APPENDIX 24
Memorandum from Democratic Audit, Human
Rights Centre, University of Essex
OBJECT LESSONS: PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES
ABROAD, THEIR FUNCTIONS AND POWERS
PREFACE
This report aims to assist the Modernisation
Committee in its deliberations on parliamentary reform by providing
information about the position of committees in other European
and foreign states. Our evidence on reform of the select committee
structures, rules and ethos in the House of Commons draws upon
immediate research into the practice and powers of parliamentary
committees and the rules governing them in Germany, New Zealand,
South Africa and the United States; on a major research study
of parliamentary committees in 18 west European nations (including
the UK) (Strøm, 1998); our own experience of and research
into parliaments in eleven nations (including Italy); and our
study of select and standing committees in the House of Commons
(Weir and Beetham, 1999). Our focus is on:
1. The areas of responsibility of parliamentary
committees (reviewing and amending draft legislation, holding
the government to account, and both these and/or other responsibilities);
2. the means by which members of parliament
are appointed to committees and the influence of the governing
party and other parties on their work and findings
3. the effectiveness of the mechanisms committees
use to report back to the house;
4. the extent to which committees influence
government policy-making and legislation;
5. the committees' powers of investigation;
and
6. the quality of resourcing and support
services available to them.
Most of the evidence was gathered directly from parliaments,
their websites, officials and committee members. We have supplemented
direct evidence with data and research from academic sources,
which we reference. Given the time-scale within which we had to
work to be able to contribute to the Modernisation Committee's
work, there are gaps in the comparative material—especially
on the party political elements of the processes. As in the UK,
political parties invariably exert control over the appointments
procedures, how committees conduct their business and how their
conclusions are mediated through the political process.
Democratic Audit is a specialist academic institution
which "audits" democracy and political freedoms in the
UK and internationally. The Audit draws upon scholars and practitioners
both in the UK and internationally and works in partnership with
the Centre for Democratisation Studies, POLIS, University of Leeds.
Democratic Audit has worked around the world for the Department
for International Development; DFID's State and Local Government
Programme, Nigeria; the European Union; the UK High Commission,
Zimbabwe; and International IDEA (Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance), Stockholm.
This report has been put together by Professor
Stuart Weir, Director of the Audit, and Iain Kearton, University
of Leeds. Weir and Kearton are among the authors of the International
IDEA Handbook on Democracy Assessment. They would like
to thank Judith February, of IDASA (the Institute for Democracy
in South Africa), and Ben Jackson, Nuffield College, Oxford, for
additional information.
In Part 1, we set out our general findings from
the comparative studies; and Part 2 contains our conclusions and
recommendations. The list of references follows. We have also
prepared a detailed summary of the position in Germany, New Zealand,
South Africa and the USA, which we can supply to committee members
should they wish it.
PART 1—PARLIAMENTARY
COMMITTEES AROUND
THE WORLD
Introduction
The parties must find a balance between their
own political interests and the representative role of legislators,
effective legislation and good government. Concern over the weakness
of Parliament in its relationship with the executive is not confined
to this country. Representative assemblies and legal systems around
the world have generally failed to expand their oversight of state
executives and have a limited capacity to deal with the multiplicity
of issues with which modern states engage. This is why, some 30
years ago, the US sociologist, C Wright Mills, relegated even
the powerful US Congress to the "middle levels of power".
All large parliaments work through committees;
such committees are usually important forums for making law and
policy. The more committees there are, and the greater the role
they perform in the legislative and policy processes, the higher
the potential output of the parliament. Thus the quality of their
output is usually vital to the effectiveness of their parliament.
At the same time, the political parties that
make representative democracy possible naturally play a significant
- and essential—part in all parliaments and their committees.
We found that the political parties, through their organisational
activities, their powers of discipline and patronage, and their
prior demands on members' loyalties, are the principal agencies
for the formation and conduct of parliamentary committees; and
thus the committees are always to a greater or lesser degree the
instruments of the parties (and especially the governing party).
Strong and effective committees are not incompatible with strong
parties, and a close relationship between the parties and committees
can enhance the influence of committees, especially in their legislative
functions. However, the parties must recognise the need to find
a balance between their own political interests and their parliamentary
members' party loyalties and the members' primary representative
role, effective legislation and good government.
