Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1
- 19)
TUESDAY 26 FEBRUARY 2002
MR OLIVER
BURCH, MR
NICK ROSEVEARE,
MR SAKANDAR
ALI AND
MS ELIZABETH
WINTER
Chairman
1. Thank you very much for coming and giving
evidence again. The purpose of this session is, as you know, we
did only last year an inquiry into our humanitarian relief into
Afghanistan. We published our report. The government has just
published their response to our report where broadly I think they
agree with most of the points we make. There is only one issue
on which they disagree with us. We secured a debate in Westminster
Hall on Thursday to debate our report and the government's response
and we wanted to try and ensure that we were as up to date as
possible with what was happening in Afghanistan. One of the frustrations
last year was it was sometimes quite difficult knowing just exactly
what was happening on the ground. Thank you very much, as NGOs.
We are very conscious that we said in our report that much of
the secondary distribution of humanitarian relief is entirely
dependent upon NGOs so we would like to ask you for your impressions.
Elizabeth, I think you might like to say something on behalf of
witnesses collectively?
(Ms Winter) We are very grateful to have
the opportunity to come and talk to you and we would like to congratulate
you on the report, for the grasp of the main issues and the dilemmas
that aid agencies face. We thought you did a good job. We remain
very grateful for the government's support and we concur with
the view that DFID and CHAD are in the forefront of donors. We
think you got that right as well. We endorse their policy of taking
a regional approach to the situation which we understand the EC
is taking as well, which is a good thing. We confirm that a long
term commitment to Afghanistan is essential and we welcome the
Committee's intention to return to it—we thought that was
a very hopeful sign—and your recommendation that the United
Kingdom government reaches the 0.7 per cent target for overseas
development assistance and looks more closely at conflict prevention
and the identification of failing states. We thought that was
a good recommendation too. We commend the views expressed that
the legitimate foreign policy objectives of donor nations should
not impinge on humanitarian actions and that poverty and injustice
need to be tackled if terrorism is to be ended. We agree with
the priorities as outlined which include of course security, health,
potable water, education, particularly secondary education for
girls, and the importance of demobilisation and providing alternative
livelihoods. We also think it is important of course to help re-establish
the role of women in Afghan society and in the economy in real
ways. Above all, what we endorse is the statements about the importance
of the Afghans in ensuring that the aid programmes have been continued
so far and the great contribution that they made; and that the
reconstruction process must be Afghan led. Afghans, as you know,
have retained a deep sense of identity and are ready to rebuild
their country. NGOs are ready to assist them as well as to work
with the interim and transitional authorities in the process.
We look to the government to continue their support for this and
we are happy to answer any questions that you may have for us.
2. Thank you for your kind comments about our
report. Throughout our report, a word which frequently came up
was security. The reports from Kabul where at least there are
some United Kingdom troops as an international peace keeping force—even
from Kabul, the suggestions on security are pretty depressing,
suggestions that police are not being paid, that the army is not
being demobilised. What are your impressions of what is happening
on the ground in terms of security? Sakandar, I think you have
just come back. Maybe you would like to lead on this?
(Mr Ali) I was in Kabul about three weeks ago and
last week I was in Kandahar. Security recently has thrown us off
ground because in the last ten days or so the events that have
happened have surprised us. There is a general feeling that security
may be a focus in that some deterioration may be happening. In
my personal experience and the staff that are there when I was
in Kabul, I did not feel that. As an aid organisation operating
in Kabul, at the time that we were there, security seemed fine.
However, I have had reports as recent as 19 February from our
office in Kabul where international aid workers are being targeted
in some pockets north of Kabul. That is an interesting phenomenon
because it did not happen before. During the conflict, yes, there
was insecurity but for the most part insecurity related to the
bigger issue of safe delivery of convoys etc., but no individual
targeting of aid workers. Since this has happened, it makes one
think what is the reason for it. Why is it suddenly happening
now? Other than that, the general perception—if you wish,
I can talk to you about the south also. I spent a few days in
Kandahar and the main reason for that is we have closed down our
quieter operations and moved back to Kandahar and security was
one of the assessments that we had to make. Kandahar seems stable.
There is visible presence however of troops, American marines,
on the streets as a deterrent and even the drive from the Chaman
border to Kandahar you can see the armoured vehicles of American
marines. We had a coordination meeting with the international
NGOs including some of the UN agencies where security was one
point of discussion and generally people felt that we are not
experts to make a security opinion, but the feeling was that we
felt safe in Kandahar at the time that we were there last week.
There was plenty of activity on the street, music in the restaurants.
You could discuss with people, so there was not the tension that
we used to feel before. Most people said they felt safe enough
to start moving back and reopen offices. That is the same situation,
in my view, in Kabul but these events that have happened do concern
us. Why suddenly has the UNICEF aid worker been targeted? Why
suddenly is there a focus on targeting international aid workers,
albeit here and there? It is not like a policy but there is an
incident that has happened which is unusual. I hope that it remains
just an unusual incident. Otherwise, the general sense of security
is okay. I can tell you the latest security reports in terms of
the highways. The highway from Turkham to Kabul is still deemed
safe. The highway from Kabul to Mazar is deemed safe. The highway
even from Kabul to Kandahar is deemed safe, although we need to
take precautions when passing through Ghazni and the areas in
the east like Paktya etc. In conclusion, I am hoping that these
were isolated incidents and I still question why it should happen
at this time.
3. One of the suggestions in the press reports
over the weekend is that the international community, the donor
community, promised a lot to Afghanistan and the Afghans have
seen very little, if any, of that come through on the ground other
than food aid and that is causing some frustration. Is that a
fair assessment?
(Ms Winter) There has been some problem with that.
The money did not arrive so that the central authority was not
able to pay people and get some quick impact things going. The
money is now arriving. The British government's money was amongst
the first to arrive so that may improve but there is a lack of
credibility for the central authority. There are jokes being made
about it in Kabul now. Yes, there is concern. The aid agencies
are trying to get quick impact projects on the go as fast as possible
so that there is some dividend for having had the changes that
have taken place.
