Select Committee on International Development Second Report


34. In tandem with refocusing policy on poverty reduction, the programme of reforms has included a range of institutional and management reforms. These reforms have included the establishment of EuropeAid as the implementing agency for European development assistance, the institution of Country Strategy Papers as a framework for programming, the devolution of project management to the EC's Delegations, a series of measures to reduce backlogs and to increase the speed of disbursements, and, improvements to the evaluation of European development assistance.

Structures and Institutional Relationships


35. The EuropeAid Cooperation Office was set up on 1 January 2001. EuropeAid was established to unify all the post-programming phases of the project cycle, to put responsibility for the implementation of all European development assistance in the hands of one agency, and to clarify relationships between the various DGs which have responsibilities for development policy and/or developing countries. In our previous report into EC development assistance we welcomed proposals to expand the role of the Common Service for External Relations (SCR), to reunify the bulk of the project cycle, and to clarify relationships between the various DGs.[64] As such, we welcome the creation of EuropeAid as the successor to the SCR, and are strongly supportive of the attempt to unify much of the project cycle and to clarify relationships between various DGs.

36. EuropeAid is key to the effectiveness of the reforms, and certainly seems to be an improvement on what went before. BOND told us that EuropeAid has contributed to addressing key shortcomings, including strengthening programming, integrating the project cycle, and initiating urgent measures to reduce backlogs.[65] DFID too reported that "there has been a reduction in the number of steps that people have had to go through and the amount of shuffling backwards and forwards between Directorates that were needed".[66] We are pleased to hear that things are better than they used to be, especially given the complexities and inefficiencies which beset European development assistance prior to the current reform process, and which EuropeAid inherited. However, as we note below, substantial problems still remain.

37. The creation of EuropeAid has been part of a reallocation of responsibilities for the various stages of the project cycle, but rather than unifying the project cycle, we believe that it perpetuates a split between policy and programming, and implementation. We accept that different donors organise their development assistance in a range of ways. But, whilst we acknowledge that other respected donors have opted for a model which differs from the UK where DFID deals with all stages of the project cycle, we tend to agree with Poul Nielson's criticism of the current arrangements; "I still find it a real error in terms of management and policy responsibility that we have a tension between the upstream policy part and the 'do it' part".[67] We take the view that the split between policy and implementation which the current structures of European development assistance institutionalise, is likely to lead to tensions and to limit the feedback of experience from implementation to policy which is so important if lessons are to be learnt, and development assistance improved.


38. A related set of problems concerns the continuing lack of clarity about the respective roles and responsibilities of DG External Relations, DG Development, and EuropeAid. In response to our question as to whether there is clarity as regards their various roles and responsibilities, Poul Nielson answered with a short and honest "no".[68] As Mr Bonacci of EuropeAid explained to us, some of the confusion and lack of clarity can be explained as a short-term problem, resulting from the creation of EuropeAid and the associated changes to the roles of the DGs.[69] That is, it may take some time for DG Development and DG External Relations to feel comfortable relinquishing some of their implementation responsibilities to EuropeAid.

39. The lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities seems to exist at the level of Commissioners too. There remains a split between Commissioner Nielson's DG Development which has programming responsibility for the ACP countries, and Commissioner Patten's DG External Relations which has programming responsibility for non-ACP countries. In our previous inquiry we welcomed progress in reducing the number of Commissioners concerned with development from four to two, but argued that the ultimate goal must be a single development DG, headed by a single Commissioner with responsibility for ACP and non-ACP countries.[70] The establishment of EuropeAid as the sole implementing agency was in part an effort to address this continuing geographical split of responsibilities at the Commissioner level. However, EuropeAid's management structure—with Chris Patten as Chair, and Poul Nielson as CEO—reveals firstly that the split remains, secondly that EuropeAid was something of a half-measure, and thirdly, that the power lies ultimately with External Relations. We share Poul Nielson's assessment of EuropeAid and the structure of relationships as a "strange construction", and agree with him that putting the whole of implementation under the formal responsibility of someone other than the Development Commissioner—that is, the External Relations Commissionerdoes not make sense.[71]