Of course, governing parties world-wide are
sensitive to the work of scrutiny and investigative committees,
like the UK select committees, and tend to employ their power
over the state, parliamentary process and their party in the legislature
to control them and to evade due accountability. They often seek
legitimacy for all their policies and actions in electoral victory,
but the diffuse mandate of the electorate is never sufficient
in itself either to endow every act of government with popular
approval or to endow political executives with supreme wisdom
in their legislative proposals or policies.
We welcome the Modernisation Committee's decision
to examine how to make the House of Commons and its select committees
more effective. We share members' concern about the breakdown
of communication between the general public and politicians, including
MPs, and the political process. We believe that the Committee
must go back to the basic principles of representative democracy
if it is to restore public confidence in Parliament and the ability
of MPs to represent their views and interests. The basic democratic
principles are those of "popular control" and "political
equality"—in other words, MPs, the people's representatives
in parliament and elsewhere, should first and foremost represent
their interests in their work equally; and other interests, be
they of the executive, party bosses or business interests, should
not come first.
We know from our research into public attitudes
that that public are not satisfied for their voice to be heard
only at periodic elections; rather, the Rowntree Reform Trust's
"State of the Nation" polls show that the British people
think constitutional rules and practice and the democratic institutions
should ensure that government continues to be both properly accountable
and transparent between elections; and a large majority believe
that they should have greater continuing power over government
between elections (Dunleavy et al, 2001). Strong, transparent
and independent select committees are one means by which the balance
of power can be redressed in the interests of ordinary citizens.
The House of Commons—a deviant case?
The study of parliamentary committees in 18
west European nations describes the House of Commons as "the
most deviant case" (Strøm, 1998). Our committee structure
is certainly distinctive; and is both weaker and stronger in certain
respects than those in other west European parliaments. The majority
of west European parliaments have permanent specialist committees
whose prime function is to examine and amend legislation; a few
have the power to initiate legislation as well. These legislative
committees can usually also summon witnesses. They are vastly
superior to the UK's ad-hoc non-specialist "standing"
committees onto which MPs are conscripted to examine draft legislation.
The ad-hoc UK committees have no powers to call witnesses and
possess marginal legislative functions and most of the UK executive's
legislation is summarily rail-roaded through them. Legislative
scrutiny in the House of Commons is a charade—a verdict
put most compellingly by the Hansard Society's study, Making
the Law, in 1993.
Most European parliamentary committees combine
their responsibilities for reviewing, shaping, and in some cases
initiating legislation, with other duties such as keeping the
government accountable and performing inquiries (perhaps also
taking up public petitions, performing financial reviews and commenting
on international treaties). There is not the same separation of
functions as in the House of Commons, with its standing and select
committees. The legislative role seems usually to take precedence.
It involves committees much more deeply in parliamentary life
and in the work of their government departments than committees
confined to oversight alone, not least because they may become
involved in shaping policy through legislation. However, the responsibility
of examining and amending legislation—which seems to take
the lion's share of their time—and the diverse range of
responsibilities that some of them undertake can preclude them
from giving scrutiny of government actions and policies sufficient
weight and time.
The scrutiny, or investigative, role
Few European parliaments have separate scrutiny,
or investigative, committees at all; and none have an effective
equivalent of the British select committees that are now being
copied around the world. And while European legislative committees
often have an oversight role, they rarely have sufficient resources
to perform it well.
The German Bundestag compensates for
this tendency by having additional mechanisms for inquiry:—
— ad hoc committees of inquiry
("investigative committees") may be set up to investigate
specific matters;
— study commissions, comprising
of members and outside experts, may be established to examine
and report on "complex and important issues"; and
— its legislative Defence Committee
can at any time constitute itself as an investigative committee
and assume extra powers of inquiry (see below).
Opposition parties in the Bundestag have
the opportunity to establish "investigative" committees—one
of which was set up to inquire into the CDU financing scandal
in 1999—as it requires only a 25 per cent majority vote
in the Bundestag to establish them. However, their terms
of reference are quite specific and they must be approved by a
simple majority in the House (which allows the government some
influence over their course of inquiry). Such committees tend
to have a partisan image by comparison with most UK select committees,
which have developed a workable broadly objective and (internally
amicable) way of scrutinising the policies and decisions of the
executive through the cultivation of a "non-partisan"
ethos, albeit within the perspective of heavy executive dominion
and strong party influence. Thus, select committees are generally
able to gain broad agreement across their party members, except
on issues of particular sensitivity for government.