(Mr Roseveare) I would add a complementary perspective
to what Sakandar Ali has just been explaining. Whilst the major
routes for transportation and some of the major centres of population
are apparently secure and one feels relatively safe in those centres,
the delivery of operations and food assistance to remote locations
is much less certain. It would be wrong to say that the rule is
the rule of the gun, but it is also true that there is no central
law and order maintenance capacity. If that does not exist as
a central force then that, by definition, means that it exists
as local forces. There is plenty of evidence that local forces,
as Elizabeth Winter has just articulated, do not have a sense
necessarily of looking to the centre for their lead. That is a
cause for concern. We are able in some locations in northern Kandahar
to do what is essential in terms of delivering within the last
couple of weeks 350 tonnes of food to a community that needs thousands
of tonnes of food. The 350 is the first they have had since 1
November. We are able to do the essential but the level of uncertainty
about how security will be practically maintained and how reliable
it is does make it difficult to invest in more elaborate responses
than delivering the essential. Of course, the essential in many
areas has not been able to be delivered for quite some time. Also
in parts of Badghis we have been able to make deliveries of several
thousands of tonnes of food to people who are again catching up.
This represents their five month ration from November all the
way through to March. It does not represent a very sophisticated
action; it represents the bare necessity of what those people
require, which is finally possible to deliver to them. Where one
is describing security, whether it is in Kabul or in urban centres
of population or on main roads or small feeder roads or rather
more remote locations that are under more localised control of
commanders, is important as one assesses overall security in the
country.
(Mr Burch) I could try and give you a snapshot of
the far west, the area around Herat. I came back from there about
three weeks ago. Christian Aid works there with local partners
and I was able to visit Herat province, Ghor and Badghis. The
last two, I think you know, have been very much an area of concern
for humanitarian reasons during the winter. Essentially, Kabul
seems a very long way away from these rural areas. There is very
little experience of central government amongst the local population
and not much expectation. In some senses, the security was better
than it was last summer for example when there was an active civil
war ongoing in those places between the Northern Alliance and
the rather beleaguered Taliban garrisons of district centres.
That has stopped but it is very interesting to see who the local
power brokers now are. We have a mixture of tribal leaders, some
of whom are quite wise and mature. We have known them from before.
There is every reason to think they will make good local administrators;
but there are also commanders who have worked with the Taliban
before, people who have undoubted criminal records, people who
have been known to interfere with aid distribution before. It
is a very mixed bag. In practice for local people they have to
relate to the gentlemen in their valley or the next valley who
can command 50 or 100 rifles. This is still the situation. It
is obviously a matter for concern. There appears to have been
no disarmament. Armed groups in the countryside are as prevalent
as ever. There seems to be in general increased intertribal tension.
This is something new. Whereas in some of these provinces—Ghor,
for example, which is almost 100 per cent ethnically Tadjik—no
big problem. In Badghis, where there are pockets of Pashtuns,
it seems there there is a mood to settle scores now, to pay off
these people who have been perceived as supporting the Taliban
before. There are certain districts in Badghis where incidents
are occurring because of that and there is rather disturbing evidence
just recently of some dislocation from parts of Badghis of Pashtuns
who are showing up near Chaman in Pakistan and it is not clear
exactly why they have moved but it would seem likely that it is
intertribal tension that has caused this. In addition, if you
look at the bigger picture of the west, this is an area which
is not exactly clearly loyal to Kabul. Ghor province is. The main
commander of the area, Ismail Khan, who certainly controls Herat,
most of Farah and most of Badghis, has a very ambivalent position,
which is worrying. Also the attitude of Iran, the neighbouring
state, and its direct relations to Ismail Khan cause concern to
people locally and to the international community. There are a
number of reasons for thinking this is not a very stable situation.
Hugh Bayley
4. I want to know what can be done to improve
the security situation. How effective are the foreign military
soldiers, the British soldiers in Kabul and the Americans in Kandahar?
Are they helping or hindering? Would more soldiers from outside
help or hinder the process and is there any evidence of security
in parts of the country improving to allow refugees or internally
displaced people to return home? If not, what more could be done
on that front?
(Ms Winter) It is worth reporting back to you what
every single Afghan has ever said to any of us—I checked
this with my colleagues before coming in—which is, "Please
bring in more forces because without security and stability we
cannot rebuild our country." The economy improved 25 per
cent in the six months when there were no hostilities in 1995.
Entrepreneurs are waiting to come back in. They ring you up and
say, "We want to invest. As long as the security is okay,
we are ready to get this country back on its feet", but we
do need more forces and not just in Kabul. We need them elsewhere.
(Mr Ali) It is important from my perspective to view
security in how it affects aid assistance. I am not necessarily
going to analyse it from a political angle but how it affects
aid assistance. There are indicators that we must have to assess
security or lack of it and what are the reasons for it. Firstly,
looking at the country as a whole, we have to remember that time
is a big factor. The forces have just come in. The interim government
is organising itself and due to a lack of communication, a lack
of phones, a lack of infrastructure, it does take time to disseminate
orders. I will give you an example of that. Back in December,
myself and one of our colleagues, Dr Hannay, travelled to Kandahar
and when we crossed the Chaman border the people, who were not
organised, but people with Kalashnikovs, responsible for giving
you a stamp, despite the fact that we had a visa from the embassy
in Britain, charged us $200 each to give us an entry stamp. When
I went again, that was not the case—i.e. that set-up was
dismantled. There is a proper building and people who ask you
questions and interview you and even speak to you in English.
The key question here is at that time, when we showed them the
visa, they said, "We do not recognise this visa." Now,
the same visa is recognised so it is an indicator that all the
time orders do disseminate and there is a recognition of some
kind of a central authority. The same at Bukhum border. The first
time we crossed after the conflict, it was a shambles. People
with Kalashnikovs, nothing organised. This time round when we
went, it was organised. People actually ask you questions and
they have English speaking people who are dressed very well. These
may seem petty issues but there is an effort being made to create
a sense of normality at the border posts, which is an indicator
to me that, given the time, there is an effort at the central
level to try and disseminate orders. Yes, there are pockets around
Afghanistan which will remain a cause for concern. One of the
main reasons for that is there is a lack of infrastructure to
consolidate these pockets into a central set-up. There are pockets
which have been isolated and they have been isolated for many
years. Security has always been a problem in these pockets and
will continue to be so, even now. These are issues that we need
to bear in mind. Other security areas which are visible are where
there is community fighting, like Ghozni. There are disputes within
the community and there are often shoot-outs within the community.
