Select Committee on International Development Third Report


Adaptation and mitigation

39. Policy tends to be unequally divided between mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation is centred on near-term energy and industrial policy while adaptation has grown out of natural resource management and concern for impacts. Mitigation is a global problem with a global solution that is regarded as achievable. Impacts are a predicament requiring adaptation. Adaptation is local solutions for local problems, often complicated by politics and is a much harder issue to deal with on a global basis. Even if greenhouse gas emissions were reduced and concentrations of greenhouse gases stabilised, the impacts of climate change would still be felt for hundreds of years (see figure 11).[127] Martin Parry, Jackson Environment Institute, told us that there was a growing realisation that adaptation was going to be essential and that mitigation on its own was insufficient. He said that it would not be feasible to reach the levels of emissions needed to avoid significant impacts; to do so would require levels ten or twenty times below those specified in Kyoto.[128] In this section of the report we consider adaptation in detail before going on to consider mitigation.

Figure 11: Even if CO2 emissions levels peak in the next few years and were then reduced, the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, particularly carbon dioxide, would still cause significant changes in climate for a century or more.[129]


Types of adaptation

40. Adaptation determines the residual impacts of climate change as shown in figure 12 and governments have a role to play in anticipating changes and planning for the future.[130] The world's population and ecosystems have adapted to a constantly changing climate for hundreds of millions of years.[131] Spontaneous adaptation will continue but is unlikely to be able to occur at a rate sufficient to cope with the changes in climate brought about by human activity, and so greater attention must be paid to planned adaptation. For example, the health impacts described in chapter 2, might be moderated by various social, institutional, technological and behavioural adaptations. Such adaptations will involve strengthening public infrastructure, improving management of resources such as water, action on food safety, urban and housing design, provision of appropriate medical services and facilities.[132]

Figure 12: The role of adaptation in determining the residual impacts of climate change.[133]

41. Climate change has the potential to undermine development unless development investment includes measures to address climate risk. Adaptation can reduce adverse impacts and enhance any benefits of climate change,[134] bringing gains beyond simply providing a basis for coping in the future. Short-term planning and neglect of climate variability (such as promoting development in risk prone locations) can leave communities unable to cope and poorly adapted to deal with future climate risk.

Figure 13: Climate change adaptation matrix.

Factors affecting adaptation

42. Many of the areas vulnerable to climate change are also under pressure from other factors, such as population growth and resource depletion: most are poor. Efforts to tackle poverty, improve environmental management, and advance sustainable development will enhance adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability. The need for adaptation will be greatest in developing countries but developing countries typically have a lower capacity to adapt than developed countries.[135] In situations where wealthier countries could build sea defences, poor countries will suffer a loss of land, livelihood and displacement of population. Table 11 shows some indicators that can be used to measure adaptive capacity and clearly illustrates the kind of factors that affect adaptation.

Table 11: Adaptive Capacity Indicators[136]
GDP/capita (in purchasing power parity)
Gini coefficient of inequality
Incidence of poverty
Life expectancy at birth
Insurance mechanisms and access to insurance
Degree of urbanisation
Access to public health facilities and services
Access to education
Community organisations (social capital)
Existing planning regulations at national and local levels
Existing warning and protection from natural hazards
Institutional and decision-making frameworks
Political stability

Approaches to adaptation

43. Studies on adaptation are increasingly being taken seriously and have been included in two large GEF projects. There are several methodological approaches to adaptation: it is possible to take a climate scenario, develop an impacts model and from this derive specific adaptation measures; alternatively, it is possible to define several plausible impacts that can be used to develop strategies to build adaptive capacity that enhances autonomous adaptation and produces greater resilience. Most of those who gave evidence to the Committee argued that there was mileage in the second approach as a policy strategy (although there was some disagreement about what further studies were required). The Tyndall Centre told us that building capacity in a flexible manner was a more realistic way forward than trying to prepare for specific events.[137]

44. We agree that a flexible but straight forward approach is needed. There is little justification for imposing an international template using common scenarios and methods at a national and local level. To do so might raise awareness but will not provide much insight into what specific local and national actions were needed. Different solutions will be appropriate in different countries. For example, in a country with a large number of rural poor, vulnerability to drought and famine are less likely to be overcome by urban industrialisation than by an investment in sustainable agricultural development.[138] Official Development Assistance (ODA) needs to be targeted to deliver sustainable development that enhances adaptive capacity; this might include agricultural research, early warning systems for food security, and technology transfer. Planned adaptation at a national level is easier than at community or individual level, where spontaneous and reactive changes in livelihoods and resource use will occur. The severity of impacts and local circumstances will dictate the adaptive response. For some countries spontaneous adaptation will not be an option. The people of the Maldives and other small island states may have no alternative but to migrate.

45. People already cope with a variety of climatic risks and other threats to sustainable livelihoods. While current variability is not a perfect analogue for future climate change, it is important to identify what can we learn from it about risk management and development needs. Both IPCC Working Group II and Saleemul Huq said that helping to build the capacity of communities to deal with extreme events should strengthen adaptive capacity to deal with future climate change.[139] We believe that concentrating efforts on disasters and extreme events will have a beneficial impact on capacity to deal with long-term climate variability, and greater emphasis needs to be placed on disaster mitigation and preparedness (DMP). We are concerned that too much focus on the short-term responses to extreme events could undermine progress towards longer-term development goals. We believe a longer-term view of relief and DMP must be taken by donors and recipient countries alike.