The German study commissions are a valuable
non-partisan resource at the disposal of the German parliament.
They have the same rights and duties as any Bundestag committee,
but their objective status is protected by the rule that their
reports may not contain any recommendations for decision. It is
up to the federal government or plenary parliament to bring forward
proposals for legislation or action based on their reports.
Finally, the German Defence Committee has the
power to constitute itself as an investigative committee and thus
to take on the same additional powers that such committees possess
(see below). It may also receive evidence in private while standard
investigative committees receive evidence in public. This flexibility
is a consequence of its monopoly over defence matters within the
Bundestag which cannot itself set up any other investigative
committee to examine defence matters. It is hard to judge how
much this greater flexibility enhances the committee s role. It
tends to concentrate on its oversight role anyway, since there
is rarely legislation on defence issues; and has invoked the right
to conduct inquiries only eleven times in total.
Our research suggests that parliamentary committees—the
chief means by which parliaments seek to make governments transparent
and accountable—have had limited success universally in
overcoming the difficulties of creating an independent and objective
oversight of the executive. The strongest and most independent
are in the US Congress, notwithstanding C Wright Mills's view.
While the UK does not have the same separation of powers that
distinguishes US politics, we believe that there are lessons that
the UK Parliament can profitably learn from the US experience—especially
on issues of powers and resourcing.
Countries with proportional electoral systems
usually have a greater opportunity for creating more balanced
and independent parliamentary scrutiny, but as the example of
South Africa shows, even a relatively strong committee system
can be swamped by the power of a governing party with an overwhelming
public mandate. The well organised legislative committee structure
in Germany is the most influential and politically balanced of
the comparator systems, but is closely integrated into the consensual
German inter-party politics that is quite different from the partisan
politics of the House of Commons; parties "let off steam"
through the "investigative" committees (see above).
Openness of committees
Both UK select and "standing" committees
are far more open than their European counterparts. Both types
of committees work largely in public: standing committees publish
verbatim transcripts of proceedings; and select committees hold
public hearings, and publish the oral and written evidence they
receive. Most German committees generally meet in private, though
public hearings are becoming more common. While of course the
deliberations of UK select committees are held in camera, the
openness of most of their proceedings gives them a more visible
presence and impact that neither Germany's legislative nor "investigative"
committees can match. Though they have far less influence on government
than German legislative committees, the open role of select committees
undoubtedly contributes to raising public interest and confidence
in British politics.
Size, resources and powers
Size and resources are significant issues for
committees everywhere. It becomes clear from study of other parliaments
that committees must be of an appropriate size if they are to
perform their duties fully and avoid neglecting any of them. By
the same token, they must be adequately resourced.
The committees in the four legislatures that
we especially studied all have a great advantage over select committees
in the House of Commons. In each of the legislatures, all members
are expected to serve on a parliamentary committee. This is so
even in the larger Houses as the table below shows:
| Country | How many
members are
there in the
popular
assembly?
| How many
serve on a
parliamentary
committee?
|
| Germany | 669
| All |
| New Zealand | 120
| All |
| South Africa | 400
| All |
| USA | 435 |
All |
Source: Democratic Audit research
| | |
Britain's House of Commons, given its large membership, need
not suffer from the problems in creating suitably large committees
that a smaller parliament like that in New Zealand suffers from.
As the experience of the German Bundestag shows, large
and well-resourced committees can share the parliamentary workload
evenly and exert real and continuing influence on government legislation
(though their "investigative" committees are more partisan
and less weighty than our select committees). Their strength however
depends on the high level of member participation; in fact, there
are 20 more places on permanent committees than there are members
of the Bundestag! The House of Commons, by contrast, fails
to make anything like the same demand on MPs. Select committee
places in the Commons require at any point in time only 40 per
cent of the total membership of the House, though the turnover
in membership means that nearly 60 per cent of MPs serve on a
committee during a session (see below). (Of course, ad-hoc standing
committees and business committees make extra demands.)
In Germany, official funding for committees is as modest
as here. But political parties play a far stronger role in German
society than here; and state funding of political parties and
of the party-related education and research foundations means
that committee members can broadly draw upon support and research
information through their parties. Committees in the US Congress
are, as is well known, powerful bodies which command huge staffs
and have substantial resources; while those in South Africa are
far less well-resourced and thus tend to be too reliant on government
ministries for information. In the UK Parliament, select committees
are poorly resourced and rely heavily on government departments
and external witnesses for their information. Standing committees
are even worse off; they are strongly whipped, short of time,
and rely almost wholly on government briefs and lobby material
from interest groups. The experience of Germany, South Africa
and the USA demonstrates the need for them to have additional
resources of their own.