The media is well informed of that. These are causes of concern
that we have to bear in mind. To answer your question, what can
be done to improve security, an effort needs to be made to strengthen
the central government. More troops are required because when
there is no infrastructure it is difficult to reach with less
people. If there were more troops, they cold be in different places
and therefore create a sense of security. In Kandahar, there is
a heavy presence of military. It seems like Bosnia. When you drive
down the highway, you see these big, armoured vehicles. I was
glad to see it because, one, it creates a secure feeling for me
and, two, I know it is a deterrent. If you drive two hours into
the desert towards Helmand from Kandahar, for example, it is an
open desert. You do not see armoured vehicles and anything could
happen. That is an area known for bandits. If there was infrastructure
to ensure that there is a reinforcement, that is one practical
thing that would improve security, whether it is communication,
road links or strengthening the government with additional troops.
Infrastructure of that kind is a key element.
Mr Khabra
5. Would you consider that in order to make
sure that there is security in the country it is important that
there should be a national army? All these different groups hold
modern weapons and they want to keep their position because of
insecurity in their own community. It is important for them that
the process should be started to pursue all these different groups.
They are prepared to disarm and whatever their military capacity
is the people, those who are fully armed and trained, they can
be concentrated to become members of the national army. They are
integrated into the national army because otherwise the government
will always remain weak. It will not be able to do anything about
the security situation at all. If there is no security, nothing
will happen at all. Therefore, there is a need to have a national
army. All these different groups will disarm themselves and become
part of the national army.
(Mr Burch) It is important that our expectations here
should be realistic. This is going to take a long time. I agree
with you that a national army should be the goal. If we get into
the business of trying to provide security everywhere with international
troops, the Bosnian experience did teach us—and this is
a much smaller country than Afghanistan—that the necessity
would be for something like 80,000 troops and a commitment that
might be for five or ten years. In Bosnia, they are still not
extracted. It is the case today that ISAF is not relevant in most
of the country. It is relevant to certain issues in Kabul and
a little beyond. If military aid to Afghanistan would be useful,
it would be to create a national security force as soon as possible.
Possibly some efforts by UN diplomats should go towards in the
interim mediating between local power brokers to make sure that
they support that effort. I am not sure, with the commitment which
exists now, that much more can be done on that.
Ann Clwyd
6. I do not know whether the military action
is still continuing. I see the odd report that there has been
more bombing and that there has been some activity in some remote
area. Is it your understanding that the military action is still
continuing?
(Mr Burch) In the west, it has more or less finished,
I am glad to say.
(Mr Roseveare) It is interesting to read and it is
simply what one picks up in the media, which the Committee does
also, that some of the military action has been used in a way
which is intended to help to consolidate the position of the government
by acting against local or regional dissent. That is a development
of interest although the main operations against Al Qaeda forces
appears to be virtually over; although I am sure that there are
still small operations that continue in locations.
(Mr Ali) There is a general sense that the military
action is over. There may be isolated operations which we are
not aware of but within the country and from the NGOs, when we
sit at the coordination meetings, military action is not an issue
any more. It is more logistical security and travel from point
A to point B. Interestingly enough, PIA has started flying its
normal route again. For the last few months, it would take an
extra hour and a half because it would divert. That is a sign
for us that it can now fly normally, so there is no threat from
the ground in that sense.
7. We read horror stories about people in remote
areas having to eat grass because they cannot get any food, about
people in camps within Afghanistan who are still under-provided
for and about refugees still leaving the country and going elsewhere.
What is your perception of those things?
(Mr Burch) A mixed picture, but we are certainly much
more optimistic than the last time we gave evidence here. In the
western area, we were lucky for certain reasons. One was the fairly
rapid conclusion of hostilities in the west. The winter came very
late in January so some of these key passes did remain open until
then. Now, the snow is there and there are all kinds of problems
in travelling. There are facilities in place to try and keep the
passes clear. The World Food Programme and the local partners
have we think done a pretty creditable job in pre-positioning
food in a lot of the areas which people were concerned about,
the mountainous areas. Whereas there are criticisms that can be
made about secondary distribution in certain districts, there
are problems with secondary distribution here and there, in general,
the picture is reasonably good. We do not think that we face a
widespread, immediate famine. Another reason for optimism is that
there has been a lot of rain in the last few weeks. It is raining
now, I understand. In the west, there has been about three weeks
of precipitation, rain on the low ground and snow on the high
ground. That is what they get in a normal winter, so there is
some reason to hope now that we may be seeing the end of the drought.
There are other problems that may lead to a lack of full food
security for another season or so. There is a lack of suitable
planting seed at the moment for spring planting and in some cases
NGOs have had to go with second best. Come harvest time in July
and August, we will see how successful that is. There have been
some problems with coordination of some of the newer NGOs who
have arrived on the scene with new money about what they should
do, where the appropriate places are to deliver aid.
8. Who is responsible for that coordination
of NGOs?
(Mr Burch) Various actors on different themes but
the World Food Programme for coordinating food distribution and
UNOCHA, the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian
Activity, overall. This is not too surprising. There are a lot
of new actors on the scene with new money who do not have experience
in Afghanistan, do not have an infrastructure of offices, and
they have to settle down. There are problems but they are being
addressed. On the issue of IDP camps, this is a very interesting
situation because you are right. There have been some real horror
stories in the press earlier this year, particularly about one,
Mazlakh Camp, outside Herat. A very interesting thing has been
done in Mazlakh over the last ten days. For a long time, agencies
who worked in the area considered that the Mazlakh Camp was almost
out of control in that the true numbers of inhabitants were not
known. Registration had not been accurately done and this had
been the case for more than a year. In the time of the Taliban,
the reality was that it was very difficult to force a recount
because the Taliban authorities did not want to cooperate and
the relationship was so delicate with them that nobody wanted
to push it. The International Organisation of Migration, backed
up by UNHCR, has now completed a successful registration of Mazlakh
Camp. A camp that was supposed to hold 325,000 inhabitants turns
out to have 114,000 inhabitants. The key fact behind this is that
the 90 tonnes of food that were being delivered per day by World
Food Programme will now go down to 40 tonnes. In other words,
you have a situation where there were double and treble registrations,
probably local, domestic people who have managed to get themselves
registered and an over supply of food and other materials into
this situation. That we are certain acted as a magnet to draw
people out of their homes in some of the rural communities as
well. This has now been proved. It is something a lot of us suspected
for a long time and it is why we were always emphasising that
the key thing was to support people at home and keep people at
home. I hope now that Mazlakh is properly registered and the right
amount of food and other materials are delivered, it will no longer
be a magnet. IOM plan to get on this spring and early summer with
returns of IDPs and returning refugees from abroad to their home
communities, and that is what we want to focus on next.