40. At the very least, the split between policy and implementation, and the lack of clarity as regards the roles and responsibilities of EuropeAid and the DGs, demands excellent communication between the institutions.[72] The Inter-service Agreement between DG Development, DG External Relations, and EuropeAid which was produced in June 2001, has the purpose of clarifying working arrangements, and improving communication.[73] The production of such an Agreement is perhaps indicative of the level of confusion about roles and responsibilities, but we do welcome this as an important innovation. We were also pleased to hear that there is a regular programme of formal and informal meetings between the DGs and agencies with a stake in international development issues. Trade Commissioner Mr Lamy's Chef de Cabinet told us that there are weekly breakfast meetings between the six Commissioners from the External Relations family of DGs and agencies (Development, ECHO, Enlargement, EuropeAid, External Relations, Trade) and six-weekly meetings between the associated Chefs de Cabinet, in addition to the formal EuropeAid board meetings.[74] Mr Nielson too told us that "Although one has to be careful about giving rosy pictures of these things, in substance, the working relationship between the group of RELEX Commissioners is much, much better than the rumour has it, much better; it is quite good".[75]


41. Several witnesses told us that they expected further reforms in the future. Action Aid told us about a recently prepared Internal Audit Service report which criticises the Commission's current external relations structure and suggests that there should be three divisions in future with the two strands of trade and development under an overarching foreign policy umbrella. The inference drawn was that either DG Development or EuropeAid will disappear.[76] Glenys Kinnock suggested that "after the next European elections and the next Commission is put in place, I do not think we will see the same structures as we see now. I do not know how they will do it but I think there is a momentum now behind pulling Development and other External Relations people together, maybe with some kind of division but pulling the whole thing together".[77] The disappearance of DG Development is seen in some quarters as a very likely, if not already decided, outcome.[78]

42. The basic problem is simply that the EU's relationships with other countries can either be organised in terms of country-types (for instance, ACP or non-ACP, or developing or developed), or in terms of issue areas (for instance, trade, development or security). Whichever organising principle is selected, there will always be some overlap of responsibilities. Poul Nielson himself, as the Commissioner with responsibility for DG Development, described efforts to perfect structures which manage the relationships between development assistance and external relations as a case of squaring the circle; there is no perfect solution.[79] He could, however, see ways of better integrating development and external relations, either at the level of Commissioners and DGs or at the level of implementation within EuropeAid.[80] More specifically, in an interview with European Voice on 28 February, Poul Nielson called for a radical shake-up, with DG Development joining forces with EuropeAid, as part of the External Relations DG. Nielson's proposal seeks to achieve two things: firstly, the bringing together within DG External Relations of programming for ACP and non-ACP countries; and, secondly, at a later date, the transfer of programming for all countries into EuropeAid so as to unify the project cycle and leave the DGs with the job of ensuring policy coherence.[81] We are of course well aware that there are different models of how to organise development assistance both in relation to managing the project cycle, and as regards the relationship between development and external relations.[82] There is no perfect solution, but the EC's current solution is far from perfect. We regard the division of responsibilities for different stages of the project cycle between the DGs and EuropeAid as an important issue. But, we maintain most strongly that it would be best to have relationships with all developing countries—both ACP and non-ACP—dealt with by a single Directorate General.

43. We share Chris Patten's reluctance to disrupt things any further at this stage of the reforms,[83] and feel that the most important thing at the moment is to try to make the current arrangements work. As Clare Short put it, "You cannot stop in the middle of a reform effort and change your mind or you waste another couple of years".[84] That said, the structures and relationships which govern European development must be reviewed periodically; if they do not foster clarity about roles and relationships, they must be revised. It would be overly disruptive to alter things now, but this is not a licence for continuing confusion until some unspecified point in the future.

44. Clare Short suggested to us that the loss of DG Development would be a disaster.[85] We too were most concerned to hear about its possible disappearance. We regard the maintenance within the Commission of an institutional focus for development, and for relations with developing countries, as absolutely essential. However, it is this institutional focus—preferably bringing the management of relations with ACP and non-ACP developing countries together—that is the key issue, rather than the continuing existence of an entity called DG Development. With DG Development currently undergoing a slow death, and even Poul Nielson calling for its integration with EuropeAid under the umbrella of DG External Relations, it may be more sensible to focus attention on how best to ensure that developmental concerns are well-represented in some form within the Commission. The structures which govern European development assistance should be kept under review, and proposals for their reform examined very carefully. We re-iterate our view that the assignment of countries to DGs on a geographical basisACP or non-ACPmakes little sense, and would welcome progress towards making a single Directorate General and Commissioner responsible for relations with all developing countries.