Legislative committees in most democracies are able to hold
public hearings on major pieces of legislation. These hearings
are considered very important because they demonstrate an interest
in openness and invite public and interest-group engagement in
making legislation and public policy. Admittedly, the role of
public testimony is often limited to minor amendments, but the
process publicly brings legislation under expert scrutiny and
can expose unwelcome or poorly thought-through legislation.
Generally, the powers of committees abroad to compel ministers,
civil servants and others to give evidence are weak and usually
depend on the approval of the whole House or Speaker where they
exist. However, German committees have the power to demand the
attendance of a member of the federal government at any meeting
(though we have been unable to find out whether similar powers
exist in the case of civil servants or expert witnesses, though
committees may of course invite experts or interested parties
to give evidence). As for investigative committees, they have
the right to summon and swear in witnesses; to demand files and
documents from the federal government; and to require ministers
consent for civil servants to give evidence. The federal government
may refuse demands for documents or the attendance of civil servants
if compliance would harm the interests either of the federal state
or a constituent state; or it would seriously jeopardise or impede
the performance of public functions (see Schick and Zeh, 1999).
Committees in New Zealand and South Africa have limited powers
to call for witnesses and documents for their scrutiny either
of draft bills or government policies and actions. In New Zealand,
committees had their powers of summons dramatically curtailed
in 1999 and they may now usually only request witnesses to attend.
However, they can approach the Speaker to issue a summons, or
may do so themselves with the leave of the House (ie, in practice,
as in the UK, the government). In South Africa, wide-ranging constitutional
powers to call for witnesses or documents are moderated by a House
rule that reserves the right of summons to the Speaker. Of the
18 west European countries in the Strøm study, only five
of the legislative committees have the formal power of compulsion,
though all can invite witnesses. On documents, eight can demand
government or parliamentary documents, the others cannot.
Finally, it is a sign of the demands upon committees internationally
that the effective use of committees resources and powers often
depends in the final event on the time that members can devote
to committee work. Here, much depends on the culture of parliaments
and members and their priorities; but the ability of committees
to scrutinise government rises where all or more members are expected
to participate in committee work. Half the parliaments in the
18-nation European survey employ sub-committees to relieve the
workload. Sub-committees enable parliaments to cover more ground
and to develop members specialist expertise; but attendance on
them can fall below the average for full committees. Where their
membership is based on self-selection, as is often the case, their
policy preferences may deviate even more from those of the full
House than their parent committees.
The role of the political parties
In the four legislatures we investigated, the political parties
play a defining role in the selection of committee members and
exercise considerable influence over their conduct. The parties
are strong within each of the legislatures and have recently tended
to take tighter control of committees and the legislature's business
than in the past. In Germany, much research and policy work is
carried out within party working groups, involving committee members
and the party leadership prior to committee discussions; thus
committees tend to be forums for party bargaining and consensus-building
and party point-scoring is rare. Committees are traditionally
the work-horses of the US Congress, but are now less independent
of the policy agendas of their party leaders than they used to
be and less free to develop their own legislative initiatives.
Party leaders are also more likely to place people on committees
with a view to their helpfulness rather than to observe previous
conventions of seniority and continuity. Select committees on
the UK model have been introduced in South Africa, but they are
still bedding down and MPs haven't yet developed their oversight
role. For the time being at least it is the mass membership of
the governing ANC and organised civic groups rather than parliamentary
committees that keep government under scrutiny.
The party system facilitates and orders the committee structure
and is necessary for its operation. Given confidence and a measure
of consensual understanding, well-organised and strong parties
can improve the contribution that committees make, but this is
often at the cost of their ability to exercise independent oversight
of policy and legislation.
