Annex G
AFGHANISTAN - RECOVERY: AN EMERGENCY PLAN
FOR THE FIRST 100 DAYS
Rationale
1. Routine development mechanisms are notoriously
slow in responding to rapidly changing, chaotic post-conflict
situations. A sudden and chaotic influx of a horde of international
agencies can overwhelm and confuse intended beneficiaries. At
the same time, there is an urgent need to demonstrate the dividends
of peace and stability to a traumatised population. Confidence
in the intentions, credibility and effectiveness of the international
community (particularly the UN) in Afghanistan will hinge on visible,
early successes that meet immediate needs at a local level, and
create the foundation for longer-term rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Recent advances by the Northern Alliance/United Front underline
the urgency of this task.
2. The international community's agreed principles
on Afghanistan's future emphasise strong support for the efforts
of the Afghan people to establish a new and transitional government
that should be broad-based, multi-ethnic and representative of
all the Afghan people, that would respect human rights and Afghanistan's
international obligations, and cooperate fully in international
efforts to facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance.
3. Until such an interim government and administration
is established (with the support of the United Nations and in
consultation with the Afghan people), the international community
should marshal its efforts and resources into achieving tangible
successes, wherever it has access, within an ambitious time scale.
Useful lessons have been learned from successes and failures in
Cambodia (UNTAC), Kosovo (UNMIK), East Timor (UNTAET) and Sierra
Leone (UNAMSIL).
Assumptions
4. The following mixture of conditions, assumed
for planning purposes, remains valid. However, more information
has emerged in the light of recent developments:
— Uncertain political authority:
the Taliban have withdrawn from key strategic areas across the
North of the country, ceding military control to Northern Alliance/United
Front forces who may assume political roles until a transitional
government is established. Other areas may remain under Taliban
control; authority will be weak in many areas as allegiances shift.
— Variable security conditions:
anarchy, looting, violence intermittently or in pockets around
the country—decreasing as Afghan and/or international monitors,
peacekeeping forces and civilian police are deployed to provide
a security/protection umbrella. Security may improve, but will
not be guaranteed: some risk taking will be necessary.
— Continued serious humanitarian
needs: food, warmth (in winter), shelter, healthcare, water
& sanitation.
— Devastated public infrastructure:
health facilities, schools, power, communications, transport etc.
— Population Movements: Large
numbers of displaced people returning home or moving about as
security conditions improve or fluctuate.
Objectives for the First 100 Days
5. A simultaneous start needs to be made on
the following key tasks:
— Providing interim security and protection
measures (perception will be as influential as reality)
— Re-establishing the presence of UN
regional coordination officers, field security officers and agency
staff, an integrated human rights presence and international NGOs
in safe areas inside Afghanistan
— Practical/logistic support to UN
Political Offices inside Afghanistan
— Expanding the delivery of emergency
humanitarian relief: food, shelter, basic health facilities, water
& sanitation, protection
— Resettlement of returning refugees
and displaced people as part of the effort to rebuild communities
— Conducting emergency repairs and,
where necessary, demining, to improve access by enabling unimpeded
use of strategic roads, passes, bridges and airfields
— Setting up electricity and water
supply in large towns, along with telecommunications and a national
radio
— Identifying qualified Afghans for
key administrative and public services
— (Re)opening basic education facilities
in main population centres
— Addressing the risks of mines and
unexploded ordnance: demarcation, awareness, priority clearance
— Provision of start-up funds for small
businesses (e.g. bakeries)
— (Voluntary) disarmament, demobilisation
and care of former combatants, particularly child-soldiers; collection
and control of ammunition (as a pragmatic measure, recognising
the unwillingness of many Afghans to part with their weapons,
the large numbers of cached weapons, and the relative ease of
re-supply of weapons as opposed to ammunition, which is less profitable
and more bulky)
— Initiating systematic assessment
of long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction needs, priorities
and sequencing. Sectors include: governance; security; economy
(transformation from a wartime to a peace economy, private investment,
development of oil and gas reserves, development of key financial
institutions); agriculture (appropriate seeds and tools, irrigation,
demining); transport; legal (particularly criminal justice and
land rights); media and civil society
Programming Principle
6. As the political and security context for
recovery and rehabilitation efforts is likely to remain highly
fluid, planning will have to remain flexible. The UK approach,
often in partnership with others, is guided by the following principles:
— Pragmatism/Opportunism: No
preconceived sequence: accept uncertainties and work wherever
security conditions enable access. Focused on what is achievable
at any one time, according to defined priorities and within an
agreed Strategic Framework (see below).