Targeting Assistance

46. New funds for adaptation must supplement current development investment and not divert existing funds.[140] Countries that have been badly hit in the past and those with particularly vulnerable populations stand to gain the most from carefully targeted adaptation measures.[141] Targeted adaptation and focusing work on reducing vulnerability will help to reduce climate risk.[142] Given the uncertainties about climate change, the precautionary principle requires a flexible package of measure and inevitably some adaptation strategies may turn out to be redundant. This means there is a risk associated with funding work on adaptation. The scientific uncertainties make it difficult to apply a cost benefit analysis to actions to address climate change; outcomes could turn out to be less serious than currently predicted.[143] Yet many 'no-regrets' options could still be developed, especially as many of the current systems relating to water, food, urbanisation, energy and transport are far from ideal. With several 'win-win' scenarios and 'no-regrets' options, we believe there are many cases where funding adaption will not only be a risk worth taking but a requirement of the precautionary principle. Least developed countries, small island states and the most vulnerable should be priorities for adaptation. Solutions could build on existing coping mechanisms where appropriate and should be compatible with national sustainability goals and strategies.[144]


47. Migration is an important traditional coping mechanism and as such is an adaptation strategy.[145] Increased climate variability might lead to increased migration,[146] particularly as people leave rural areas to seek off-farm incomes in towns and cities.[147] The number of environmental refugees now exceeds the number displaced by war and conflict.[148] In 1999, the World Disasters Report noted that out of 43 million refugees worldwide, 25 million (nearly 60%) were environmental refugees.[149] Migration can be a sustainable strategy where it builds and reinforces local knowledge and promotes the sustainable use of resources. The Tyndall Centre saw evidence of this in Brazil, Vietnam and a number of small island states.[150] During our visit to Ghana earlier this year, we saw for ourselves how displaced people from Burkina Faso and northern Ghana were introducing more efficient and sustainable ways of producing charcoal as they moved south. If other adaptions, including planned migration, are not possible and coping mechanisms are exhausted, there is a greater chance of displacement migration taking place as a last resort.[151] But the right to migrate is increasingly being contested and is a source of conflict in many societies.[152] Many of those displaced in Bangladesh by rising sea levels will migrate to India, exacerbating already high levels of illegal migration.[153] Andrew Bennett, DFID, told us that migration out of the Sahel into the Ivory Coast was on such a scale that the Ivory Coast had introduced legislation preventing foreign nationals from owning land.[154] There is no international recognition of environmental refugees; they are not entitled to the same rights as refugees from conflict and persecution.[155] The UK Government has no specific policy to deal with them. The British Bangladeshi Professional Association called for a new convention to protect the rights of environmental refugees in the same way that refugees fleeing conflict or persecution are protected under international law.[156] The need for national and international policies to deal with 'environmental' refugees will become greater as more people are temporarily or permanently displaced from their homes by more frequent and more intense climate disasters or by progressive climate change, such as rising sea levels or desertification. DFID should be pushing for a policy on 'environmental' refugees. Any policy response must recognise that this issue cuts across several Whitehall Departments. DFID must ensure that this issue is raised with and understood by the Home Office and the Foreign Office.

48. Rural to urban migration is on the increase but some urban livelihoods can be particularly vulnerable, especially for those eking out a living in urban slums. Ian Davis stressed the importance of tackling rural development to slow the flow of people to cities.[157] Support for rural development could help to keep people in an area where there was some hope of adapting livelihoods to cope with climate change rather than seeing them move to areas where they may be even more vulnerable.

Building adaptive capacity

49. When provided with education, access to credit and the freedom to adapt, people can create sustainable systems for themselves. Such systems are often based on indigenous knowledge and traditional coping mechanisms. Saleemul Huq, IIED, argued for strengthening the capacity of institutions and civil society to adapt to climate change. He stressed the importance of institutions for measuring and monitoring impacts, and for analysis and planning.[158] The institutions must be supported by scientific and technical capacity.

50. With ninety percent of suitable land cultivated in Asia and Europe and seventy-five percent cultivated in North America, climate change will have major implications for farming practice. Africa and South America both have more suitable land left uncultivated than is currently under cultivation. Most of this land is concentrated in just a few countries: Angola, Congo, Sudan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia.[159] In many parts of Africa, despite a drop in rainfall and increasing populations, agricultural productivity has been maintained, largely through improved management.[160] The FAO is working to help build farmers' ability to cope with climate change by encouraging 'no-regrets' agricultural development and by increasing efficiency and flexibility under current climate conditions so that farmers are better placed to deal with future changes. Their 'no-regrets' approach includes reducing the use of nitrogenous fertilisers (which are costly, inefficient and harmful) and making use of breeds of livestock that are efficient converters of feed into milk and meat to reduce methane emissions. They also work with planners to reduce rates of deforestation[161] as the erosion of forest cover will have implications for watershed management, biodiversity and the use of forest as carbon sinks.


51. Achieving a balance between the tensions inherent in the environment agenda and the development agenda, and between economic liberalisation and sustainable development, presents a difficult challenge. It raises the danger of development actions that do not reduce but increase vulnerability, a process known as maladaptation.[162] Preserving existing resilience and adaptive capacity can help avoid maladaptation. Some adaptation strategies and coping mechanisms are latent and communities may be less vulnerable than models might suggest.[163] Donors must take care to ensure that development activity enhances and does not destroy autonomous and latent coping strategies. Maladaptation arises from development that:

  • occurs in risk prone locations;
  • is based on short-term considerations;
  • neglects known climate variability;
  • suffers from a lack of information; or
  • is over-reliant on insurance mechanisms.

52. Jonathan Walter, editor of the World Disasters Report, gave us an example of maladaptation in India where an area of mangrove swamp had been cleared for prawn farming; the mangroves had acted as a break to storm surges and subsequent cyclones destroyed not only the prawn farms but threw many small-holders into destitution.[164] We agree with Neil Adger, Tyndall Centre, that "The first thing that DFID needs to do is make sure that their policies and investments overseas do not actually undermine the capacity to adapt.".[165] Perverse subsidies and large infrastructure projects can undermine adaptive capacity. Without careful assessment and planning, investments in coastal infrastructure, urbanisation, transport and industrialisation could undermine people's ability to adapt spontaneously.[166] Care has to be taken to ensure that disaster risks are not increased by, for example, building on flood plains or changing patterns of land use. We are convinced that promoting risk management is better than trying to reduce climate hazards through over-reliance on large-scale, inflexible engineering driven structural works, which often turn out to be commercially unviable, technically impractical and impact adversely on the environment.[167]

Managing climate risk

53. Ultimately, adaptation is a risk management strategy.[168] Ian Davis, Cranfield Disaster Management Centre, proposed a risk reduction chain demonstrating the interdependence of the different structural and non-structural measures that could be taken to reduce the risk posed by natural disasters.[169] He told us that very few countries had adequate risk assessment processes in place.[170] Risk assessment, from community levels upwards, is vital if the problems (and solutions) are to be properly identified.[171]

54. Climate change creates an additional uncertainty about the future. As the climate becomes more variable and extreme events more damaging, relying on historical observations of climatic risks or traditional coping mechanisms may not be sufficient. Societies must adapt to climate change by learning to live with risk. This is achieved by monitoring climate change impacts and adaptive capacity, implementing adaptive responses when appropriate and using climate forecasts to manage near-term risks.