An alternative career structure
Stability of membership is vital to an effective committee
system. The more stable the membership of committees is, the more
expert committee members become, and the better able they are
to improve the quality of legislation and to keep public policy
under informed scrutiny. As Kaare Strøm observes, "The
trick for the legislature as a whole is to induce members to take
the trouble to acquire expertise". The key is to foster a
culture of stability, or the "alternative career structure"
that the Liaison Committee proposes for service on select committees,
so that members are encouraged to invest in specialism knowing
that the investment is worthwhile. Established committee members
usually also become familiar with the administrative agencies
and relevant outside interest groups; and their acquisition of
expertise is usually facilitated if the committee's jurisdiction
is well defined. At the same time, it is important to avoid members
becoming too closely associated with outside interests; the former
Agriculture Committee's closeness to farming prevented its members
from taking expert warnings about the dangers of BSE seriously
enough to be a check on the government's policies (Weir and Beetham,
1999).
In both the USA and Germany the composition of committees
has been relatively stable; in the US Congress, in particular,
service on committees has been a significant and respected career
choice and seniority has mattered. In both cases, the influence
and power of the committees has buttressed and made worthwhile
the idea of an alternative career structure; and thus if the UK
is to adopt the same aim (as most witnesses suggest), the idea
is likely to depend more on an effective and independent committee
structure than extra payment for (say) committee chair persons.
In the US Congress, committee chairs receive only the same (high)
salary as other members, augmented by larger allowances for office
costs. It is also worthy of note that where all or most members
are expected to serve on parliamentary committees, the scope for
vetoes or other manipulation by party managers and whips diminishes.
Chairing parliamentary committees
Active and inquiring chair persons are of course vital to
creating effective committees. In the USA, the stable career structure
has set a high value on senior committee positions and encourages
promotion on the grounds of seniority; and the separation of powers
means that committee chair persons and aspiring members are more
likely to play fulfilling roles and less likely to be compromised
by hopes of executive position. Otherwise, the differing conventions
regarding the appointment of chair persons are naturally based
on party. In Germany, the chairs are allocated proportionally
between the parties (and with PR elections this means in line
with their electoral strength); and winner-takes-all distribution
of positions in New Zealand and the USA. In most countries, the
strength of party means that chair persons must establish a balance
between pursuing inquiries that will satisfy their scrutiny role
and avoiding issues that may prejudice their political career.
Given that few countries have established a secure alternative
career structure in committee service, their political progress
and executive advancement are both at hazard if they perform the
task of scrutiny too zealously.
The influence of parliamentary committees
The inter-action between governments, parties and committees
is crucial to the influence of the committees and to the reception
that their reports and recommendations receive in the chamber
and from government. Abroad the focus of committee scrutiny is
normally on legislation. In Germany, the fact that that government
s party managers and other party leaderships have been involved
in developing their parties position in committees means that
their reports are commonly accepted in their entirety by government
and in parliament. There is a tradition almost of deference in
the USA towards the stronger US committees which possess a legislative
capacity and also powers of veto over what pieces of legislation
go forward to the House. But they too are becoming more reliant
on party whips to get their bills through. In South Africa, a
piece of legislation may be knocked backwards and forwards openly
in the House between committee and the responsible minister, until
the government and committee reach agreement on a bill that can
go forward. In New Zealand, major committee amendments must generally
be approved by the dominant and, if necessary, other parties before
the House accepts them. In Germany, the process happens in reverse,
with parties bargaining in committee around positions developed
in internal meetings. The result is that the parties generally
reach agreement on legislation before it goes forward to the House.
Here, it is the House of Lords that generally accomplishes major
amendments to draft legislation, not the weak standing committees
in the Commons where ministers simply drive their proposals through;
and government treatment of select committee reports is too often
perfunctory, dilatory and even dismissive.
The effects of electoral systems
Proportionality makes for a higher quality of representation,
and usually for more independence for parliamentary committees.
But our four case studies show how party politics and traditions
can override its effects. Germany is perhaps a classic example
of the more balanced and consensual committee politics that PR
generally provides; and the arrangements of the parties there
ensure that the committees still contribute to decisive government.
The USA has the confrontational two-party system that first-past-the-post
elections encourage, but the separation of powers and the consequently
stronger committees in Congress, along with the looser and less
disciplined parties there than (say) in the UK Parliament, have
created more independent committees. In South Africa, the sheer
electoral popularity of the ANC has swamped the opposition parties
even under PR elections and creates a dominant party system within
which the role of committees has been subdued. New Zealand, is
somewhat of a hybrid. New Zealand is a recent convert to PR (1996),
but has not abandoned majoritarian politics. The current coalition
government has a small majority and has increased the sizes of
committees to secure a majority on most of them and thus to control
their conduct rather than make the political deals with other
parties that most governments adopt in such circumstances.