Mr Robathan
9. In the autumn we were told that Afghanistan
faced a dire humanitarian crisis. What you are saying is that
the system worked with the World Food Programme. Do you think
people have been dying in large numbers from starvation or has
the food issue been working this winter and therefore the catastrophe
did not take place?
(Mr Roseveare) There is no doubt that the hostilities
that took place inhibited the delivery of humanitarian relief.
The winter, although later than expected and perhaps there were
some weeks of leeway there that had not been expected, has made
the delivery of humanitarian assistance to some areas extremely
difficult. There is no doubt that many thousands of people in
remote areas who have not received the food entitlement that they
had expected in November or any month since then have had to resort
to eating boiled grasses, chewing on roots from the ground and
so forth. We were pressed very hard to predict, at the time when
some of us were calling for a humanitarian pause, the number of
people who would die if it did not happen. The response to that
now and the response to the question now is still the same, which
was that our concern was about suffering and about levels of death.
There was insufficient means of collecting hard and specific data
on rates of mortality and morbidity across the country because
of the infrastructure problems, security problems and access problems
that in many places continue. The levels of suffering that people
have had to endure have been appalling and unacceptable, but there
is not specific evidence either to support or to destroy the fact
that there will have been deaths of weak and vulnerable people,
pregnant and lactating mothers, young children—
10. I am not doubting that but have people been
dying in large numbers or significant numbers from starvation,
in your experience?
(Mr Ali) Since autumn, one of the key things that
has happened, perhaps as a result of this Committee, is the swift
response by the international community to stop a potential disaster
from reaching its peak. Areas like Daykondi, Uruzgan, areas that
in the winter would suffer, the cut off areas in the central highlands;
the pressure that was put on the aid agencies including the World
Food Programme and delivery and the NGOs was such that it made
them respond swiftly and target those areas that were highlighted.
For example, Kizran and Adjistan. These are two areas in the Uruzgan
district where at considerable risk to the Afghan local staff—I
think they have done a gallant job—they managed to ensure
that food reaches Kizran and Adjistan which were some of the most
affected areas in the central highlands, near Daykondi, which
was one of the places we highlighted. I can give you an example
of our own staff, the Afghans. When they were delivering to Kizran,
they were beaten; their vehicles were snatched from them and they
were even accused of being spies because they were writing reports
in English. Despite that, they managed to ensure that hundreds
of tonnes of much needed food did go there and to avert what potentially
could have been a disaster if they did not take that risk. It
was a time where the local people—again, I must stress that
when I had given the option to the Afghan staff to say, "This
is a conflict. If you want to go home, you can. We can stop the
operation" and the local people turned round and said, "These
are our people and this is the time they need us. We are not going
home." It is that courage backed up by the swift response
by the international community that has averted what potentially
could have been a disaster. In response to your question, there
are not reported hundreds of deaths because I think we responded
quickly as an international community.
(Ms Winter) However, the death rate has gone up. Micro
studies done in Badghis, which is one of the worst affected provinces,
do show an increase in the death rate. There has been an increase
too in morbidity from disease, from hypothermia etc.,—in
other words, a very weak and vulnerable population. Winter is
now upon us in some areas. There definitely have been increases
in the numbers of deaths. How big that is I do not think any of
us would be able to tell you.
Ann Clwyd
11. What specific programmes are being implemented
by the agencies for what some people consider to be the most vulnerable
parts of the population? That is, women and children, war widows.
We heard a lot about them at the beginning of the action. Can
you tell me what agencies are specifically doing for them?
(Mr Burch) Many agencies are engaged in delivery of
complementary food packets over and above the World Food Programme
ration which is basically wheat. This is the addition of extra
food such as beans, pulses, oil etc. We are supporting quite a
number of programmes of that kind through our partners. These
are targeted quite carefully at the most vulnerable families in
communities which themselves are classified in terms of vulnerability.
We tend to consider families. That is the easiest way to work.
They tend to be in the most remote places. We are also doing something
which we did last year, also during the drought, in the four districts
of Ghor, which is a programme specifically for the families of
malnourished children. It involves a monthly measurement, which
is very onerous on the team, as you can imagine. Children are
measured and compared against the UNICEF/World Health Organisation
norm. Those who are below a certain level, their families are
put on a project of food distribution. This is very much an emergency
phase. We are not generally very enthusiastic about the idea of
giving away large numbers of food packets for long periods. We
sincerely hope that within two or three months we will be into
a new phase of longer term projects where certainly food is given
where it is appropriate, but it is earned, food for work projects,
which will create some local infrastructure: roads, irrigation
works and so on. We are also interested in IOM's plans for the
return of IDPs and refugees from camps. The International Organisation
for Migration is organising this together with NGOs at the receiving
communities. That will be very important this summer but there
are many other issues which are going to be of great interest
during the next year and years following, including civil society
issues, certain things that just were not possible under the Taliban—in
particular, education for both sexes.