Country Strategy Papers and the Inter-service Quality Support Group

45. Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) are—for the EU if not for DFID which has pioneered their use—a new approach to programming. The CSP approach provides a standard template for assessing the diverse needs of individual partner countries and formulating appropriate development strategies. CSPs are intended to focus on poverty reduction, encourage consultation with civil society, promote donor coordination, emphasise country ownership, concentrate efforts on a limited number of priority issues, and promote a number of cross-cutting issues such as human rights, gender equality, and environmental concerns. The expectation is that in time CSPs will mesh with the assistance strategies of other donors, leading to improved donor coordination and resource-pooling, and decreased administrative burdens for developing countries.[86] In addition it is hoped that the CSP framework will ensure that careful thought is given to the coherence of the various EC policies which are likely to impact on a country.

46. Country Strategy Papers are the formal responsibility of DG Development (ACP countries) and DG External Relations (non-ACP countries), but an Inter-service Quality Support Group (IQSG) has been established to review the strategy papers and promote best practice. This group brings together staff from DG Development, ECHO, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, DG Enlargement, EuropeAid, the Evaluation Unit, DG External Relations and DG Trade. More than 100 country and regional strategies have been produced and assessed by the IQSG; 29 have been formally adopted by the Commission.[87] We warmly welcome the institution of CSPs as a way of focussing country programming. In particular we endorse their philosophy which emphasises country ownership, civil society involvement and donor coordination. As Glenys Kinnock stated in her submission, CSPs have "the potential to improve the focus and clarity of the EC's work", and, as such, are an important step forward.[88] We also join with DFID in applauding the establishment of the IQSG as a mechanism to promote best practice.[89]

47. However, whilst we firmly believe that the adoption of the CSP approach is a very positive development, we do have some concerns about how the process is being conducted in practice. There is a tricky balance between the goals of donor coordination, civil society consultation, and country ownership; we are concerned that the right balance is not in some cases being achieved. The Committee heard of a CSP being "written in Washington",[90] the implication being that the World Bank was the prime mover, and also heard the level of consultation with civil society described as "patchy". BOND reported that, "The reality on the ground is that very little genuine consultation takes place".[91] In this instance the finger of blame cannot be pointed at the Commission; in some cases Governments are either unable or unwilling to consult with civil society, in others local civil society organisations are either absent, or lack the capacity to participate in consultations. As far as the content of the CSPs is concerned, some witnesses expressed concern that the CSPs produced so far had tended to opt for transport or unspecified macro-economic support as priority issue areas.[92] We however share DFID's view that within the context of a nationally-owned development plan, a country's choice of priorities is something of a "second order" issue.[93]

48. It is important that NGOs, DFID, and other donors continue their efforts to build the capacity of civil society organisations in developing countries so that they can participate in consultations, share in the local ownership of development strategies, and hold donors to account for their actions. There may be merit too in examining how civil society consultation takes place as regards the disbursement of the EDF funds within the context of ACP-EU relations. Under this arrangement, consultation with non-state actors is a contractual requirement[94] and resources are provided to help make this a reality.[95] We look forward to seeing CSPs, produced through proper consultation with civil society organisations, assume a central role in the programming and implementation of European development assistance.

Deconcentration to Delegations and Staffing

49. The success of the CSP process is predicated on the European Commission having effective Delegations which are well-staffed and have the authority to make decisions. The devolution of project management to Commission Delegations in partner countries transfers responsibility and authority for implementation away from Brussels and into the field. EuropeAid coordinates this process of "deconcentration" to Delegations, and will, ultimately, be left as the "manager of the system",[96] with the Delegations in charge of project implementation. The objective of deconcentration is to make the implementation of development assistance more responsive to locally felt needs and partners' priorities, and to enable Delegations to work more closely with actors at the local level. We are strongly supportive of the principle of deconcentration. If it is done properly, it is likely to improve dialogue between donors and local communities, to facilitate coordination between donors, and to enable the EC's Delegations to play an important role in the generation and implementation of coherent national development plans.

