Examination of Witnesses (Questions 100
- 119)
WEDNESDAY 23 JANUARY 2002
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
DAVID VENESS
CBE, QPM, DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT
A, DETECTIVE CONSTABLE
B AND DETECTIVE
CONSTABLE C
100. I wonder at times whether we have made
too rigid a distinction between PIRA and both CIRA and RIRA, bearing
in mind, for example, the Omagh situation. They do not move too
far in Northern Ireland or anywhere else without PIRA knowing
something of what is going on and yet they have not yet come forward
to reveal names and support witnesses.
(Mr Veness) We would agree with those as wise observations
for two reasons. We are seeing historical evolution and we are
seeing groups which are transforming, absorbing other members,
and regrettably absorbing new members as well. As I was mentioning
in relation to the last question, one sees some almost Godfather-type
figures who are in the wings irrespective of what the first letter
is in front of IRA, be it a "P" or "R". The
other complication is one of geography, that we are seeing a common
area of origin which in our view would be South Armagh and North
Louth where, by obvious opportunity, the chances of smuggling
are greater and that smuggling dimension flows into both organisations.
Certainly it is a dimension which we regard as the most worrying
seen from the position of British citizens in GB.
Mr Tynan
101. We have evidence that by the end of October
2000 something like 44 million cigarettes were confiscated, double
the amount that was confiscated in 1999. Have you any idea of
the routes that contraband and smuggled goods and the materials
for manufacturing such contraband have travelled between Northern
Ireland and Great Britain and between the UK and Europe?
(Mr Veness) I could give you a broad view on that
but it might be helpful if I refer to my two detective constable
colleagues who know infinitely more about the detail than I do.
Chairman
102. Please feel free to let the best person
answer.
(Mr Veness) Absolutely, which invariably will not
be me, Chairman.
(Mr B) Obviously this is an issue that we have been
looking at closely for the last several years, the issue of terrorist
fund raising. Since we have been looking at it we have seen an
evolution, changes in methods that terrorists will use to raise
funds. With regard to, for example, hydrocarbon fuels, when we
first started looking at the issue we saw the movement of fuels
from the island of Ireland on to the mainland. That seems to have
dropped off and we now see the terrorists almost self-sufficient
on the mainland using, as has been already highlighted, contacts
with English criminals on the mainland to launder diesel. That
is one of the trends that we have seen. With regard to hand-rolling
tobacco and cigarettes, we have seen terrorist organisations making
bulk purchases from warehouses on mainland Europe and using Great
Britain as a route to take them back beyond Ireland. We have also
seen evidence of terrorist groups using haulage companies' drivers.
The wagons will come on to the mainland from the island of Ireland
effectively empty, so if they were stopped at a west coast port
and searched they would be empty. They would then travel to mainland
Europe to a warehouse, perhaps in Germany or Belgium, make a bulk
purchase of cigarettes or hand-rolling tobacco, secrete it very
cleverly in the back of the heavy goods vehicle, move back on
to mainland Great Britain, possibly through an east or south coast
port, as I said, extremely cleverly disguised in shells of certain
agricultural equipment etc, and the cigarettes would then be disseminated
from Great Britain at a warehouse, at a farm, wherever, again
using English criminals to do that. The wagon would then travel
back to the island of Ireland and if it was stopped would once
again be empty. We have seen the evolution of that sort of moving
hand-rolling tobacco and cigarettes. We have also seen the evolution
of the movement of massive containers full of cigarettes. The
richest source of hand-rolling tobacco and cigarettes that we
can identify at the moment would be the Baltic States and south
east Asia. Obviously, by moving containers they completely cut
Great Britain out of the equation. That is an overview of the
trends that we have been monitoring up to the present time.
Chairman
103. Are the X-ray facilities we have now got
at some of the ports any use in this sort of contraband or only
any use for human beings?
(Mr B) They are of use. Obviously this is an area
of expertise that Customs have the lead on and we are very much
dependent on Customs' X-ray machines to identify this form of
smuggling. However, where X-ray machines have been deployed in
certain east coast ports we have seen the displacement of smuggled
traffic to avoid these X-ray machines. According to my Customs
colleagues, and as I say it is their area of expertise, this is
extremely effective in identifying and displacing movement of
contraband goods.
Mr Tynan
104. How successful are Customs in preventing
contraband cigarettes and alcohol coming in? How often do they
catch someone? The reason I ask is that I have a haulage company
in my constituency which was stopped with £250,000 worth
of cigarettes and hand-rolling tobacco and they claimed that the
driver was responsible. He ended up having his lorry restored
to him without a fine and there was no action, I understand, taken
against the driver himself. I am just wondering how successful
we are in identifying and prosecuting that kind of smuggling.