Service on UK select committees
Scrutinising legislation and government departments are regarded
by MPs as the two main priorities of Parliament. A poll for the
Hansard Society in June 2000 found that nearly 85 per cent of
MPs say that scrutiny of legislation is very important , and another
10.1 per cent say it is quite important. The equivalent figures
for scrutiny of government departments are 73.7 and 20.7 per cent.
Both roles are ranked well above debating national issues, constituency
work and supporting party policy.
However, in practice, the culture of scrutiny is poorly developed
in the House of Commons. MPs give priority to dealing with constituents
complaints (53.1 per cent) over holding government to account
(52 per cent) when asked what was their most important role; and
while just 23.5 per cent of MPs did more than five hours work
weekly on select committees, some 77.1 per cent of MPs gave more
than five hours to dealing with constituency casework . These
figures point to the well-known fact that personal priorities
for most MPs are party loyalty and constituency affairs.
In the 1999-2000 Session of Parliament, 376 MPs served on
select committees (other than business committees). There were
in all 259 places on the 21 select committees that scrutinised
government activities ( scrutiny committees ), not counting either
the Environmental Audit and Liaison committee. Thus, at any one
time, scrutiny committees required service from nearly 40 per
cent of the total membership of the House; and in all, some 57.1
per cent of MPs served at some point on a scrutiny committee.
The size of the government pay-roll in the House which now stands
at 141 members (21.4 per cent of the total number of MPs) inhibits
the capacity of the House to provide the resources in terms of
MPs abilities and time that are required for effective scrutiny.
While over half the MPs surveyed saw select committees as
the most effective mechanism for securing information and explanation
from government , MPs as a whole were under no illusions about
the capacity of Parliament to keep government s diverse activities
and agencies under effective scrutiny under a third said that
Parliament kept government spending under very or quite effective
scrutiny; and just over a quarter said the same for departmental
policy making . The scores for other scrutiny functions were far
lower.
Summary
In summary, our research indicates that strong committee
systems can be allied to traditions of strong government; and
in our view, can contribute to good government as well. The first
pre-conditions seem to be that the political parties should be
willing to enter into dialogue over draft legislation and public
policy, rather than aim to inflict defeat on their rivals; that
all or most members of a parliament participate in the work of
committees; and that the committees are properly resourced. Parties
are essential to the business of representative government; and
as our small sample shows, their strong role in parliament need
not wholly compromise the independence and integrity of committees
and can assist in satisfactory outcomes. A great deal depends
on the political culture; and in this respect, the non-partisan
ethos of UK select committees is a major advantage. Nevertheless,
the parties will naturally always wish to advance their own interests
at the expense of objective scrutiny (where that desirable commodity
exists) and possess the whip hand in the last resort. But it is
possible to encourage a political culture within which the quality
of legislation and government matter; and respect for a diversity
of view exists. Such a change in attitudes is essential in the
House and in British politics generally.
The structure, resources and powers of parliamentary committees
are vital to the overall success of any Parliament. The Modernisation
Committee should consider these aspects of the work of both standing
and select committees and also consider the committee structure
in the Commons as a whole. While select committees are more effective
than parliamentary committees abroad in the oversight role, standing
committees fail to subject draft legislation to effective scrutiny.
The Modernisation Committee ought to make proposals to reform
the standing committee process alongside improving the role of
select committees; and ought to consider root-and-branch reform
of the committee system on more European lines. Larger committees
which draw more fully on the human resources of the House ie,
on all or most MPs could transform their powers and influence.
At the same time, the House would benefit from more flexible committee
arrangements, as in Germany.
As for powers and resources, the US committees are the most
obvious models. They have more powers to call witnesses, more
control over their greater resources, and there is more transparency
in the way they are resourced. While the Modernisation Committee
will wish to respect the traditions of UK parliamentary democracy,
more powers for committees and greater and more transparent resourcing
could establish a more modern and relevant Parliament in the UK.
PART 2—CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
The Modernisation Committee can learn from the experience
of other nations. However, there are also four valuable guides
to reform at hand domestically:
— Shifting the Balance, the First Report
of the Liaison Committee (session 1999-2000);
— The Challenge for Parliament: Making Government
Accountable, the Report of the Hansard Society Commission
on Parliamentary Scrutiny (chairman, Lord Newton of Braintree),
2001;
— Strengthening Parliament, the report of
the Conservative Party's Commission to Strengthen Parliament,
July 2000 (chairman, Lord Norton of Louth); and
— Making the Law, the report of the Hansard
Society Commission on the Legislative Process, 1993 (chairman,
Lord Rippon of Hexham).