55. Climate change could have a significant impact on health, livelihoods, property, the economy and the environment. But climate change is characterised by uncertainty. Models predict ranges of possible change and impacts are described in terms of likelihoods, vulnerabilities and severity. Risk management is an ideal tool to help address issues where the probability of consequences has to be balanced against the vulnerability of stakeholders. Applying the principles of risk management and risk communication may be helpful in analysing climate risk. But the use of risk management must be underpinned by the precautionary principle and public participation in the process. Adopting a risk management approach could help to strengthen local disaster preparedness, reduce the vulnerability of the poor, develop formal and informal coping mechanisms and expand access to insurance. The risk of climate change can only be managed through a mix of social and political processes including:

  • land use planning and management;
  • building codes and standards;
  • insurance;
  • prediction forecasting;
  • warning;
  • engineering; and
  • new technologies.[172]

Figure 14: Risk diagram for assessing climate risk to development projects and programmes.[173]

56. The application of risk management techniques to climate risk must recognise that there are wider issues beyond simply looking at the magnitude or frequency of impacts. Risk management seeks to base decisions on an analysis of probability (likelihood/chance/uncertainty) and magnitude (impact/consequences/severity/hazard) but also considers issues of equity, justice and freedom. In a risk management approach, where there is a lack of full scientific certainty, decisions may have to be guided by the precautionary principle using judgement, values and priorities. For each project or specific case there may be different levels at which action is triggered but the overall framework shown in figure 14 can still be helpful in determining possible courses of action. The process needs to be a participatory one, taking account of the views of as many different stakeholders as possible.

57. People often have different perceptions of risk.[174] Policy makers, the public and scientists may all have different views about what constitutes serious harm and what level of risk is acceptable. Scientists tend to focus on probabilities ('a severe drought is unlikely'). Policy makers and the public focus more on the magnitude of the impact ('a severe drought would be devastating'). Scientists can often be ill-informed about the concerns of the public while policy makers and other stakeholders might have poor information about the probability and magnitude of impacts.[175] Communication and exchange of information are vital if decision making is to reflect the needs of stakeholders and be based on the best scientific information available.


58. Mitigation seeks to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases and enhance carbon sinks.[176] It could bring several benefits not related to climate including:

  • reductions in health problems
  • reduction in environmental impacts
  • protection and preservation of natural resources (forests, soils, water)
  • reductions in subsidies to fossil fuels; and,
  • induced technological change.

59. Alternative development paths, with different levels and patterns of production and consumption, will result in different levels of greenhouse gas emissions;[177] a sustainable development path should reduce greenhouse gas emissions.[178] Successful policies on mitigation are likely to be compatible with economic development, for example by reducing the carbon-intensity of the economy. In 1996, China was the second largest emitter behind the US but managed to reverse the trend through a series of market reforms and liberalisations. Its emissions are now eight per cent below the 1996 emissions levels.[179] At the same time its economy grew by a third.[180] Developing countries are willing to take action on mitigation but only once developed countries have made and stuck to commitments to reduce emissions.[181]

60. Efforts to reduce greenhouse gases will have both an impact on and be affected by socioeconomic policies, especially those relating to development, sustainability and equity.[182] For the vulnerable populations, the closely related issues of mitigation and adaptation are of concern. A failure to mitigate could make adaptation impossible, such as, coping with a metre sea level rise in a densely populated coastal delta. In others, mitigation policy could exacerbate impacts on vulnerable livelihoods, for example, by increasing the cost of fertilisers or energy.

Access to energy

61. Energy is essential for social and economic development[183] and any development strategy must address the need for suitable, sustainable and affordable energy.[184] Many developing countries face an enormous challenge in bridging the energy gap; Andy Haines, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, told us that two billion people did not have access to adequate energy.[185] Tackling poverty, meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and ensuring sustainable development will require an increase in energy consumption. Energy consumption in developing countries is predicted to double over the next twenty years.[186] In the short-term, it is unlikely that an economic case can be made for switching from dirty fuels like coal and oil. Phasing out fossil fuels entirely may not be possible or desirable for many decades.[187] Most developing countries will remain dependent on fossil fuels as a major source of energy for decades to come because they are cheap and readily available.[188] But there can be some synergy between the goals of energy efficiency, greenhouse gas mitigation and energy security. The Intermediate Technology Development Group argued that because developing countries start from relatively low levels of energy consumption there was an opportunity for them to follow a cleaner energy technology path.[189] Substituting gas for coal and other high carbon sources will help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions while still meeting the demand for energy.[190] Gas can provide an environmentally and economically acceptable short-term solution as the renewable sources that will ultimately play a major part in providing energy for power and heat are developed.[191] We were encouraged to see in Nigeria that efforts were being made to reduce gas flaring by developing a domestic market for natural gas, tackling flaring and providing an alternative energy source. However, it was clear that more could be done to accelerate the process. Solutions for tackling climate change and bridging the energy gap should combine existing and new energy solutions to ensure the future is both economically and environmentally sustainable.[192]

62. Renewable energy, especially small-scale off-grid solutions, could reduce local, regional, and global environmental impacts as well as energy security risks (in some cases at a lower cost for consumers). For example, renewable energy technologies could be the lowest cost option for providing off-grid household and village-scale power in rural areas of developing countries.[193] We accept that fossil fuel use will continue to rise in developing countries as efforts are made to bridge the energy gap. However, each time the use of fossil fuels is considered as a source of energy, developing countries and donors should assess if a viable renewable alternative would ultimately be more sustainable or if there is a low-emission alternative. We believe that the Clean Development Mechanism has a crucial role to play in helping to make this transition and DFID should be promoting it within developing countries. We are conscious that dealing with individual projects is unlikely to bring about the large scale transformation needed in energy systems and some form of mechanism may be necessary to speed up the market transformation to cleaner energy sources.