— Targeting: Vulnerable populations
(women, children, elderly, disabled), and the communities to which
displaced people are returning. While it may be more practical
to begin activities from major urban areas, programmes will need
to reach out to rural areas (where needs are most acute) as quickly
as possible (see below).
— Balance: Care should be taken
not to exacerbate tensions and instability by favouring certain
groups simply because they are more easily accessible or better
organised to capture or divert available resources. This will
be an important factor while only a limited number of areas are
considered sufficiently secure to re-establish an international
presence. Over-concentration of aid in, e.g., Mazar-I-Sharif,
could cause disruptive population movements from surrounding rural
areas. Mazar should instead be regarded as a key initial supply
base for expanded humanitarian and recovery efforts across provinces
and into the central highlands. Similarly, Herat and Kabul
would be regional hubs for servicing their respective surrounding
areas.
— Flexibility: Adapt methods
to circumstances in different areas - where field commanders are
accepted as de facto local authorities, seek ways to make
them accountable to local communities. Give them a stake in stability
and a desire for legitimacy. Establish and agree a workable framework
of conditionality, monitoring and accountability.
— Participation: Irrelevant
interventions can sometimes do more harm than good. Involve beneficiaries,
including women, in assessments, planning, implementation and
monitoring. Build on traditional solutions, support local initiatives.
— Local resources: Contribute
to the local economy, get value-for-money and achieve long-term
effectiveness by using skills, casual labour and goods from local
communities. Credit/grant mechanisms and safe transit will be
essential. Support nascent local community organisations and NGOs.
Begin to establish key institutions, invest in human resources
through skills training and carefully managed reintroduction of
diaspora. NB: The UN and INGOs will be the largest employers in
Afghanistan, potentially undermining the attempt to establish
local institutions and a government by offering better wages.
— Benefit Afghanistan's neighbours:
Where goods and services need to be procured, give preference
to neighbouring countries (Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, China) so that they see the benefits of developing
Afghanistan. Opium cultivation and trafficking will remain the
primary concern of many neighbouring states, but it will take
time to phase these activities out and support economic alternatives
on a regional basis.
— Integrated information strategy:
Keep local populations informed while managing expectations and
promoting stability. Experience suggests that a combination of
local-level meetings and local language radio is more effective
at spreading credible word-of-mouth reports of positive activities
than a "foreign" UN radio station. A strategy to communicate
the intentions and early activities of the international community
to the national, regional and international media will also be
required.
Planning, Implementation and Delivery Arrangements
7. An Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF),
comprising senior representatives of key UN Departments and Agencies,
has been set up at the UN Headquarters in New York. Working under
the supervision of UNSRSG Brahimi, a mirror of the IMTF (a "Transition
Recovery Office") should be set up inside Afghanistan to
be responsible for field delivery. To help the IMTF, a Planning
Task Group has been established (DFID co-funded) at the New York
University Center on International Cooperation. The IMTF could
produce a joint Strategic Framework building on the above outline
and existing data. This would set out the detailed roles and responsibilities
of international actors, and a work programme. The IMTF is monitoring
the rapid-response readiness of the key UN agencies. For illustration,
roles of UN and other agencies (often in partnership with NGOs)
could be as follows:
— UNDP (United Nations Development
Programme)—Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery—working
closely with DPKO (Department for Peacekeeping Operations)
and DPA (Department for Political Affairs): civilian/military
security arrangements; resettlement and reintegration of displaced
people and former combatants; institution building; supervision
of human resources for municipal administration; administrative
support to interim government
— UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan
(as part of the Office of the UN Coordinator for Afghanistan):
mine/UXO awareness, demarcation and clearance
— WFP (World Food Programme):
food delivery and distribution; supplementary feeding centres
in hospitals and children's centres; common logistic services
(transport, communications)
— UNHCR (United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees): continue to care for refugees in camps;
protection; monitoring of population movements; transport, logistics
and community resettlement of returnees
— FAO (Food and Agriculture
Organisation): food security; agriculture rehabilitation
— UNICEF (United Nations Children's
Fund): delivery of emergency winterisation supplies; child protection;
primary education (with UNESCO); medical supplies and establishment
of clinics for primary and maternal healthcare (with WHO
and UNFPA/Population Fund); nutrition (with WFP)
— WHO (World Health Organisation):
disease control; public health; hospital day supplies; essential
medical supplies; training of health workers
— OCHA (Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs): information mapping system for all needs
assessments and agency/NGO activities
— OHCHR (Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights): human rights and gender integration
into all recovery activities; begin consideration of the case
for different types of reconciliation/justice mechanisms
— UNCHS (Centre for Human Settlements
(Habitat)): housing, water and sanitation in urban areas
— IOM (International Organisation
for Migration - NB not a UN agency): repatriation of qualified
Afghan nationals; registration, assisted transportation and resettlement
of displaced people
— ICRC (International Committee
of the Red Cross): detainees; protection; provision of relief
supplies and support to health services
— INGOs (International Non-Governmental
Organisations): service delivery in all the above areas, acting
under the Strategic Framework
— EC (European Commission):
financing; use of Rapid Reaction Mechanism to support infrastructure
repair, demining, and local policing; humanitarian aid delivery
(ECHO); administrative support to interim government
— Bilateral Donors: flexible
financing and technical assistance to UN agencies, coordinated
by the IMTF (see below).