50. Mr Bonacci of EuropeAid told us that reasonable progress was being made with an ambitious schedule of deconcentration to Delegations. The plan is to devolve project management to 78 Delegations over the course of 2001-2003. The first phase was to take place in 2001 and to include devolution to the following 21 Delegations: Croatia and Russia in Europe; China, India, Indonesia and Thailand in Asia; Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey in the Mediterranean; Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Mexico and Nicaragua in Latin America; Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Senegal and South Africa in Africa; and, the Dominican Republic in the Caribbean. By 30 January 2002, devolved project management had started in 10 countries, and was expected to begin in the remaining 11 countries within a couple of months. Beginning in the latter half of 2002, a second phase is to involve 26 countries, completing the process for countries in Europe, Asia, Latin America and the Mediterranean, and extending it to fourteen ACP countries. Completion in the remaining ACP countries is scheduled for 2003.[97] We are glad that there is a timetable for deconcentration, but we do not understand the logic behind the sequencing of deconcentration to Delegations, and wonder why an important regional country such as Nigeria was not included in the first phase of Deconcentration.

51. The European Commission, along with many NGOs, has long insisted that the success of the reforms of European development assistance, and of deconcentration more specifically, depends on adequate staffing, both in terms of number and quality. As Saferworld put it in written evidence, "It is vital that the proposed decentralisation of authority to the delegation level is matched by adequate levels of staffing from the outset".[98] The impressive performance of the European Agency for Reconstruction in implementing aid for Kosovo, in part on the basis of adequate and appropriate staffing, illustrates and reinforces this point.[99] In our previous inquiry into EC development assistance, staffing was a contentious issue. The Commission argued forcefully for more staff,[100] Clare Short stated that she would "fight to the death" to prevent this,[101] and we suggested that any reassessment of staffing needs must take account of progress made with increasing the efficiency of European development assistance.[102] In evidence to the current inquiry we heard that Clare Short and DFID now supported the increased staffing needs of the Commission, and no longer felt that the issue of staffing was solely being used as an excuse for under-performance.[103]

52. Action Aid and BOND reminded us that the staffing issue is about appropriate skills and experience, as well as about adequate numbers. Action Aid explained that "It is not just a question of the number of personnel either in the field or in Brussels but the extent to which they are equipped and trained to undertake their tasks. The Commission needs to ensure that personnel working in EuropeAid are trained in, have experience of, and apply, participatory, people-centred development".[104] Drawing on evidence from Bangladesh, South Africa, and Nicaragua, BOND told us that Delegations were unable to take seriously gender issues and policies.[105] Complaining about the Commission's staffing of Delegations, BOND suggested to us that "It is impossible seriously to implement the commitments that they have made to poverty elimination, to promoting equality between men and women, to promoting respect for human rights, unless they seriously step up the quality of their staff and expand the training to all the other staff".[106] Our concerns were not alleviated by Chris Patten's acknowledgement that out of 209 top-level officials working for the RELEX family of DGs, only 56 had worked as civil servants beyond the EU's borders for more than a year.[107] Appropriate skills, training and experience is as important as adequate numbers of staff.

53. There is a tension between the desire to make progress with deconcentration, and the need to staff Delegations adequately and appropriately. We were very concerned to hear that the process has already slipped slightly behind schedule,[108] and were not filled with confidence by Mr Bonacci's admission that "we still have some doubts ... we do not know whether we will be in a position to find all the staff needed".[109] It is clear to us that the Commission is struggling to balance the demands of speed and quality as regards the process of deconcentration to Delegations. There is a need for action; otherwise the success of the whole reform programme will be put at risk. Firstly, there is a need for more flexible contracts so that suitably qualified staff with development skills can be attracted.[110] We urge the Commission to prioritise its efforts to amend its staffing regulations to allow longer-term contracts. Secondly, it is vital that the budgetary authorities provide, in the 2003 and 2004 budgets, the financial resources needed to complete the process of deconcentration. We urge DFID and the UK Government to support the Commission in meeting its staffing requirements.