(Mr Roseveare) One of the things that has changed
quite dramatically and has had a direct causal effect on our ability
to address the needs of women, children, widows and female headed
households at village level has been the fact that we are now
able to employ women on our surveys teams and the teams that go
out to conduct the distributions and assessments. That therefore
means that our teams can talk to and inquire about the status
of women who otherwise might have a status that was somewhat hidden
within some village communities and remote settlements. That has
made a dramatic difference in our ability to find out about those
members of the community that may be more vulnerable than others,
who may be women or women with children or female headed households,
and to address those needs. We are still at a stage of delivering
a lot of humanitarian response to meet people's food needs and
a lot of planning is going on for longer term needs, but in the
humanitarian response work, that is one critical thing that has
changed, that has enabled us to address particularly women's needs;
the other thinking about girls' schooling, about an interesting
proposal which came through the other day which we may very well
serve up and commit to was the retraining and refresher training
of women professionals, particularly from Oxfam's point of view,
water engineers for the country, and to put these people back
in the economically productivity activity that they could otherwise
be in. Those are medium term measures that will come on line.
For the time being, it is simply our access to women in a simple
way that has made quite a lot of difference.
(Mr Ali) It has made a dramatic difference. At the
tail end of the conflict, WFP were poised to do a city wide survey
of Kabul and in that we had to employ 305 women to be able to
cover the city. It was the first time that I was overwhelmed because
you have teachers, university students, women turning up from
all walks of life, having access to women, and able to get quality
information about their status, about the number of children,
information that was given directly by the beneficiary, not by
the head of the community. That quality information allowed us
to convert into better programmes and better projects. That is
a significant change. The same in Kandahar. A survey was done
but it was agreed that it is better to do a blanket distribution.
The fact that there is now a changing attitude and women are coming
forward to do work and aid agencies are able to actively employ
them. They go out into the community and bring back quality information
that allows better programming. There are a couple of issues that
I think need to be pointed out. One, in terms of training, focus
on women is very important but within the education sector one
point we need to bear in mind is that so far the international
debate has been on training of teachers. Building the capacity
of the education directorates as well as the educational institutions
within the government to do the monitoring and supervisory roles
is equally as important to deliver education. Yes, on the one
hand, we should train teachers and there are incentives to do
that but the two must go hand in hand to ensure sustainability.
The British government has been excellent in putting forward money
for education, particularly in areas like Kandahar, through Islamic
Relief, where this is an approach we are taking. Furthermore,
there are now initiatives coming from various agencies which target
women specifically like the Afghan Women's Initiative, which is
a similar concept that was employed in the Balkans, where a lump
sum of money available within the agencies, a project implemented
by women for women and the initiative should come from women.
It is not an idea that is preconceived but the idea to sit amongst
women and say, "What are the good things that you should
be doing?" because human beings know their own best solutions.
I think it sends out a very important political message that,
where an agency puts aside a lump sum of money for women it is
recognising the vital role that women will play in the rebuilding
of Afghanistan. It highlights the role of women amongst a society
where we must admit that it is still predominantly men.
Tony Worthington
12. With regard to infrastructure and teaching,
you have to build up government capacity. I am very interested
in the interrelationship between the international effort and
the creation of the institutions of Afghan society which does
seem to be crucial. If you took a specific issue like water infrastructure,
are there signs that there is a body there, either internationally
or nationally, instead of individual NGOs going and repairing
a well, that is saying, "Look, we have just had total infrastructure
destruction. This is what we need to do in this order to bring
it back." How is that going to happen?
(Mr Ali) What exists at the moment are the various
coordinations of sectors: the water and sanitation sector, the
agriculture sector etc., These sectors somehow link into the Ministry
of Planning and the Ministry of Planning is usually overseeing
the work of NGOs. The link however is very weak and it needs to
be strengthened by strengthening the Ministry of Planning also,
because from my experience when we met with the Ministry of Planning,
wonderful ideas and words of advice, but not necessarily the technical
knowhow available within the ministry to then sit down with the
NGOs and draw up a blueprint and say, "This should be the
infrastructure plan for this particular area." The onus remains
on the international NGOs to draw up the blueprint and go back
to the Ministry of Planning and say, "This is what we have
done." The Ministry of Planning is then often in a situation
where it gives the approval or disapproval which is the weak link,
because often international NGOs have put in so much effort into
coming up with a plan only for it to be disapproved by the Ministry
of Planning creates some kind of resistance. If the ministry could
be strengthened in all sectors—education, health, water
and sanitation—to be able also to provide expertise and
if that expertise is not available locally perhaps we can think
of Afghan expert groups elsewhere to be able to give that information
and then give the Afghans the lead role in providing that expertise
and give the facilitation role to the international NGOs and perhaps
the implementation.
13. What is the Ministry of Planning? Is it
a political appointment?
(Mr Ali) Yes.
14. Is there any background there of people
who have been involved in planning in the past or have they gone?
What is its link to the locality? Is there any system of local
government at all there? What needs to be put in place?
(Mr Ali) The structure is such that you have the central
ministries which then have counterparts at the provincial level.
It is a political appointment, the Minister of Planning, and even
at the provincial level it is somewhat of a political appointment.
There are not experts available within the ministries to take
care of all planning issues because in terms of an international
organisation it was down to whatever project you want to do has
to be coordinated with the Ministry of Planning for the most part,
whether it is agriculture, water or something else. The Ministry
of Planning has to be involved. Unfortunately, it is more of you
present the project and the ministry often says, "This is
good" or, "We like it" or, "We do not like
it", but it does not give the expertise one wants to create
a consolidated relationship.
15. You are going to the Ministry of Planning.
Are you going to a politician or a powerful person of some kind
who relates to who? Is there any kind of civil service whatsoever?
(Mr Ali) The Ministry of Planning is responsible to
the central administration and the Minister is a political appointment
responsible to the central administration. There is a central
plan of some kind but often it comes across in my view as a wish
list. Often, the ministers want to divert assistance to areas
that in international NGOs' assessment do not necessarily need
it, but because there may be a political link to it they try and
divert it. There is a central body that the ministers are responsible
to and there is a central plan which is more of a wish list but
not in terms of blueprints of projects or technical plans that
they can then present to NGOs and say, "If you want to implement
this . . .". There has been one good development recently,
for example. We had a proposal to build a clinic in Baghman, about
20 kilometres from Kabul. The idea was to get a patch of land
from the Ministry of Health and build the clinic which you can
then give to the community as a sustainable asset, rather than
just renting the building. The Ministry of Health put forward
a patch of land and asked if she could lay the foundation stone,
which was no problem for us. Then our engineers drew up the technical
plan and gave it to the Ministry of Health and she said, "No,
we have a standard plan." Our particular plan was rejected
but I was happy because the Ministry of Health has now taken the
initiative to come up with a standard plan of what a clinic should
be and what basic facilities it should provide. It shows that
there is now some kind of a move forward to standardise an approach.