In our view, British select committees provide a firm base
for improving the accountability role of the House of Commons.
The Modernisation Committee, through the adoption of a judicious
balance of the main recommendations of the above reports, and
good practice from abroad, could put the House of Commons in the
first rank of legislatures around the world for scrutiny both
of government legislation and policy-making.
1. Broadening the role of select committees
It is important to preserve and enhance the attributes of
select committees while remedying the deficiencies of standing
committees. The Modernisation Committee should refrain from looking
at select committees in isolation from standing committees and
consider the House's ability to deal with legislative proposals
and policy-making as a whole.
We RECOMMEND that the role of select committees should be
expanded to take on scrutiny of the government's legislation as
well, as in the Scottish Parliament and west European parliaments;
and that the ad-hoc standing committees should be abolished. This
would at once bring informed scrutiny to bear upon draft legislation
and cumulatively build up extra expertise for the future. Various
aspects of current experiments in parliamentary reform in the
House of Commons already point in this direction.
2. Drawing most MPs into committee scrutiny work
To accomplish such a change, or an equivalent strengthening
of the scrutiny of legislation, the House of Commons can no longer
ignore its own human potential. The most important resource that
the House has at its disposal—the men and women who sit
on its benches—is wasted. If there were to be expanded committees
that scrutinised both government legislation and policy-making,
these new "scrutiny committees" would have to be larger
than either existing types of committee are now so as to take
on the additional workload without neglecting either aspect of
their wider scrutiny role. This would mean drawing more MPs into
a scrutiny role on committees - a change which would have the
added advantages both of developing the expertise of MPs and reducing
the scope of manipulation by party managers.
Whereas other parliaments, like the Bundestag, make
full use of the human potential at their disposal by requiring
all members to serve on parliamentary committees, our select committees
take up only 40 per cent of MPs at any one time. One of the reasons
for this is the swollen government contingent (the "payroll
vote") which appropriates a fifth (21.4 per cent) of the
House's membership. Another is the growing demand from constituents
that MPs naturally wish to satisfy to secure their seats at election
time.
It is time to make a reality of the commitment to scrutiny
which MPs expressed to the Hansard Commission. While they pay
lip-service to the ideals of scrutiny and accountability, in practice
they devote far more of their time to their constituency caseload
than to service on committees. One way of easing the conflict
would be to increase the office staff of MPs, perhaps by welfare
rights workers able to deal well with the problems of constituents.
We RECOMMEND that
— The House of Commons draw upon as large a number
of MPs as possible to staff effective scrutiny committees (however
they may be organised)
— A strict limit should be imposed on the executive's
demands on the House to allow MPs to perform their major scrutiny
functions effectively
— If necessary, the staffing needs of MPs should
be re-considered to ensure that their scrutiny role does not adversely
affect their constituency work.
3. Developing an alternative career structure
Other legislatures have developed the idea of basing "alternative
career structures" on committee service to create more informed
and consistent scrutiny of government. We set out the advantages
of this approach in other countries above. Here it would dilute
the pressures to climb the greasy pole to ministerial office—and
the deference that goes with ministerial ambition. We do not think
that it would be necessary to pay committee chair persons an extra
salary, as has been suggested; though committee chair persons
could be given additional office allowances, as in the USA, to
meet the additional costs that their responsibilities demand.
In our view, it is more important that
(a) committee structures and powers are sufficient for
committee service to offer MPs a worthwhile and effective role;
and
(b) MPs can be reasonably certain that the "alternative
career" is a stable prospect that does not depend on them
pleasing or not offending party whips.
We RECOMMEND that the Modernisation Committee consider and
develop proposals for a stable alternative career structures for
MPs based on service on scrutiny committees; and bear in mind
that a stronger and more effective committee system is likely
to encourage such alternative careers. Many of the detailed recommendations
from the four domestic reports cited above to make committees
more autonomous would do much to create confidence among MPs that
a "committee career" would be worthwhile.