63. Significant investment related to energy and power generation, mainly based on fossil fuels, is taking place in developing countries (see table 12). Little is focused on renewable energy or energy efficiency because they are thought to be associated with high costs and long payback periods.[194] Investing in more sustainable technologies could contribute towards sustainable development and reduced greenhouse gas emissions.[195] The Clean Development Mechanism, the Global Environment Facility and multilateral development banks have a significant role to play in helping to shift the focus of investment. The policies of developing countries must ensure that investments help to provide long-term sustainability, deliver emission reductions and encourage technology transfer. However, any policies to mitigate greenhouse gases in developing countries should not result in inequitable restrictions on access to fossil fuels as a source of energy.[196]

Table 12: Fossil fuel and renewable energy financing as at Sept 2001[197]
Fossil fuel financing, World Bank Group, since 1992
US$20.8 bn 
Estimated lifetime CO2 emissions from these projects
40.6 bn tons 
Worldwide CO2 emissions from consumption/flaring of fossil fuels, 1999:
22.3 bn tons 
No. of World Bank Group fossil fuel projects, since 1992
Renewable energy/energy efficiency financing, World Bank Group, since 1992
US$900 million
No. of World Bank Group renewable energy/energy efficiency projects, since 1992
Top three recipient countries of World Bank fossil fuel aid since 1992
India (US$3.196 bn)
China (US$2.914 bn)
Russia (US$2.89 bn)
Total megawatts, fossil fuel power plant generation capacity financed by World Bank since 1992
Total megawatts, existing solar power plant generation capacity worldwide, 2000:

64. Switching from high carbon fossil fuels to gas or even to renewable energy is only part of the answer in providing energy to the rural poor. The provision of alternative forms of energy needs to be done in parallel with policies to improve the sustainability of biomass (such as firewood, agricultural crops, energy crops, and other organic matter) as an energy source. Half the world depends on biomass fuels for domestic energy and more than two billion people use biomass for cooking. Making the use of biomass more sustainable will have a price. The International Energy Agency has estimated that it would cost about US$ 12 billion to encourage sixty per cent of biomass users to use energy more sustainably.[198] Set against this, however, policies to reduce greenhouse gases would bring substantial health benefits by tackling the high levels of indoor pollution associated with biomass, or reducing by vehicle emissions.[199] Donors should promote sustainable use of biomass energy (firewood and other organic matter used to produce energy) to ensure that access to energy is possible in as environmentally friendly and affordable a way as possible.[200] There should be a focus on local production in developing solutions especially in the development of simple measures such as improved stoves, briquetting of sawdust and other indigenous solutions.[201]

International negotiations on climate change


65. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed by more than 150 countries at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Its ultimate aim is the "¼stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.".[202] It established that:

  • climate change was a serious problem;
  • action could not wait upon the resolution of remaining scientific uncertainties;
  • developed countries should take the lead; and,
  • developed countries should compensate developing countries for additional costs incurred in taking measures under the Convention.

66. The UNFCCC requires that developed countries help vulnerable developing countries to meet the costs of adaptation, assist with technology transfer and support capacity building.[203] Developing countries are seeking an equitable framework for achieving the stabilisation of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. They need a clear indication of their current and future obligations based on their current and future emissions. They want to enhance their ability to combat and respond to climate change, particularly by developing adaptive capacity.[204]

67. The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted in 1997 and contained additional legally-binding commitments; countries agreed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to at least five per cent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. Although the Protocol has yet to come into force, it represents a small but important first step towards tackling climate change.[205] Developing countries have not taken on any specific emissions targets, but they do have other obligations under the UNFCCC and Kyoto.[206] While the EU and Japan have made progress in ratifying the Protocol, the US, Canada and Australia are reluctant to do so.[207] Although it is likely that enough countries will ratify the Protocol to see it enter into force, many believe that without the participation of the US the Protocol would be severely undermined. We hope that our colleagues in Congress will reconsider this issue. However, others feel that without the US the Protocol could actually be more effective as the 'price' of carbon would remain high (there would be more value in trading carbon emissions if the market was not flooded with all of the US emissions) making the various Kyoto mechanisms more attractive. While the US has now accepted that climate change is caused by human activity, they still show no sign of softening their position on the Kyoto Protocol. Australia takes a similar position to the US, believing that the Protocol would be damaging to its economy.

68. The Protocol made provision for some market-based mechanisms intended to lessen the potential economic impacts of emission-reduction requirements. These include Joint Implementation, the Clean Development Mechanism, and Emissions Trading. The International Institute for Environment and Development emphasised that the various market mechanisms must deliver sustainable development and address knowledge, technology and resource transfer.[208] Over the last two decades the focus has shifted from setting broad global targets, through a range of market-based approaches, like taxation and standards-based approaches, to stand-alone economic instruments. The success of any instrument will depend on:

  • the degree to which it addresses environmental and cost effectiveness;
  • its flexibility and scope for encouraging innovation;
  • its equity;
  • its openness; and,
  • its public and political acceptability.[209]


69. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), defined in article twelve of the Kyoto Protocol, allows developing countries either to start their own mitigation projects or develop such projects jointly with industrialised countries.[210] CDM is still new and the detailed provisions governing how it will work are still being worked out. The only CDM projects so far have been pilot projects. However, of the three mechanisms listed in paragraph 68 it is the one most likely to benefit developing countries; the ground rules for the other mechanisms are still to be established. CDM is intended to help developing countries achieve sustainable development while helping developed countries to reach emissions reduction targets.[211] It is a vehicle for the transfer of clean technology and a stimulus for private investment.[212]

70. Some of the detailed provisions for CDM that are still being worked out relate to funding for adaptation. One proposal is that two per cent of the project be set aside for funding adaptation, although it is unclear if these funds would fully fund projects or supplement other funding. It is unlikely that CDM is going to generate much funding for adaptation in the near future. IIED told us that the absence of the US from the Kyoto Protocol diminished the scope for CDM projects.[213] CDM projects are not likely to be evenly distributed; it is estimated that eighty per cent of projects will go to just a few countries (mainly India, China and Brazil).[214] With low emissions, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa have limited scope for reducing emissions, making it difficult to attract CDM projects. The same barriers that deter foreign direct investment (FDI) are also likely to deter CDM projects from developing countries.[215] Poorer countries are more likely to attract small scale projects rather than large scale investment. The transaction costs associated with CDM could be as high as tens of thousands of pounds and do not vary significantly with the size of projects. This may make small projects economically unviable within the CDM.[216] Conscious of this, the CDM Executive Board set up a panel in April 2002 to make recommendations on simplifying procedures for small-scale CDM. We welcome the fact that DFID has commissioned research looking at how CDM projects can contribute to poverty alleviation and examining the scope for simplified procedures for small-scale CDM projects.[217] We believe that fixed transaction costs will continue to make small scale CDM projects in developing countries economically unviable. Unless these costs can be reduced or some other provision made for small scale projects the majority of developing countries will see little benefit from CDM. The UK Government should be pressing for these matters to be addressed by the CDM as quickly as possible.