(Mr C) The policies on prosecution and so forth would
be a Customs matter. In terms of how successful they are, we are
obviously aware that the numbers of seizures have increased, certainly
over the last 12 months, and there has been a more progressive
multi-agency approach to this problem. One measure of their success
could be seen in the fact that the price on the black market for
sleeves of hand-rolling tobacco and cigarettes has increased over
the last six months in particular. We have seen some very substantial
seizures of containers, which my colleague spoke about, and also
ships coming into both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
105. This might seem a daft question, but as
regards the paramilitaries finding a market for contraband, is
that very easy to do and, if it is easy to do, are the people
who are buying the contraband aware that they are breaking the
law and how do you see that kind of action taking place?
(Mr C) This is where your interaction with criminals
comes into play. They will find your market place for you so you
have your wholesaler then to push the cigarettes out to outlets,
clubs, car boot sales. Many people have the impression that it
is a victimless crime. The penalties compared to importing class
A drugs are considerably lower, so people are prepared to take
the risk to sell the goods.
The Reverend Martin Smyth
106. How do you disrupt the distribution and
dealing in contraband and smuggling goods on the mainland? What
other agencies are employed and involved with you?
(Mr Veness) I will take the strategic ground and then
turn to Superintendent A for the day to day conduct of operations.
It has to be conducted in a pan-agency and indeed pan-geographic
approach. It cannot be done purely from London and it cannot be
done by one law enforcement agency. We describe this as UK Counter-Terrorism
PLC. It has to be that conjunction of endeavours. In terms of
strategic linkage, clearly the Police Services are critical and
that is both the Police Service of Northern Ireland and Garda
Si«ocha«na and, because of the evolution of GB counter-terrorism,
there is the very effective network that exists around the Special
Branches of the United Kingdom. We on the police side have both
policy mechanisms within the Association of Chief Police Officers
and indeed an operational advisory group, of which I am the Chairman,
which deals with day to day co-ordination of operations. This
is far from being a police service endeavour on its own and must
involve the critical contribution of Her Majesty's Customs and
Excise, indeed all of the border agencies, Inland Revenue and
many others as well, including indeed the private sector in respect
of the running of ports. In terms of day to day operations we
have a series of initiatives which have involved port operations,
traffic operations and linking those both in human and technical
terms, for example exploitation of automatic number plate recognition
technology coupled with CCTV. Perhaps I can turn to Superintendent
A who will touch on the respective operations.
(Mr A) About 18 months ago, coming at this from the
police perspective and the national security side of the police
perspective of countering terrorism, we realised that the number
of agencies were looking very much at the same targets that we
were looking at. They may have been looking at them from a different
angle, of course. Customs and Excise are very much involved in
this type of activity, and police investigating criminal activity
across the country have also been touching on this activity but
not necessarily recognising the security implications that we
sought to identify and highlight. At that stage, about 15 months
ago, we joined with the Security Service and all other police
services in mainland Great Britain for a joint national plan to
counter RIRA activity here in Great Britain. There were four main
planks to that plan. One of them was very much aimed at attacking
the dissident smuggling. We realised that the sort of intelligence
that would be received within various organisations may or may
not be acted on, depending on the threshold for dealing with that
intelligence, the level of activity that was going on and the
operational objectives of the particular organisation. We sought
to bring those together. We were aware that probably a number
of police officers working at a local level would be coming across
exactly the sort of activity my colleagues have described: people
distributing hand-rolling tobacco, cigarettes, alcohol, diesel.
That may not be a priority for the local police who are engaged
in combatting robberies and burglaries. Likewise, the Customs
and Excise may be looking at the higher strategic levels. We wanted
to bring this together and highlight across the country that there
is an interest in this activity and that the police services,
the security services, Customs and Excise and other government
bodies, including the MoD engaged in Northern Ireland, could come
together and maximise the use of the intelligence and the various
intelligence sources to create opportunities to intercept some
of these loads and create the opportunities to infiltrate the
operations and disrupt the loads and deny to the terrorists the
smuggling routes that Mr Veness has pointed out. A number of operations
have happened throughout that time ranging out from the port operations.