Backlogs, Disbursements and NGO Payments


54. Huge backlogs, low levels of disbursement, and long delays between commitments and payments have long plagued European development assistance. In our previous report we supported the Commission's proposal to examine old and dormant commitments with a view to rescinding them, and recommended that the Commission propose a clear timetable for achieving this objective.[111] We are pleased that the Commission set itself the task of dealing with these issues, and welcome the progress that has been made.[112]

55. As Poul Nielson explained, to improve speeds of disbursement, it is first necessary to deal with the existing backlog.[113] The Commission, and EuropeAid specifically, has made considerable progress with clearing the backlogs of old and dormant commitments. By November 2001 the level of old commitments (pre-1995) had been reduced by 45 percent compared to the level in November 1999. The level of dormant commitments (not resulting in payments within two years) had fallen too, by 30 percent from the end of 1999 to November 2001.[114] As regards disbursement levels too, progress has been made. Mr Bonacci reported a 17 percent increase in disbursements for the EDF and budgetised ODA combined, for each of the years 2000 and 2001.[115] Finally, progress has been made in reducing the delay between funds being committed and fully disbursed. From a peak of just less than five years in 1998, by 2001 the average delay had fallen to just less than four years; as regards the EDF, the delay had fallen from just less than six years in 2000 to around four and a half years in 2001.[116] We remain concerned however that these welcome average improvements hide serious problems in particular cases. During our recent visit to Nigeria for instance, we were told that there are £600 million of unspent funds, and that a so-called "quick start" project had taken 2 years to disburse its first Euro. Such delays are unacceptable and demand further progress.

56. EuropeAid is also in the process of simplifying and harmonising its contracting procedures in order to reduce the time taken to complete the tendering process, to increase disbursement capacity and to prevent backlogs building up in future. The new financial regulation, the reduction in the number of contracting procedures from forty-six to eight, and the provision of a "sunset clause" to place a time limit on the validity of budgetary commitments were all commended to us as useful innovations.[117] It is good that progress has been made, but further progress is needed and cannot be taken for granted. In 2000, payments of ODA still amounted to an unacceptably low 59 percent of commitments.[118] In addition, we are concerned to ensure that the speed of payments is not increased at the expense of the quality of projects, and reserve judgement on the "sunset clause" until the details are known. We hope that a time limit will encourage better design and appraisal and hence speedier agreement, and not act as a disincentive to participatory and inclusive development.


57. As noted in our previous inquiry into EC development assistance, NGOs have faced problems of late payments and complex procedures.[119] The reform process was intended to bring about improvements to EC-NGO relations, and in particular to reduce payment delays. As such, the last two years have been a time of major change to the management of the budget line for NGO co-financing, B7-6000, and to EC-NGO relations more generally.[120] Perhaps not surprisingly given the associated disruption, and some tensions around the relationship between the Commission and the Liaison Committee of Development NGOs to the EU in Brussels, there have been some difficulties and continuing delays, of which NGOs have been highly critical. Action Aid told us that "As far as grants to NGOs are concerned the situation is bleak although it is not too late for the current reforms to radically improve the situation", and said that the Commission's "ad hoc measures" were threatening to undermine the objectives of the reform process.[121] Complaints focussed on continuing unacceptable delays, and a lack of transparency as regards the timetable for calls for proposals and the criteria for making decisions.[122] BOND did report that some progress was being made with clearing the backlog and reducing delays, and welcomed the new framework - the General Conditions—for the B7-6000 co-financing budget line, but worried that the separation of EuropeAid from DG Development had damaged EC-NGO dialogue and led the Commission to view increasingly NGOs as implementers rather than development actors in their own right.[123]

58. EC-NGO relations have clearly been damaged by a lack of transparency and trust. NGOs, which can ill-afford to be paid late, have also had to deal with much uncertainty as regards both individual funding decisions, and the long-term future of EC-NGO relations and the associated funding environment. There can indeed be little doubt that the nature of European NGOs' relationships with the EC is likely to evolve, especially as the capacity of developing country NGOs increases. Whilst this is a longer-term issue, and one which deserves serious consideration, it does seem to us that the Commission has recognised the problems of late payments and lack of transparency in decision-making, and is endeavouring to institute procedures to enable it to cope with the huge volume of applications it receives. This is very welcome. We urge the Commission to be as transparent as possible in its dealings with NGOs, because it is the uncertainty—as well as the delays—that causes problems for the NGOs.


59. Evaluation is of paramount importance to any organisation. Evaluation is the basis for accountability, transparency, learning, and informed decision-making. High-quality evaluation is fundamental to any assessment of the Commission's progress in implementing its reforms successfully. In particular, evaluation in terms of a standard framework is a prerequisite if comparisons are to be made between the poverty focus and effectiveness of European development assistance and that of member states' bilateral programmes.