71. While the distribution of CDM projects might not matter from a global carbon perspective, as it does not matter where emissions reductions take place, it does matter from a sustainable development perspective. The CDM has an explicit objective to promote sustainable development and CDM investments should be supporting this objective. However, the UNFCCC gave the responsibility for ensuring that CDM investments met the sustainable development objective to host countries. Many developing countries lack the experience and capacity to ensure that this objective is met. Donors clearly have an interest in ensuring that each CDM project meets sustainable development criteria. They should ensure that host countries are able to assess and monitor this criteria.[218] The UK Government could also investigate the scope for building incentives or rewards into CDM so that the CDM can properly recognise the value of additional benefits beyond emissions reductions and climate protection.


72. Adrian Davis, DFID, explained that the basic raison d'etre for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was to provide funds to cover the additional costs of targeting environmental objectives through a development project or programme.[219] Around US$1.3bn of the US$3.4bn GEF has so far allocated has been allocated to climate change but by June 2001 disbursements totalled only US$386mn. GEF climate change projects are organised into four areas:

  • removing barriers to energy efficiency and energy conservation;
  • promoting renewable energy by removing barriers and reducing implementation costs;
  • reducing the costs of low greenhouse gas emitting energy technologies; and,
  • supporting the development of sustainable transport.[220]

73. The UNFCCC has often used the GEF as a mechanism to implement new agreements. Three new funds, to be administered by GEF, were established at Bonn (the fifth Conference of Parties, CoP-5) to provide assistance to developing countries. These were:

  • the Special Climate Change Fund: to assist developing countries with adaptation and technology transfer;
  • the Least Developed Countries Fund: to support the preparation and implementation of national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs); and,
  • the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund: to finance adaptation projects in developing countries that have become parties to the Kyoto Protocol.[221]

74. Neil Adger, Tyndall Centre, told us that at Marrakech (CoP-7) the GEF was given responsibility for another new fund, the Adaptation Fund.[222] Bilateral donor agencies and national governments are obviously the main players in terms of planning for the future and adaptation. But, with responsibility for so many different funds, GEF is well placed to coordinate much of the international activity and ensure information is shared.[223] It could ensure that knowledge gained from adaptation work carried out in developing countries was shared efficiently and effectively.[224]

75. GEF is the main source of funding for adaptation. Projects are funded in a three-stage process: Stage I for studies and planning only; Stage II for planning and capacity building; and, Stage III for further capacity building as well as actual implementation of adaptation measures. The International Institute for Environment and Development considered that this was a rather cumbersome process. Very few activities have been funded under Stage II and none have been funded under Stage III.[225]

76. Bilateral and multilateral donors should ensure guidelines and procedures are simple and straightforward so that the most vulnerable developing countries can access GEF funding easily for work on adaptation to climate change.[226] GEF must address the needs of developing countries including:

  • needs for adaptation;
  • needs for understanding adaptation processes; and,
  • needs to consider migration as a potentially sustainable adaptation strategy both locally and internationally.[227]

77. DFID estimated that the UK had provided around £215 million to GEF since its inception. Negotiations are currently under way for the 3rd replenishment of the GEF, to cover the period from 2002 to 2006. The UK has called for a fifty per cent increase in the funds available from US$2bn to US$3bn.[228] Adrian Davis, DFID, told us that the increase was to cover work arising from deteriorating global environmental trends and the new responsibilities GEF was being asked to take on.[229] Decisions on the replenishment were being delayed by the US and Japan, who together accounted for about forty per cent of the GEF. The US was two years, or US$220 million, in arrears on the GEF[230] and was unlikely to settle these arrears in a single payment. We support DFID's call for an increase in funding available to the GEF provided that first, any additional resources are new resources and other development activities were not jeopardised, and secondly, DFID worked to ensure that a clear allocation was made within GEF for funding work on adaptation beyond capacity building and preparation of NAPAs. During the replenishment discussions DFID should use its influence to ensure climate change is not lost among the myriad other GEF activities.[231]

78. The GEF is essentially an environmental fund, with rules appropriate to global environmental concerns; there must be global benefits from work it funds and that the funding it provides must be additional or incremental. However, while these rules are relatively easy to apply to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, they are difficult to translate to climate adaptation (or at least to adaptation for human livelihoods). The costs are often not incremental and it is difficult to distinguish at present between the long-term climate change risk and the present exposure to climatic variability. The GEF should be strongly encouraged to develop means to fund precautionary adaptation projects that reduce the impact of present climatic variations on the most vulnerable populations.[232]


A northern focus

79. Developed countries have contributed more to climate change while developing countries suffer the most from its consequences. Equity and social justice lie, therefore, at the heart of the climate change debate. But they have not often featured in what are northern-focused and environmentally-dominated negotiations. For example, negotiations have largely ignored adaptation, a prime concern of developing countries.[233] Benito Müller, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, told us that the international climate regime had focused almost exclusively on mitigation.[234] Negotiations had focused on reducing the burden of implementation on polluters[235] and market mechanisms intended to reduce emissions were geared towards northern consumers and were unlikely to deliver technologies that would directly benefit the poor.[236] Future negotiations could be jeopardised, unless notions of fairness and equity are adequately addressed.[237]

Negotiating capacity

80. Climate change does not attract the same levels of international attention as other policy issues. There is a marked imbalance between the international institutions dealing with trade and those dealing with the environment or sustainable development.[238] Similarly there is an imbalance in the negotiating capacity that developed and developing countries can bring to international negotiations. Benito Müller told us that at the Bonn Conference of Parties (CoP-5), where the negotiations had continued for three days without interruption, the US had 120 official delegates while India had seven, and some countries only one.[239] Developing countries often lack the capacity or resources to play a full part in international negotiations, even to the extent of having the resources or capacity to field a team able to cope with the demands of successive all-night negotiations. It is of little surprise then that the results emerging from such negotiations do not fully address the needs or concerns of developing countries. Pooling resources in larger groupings, such as the G77 and China bloc, could help but the internal politics of such groupings sometimes undermines their effectiveness. Some funding is available to help developing countries participate in international meetings. A trust fund was established by the UNFCCC to support the participation of representatives from developing countries, especially least developed countries, small island states and economies in transition. Additional funding and programme-specific budgets were made available to support participation in workshops and expert group meetings. This is all welcome but does little to address the huge imbalance in the negotiating and scientific capacity between north and south. We find the huge imbalance in the negotiation capacity between developed and developing countries alarming. The best way to bring about fairness and equity will be to ensure developing countries can shape and implement agreements effectively. Institutional capacities will have to be strengthened and negotiating capacity developed. DFID could make an important contribution towards helping developing countries play a more significant part in international negotiations, as it does for trade negotiations.[240]