That was probably the first time that we have co-ordinated operations
around the country where we have linked the west coast and the
south coast, for the very reason pointed out by my two colleagues,
the fact that when we first covered this we were probably looking
at it from the fact that we were the land bridge between Europe
and Ireland. That is the way we started to close down our borders
and we actually had some significant successes there, not only
in terms of seizures but also in terms of disrupting activity
and preventing terrorist activity here in Great Britain during
those times. From there we have seen this market develop and the
whole market has developed from the supply through the processing
to distribution. Again, we engage all the agencies in developing
the intelligence, working with each other and usually choosing
the most appropriate agency to follow through the disruption,
the seizure or an investigation and prosecution. This is really
day to day work. We find probably 80 or 90 per cent of our intelligence
in relation to the activity of certainly dissident Irish terrorism
here in on the British mainland will touch on some of this contraband
or smuggling activity.
107. I appreciate that one of the problems of
dealing with contraband, drugs and such like, is that different
bodies have their own views and their own interests. There are
those who want to try to trace it to where it is going with the
possibility of it being lost, as has happened before, and sometimes
others want to get the credit for seizure when another agency
has actually given it guidance. Is that continuing or is there
greater co-operation now, or is there nervousness? Or, if I may
put it another way, the police's first obligation is to protect
and preserve life. Does that come in very fast whereas, if it
were to be left for a little while, we might have more success
in getting to the root of the matter?
(Mr Veness) There is always more that one can achieve
and if one has different cap badges serving different organisations
one inevitably is going to get different priorities, different
performance indicators, and they play both a benign and sometimes
a less helpful role. The advantage that we have, although we would
rather we did not have it in relation to terrorism, is that the
penalty of not getting this right is the loss of life of members
of the public. The agencies are seized of what they can contribute
to that endeavour. If we get it wrong then this degree of activity
is going to fund real bomb-making. Indeed, it is the same activity
in terms of the logistic routes. There is true meeting of minds
at the most senior level. The heads of the component elements
of Customs and Excise, for example, and the relative directors
of the security service, get together and we are behind these
concerted endeavours. If there is the opportunity to make a decision
between playing it long and playing it short, ie, interdiction
at an early stage, it will be driven by a judgement on how we
can make the optimum impact on the terrorist organisation. If
it is around playing it long in order to build up the information,
the awkward bit of senior decision making that comes into this
is the unwelcome one that we could not afford, in playing it long,
to allow a bomb or the constituents of a bomb to run in a risky
sense. Speaking personally, those are the real two o'clock in
the morning, wake-with-a-start moments when you have reflected
on those. There has to be a judgement that is decided on the grounds
of public safety. In many ways, whilst there are similarities
in allowing some kilos of heroin or allowing other material to
run, we have seen the Real IRA on several of the recent attacks
on the mainland actually purchase the vehicle on the day of the
attack, so they are putting together the vehicle, the bomb, the
explosive and the timer power unit all in the space of a few hours
and putting it down. There is a need for high speed and accurate
decision making. Taking your point, sir, of course it is right
to let it run if we can and if that is bigger than the performance
measure of an individual organisation, then so be it. We have
got this question mark hanging over that decision making process.
108. I appreciate the problem, bearing in mind
that at least one large lorry has got lost somewhere along the
road in the past. Can I ask, since you did not mention it, what
is the role of Europol with you in coming to some of these decisions,
especially with material coming from the continent?
(Mr Veness) There are two ways in which Europol can
assist us. From my desk at Scotland Yard the operational asset
that Europol gives my colleagues and I is that there are liaison
officers from the 15 states of Europe who effectively are working
on one corridor. In a drug sense, if we have got a movement that
is, say, coming out of North Africa into Spain, traversing France
up into the Low Countries and then coming into Felixstowe, we
have got the ability to achieve operational co-ordination very
quickly and, even more importantly, where we have got the clash
between the common law and the Napoleonic system, to engage with
magistrates if that is necessary, particularly in those states
where that applies. Of course that has all leapt on since the
Justice and Home Affairs meeting last autumn where there has been
an added mandate for Europe, particularly in the light of the
events of 11 September. We have all now as European states contributed
extra liaison officers whose sole purpose is to track terrorist
movement. That is giving us an extra dimension. It would be entirely
accurate to report, and you will probably not find it unexpected,
sir, that the focus of the officers that we have sent there in
the period a few months before Christmas and after has been at
this stage on international terrorism and the various links around
Europe associated with al-Qaeda. However, I am confident that
the role of Europol will develop as I have discussed with you
already and, in relation to class A drugs, it will be of assistance
when time permits in this arena as well.
109. How far can you monitor and how do you
monitor activity? What guidelines have you about intelligence
that tells you of heightened activity? Are there any sort of patterns
that have been observed that can help you as you come to decisions?
(Mr Veness) Our major allies are the Police Services
of the island of Ireland.
The Committee suspended from 4.38 pm to 4.48
pm for a division in the House.
