REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
63. The drought has had an impact on the whole region,
notably Balochistan in Pakistan, Sistan Baluchistan in Iran and
Tajikistan. Tajikistan faces a severe food crisis of its own as
a result of the drought. Cereal production in 2000 was down by
forty-six per cent compared to 1999 and will be sufficient to
meet the national requirements for only three months. There is
a risk that if food aid is not provided there could be widespread
migration and even renewed conflict in a country still recovering
from a fiveyear civil war. The WFP has launched an emergency
operation to provide 126,000 tonnes of food to cover the nine
months shortfall for up to 1.16 million people. The total cost
of this operation is US$62 million and is now nearly fully funded[98].
US MILITARY FOOD DROPS OF HUMANITARIAN
DAILY RATIONS
64. The US military is thought to have spent some
$46 million on dropping over two million humanitarian daily ration
packs by air[99]. At
best this was a waste of resources and at worst it was dangerous.
Little control can be had over where the food ends up, whether
in a minefield or in the wrong hands; ration packs can only be
collected by the fittest and are likely to be taken by the strongest
not the needy. There have been reports of children straying into
minefields to collect the parcels. The food itself is of little
use unless the recipient knows how to use it - and the written
instructions the packs carry are of limited use in a country where
sixty-four per cent of the population is illiterate. We agree
with Christian Aid and Islamic Relief that dropping these packs
diverted attention from the co-ordinated humanitarian strategy[100].
We see little point in this exercise even as a hearts and minds
strategy; most of the food aid in Afghanistan is from the USA
and clearly marked as such. We believe that the money spent
on dropping humanitarian daily rations would have been better
spent through the co-ordinated donor response.
64 Special alert, no. 315, FAO/WFP crop and food supply
assessment mission to Afghanistan, 7 June 2001 Back
65 Special
alert, no. 315, FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment mission
to Afghanistan, 7 June 2001 Back
66 Special
alert, no. 315, FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment mission
to Afghanistan, 7 June 2001 Back
67 Ev
42, [Para 2 and 3] Back
68 Ev
115, [Para 18] Back
69 DFID
Afghanistan Crisis Situation Report, 25 November 2001 Back
70 Ev
115, [Para 18] Back
71 Q179 Back
72 DFID
included a WFP map in their evidence, (see Vol II Ev 122, [Annex
D]) showing levels of food insecurity in September 2001 across
Afghanistan based on survey data from their Vulnerability and
Mapping Unit (VAM). Back
73 In
his evidence, Sakandar Ali presented a map (Q82) showing immediate
food aid in priority food insecure districts based on WFP VAM
data but also including details of areas likely to be cut off
in the winter. See foldout map on inside front cover of Volume
II Back
74 After
a one-off food distribution 400,000 will require ongoing support Back
75 Ev
85 Back
76 Ev
86 Back
77 Q134 Back
78 Ev
86 Back
79 See
paragraph 53 Back
80 Q102 Back
81 Ev
115, [Para 19] Back
82 Ev
103-4 Back
83 Ev
115, [Para 20] Back
84 Ev
49 Back
85 Q190 Back
86 Q134
and Q146 Back
87 Ev
49 Back
88 Ev
21, [Para 10] Back
89 Ev
50 Back
90 Ev
51 Back
91 Ev
115, [Para 21] Back
92 Ev
115, [Para 22] Back
93 Médecins
Sans Frontiers, Press Briefing, Afghanistan, 5 December 2001. Back
94 Figures
sourced from DFID Situation Reports of 5 and 7 December Back
95 Q181 Back
96 Q86
and Q87 Back
97 Q226 Back
98 WFP
Tajikistan EMOP 6288.00 Back
99 USAID
Central Asia Region, Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #32 Dec 3, 2001 Back
100 Ev
21, [Para 8] Back