NGOs can now go, for example, to the Ministry of Health and say,
"We want to build a clinic. It will be catering for this
number of people in this location." The Ministry has done
some kind of homework and they will say, "For that, I think
you should go for this and this." That is a good sign. If
we can strengthen that further along with other ministries, particularly
the Ministry of Planning, which has the overall responsibility
for any project that goes on, that would help further.
16. As I understand it, there is no indigenous
resource; there is no tax gathering system; there is no wealth
from within Afghanistan going into the Ministry. Whatever wealth
there is is coming out of Tokyo and the agreement there and the
setting up of a trust fund or the setting up of something under
UNDP. I am just not clear how that gets into the Ministry or whether
it goes to the Ministry at all or whether there is another set
of plans that is being internationally based. I do not understand
what is happening. It is very early days. I am not sure what the
idea is. I am not sure what is happening.
(Mr Ali) For the most part, the ministries are relying
on the international assistance and that international assistance
at the moment is mainly through international NGOs and the UN
agencies. Take the clinic project, for example. The patch of land
that the Health Ministry has put forward had been put aside for
a number of months but the Ministry itself did not have the money
to build a clinic. Now you have an international NGO that presents
a plan and the Ministry says, "How about working this one?"
Therefore, they give you the go ahead. When it comes to the financial
contribution, it is still a dependence on the international assistance.
At the moment, there is not sufficient money and the Ministry
would not leave the land barren but just build the clinic itself.
Mr Khabra
17. What is being done to help people return
to their villages to plant their crops? What is being done to
stop people using their land to grow poppy plants rather than
food?
(Mr Burch) On return, IOM is organising a nation wide
transport system which will consist of trucks moving on main routes
by which people can effectively get a ride from their place of
displacement to their home community. IOM's plan will also include
reception hubs where people will get a reintegration packet which
will include some food, agricultural tools etc. There will be
secondary transport to their homes and NGOs will be contracted
to IOM to provide support for the communities receiving those
returnees, not just the returnees themselves, but also the wider
community. Less antagonism will be created. We think this is very
important we think it will be our next prime focus in rural areas
this summer. On the subject of the poppy, I think I will defer
to Sakandar because poppy growing is a particular problem of the
Kandahar/Helmand area where Islamic Relief works. From the west,
it is certainly a source of income or has been in the past for
young men to go to work on the poppy crop. After a period in which
the Taliban did ban poppy growth, the latest news that there was
this autumn widespread planting is, I understand, that possibly
as much as 40 or 50,000 hectares have been planted in the Helmand/Kandahar
region. UNDCP, the UN drugs control agency, report that and certainly
there are funds available from the United States and elsewhere
to provide alternative activities for farmers who may be tempted
to grow poppy in dry conditions as a crop which will get them
a much better return than wheat. The fact is that it is difficult
to implement those programmes and a certain amount of compulsion
is needed also as well to prevent poppy growing. It would seem
at the moment that there is going to be a resurgence of the problem.
Chairman
18. Sakandar, is there anything you want to
say about poppy growth?
(Mr Ali) I would, particularly because as Oliver said
in the southern region, particularly Helmand and Kandahar, statistically
Afghanistan used to produce something like 45 per cent of the
world's heroin and out of that 70 per cent of it used to come
from the southern region, primarily Helmand, it is one of the
areas that we work. At the moment, from our observations, what
we have seen is that activity to recultivate the poppy has not
started but I must confess the discussion has started already
amongst the communities because the southern region is primarily
a feudal area, so you have people who work on the land and the
landlords. Often the people who work on the land take monthly
loans from the landlord which they used to pay back after the
sale of the poppy crop. Those debts still exist and the assistance
that was expected has not been forthcoming quickly enough which
has started a discussion: "Well, what is the alternative?".
I listened also to a recent media report where a farmer can actually
earn up to 15,000 dollars for growing poppies and that is a lucrative
incentive. Poppy growing is not a local problem it is actually
an international problem. The international community therefore
needs to react quickly to ensure that measures are put in place
to make sure that people do not go back to poppy growing because
for the most part they have stopped. I think it would be a real
shame if they did simply because we are not swift enough in making
sure they do not go back. Can I just make a point on repatriation
because it was actually a good question. There is now a global
discussion for Afghan refugees to repatriate and particularly
amongst the neighbouring countries, Pakistan and Iran, and His
Excellency, Hamid Karzai, has been going around encouraging the
Governments to start repatriation programmes. UNHCR and IOM are
involved in that. I think, for the record, the Committee should
be aware that the package that has been put forward as an incentive
for families to return is actually insufficient and it is not
going to be an encouragement. Return has to be voluntary, it cannot
be coerced. If you look at the return package that has been put
forward by UNHCR, it is 5,000 Pakistani rupees, 100 kg of wheat
and two metres of plastic sheeting. Now a family of seven, on
average, what incentive is that for them to return? Secondly,
a lot of the return will be happening to the southern and the
eastern region, mainly the Pashtun Belt because a lot of the refugees
are actually Pashtuns and these are drought hit areas where water
is not available, there is limited infrastructure even to carry
water. These issues need to be addressed when we talk about repatriation,
not simply just picking up people and throwing them back into
Afghanistan but giving them a chance to have some kind of a life
when they go back. In a situation where you get two metres of
plastic sheeting and 100 kg of wheat and 5,000 rupees which will
just take you to where you want to go or close by, I think it
is not necessarily going to be an incentive for them.
Chairman
19. Nick, I have got two colleagues who want
to ask questions, John and Ann. What I suggest you do is answer
their questions and then we will do a tour de table down
the table starting with you responding to any points and if you
wish to add anything, if there is anything you feel between us
all we have not covered today which you think it is important
that we should raise in Thursday's debate on this matter.