— International Financial Institutions:
financing and technical assistance to UN agencies and interim
government
— Coalition forces: strengthened
civilian-military coordination arrangements, including two-way
information exchange and low-profile logistical support to relief/recovery
operations if required
8. As indicated already, the credibility and
chances of success of the recovery effort in Afghanistan will
require the involvement and leadership of Afghans themselves.
Work is ongoing to identify skilled Afghans in the regional and
wider diaspora who are willing to return to work on reconstruction
and recovery. Through IOM, DFID/CHAD will support the linkage
of existing diaspora networks into the UN/IMTF Planning Task Group
and the creation of a system by which to match and place qualified
Afghan nationals into opportunities as they arise (where appropriate
skills are lacking locally).
Resourcing
9. Multiple bilateral funding arrangements are
inefficient and impose an unacceptable administrative burden on
implementing agencies. However, UN and World Bank Trust Fund arrangements
have also proved inefficient and slow (because of bureaucratic
requirements and restrictions imposed by agencies and donors).
East Timor and Kosovo taught that the concept of a single "catch-all"
trust fund, however appealing on paper, only hampers efforts in
practice. One possibility (to speed up financing processes) would
be for donors to check with a Resource Allocation Unit in the
IMTF on where pledges should be directed. Once agreed, donors
would disburse directly to the agencies concerned. Whichever combination
of interim financing arrangements is decided upon, the emphasis
should be on effectiveness and efficiency (e.g. by agreeing a
single framework for reporting and accountability with all donors),
and mechanisms should allow a straightforward transition to long-term
resourcing. NB Initially, the lack of established institutions
will limit the quantities of funding that can be disbursed and
absorbed.
10. Reporting and accounting arrangements should
be as simple as possible. Proactive outreach officers could be
tasked to help local NGOs and community groups access funds to
meet identified needs, and to assist monitoring and evaluation.
11. The IMTF running costs would be met through
the UN Regular or Peacekeeping Budget (depending on whether a
Peacekeeping Force is established). The costs of an effective
Recovery Plan will be high: provisional estimates suggest $400m
would be required if all the scheduled activities of the 100 day
plan are fully implemented (the IMTF will be conducting its own
estimate, drawing on further analysis, for example from the World
Bank and UNDP).
Next Steps
12. DFID will continue to support the efforts
of Ambassador Brahimi and the IMTF to develop and implement their
plans (through agencies) as effectively and efficiently as possible.
Key UN agencies are making arrangements for rapid re-deployment
of international staff and equipment, following rapidly conducted
security assessments. DFID has offered practical assistance -
logistics, personnel, cash - to help the UN to move quickly into
Afghanistan.
13. To back up the UN, DFID is pre-positioning
a field support team of six humanitarian specialists, with communications
and logistics equipment, in Termez, Uzbekistan, to move forward
to Mazar-I-Sharif as soon as security conditions allow. This team
will conduct emergency assessments, ensure the expansion of humanitarian
aid delivery and direct the initiation of quick impact programmes
along the lines described above. They will also provide practical
support to key UN agencies such as OCHA as they are established.
14. As the international agencies re-establish
themselves, DFID will continue the rapid assessment and funding
of key agencies' proposed activities in accordance with relief
and recovery priorities.
Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Dept,
UK Department for International Development, London
13 November 2001
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