APPENDIX 6
Letter from Sir Trefor Morris CBE, QPM,
former Chief Inspector of Constabulary
I note the recent comments of the Home Secretary,
when he suggested a debate on what he asserted was his position
of "having responsibility without power". I mention
that point simply because I detect in the Reform Document particular
issues which seem to me greatly strengthen the powers of the Home
Secretary. "Nothing grows in the arid shadow of a Royal Commission"
said Douglas Hurd, then Home Secretary, when he was being pressed
to have such an examination of the Police Service in the late
1980's. Perhaps now is the time for a Royal Commission, particularly
if the radical changes proposed are to cause a significant shift
of power in the tri-partite arrangements set up in the Police
Act 1964, following a Royal Commission.
I have not carried out a detailed analysis of
the Reform Document, which seems to be a "White Paper",
and much of what is suggested seems to me to be a set of sensible
proposals, particularly those which have to do with changes I
put in place in my time as HMCIC, (eg Performance Indicators),
and the technology in my time as Chairman of PITO. However, there
are some specific matters, which I would regard as contentious.
DETECTION AND
CONVICTION RATES
The criticism that detection rates have fallen
"drastically" over recent years and that there is an
unacceptable disparity between the best and worst police forces
is well justified. HMIs have been challenging that position since
those differences became apparent with the introduction of performance
indicators. But, setting the fall in the conviction rate at the
door of the police causes me great surprise. The police are the
gateway to the Criminal Justice System and offenders are "handed
over" in the first instance to the Crown Prosecution Service.
Although I do not have the current figures, in my time the CPS
decided to discontinue over 200,000 cases each year before the
offender could be put before the Courts. Added to that, as I recall,
of those cases going forward an even greater number were not actually
prosecuted for a variety of reasons. One has also to take into
consideration the diversion of cases from the Courts where cautions
are administered under guidance from the Home Office as alternative
to prosecution.
The Standards Unit
My great concern with regard to the proposal
to set up such a unit is that it seems to cut across the central
role of HMIC. There have been great changes progressively within
the Inspectorate throughout the 1990s in the way the inspection
system has been conducted, both in personnel, with the introduction
of Lay Inspectors in my time and in the inspection process itself,
with the introduction of thematic and more careful directed inspections
looking at performance in particular areas.
Most if not all of the tasks set out in the terms
of reference for the Standards Unit are either directly or indirectly
the responsibility of the Inspectorate and although the Reform
Document proposes that they and the Unit will work closely together,
I suspect many within the Police Service will see the potential
for conflict. This is particularly so with the arrangements for
inspection and comparison of BCUs within Forces. There has always
been a complaint from Chief Constables about the amount of information
they have to supply to the various bodies who now hold them to
account. To set up yet another separate body will exacerbate the
situation.
I mention above that some of the proposals will alter
the balance of power within the tried and tested tri-partite structure.
It seems to me that the setting up of the Standards Unit coupled
with the proposals in the later paragraphs of Chapter 6 is bound
to affect the position of Chief Constables as well as Police Authorities,
(particularly the former). Although not clearly defined at this
stage, the Reform Document sets out in paragraphs 6.74 et seq.
a whole set of measures to improve and assess the performance
of chief constables and their senior teams, most of which are
admirable. But the threat of removal of the Chief Constable directly
by the Home Secretary rather than the present arrangement outlined
at paragraph 6.85 will have other ramifications and most certainly
affect the operational independence of the chief constables. The
"Sword of Damocles" is a great persuader! By all means
let the Police Committee get rid of those who are guilty of misconduct
or incompetence. But the implication of the proposed changes is
that the Chief Constable who does not closely follow the direction
of the Home Secretary may be adjudged as unsatisfactory and dismissed.
I just wonder how senior members of the Civil Service would react
to such a proposal affecting them.
Sir Trefor Morris, CBE, QPM
February 2002
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