Mr Battle: When we met at the beginning
of the crisis there was criticism of the ability of the World
Food Programme to cope. There have been also a lot of international
eyes on the World Food Programme. Have they learnt from the experience?
Have they changed their systems of communications and logistics?
If so, the World Food Programme did tell us, for example, that
the snow would not create a problem, they would get in snow ploughs
from Sweden, Russia and elsewhere, why is the snow a problem or
is it just that the snow has overwhelmed even the World Food Programme's
best attempts at logistics?
Ann Clwyd: I do not know if the Agencies
have been involved at all with the welfare of those taken prisoner
in Afghanistan? Some of the horror stories which we have heard
are about conditions at the prisons, not enough food, etc., etc.
I wonder if you can give us an estimate of the prison population
now and their situation?
Chairman: Nick, any comments on either
of those two points or anything in addition that you feel we should
take on board which has not been raised yet?
(Mr Roseveare) Yes. On WFP, the World Food Programme,
there were lots of criticisms, lots of anxieties that they may
not be able to perform or were not performing in an adequate way.
I think, as Sakandar said, a lot of that was taken on board. The
stops were pulled out and there were changes in approach and tactics
which enabled, for the most part, a much better job than if one
had extended the trend in the early part of the crisis, a much
better job to be executed than would have been predicted. I think
that of course problems remain and of course there are logistical
difficulties and so forth but for the most part I think that people
felt that after a while, and with the maintenance of some pretty
acute pressure, changes have been made which have delivered an
adequate operation, for the most part. Whether there are particular
difficulties relating to snow at the moment, I can only specify
one location that we have difficulty accessing as of last week,
this is because of very deep and very heavy snowfalls which one
would have difficulty getting through by any practical means.
Oxfam and most agencies have a continuing dialogue with WFP. We
continue to be an implemented partner for many of the operations
we have been describing now. There is a mutual recognition of
the constraints which are upon all of us and a desire to work
through those and solve them for the delivery of programmes. I
think there was change and there continues to be a good dialogue,
that is not to say there are not problems. On the issue of prisoners
in Afghanistan, just to say I do not think I am qualified to answer
that. Obviously the International Committee of the Red Cross would
have a detailed view that they may or may not want to discuss
in public. Other colleagues may be in a position to answer on
that. Just a couple of other issues briefly. It is perhaps worth
nothing that the ASG, the Afghan Support Group meets next week,
I think in Geneva. We would want to see, I guess, clearly articulated
in that forum the continuing need for pledges to be converted
into delivery of assistance for Afghanistan and that the levels
of interest and commitment should be maintained by the international
community and by donors and that anything which looks like a slowness
to do so should be quite assertively nipped in the bud by the
international community and in particular by the British Government
if it can exercise influence to do that. We are all too familiar
with the difficulties in the past of intense interest in Afghanistan
being followed quite swiftly by a period of disinterest and anything
which looks as if it might be fading I think needs to be dealt
with quite swiftly. The current conversion rate of pledges, which
has been fairly good I think to date, must be maintained. Also,
something that comes out of our discussions earlier, briefly,
simply to say that just as on the issue of poppy cultivation there
is a need for the international community to engage and to provide
the alternatives and the resources to deliver them and to regard
it as being a problem of international interest, it is not one
that the Afghan authorities should miraculously suddenly be expected
to take total responsibility for and to act against. The issue
of security also that we talked about at the beginning of this
meeting needs the close and attentive continued scrutiny by the
international community of how different regions and their local
leaderships are behaving and whether or not this is felt to be
consistent with continuing to nation built and deliver something
of a leadership structure that is supportive of a central authoritative
government. If that attention begins to waiver or to wain or be
diverted to elsewhere, there is a worry, a concern that the trend
may be to revert to some of the more fragmented and fractured
power structures in Afghanistan that have existed in the past
and that would be a strong concern of ours. So for the international
community continued very, very close attention to some of these
issues.
Chairman: Sakandar?
(Mr Ali) I just want to slightly elaborate on what
Nick said about WFP. I concur with Nick, we also work very closely,
particularly in Kabul and the southern region and I must say that
the concerns which were raised in October have seriously been
taken on board. It has been shown in the field that WFP is trying
any means possible to ensure that food does get to people who
need it. I think the international community also must be recognised
in giving the support to WFP to ensure that assistance is given.
The planes which were donated, the hundreds of trucks which were
put forward and have arrived, and recently the six helicopters
which have been put forward will allow WFP to reach even the most
difficult areas, to make the assessments through the helicopters
etc and we look forward to that. I think the quicker those helicopters
etc arrive the better because the winter, as Elizabeth has said
already, is coming and we do need to reach people. That is a very
good alternative. WFP has even said if need be they will take
food through the helicopter to these pockets, so it is a good
initiative. In terms of prisoners, I think although we are not
involved in that sector but what is important and what we hear
from the communities is a concern for the families actually left
behind by the prisoners because a lot of the prisoners who were
there and a lot of them who were foreigners who were there have
wives and children who have been left behind within the communities
and they have been exposed and become vulnerable in that. I think
the Committee needs to be aware that there is a certain human
rights element towards the families to prisoners which we should
not overlook because in their situation in an environment like
that I think they would probably be most at risk. Some people
even said we feel sorry for them because they have had to scatter
their families to different villages for protection for some reason.
Now the points that I would like to make for the Committee are
four but these are often the silent points which we oversee in
delivering international assistance. I think we need to bear them
in mind because they can have far reaching consequences unless
we tackle them now. There are four general points. The first one
is on Afghan refugees. Because I have got them written down I
think it will be quicker so I will just read them to you. The
Afghan Government has recently opened the dialogue with the Governments
of Iran and Pakistan for the repatriation of Afghan refugees.