Chairman
110. Perhaps you could carry on, Mr Veness,
answering the Reverend Martin Smyth's question.
(Mr Veness) Clearly the multi-agency dimension is
the critical one. I think there are further opportunities in terms
of bringing together the energies and the skills that rest within
diverse organisations. The mistake is to assume that any one organisation
has a mastery of any one of those. I am sure there is a lot of
scope for more umbrella networking opportunities.
111. No patterns have come up? At home, for
example, some of us begin to predict when we would expect certain
things to happen.
(Mr Veness) I acknowledge entirely the sheer scale
of activity, particularly within the Province compared with Great
Britain. Fortuitously, the scale of our activity is very modest
on any comparison whatsoever. When I mentioned complexity, it
is the challenge of putting a mainland operation together, moving
the explosive, marrying it up with the timer power unit, conducting
the reconnaissance where there may be varying levels of heightened
police security. Our opportunities when we have been very close,
ie, we have been behind following the particular group, are that
they are a combination of the challenges of putting the operation
together rather than being able to neatly align that with a particular
occasion. But of course you are right, sir. In respect of key
events, and we have seen that particularly in Real IRA activity
where significant developments in the peace process at Easter
have been chosen as opportunities, we must be at heightened alert.
It is a regrettable fact that we have been in a period of consistent
heightened alert since June 2000 in respect of the Real IRA so
that has not allowed respite. In that period there have been these
episodic eight attacks of Real IRA on the mainland, some aligned
with predictable periods, some not. There are a couple within
there that are not. The attacks on the Hendon post office do not
appear to have that thread of logic.
Mr Clarke
112. Following on from your last comments, of
course the complexities of trying to stop the sources of funding
that will enable that terrorist activity to take place are more
complex because, whilst we may pre-guess certain periods in the
year, such as Easter, where there could be heightened risk of
attack, as far as sourcing and funding the materials for that
attack, that could happen at any time.
(Mr Veness) Yes.
113. That brings me to ask you a question in
respect of your operations throughout the year with regard to
stop and search. I wondered first off if you could tell me whether
or not your stop and search operations are of a continuous nature
or whether or not they are targeted at particular times or particular
ports or a particular issue that may or may not come off.
(Mr Veness) In broad terms what we seek to achieve
are rings of concentric security so that it is not as if there
is one barrier or hurdle to get across; there is a string. For
example, if somebody is bringing in a lorry load of material in
which there are secreted home-made explosives, we seek to create
a barrier at the ports, a barrier in respect of movement on either
the motorway or a major road, and also a barrier as one gets to
a likely area for putting that explosive together with a vehicle,
some form of agricultural outhouse, and then a barrier around
the target areas themselves. We seek to operate that in a series
of lines of defence. We seek to make those as unpredictable as
possible so that the terrorist does not have the benefit of knowing
which particular area it is. Will it be Caernarfon or Holyhead?
Where is the multi-agency activity going to be? What we do know
is that the ability of the haulage trade to pick up where we are
active is phenomenal and is at least the equivalent of our own
process of feedback in that regard. It is a question of trying
to drive that through intelligence as far as we can. As Reverend
Martin Smyth was indicating, the best sources of intelligence
that target our operations come from the Police Service of Northern
Ireland and Garda Si«ocha«na for the very definition
of the point of origin. We have the advantage of the powers that
are available under section 44(1) and (2) of the Terrorism Act
which allow us to operate with a heightened degree of terrorist
focused stop and search, so we will seek to utilise the specific
powers that are given to us under the Terrorism Act rather than
a general application of stop and search in a broad criminal sense.
We will be doing that if we have evidence that that is appropriate.
Those are powers that, for example, if I as a chief officer sign
them, they need to be ratified by the Home Secretary in person,
so there is a serious degree of supervision of the judgement that
I am making, for example, in invoking the powers under section
44(1) and (2). It will be those powers or specific powers that
our colleagues in Customs and Excise would be operating under
rather than blanket stop and search powers.
114. Moving that on to look at the multi-agency
arrangements that would be required between yourselves and the
Customs and Excise, and indeed others, to form a successful operation,
given that the evidence is on a confidential basis, could you
talk about the level of resources that are needed to carry out
that work and whether or not that level of resources is made available
both towards yourselves and towards your partners throughout the
year?