60. The first Annual Report on the Implementation of the European Commission's external assistance was published in January 2002.[124] As a baseline report, it refers to the situation at 1 January 2001, the date of establishment of EuropeAid. We join with others, including Ministers attending the European Development Council on 8 November 2001, in welcoming the recognition that it is important to make such a report, but in being extremely disappointed with the structure and content of the report itself. The Annual Report makes no attempt to measure impact, fails to say how the Commission intends to measure impact in future, and neglects to discuss priorities or compare the different regional or sectoral programmes. The Annual Report is a step in the right direction, but a disappointingly small step which must be improved upon next year.

61. Evaluations of specific programmes are managed by the Evaluation Unit. Located within EuropeAid, this unit is in charge of the evaluation of the Commission's development and cooperation programmes. It covers all geographical regions, as well as sectoral programmes. Its stated objectives are, firstly to learn lessons to improve policy and practice, and secondly to improve transparency and accountability. The evaluation unit reports directly to the five RELEX Commissioners on the board of EuropeAid, and as such might be described not as being independent of the Commission, but as having an independence within the Commission.[125] This placing of the evaluation unit within the implementing agency - whilst apparently peculiar - is not dissimilar to the approach employed by DFID. Poul Nielson responded to our questions about the location of the evaluation unit within EuropeAid, saying that: firstly, the EC's evaluation unit makes use of external evaluators as much as other donors do; secondly, that internal evaluators tend to communicate their findings more clearly and with less fear of losing subsequent contracts; and thirdly, that were the evaluation unit to be located in DG Development or DG External Relations, it would then be too close to the programming phase of the project cycle.[126]

62. We agree that for the purposes of learning, an internal evaluation unit can be best, but feel that this might not be the case as far as accountability and transparency are concerned. In addition, we were not convinced by Poul Nielson's suggestion that an external unit is likely to be less willing than an internal one to want to rock the boat. We are also aware of serious concerns about the independence of the evaluation unit and the transparency of its processes, concerns which have been voiced by professional evaluators which much experience of working with and for the EC.[127] We recommend that further consideration is given to the multiple objectives of evaluation and the best way of achieving these in a transparent manner.

63. No matter whether conducted by an internal or an external unit, any assessment of the (cost)-effectiveness of development assistance depends upon information about both spending, and about the impacts of that spending. Attempts to assess the effectiveness of the European Commission's development assistance programmes are lacking on both counts. Echoing a point made earlier—paragraph 24—the Development and Cooperation Committee of the European Parliament stated in its opinion on the Budget for 2002 that, "The system for budget classification is beneath contempt, making it more or less impossible to establish the detailed distribution of EU aid money sector by sector".[128] Lacking proper systems for information management, the EC has, up until now, failed to provide a sectoral breakdown of its development spending, something which would enable comparisons to be made between the EC and other DAC donors. The EC accepts that this needs addressing. Poul Nielson described the process of retrieving data to report on what the EC does in terms of development assistance as "archaeology",[129] and said that being able to report in the same way as other DAC donors do would be "a measure of going normal, going mainstream."[130] We were encouraged to hear that the Common Relex Information System (CRIS) will be operational by mid-2002, and that the clear intention is to be able to produce a sectoral breakdown for spending in 2002, and to perhaps produce a retrospective breakdown for 2000 and 2001.[131] We congratulate EuropeAid on its progress in this area, and encourage further endeavours—particularly in terms of developing project-profiles which go beyond the DAC sectoral breakdowns—to improve transparency and accountability, and to inform decision-making.

64. We are pleased that evaluation is being taken increasingly seriously in the Commission, and are encouraged that there has been some progress with producing an Annual Report, improving the information systems, and with beginning to report on the sectoral breakdown of spending. Work remains to be done with clarifying which budget categories are focussed on development objectives, and care must be taken to guarantee the independence of the evaluation unit and the transparency of its processes. We do not wish to demand more from the EC than we expect from other donors, but we trust that the EC will continue to work with other donors to develop a set of useful performance indicators.