UN agencies are also talking about repatriation. The remedy suggested
is to give some items and money to the returnees and make repatriation
attractive to the people. However, there are still some geographic
areas, particularly in the southern Afghanistan where water is
hardly found, the ecosystem is fragile and even lacks the carrying
capacity necessary for human settlements. Encouraging people to
return to such areas would not only make them vulnerable but would
also destroy the delicate ecosystem of the area. We suggest that
the Afghan Government must have a comprehensive repatriation plan
before actual arrival of the people from Pakistan and Iran and
the plan must also be based on environmental assessment and should
consider the well being of local ecosystems. Secondly, and here
it is a point that the industry would most like to highlight,
is the rehabilitation of the health system. There are a number
of agencies coming forward with plans to rehabilitate the health
system and health schemes. What we would not like to see is Afghanistan
being used as a dumping ground for pharmaceutical companies because
although WHO has an approved list of medicine there is actually
no mechanism as yet to check what comes in and what goes out of
the country. The only mechanism that exists at the moment is in
the neighbouring countries, SAFRON in Pakistan but SAFRON is concerned
about what is transiting through Pakistan, it does not actually
have the ability to control. If we encourage agencies and donors
to ensure that we bear this in mind, that it should not be used
as a ground for pharmaceuticals and if medicines do arrive that
are not suitable then the donors must be willing to pay for them
to be returned back as opposed to just being left in the country.
The added point is the support to the national curriculum. There
is a discussion now at the central and provincial level to come
up with a unified curriculum for the country and the focus is
still for the main part remaining and training the teachers to
be able to teach. Also I think in line we need to capacitate the
education directorates and the ministries to take care of the
supervisory and monitoring roles to deliver good quality education.
Finally, since the planting season is coming up, we would see
as every year a lot of seed programmes and agricultural programmes
taking place. I must point out to the Committee that FAO, the
Food and Agricultural authority, does not actually have a seed
verification system in place so we need to ensure that whatever
seeds come to Afghanistan are genetically modified. If these seeds
are going to, yes, give better crops, what are the social consequences
of that crop? Will women have to spend more time in the field
because these seeds take extra time? Will it affect the social
impact? Our suggestion is that at the moment there are seed verification
centres in Baluchistan, in Chitral, which are near to the border
with Afghanistan. If as a point of reconciliation perhaps these
verification centres through FAO could be used to certify seeds
which go into Afghanistan it would be a great encouragement because
otherwise we may end up with a situation where we have lots of
agriculture but the social consequences of that are actually much
more dire than they are now because there is no verification system.
Chairman: Elizabeth?
(Ms Winter) On the question of prison population,
as has already been said, it is obviously an ICRC responsibility
but it is a major human rights' issue, no question about it. We
estimate that the population is around 5,000 and as Nick or Sakandar
have already said, there are a lot of families involved too so
it is not just the 5,000 prisoners themselves. We do not have
any great details although we assume that in most of these prisons
conditions are pretty awful. There is particular concern about
the one in Shibergan and if you would like more information we
can perhaps supply that to you at a later date. Turning to other
things, what we have not discussed really, except in passing,
is the question of the diaspora and the return of technically
qualified Afghans. This is a very complicated issue. There are
a lot of Afghans who are waiting to go back, waiting for the conditions
to be right for them to do so. One of the major constraints on
them returning, although some have done so already under their
own steam, one of the major constraints is concern that they will
lose their asylum status. So, for example, if hostilities broke
out again or it was simply impossible to work there they might
not be able to return to their families who are in Europe or wherever.
We understand that the refugee organisations here are looking
at these issues and the Home Office is also addressing them. We
wonder whether some concern could be given to this and whether
or not a situation like in Kosovo could be sorted out so that,
in fact, people do have the ability to go back and assess the
situation, perhaps give temporary consultancy assistance before
they return permanently. Databases are being drawn up, various
ones, so that prospective employers and prospective employees
can be put in touch with each other. As I say, it is a complicated
issue and requires more thought. You raised in your report the
question of the media coverage. Just to let you know that BAAG
has organised a couple of workshops since then including the representatives
of the media. We are supporting a photographer to go out and come
back with more accurate images that can then be used and we hope
the coverage will be improving from now on. Finally, in terms
of the last thing I would like to say, I think you have it right
in your report talking about Afghan led reconstruction and so
on, and I think just to reiterate it is important to build on
the expertise and knowledge that exists already. That is largely
in the NGO community, particularly with the Afghan members of
staff who have requested at various meetings that we all be given
time to reflect, that we do not just rush around and there is
one quote that has remained with me at the World Bank/UNDP Asian
Development Bank meeting in November that we attended: "Please
stop sending us these hyper active and non productive expatriates".
We have all met them and we would rather do without them.
Chairman: Oliver?
(Mr Burch) For Christian Aid, I would agree that WFP
did rise to the occasion there with more funds provided to it.
We were all lucky with the late winter, just to repeat that again.
With the assets they have in place now—transport aircraft
on standby, helicopters have been mentioned, we have the Swedish
Rescue Service Agency with three snowploughs who are now on the
Chagcheran Road and have guaranteed to keep that open for the
rest of the winter—it does seem that the problems are very
well addressed. I am sorry I cannot add anything on prisoners.
I would only refer to ICRC or whatever it is Elizabeth has told
us about. There are a lot of human rights' issues coming out of
what has happened recently beyond the fact of people being imprisoned.
Reprisals against civilian populations occurred on both sides
actually during some of last autumn's conflict. Villages were
burned and some of those people are still homeless and need help
to rebuild. Just one further comment on the issue of return, and
to separate the return of IDPs from these big camps which in the
west at any rate we really think should be happening quite fast
and there is no reason why those people cannot be supported much
more efficiently at home than they could be in camps in the desert.
Of course we have the issue also of return of refugees from abroad.
Just to sound a note of concern about any possibility that neighbouring
states may use the situation now as an excuse for forced repatriation.
There are some signs that Iran may get a little bit aggressive
in this way. They have two million refugees at the moment who
are not particularly wanted. Most of them have been in Iran for
a long time and are more or less economic migrants. There are
some signs that there may be a big push now by the Iranian authorities
to get those people back to Afghanistan as fast as can be done.
Sakandar has said that there is a limit to what their communities
can absorb in the short term. Thank you.
Chairman: Thank you all for having come
and given evidence today. I hope that in the debate on Thursday
we can reflect some of those concerns. Thank you for helping ensure
that we get what we say into the proper kilter. As you know, as
a Committee we are wanting to do a further inquiry into reconstruction
of things in Afghanistan. I think we will need to work out when
best we can do that. We hope it will not be too far away. Thank
you very much indeed.
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