(Mr Veness) It is a very significant challenge. For
example, it could not be more acute than it is at the moment because
if, for example, an al-Qaeda attack or an attack by one of the
associated international terrorist groups were to take place here
with, as we have seen, macro casualty implications the consequences
would be devastating, so we must at the moment be focusing on
that particular threat as well as having always a vigilant eye
to what may be emanating from the island of Ireland. The most
likely probability we think here in London this afternoon in terms
of statistical probability would be a Real IRA attack, but if
it were an international terrorist attack the difference would
be that the impact that that could potentially make in terms of
death and public harm would be, one hopes, markedly different,
so these are not easy judgements. As you know, we are in vigorous
debate about trying to do both of those. To be frank, sitting
here this afternoon, the events of 11 September have meant that
we can no longer without extra resourcing address the twin challenges
of continuing dissident IRA activity, for example, in the major
cities of the United Kingdom and a greatly enhanced international
terrorist threat. We are moving resources one from the other,
and indeed not only one from the other but we are moving them
from crime that affects people in their homes, in their families
and in their high streets as well.
115. That is very helpful. Whilst I would not
expect you to answer for colleagues within Customs and Excise,
would you say that the pressures on them are equally severe?
(Mr Veness) Absolutely, yes. You are absolutely right
in terms of have they got class A drugs, cocaine and heroin. They
have got people smuggling drugs, but there is also the whole issue
of exploitation, of child prostitution, etc. All those cases are
eminently worthy of significant public resources and choices have
to be made. From an entirely selfish counter-terrorist perspective
I would value the advantages of, for example, impacting upon dissident
Irish Republican activity on the mainland as being an even more
prioritised activity within Customs and Excise. It has a practical
implication because there are levels at which one would tend to
kick in in terms of activity, we would suggest. Indeed, whenever
we raise it our Customs colleagues are enormously supportive,
helpful and understanding, but they have got a great many other
things on their plate as well.
Mr Clarke: That is understood. Thank you.
Mr Bailey
116. Looking at the legal weapons that you have
at your disposal for combatting terrorism and cross-border activities,
you have already mentioned that you use the Terrorism Act. What
sort of offences would you look for in using that act as a basis
for taking action against those people?
(Mr Veness) We are fortunate in that there has been
a significant degree of government commitment to terrorist law.
I need not remind anybody here that only in recent weeks we have
had the opportunity to contribute to the new act of December of
last year, so this is a vibrant and continuing debate which we
warmly welcome in the law enforcement community. Primarily in
direct answer to your question, the Terrorism Act 2000 gives us
the fund-raising provision, the use and possession of funds, laundering
provisions, and indeed some very salutary periods of imprisonment
and indeed forfeiture provisions that augment those thereafter.
There are robust powers within there. Within the new Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act of December 2001 we have got the provisions
for seizure of cash and disposal of assets which helpfully now
is on the balance of probabilities. There are real opportunities
for us to move against those organisations, including the preparation
and instigation of acts of terrorism which is probably the charge
that we would most commonly use in relation to the actual mainstream
terrorist activity.
Chairman
117. Have you used any of these powers yet or
are you in the process of doing so?
(Mr Veness) The Terrorism Act 2000 we use every day.
I have referred to the search powers which in my judgement are
indispensable and on which we regularly make applications to the
Home Secretary. The provisions that we have historically enjoyed
under the Terrorism Act, particularly for the extended detention
of prisoners, are absolutely indispensable from a terrorist investigation.
We just would not reach first base on in respect of the forensic—
118. You have misunderstood me. I meant do you
use any of the new ones to seize and confiscate?
(Mr Veness) Yes. With regard to the specific offences,
not in relation to Irish Republican terrorism, we have ongoing
investigations in respect of international terrorism. Of course,
it was only just before Christmas, the 19th, that we had the opportunity
to pursue them.
Mr Bailey
119. In effect you have mentioned some offences
for which you find this legislation very helpful. If you could
look at the range of offences on which you work with the Customs
in combatting, many of which are relevant to RIRA activity and
other terrorist acts, are there any gaps, do you think, in the
existing legislation that should be filled to enable you to do
your work more effectively?
(Mr Veness) If I were to point to one in particular
it would be in relation to penalties, particularly on the powers
that are available to our colleagues in Customs and Excise. The
example that I would use is that if one were engaged in the importation
of class A drugs, then one would be looking at potentially ten
to 14 years as the risk that the criminal is running. For most
of the excise evasion offences that have these deadly consequences,
amongst which is the hydrocarbon for the home-made explosive,
we are talking just in terms of a Customs prosecution, of a probable
ceiling of seven years. As seen from the terrorist perspective,
and you can see it every day in terms of common criminality, they
would rather take a risk at this end of the market in terms of
excise evasion than run the risk of the other offences that we
have historically (and I think now slightly out of date) regarded
as the focus for the most serious crimes. To be frank, the criminal
mind has moved ahead by seeing the opportunity that is presented
by this particular form of criminality.
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