81. It is not only a matter of capacity but also of priorities. The International Institute for Environment and Development told us that small island states were well organised and had formed the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). AOSIS has obtained legal and technical advice to help it in negotiations.[241] The least developed countries (LDCs) were less well organised in climate change negotiations than they were in other fora, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO).[242] LDCs need access to scientific and legal advice, either by boosting their own capacity or from independent sources.

Setting emissions targets fairly

82. Both atmospheric stabilisation of greenhouse gases and the entry of developing countries into the climate regime are likely to require a move to per capita emission targets.[243] David Crichton and the Corner House both suggested DFID should consider the 'contraction and convergence' model set out by the Global Commons Institute.[244] Contraction and convergence is based on per capita emissions and offers an opportunity to address issues of equity. With emissions shared on a per capita basis, developed and developing countries could trade surplus emissions rights.[245] Advocates of contraction and convergence point to its inherent equity and its ability to bring together developed and developing countries in a single framework. However, contraction and convergence recognises that emissions from developing countries will grow and does hold back their development in order to rectify damage caused by developed countries.[246]

83. Benito Müller proposed a global compromise set of quotas under which each country is given an allocation between their present use and a per capita entitlement. This would reduce the cost of lowering global emissions and still permit many developing countries to benefit from selling their surplus rights. Figure 15 clearly shows that per capita carbon emissions are many times higher in high income countries than in low income countries. But it also shows that high income countries are more carbon-efficient in producing wealth. While developed countries need to reduce the amount of carbon they produce per person, developing countries must become more efficient in their use of carbon. Developing countries have an opportunity to avoid making the mistakes developed countries made during the industrialisation of the North. They can follow a cleaner development path, becoming more efficient in their use of carbon as their economies grow, investing in energy efficiency and low carbon energy supplies.

84. UK policy on emissions reduction has focused on bringing the Kyoto Protocol into force. DFID recognised that the targets in the Protocol were probably inadequate but argued that the Protocol would provide a starting point from which to make further progress. DFID acknowledged that contraction and convergence models had an intuitive logic, but noted that their success depended on developed countries making significant cuts in emissions. There has been little evidence that developed countries are willing to do this. DFID stated that, without agreement to reduce emissions, contraction and convergence was "¼interesting but ¼little more than that".[247]

Figure 15: Carbon emissions on a) a per capita basis and b) per US$ of GDP. High income countries emit ten times the CO2 of low income countries. However, lower income countries are inefficient producing much more carbon per US$ GDP than the high income countries.[248]

85. There would appear to be a clear case for moving to per capita emissions levels. But, the main point is to set quotas that can be traded. Some element of the quota should be per capita, but this should be set at an existing baseline, like 1990, so that there is a disincentive to continue population growth (energy use can grow but the quota is already fixed). It will be more difficult to make targets based on notions of carbon-intensity or percentage energy efficiency work in practice and they may not deliver the intended benefits. In designing any scheme to share emissions rights or allocate emissions targets it is important to remember that the international community has a poor track record when it comes to dividing global commons, like oceans or the atmosphere, equitably.


86. Many see the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) as the last chance to push for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Though this would be an important milestone to celebrate, it would leave many concerns of developing countries unresolved. Climate change will not be a core agenda item at WSSD. Instead the focus is likely to be on other areas that have seen little progress. DEFRA said that WSSD was expected to focus on the gaps in implementing the Agenda 21 programme, with a focus on the implementation of sustainable development.[249] However, some groups have expressed concern that the international community should not assume climate change has been adequately dealt with. They would like to see WSSD at least give impetus to a review of the adequacy of the climate change convention.

87. WSSD is attempting (pushed by developing countries) to give social and economic issues a higher profile. Clare Short told the Environmental Audit Committee that she believed Johannesburg offered an opportunity to move away from the northern-dominated environmental agenda. She told us that the prize for Johannesburg was a "¼shift in the mind set, a guarantee of development for the poor with a commitment from all of us to work for a sustainable planet¼".[250]

88. The Environmental Audit Committee has reported on the UK Preparations for the World Summit on Sustainable Development and concluded: "We support the Government's decision to push issues such as poverty eradication and access to clean water as leading candidates for WSSD's agenda rather than issues such as climate change and biodiversity where frameworks of action have largely been agreed. However, WSSD does not start with a clean sheet and it is important that these elements of the Rio process are built upon and not forgotten in the WSSD discussions.".[251] Clare Short told us that any attempt to discuss the Kyoto Protocol at WSSD would be divisive and could result in some major players avoiding the conference.[252] We agree that discussion of the Protocol would be divisive and could jeopardise other important negotiations at the WSSD. We also agree with the Environmental Audit Committee that climate change should not be a major focus of WSSD. There is already a well established international process for dealing with climate change. At most, WSSD should seek a commitment to make the established process work more effectively and equitably. Substantive discussion should be left to a more appropriate forum.

Coping with climate disasters


89. A mix of social, political and economic measures are needed to help manage the risks posed by extreme climate changes. Post-disaster reconstruction offers an opportunity to rebuild infrastructure and systems in a different way, making them more resilient. There are opportunities to change agricultural practice, land use planning, and building codes. Table 13 lists several adaptive strategies that have been used in the past to moderate the effect of natural disasters (although they are not always adequately or fully applied, and so their effectiveness is limited).