4. Reforming the system for appointing committee members
Our research indicates that political parties are inescapably
involved in determining the composition and conduct of parliamentary
committees; and that their involvement can enhance their work
and influence and need not damage their effectiveness. However,
the parties in the House of Commons—and especially the governing
party—are very strictly disciplined. The politics of the
House are hierarchical and intensely partisan and do not allow
for the political flexibility within which parties and committees
work well together in other parliaments. Both Conservative and
Labour governments in the recent past have removed or blocked
chair persons and members from being appointed to particular select
committees. Conduct of this sort prejudices not only the work
of committees, but also the prospect of establishing a stable
career structure on committees and public confidence in Parliament
as a whole.
In some parliaments, the Speaker plays a mediating role between
government, parties and committees. Given the reservations which
the current Speaker has apparently expressed about his deputy
being involved in any new appointment process, independent of
party whips, it would seem that this is not a precedent that can
be followed in the UK.
We therefore RECOMMEND that the Modernisation Committee pursue
the proposal of the Hansard Society Commission report, The
Challenge for Parliament, that reform of the appointment system
for committees should be based on the Liaison Committee of select
committee chair persons. We further RECOMMEND that
— The chair persons of scrutiny committees should
be constituted as a smaller, less unwieldy committee to represent
these committees; to take charge of appointments to scrutiny committees;
and to order the resources and affairs of scrutiny committees
in a more transparent way than at present
— this smaller committee should be empowered to
establish its own executive sub-committee, as also recommended
by the Hansard Society Commission, to which all the above functions
may be delegated.
5. Strengthening the powers and resources of committees
The powers and resources of parliamentary committees around
the world are generally weak in relation to the powers and resources
of governments. Given that ministers are formally accountable
to Parliament, we believe that parliamentary committees here should
have stronger powers to require their attendance and that of named
civil servants; and to ask for official documents. Unfortunately,
committees require the approval of the House—thus, in effect,
of the government—to order attendance at a hearing. Further,
the recent Freedom of Information Act places considerable obstacles
in the way of effective committee scrutiny of government policy-making.
The resources available to committees are limited and the criteria
for awarding them are obscure. From our own experience of research
for select committees, we believe that the types of research that
can be undertaken are themselves limited. Committees should be
able, for example, to commission public opinion polls or specific
external research projects. They are also largely bound by obsolete
printing processes and House rules to produce poorly-designed
reports that have no visible popular appeal.
We RECOMMEND that the Modernisation Committee examine ways
— to strengthen the powers of committees to order
the attendance of ministers, specific civil servants and others;
and to send for documents
— to increase the resources available to committees
to conduct their business; commission research; and to publish
attractive reports, so far as is possible from individual budgets
under their own control; and
— in order to strengthen their own accountability,
scrutiny committees should organise their budgets under the oversight
of a committee of scrutiny committee chair persons, or an executive
sub-committee, on behalf of the House as a whole.
6. Creating a wider and more flexible scrutiny role
The example of the German Bundestag, with its variety
of committees, suggests that the House of Commons may benefit
from more flexibility in its arrangements for scrutiny. It may
well be worth experimenting with British versions of the German
study commissions. At the moment, the executive has a virtual
monopoly over longer-term inquiries, task forces and czardoms
of various kinds. There is a tendency for such inquiries to become
partisan, to be "captured" by sectional interests, or
to be heavily influenced by the executive in advance, as for example
both the Jenkins Commission and the Royal Commission on the Future
of the House of Lords were. The Commons would benefit from the
ability to establish alternative commissions of its own, taking
a dispassionate view of complex issues that has a longer perspective
than the next election and perhaps mixing MPs and external experts.
We RECOMMEND that the Modernisation Committee give scrutiny
committees the right to establish longer-term commissions of inquiry,
with external members as need be, on an experimental basis.
7. Other proposals
The Liaison Committee, Hansard Society and Conservative Party
reports contain sensible proposals on which our comparative research
has cast no light. We believe that the Modernisation Committee
has the opportunity to put the British Parliament in the first
rank of parliaments around the world if it builds on good practice
and experience from abroad and the recommendations of these reports.
However, our Parliament is likely to remain in the "middle
levels" of power until electoral reform; stronger
Freedom of Information laws; and a second chamber with at the
least a majority of elected members between them give parliamentarians
a real prospect of representing the people with a proper degree
of distance from executive dominion, party control or sectional
interests.
Stuart Weir and Iain Kearton
January 2002
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