64   Ninth Report from the International Development Committee, Session 1999-2000, The effectiveness of EC development assistance, HC 669, para. 59. Back

65   Ev 19, [para. 5] Back

66   Q16 Back

67   Q183 Back

68   Q181 Back

69   Q106 Back

70   Ninth Report from the International Development Committee, Session 1999-2000, The effectiveness of EC development assistance, HC 669, para. 13. Back

71   Q182 Back

72   Ev 106; Ev 54, [para. 7] Back

73   Inter-service Agreement between DG External Relations, DG Development and EuropeAid Co-operation office, June 2001. Back

74   Q117 Back

75   Q184 Back

76   Ev 100, [para. 7] Back

77   Q140 Back

78   Ev 23, [para. 33] Back

79   Q185 Back

80   Q187 Back

81   European Voice, 28-2-2002. Back

82   Prior to the establishment of DFID as a separate Government Department in 1997, development issues were dealt with by the Overseas Development Administration, as part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Back

83   Q214 Back

84   Q270 Back

85   Q268 Back

86   Q43 Back

87   European Development Policy Targets and Indicators, pp.44-46 (European Commission Paper for EuropeanParliamentWorkshopon26February2002). Back

88   Ev 54, [para. 5] Back

89   Q6; Q48. Back

90   Q76 Back

91   Ibid. Back

92   Ev 103, [para. 27]; Ev 22, [para. 30]; Ev 56, [para. 32] Back

93   Q10 Back

94   Q202 Back

95   Q198 Back

96   Q104 Back

97   Ibid.; Deconcentration Progress Report as of 30 January 2002 - Not printed, copy placed in library. Back

98   Ev 105 Back

99   The European Scrutiny Committee referred to us a European Court of Auditors Report concerning the financial accounts of the European Agency for Reconstruction and the implementation of aid for Kosovo for the year 2000. This report concurs with our view - paras. 51 to 53 - about the importance of appropriate and adequate staffing. See also: Ev 3; Ev 55, [para. 17]. Back

100   Ninth Report from the International Development Committee, Session 1999-2000, The effectiveness of EC development assistance, HC 669, para. 62. Back

101   Ibid., para. 65. Back

102   Ibid., para. 69. Back

103   Q42 Back

104   Ev 102, [para. 18] Back

105   Ev 20, [para. 14] Back

106   Q85 Back

107   European Voice, 31-10-2001. The breakdown by DG was: Development, 12 out of 31; ECHO, 3 out of 10; Enlargement, 4 out of 20; EuropeAid, 15 out of 62; External Relations, 16 out of 58; Trade, 6 out of 28. Back

108   Q32; Q104 Back

109   Q106 Back

110   Ev 3, [para. 17] Back

111   Ninth Report from the International Development Committee, Session 1999-2000, The effectiveness of EC development assistance, HC 669, para. 50. Back

112   Q104; Ev 40 and Ev 41 Back

113   Q203 Back

114   Overview on Budget Implementation 2001 - Not printed, copy placed in library. Back

115   Q104 Back

116   Ev 41 Back

117   Ev 2, [para. 11]; Ev 55, [para. 21] Back

118   European Commission (2002) Annual Report on the Implementation of the European Commission's External Assistance, Situation as at 01.01.2001, p.141. Back

119   Ninth Report from the International Development Committee, Session 1999-2000, The effectiveness of EC development assistance, HC 669, para. 51. Back

120­6000en.htm (accessed 16-4-02) Back

121   Ev 101, [para. 11] Back

122   Ev 101 and 102, [paras. 11-17]; Ev 20, [para. 17] Back

123   Ev 20, [para. 20]. Back

124   European Commission (2002) Annual Report on the Implementation of the European Commission's External Assistance, Situation as at 01.01.2001. A draft version of this document was referred to us by the European Scrutiny Committee; our opinion on the annual report is given in para. 60. Back

125   Q49 Back

126   Q206 Back

127   Portes and Montes letter of 19-2-02 to Patten and Nielson - Not printed, copy placed in library. Back

128   European Parliament Committee on Development and Cooperation, Opinion on the draft budget for 2002. 12-9-2001. Back

129   Q190 Back

130   Q204 Back

131   Letter of 4-1-02 from Poul Nielson to Mr Joaquim Miranda, Chair of the European Parliament Committee on Development and Cooperation - Not printed, copy placed in library. Back

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