Table 13: Adaptive strategies to limit the impact of natural disasters[253]
changes in land use and natural resource planning and management, land use restrictions;
changes in building codes and standards including improved design criteria for roads, bridges, dams, water supplies, sewers. Changes in safety and fire codes for buildings;
the development of systems for risk assessment, risk management and emergency management;
the strengthening of management and institutional preparedness as well as strengthening institutional and legal frameworks for local disaster-preparedness organisations including NGOs;
linking local, national and regional initiatives and disaster preparedness structures;
the provision of training and educational opportunities especially in relief management. Better understanding and training for self sufficiency and helping to initiate self help activities.
the development of post disaster recovery and support systems;
reconfiguring, strengthening and developing emergency services with the development of new responsibilities in relation to disaster planning and management;
strategies for continuation of government and business operations and survival and functioning of critical public services;
public health policies that address disaster planning and preparedness;
systems for insurance;
improving prediction and forecasting including development of warning systems that can work at a local or village level (such as radio based systems);
supporting community-based projects and strengthening local structures;
systems for emergency management including education, training and public awareness;
strengthening public infrastructure (such as dams, dykes, flood channels, communication networks);


90. External emergency relief assistance often creates parallel structures to local initiatives. Often, as a result, local community structures are left weaker and more vulnerable than before. We recognise that there is a balance to be struck in delivering emergency relief quickly and working through local organisations who may be hampered by a lack of capacity. But, relief operations should seek to leave a country better able to cope, having improved local capacity and institutions rather than simply patching up problems and moving on.


91. Disaster mitigation and preparedness (DMP) could be effective in reducing loss of life and livelihoods.[254] Stressing the importance of DMP, Clare Short said "¼you have floods in the southern United States of America and a few people lose their cars; you have them in Mozambique—it used to be Bangladesh but Bangladesh has learned—thousands of people lose their lives. Part of dealing with catastrophes is to be prepared and organised to deal with them.".[255] A well functioning early-warning system can be one of the most effective measures for saving lives. In 1971, a cyclone in Bangladesh cost 300,000 lives. A similar storm in 1991 killed about 100,000 and in 1998 in another comparable event only about 100 died.[256] But early warning systems can only help to save lives if adequate provision is made for shelter and evacuation. They can do little to prevent economic loss and destruction of livelihoods.

92. Many witnesses stressed the need for DMP work to be properly funded. Ian Davis, Cranfield Disaster Management Centre, noted that while donors often generously funded relief work, longer-term reconstruction and rehabilitation was starved of resources.[257] In their memorandum, Tearfund said that the cost of investing in disaster mitigation and preparedness was lower than the cost of post-disaster relief and reconstruction. But despite the case for investment, donors see DMP as a low priority. Tearfund argued that if international development targets were to be met disaster mitigation and preparedness had to be given a higher priority and more funding. It is unclear why DMP is starved of resources while relief work is well funded, but it may be related to the fact that the cost of DMP work is often borne by developing countries while relief and reconstruction is funded by donors and aid agencies.

93. Disaster mitigation needs to be put on a more formal footing within many countries. Developing countries have seen DMP as a low priority[258] and often it is not reflected in national plans and strategies.[259] It should be integrated within existing structures and become part of the normal political and development process.[260] Coordinating activity under the umbrella of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) could provide a focus for increasing and improving disaster mitigation and preparedness work within a country.[261] A lack of capacity and resources in developing countries has hampered DMP[262] where even low-cost interventions have not been implemented largely because of a lack of knowledge and awareness. Many represent 'no-regrets' options as even in the absence of climate change, improving disaster mitigation and preparedness has the potential to deliver significant economic and social benefits.[263]

94. Ian Davis, Cranfield Disaster Management Centre, advocated the involvement of local communities and devolution of control for some DMP activities.[264] Much of the detailed planning and policy making on disaster mitigation and preparedness needs to happen at a local or community level. There is a difficulty, however, in that much of the information on climate change impact exists only at a global or national level. Activity at national and local levels needs to be coordinated with the involvement of public and private organisations and other stakeholders. Capacity for addressing DMP is often better at a local government level. At a local level people need to be encouraged to participate in coordinating meetings and committees. It is vital that at a local level there is a focus on the need for families to have some minimum level of self-sufficiency.[265]

127  Huq et al, 2002, IIED Opinion: Climate Change and Sustainable Development Beyond Kyoto Back

128  Q49 Back

129  IPCC 2001, Third Assessment Report, Synthesis Report-Summary for Policy Makers Back

130  Q61 Back

131  Ev 61 Back

132  Report of IPCC Working Group II: Summary for Policy Makers, 2001 Back

133  Klein, R, 2001: Adaptation to Climate Change in German Official Development Assistance-An inventory of activities and opportunities, with a special focus on Africa, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Zusammenarbeit, Eschborn, Germany. Back

134  Report of IPCC Working Group II: Summary for Policy Makers, 2001 Back

135  Klein, R, 2001: Adaptation to Climate Change in German Official Development Assistance-An inventory of activities and opportunities, with a special focus on Africa, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Zusammenarbeit, Eschborn, Germany. Back

136   Klein, R, 2001: Adaptation to Climate Change in German Official Development Assistance An inventory of activities and opportunities, with a special focus on Africa, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Zusammenarbeit, Eschborn, Germany. Back

137  Ev 67 [para 1] Back

138  Ev 60-61 Back

139  Report of IPCC Working Group II: Summary for Policy Makers, 2001and Ev 71 [para 13] Back

140  Ev 62 Back

141  Ev 60 Back

142  Ev 61 Back

143  Financing Climate Change: Providing Public Goods, preventing public bads, Dr Peter Newell, Institute of Development Studies (IDS). An abridged version of this paper appears in Financing and Providing Global Public Goods: Expectations and Prospects, prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden by IDS. Back

144  Ev 71 [para 10] Back

145  Ev 61 and Ev 71 [para 14] Back

146  Ev 70 [para 6] and Ev 71 [para 14] Back

147  Q5 Back

148  Ev 129 Back

149  World Disasters Report 1999 Back

150  Ev 61 Back

151  Ibid. Back

152  Ev 61 Back

153  Q88 Back

154  Q25 Back

155  Jackie Jones, 2000, A study of UK Government Policy and responsibility towards environmental refugees from developed countries displaced by the adverse impacts of climate change. This paper was a dissertation submitted as part of a MSc in Rural Resources and Environment Policy. A copy has been placed in the House of Commons Library. Back

156  Ev 131 Back

157  Q127 Back

158  Ev 70 [para 4] and Ev 71 [para 9] Back

159  Food in the 21st Century: Global Climate Disparities, Mahendra Shah, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Back

