many available in the pharmacopoeia. These would be manufactured illicitly in the consuming countries, as are currently amphetamines and ecstasy.

2.  DECRIMINALISATION OF POSSESSION NOT THE ANSWER

  2.1  Decriminalisation, by which the possession of illegal drugs ceases to be a criminal offence while their supply and production remain illegal, is likely to make the situation worse. For it will increase numbers of users and thus the customer base of the illicit drug suppliers and producers. This will strengthen their already massive economic power. (International trade in drugs has been valued at £250 billion a year—more than iron and steel or automobiles. British drug users spend £6.6 billion a year).

3.  LEGAL PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY SUCCESSFULLY CONTROLLED

  3.1  There has been one successful international response to the problem. That is the system of regulation of the international trade in legitimately produced narcotics, which is overseen by the International Narcotics Control Board. This involves auditing of product, manufacture, imports, exports, stocks and legal consumption of controlled drugs in all countries. For the past 70 years this has effectively excluded the legitimate pharmaceutical industry from supplying the illicit market. (In the 1920s, before this system was introduced, European pharmaceutical manufacturers were shipping large amounts of heroin to drug dealers in China.)

4.  NEW STRATEGY OF COMPLETE CONTROL OF SUPPLY AND USE

  4.1  What is needed is a radical change in drug policy that will make it possible to target effective controls, so as for example to make it very difficult for young people to gain access to drugs, and to obtain constant feedback. This means there must be complete control of supply and constant monitoring of drug users.

  4.2  Complete control over the supply of drugs to users can be achieved by:

    —  firstly making the supply legal and so open to inspection at every point; and

    —  secondly by making it a government monopoly and so uninfluenced by commercial motivations of the marketplace.

  (A strategy of government monopoly has been adopted by some Scandinavian countries to control the supply of alcoholic beverages).

  4.3  The exercise of detailed control over the recipients of drugs can be achieved by making mail order the only channel of distribution.

  This would mean that restrictions on who might buy what drugs in what quantities would be enforceable. Proof of age for example would be a routine requirement for registration as a purchaser of drugs. (Diversion of supplies in transit would be unlikely if the price is low enough to make them an unattractive target.)

5.  RESEARCH AND ONGOING EVALUATION OF POLICY AUTOMATICALLY INCLUDED

  5.1  This system would produce a database containing details of practically every drug user in the country with good information about their consumption. This would provide a foundation for robust epidemiological research into the effects of drugs on their users, including that overwhelming majority about whom little is known because they do not come to the attention of either law enforcement or health and social work agencies.

  5.2  This scheme also provides machinery for targeting flexible responses to whatever fresh problems the improved information that will become available may reveal.

6.  OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTING NEW POLICY

  6.1  Public Opinion. A difficulty will be to overcome the consequences of the demonisation of drugs over many years. Drugs will seem to many to be unsuitable to a government monopoly. However, the policy is essentially a measure to reduce crime and promote public health, and an uncommercial venture (declining sales signal success so long as the illicit trade remains suppressed). There is widespread public support for government monopoly in areas that involve safety and health.

  6.2  The International Conventions. Prima facie, the new strategy appears to breach the 1961 and 1972 Conventions on drugs. However, there were exceptions to the prohibition on making controlled drugs available without medical justification. For example, cannabis continued to be legally available in some provinces of India for 25 years after the ratification of the 1961 Convention. There is a proviso that in these circumstances, the production and supply must be a government monopoly.

  6.3  Vested Interests. There are numbers of people with a vested interest in maintaining the illegality of recreational drugs. First are the organised criminal syndicates which currently serve the market.

  Second are the politicians, policemen, and government officials who benefit from bribes and other corrupt inducements offered by the illicit trade.

  Third many legitimate careers, in the police, the customs and the law, have been built on the control of drug trafficking and would be threatened by its replacement by a legitimate supply system. A government drug supply agency would absorb very few of the consequent redundancies.

  Acknowledgement. Mail order as the ideal channel of supply by a government monopoly was originally proposed by the late Professor J D P Graham in 1976.

September 2001


 
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