160  Ev 67 [para 2] Back

161  FAO, 1997, Agriculture and climate change: FAO's role See Back

162  Ev 62 Back

163  Ev 61 Back

164  Q105 Back

165  Q62 Back

166  Q63 Back

167  Q77 Back

168  Q61 Back

169  See figure 1, Ev 80 Back

170  Q111 Back

171  Ibid. Back

172  Bruce, Burton and Egener,1999, Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness in a changing climate; A synthesis paper produced for emergency Preparedness Canada, Environment Canada and the Insurance Bureau of Canada. ( Back

173  Based on diagram in C. Preyssl, R. Atkins and T. Deak, 1999, Risk Management at ESA (European Space Agency) Back

174  OECD 2001, Identify risk, PUMA/MPM (2001)2  Back

175  Seminar on Health Policy-The Precautionary Principle: Meaning and Utility, 30 January 2002, Back

176  A sink is a reservoir that can take up and store a chemical element or compound from some part of its natural cycle. For example, soil and trees tend to act as natural sinks for carbon.  Back

177  Report of IPCC Working Group III: Summary for Policy Makers, 2001 Back

178  Ibid. Back

179  Q80 and Q81 Back

180  Q155 and Back

181  Q87 Back

182  Report of IPCC Working Group III: Summary for Policy Makers, 2001 Back

183  Ev 144 [para 5] Back

184  Ev 145 [para 18] Back

185  Q44 Back

186  G8 Renewable Energy Taskforce, Final Report, July 2001. See Back

187  Ev 146 [para 2.7] Back

188  Ev 139 Back

189  Ev 144 [para 5] Back

190  Ev 145 [para 1.2] Back

191  Ev 147 [para 2.8] Back

192  UNEP, 2001, UNEP Finance Initiatives Climate Change Working Group Position Paper.  Back

193  G8 Renewable Energy Taskforce, Final Report, July 2001. See Back

194  Linkages between climate change and sustainable development, Beg et al, 2001 (submitted to Climate Policy in October 2001 revised December 2001) Back

195  Ev 146 [para 2.2] Back

196  Ev 139 Back

197   The Sustainable Energy and Economy Network, see Back

198  Ev 144 [paras 11-14] Back

199  Ev 50 [para 4] Back

200  Ev 130 [para 5.4] Back

201  Ev 144 [para 15] Back

202  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 2 (See Back

203  Ev 13 [para 4.2] Back

204  Huq et al, 2002, IIED Opinion: Climate Change and Sustainable Development Beyond Kyoto Back

205  UNEP, 2001, UNEP Finance Initiatives Climate Change Working Group Position Paper.  Back

206  Ev 13 [para 4.5] Back

207  The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology has produced two papers on implementing and ratifying the Kyoto Protocol that will provide greater detail on the mechanisms in the Protocol and the ratification process. Post Note Number 147 October 2000 and Post Note Number 176, April 2002. Back

208  Ev 73 [para 22] Back

209  Financing Climate Change: Providing Public Goods, preventing public bads, Dr Peter Newell, Institute of Development Studies (IDS). An abridged version of this paper appears in Financing and Providing Global Public Goods: Expectations and Prospects, prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden by IDS. Back

210  Ev 139 Back

211  Ev 14 [para 4.7] Back

212  Ev 73 [para 22] Back

213  Ev 73 [para 22] Back

214  Ev 14 [para 4.9] Back

215  Ibid. Back

216  Ev 15 [para 4.10] Back

217  Ev 37 Back

218  Ev 73 [para 24] Back

219  Q37 and Ev 6 [para 31] Back

220  Ev 6 [para 31] Back

221  Ev 13 [para 4.3] Back

222  Q72 Back

223  Ibid. Back

224  Ev 72 [para 21] Back

225  Ev 72 Back

226  Ev 72 [para 21] Back

227  Q72 Back

228  Ev 6 [para 32] Back

229  Q36 Back

230  Ibid. Back

231  Q72 Back

232  Downing and Klein, Towards an International Funding Strategy for Climate Adaptation: A Contribution from Adaptation Science. A Background Paper to the Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel of the Global Environment Facility. Nairobi: STAP/GEF. Back

233  UNEP, 2001, UNEP Finance Initiatives Climate Change Working Group Position Paper.  Back

234  Q90 Back

235  Huq et al, 2002, IIED Opinion: Climate Change and Sustainable Development Beyond Kyoto Back

236  Ev 145 [para 18] Back

237  Linkages between climate change and sustainable development, Beg et al, 2001 (submitted to Climate Policy in October 2001 revised December 2001) Back

238  Huq et al, 2002, IIED Opinion: Climate Change and Sustainable Development Beyond Kyoto Back

239  Q91 Back

240  Ev 70 [para 5] Back

241  See Back

242  Ev 71 [para 10] Back

243  Huq et al, 2002, IIED Opinion: Climate Change and Sustainable Development Beyond Kyoto Back

244  Ev 138 and Ev 151 Back

245  The Corner House, 1997, Climate and Equity, After Kyoto Back

246  Ev 125 [paras 31-32] Back

247  Ibid. Back

248  Source: World Bank Development Indicators Back

249  Ev 15 [para 5.4] Back

250  Q150 Back

251  Third Report from the Environmental Audit Committee, Session 2001-2002, UK Preparations for the World Summit on Sustainable Development, HC616 Back

252  Q155 Back

253   Bruce, Burton and Egener,1999, Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness in a changing climate; A synthesis paper produced for emergency Preparedness Canada, Environment Canada and the Insurance Bureau of Canada. ( Back

254  Ev 83 Back

255  Q152 Back

256  Q17 Back

257  Q101 Back

258  Ev 83 Back

259  Q113 Back

260  Q124 Back

261  Bruce, Burton and Egener,1999, Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness in a changing climate; A synthesis paper produced for emergency Preparedness Canada, Environment Canada and the Insurance Bureau of Canada. ( Back

262  Ev 83 Back

263  Bruce, Burton and Egener,1999, Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness in a changing climate; A synthesis paper produced for emergency Preparedness Canada, Environment Canada and the Insurance Bureau of Canada. ( Back

264  Q119 Back

265  Bruce, Burton and Egener,1999, Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness in a changing climate; A synthesis paper produced for emergency Preparedness Canada, Environment Canada and the Insurance Bureau of Canada. ( Back

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