Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120
- 135)
WEDNESDAY 23 JANUARY 2002
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
DAVID VENESS
CBE, QPM, DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT
A, DETECTIVE CONSTABLE
B AND DETECTIVE
CONSTABLE C
120. In terms of providing a justification for
using the acts which are available under the new legislation,
what sort of level of evidence do you need before you can start
to take steps to use it? What do you look for?
(Mr Veness) In terms of beginning the investigation,
it is risk to life and a threat in relation to harm to the public.
We would begin an investigation on that basis. Clearly pretty
well all of the offences which are provided for require the criminal
burden of proof to be satisfied before we are able to move to
proactive operation in respect of arrest. We do not have of course
the specific provision under the Terrorism Act 2000 whereby being
concerned in terrorism gives us a broader basis. Those are the
indispensable powers that I have described to the Chairman and
which have been of such merit.
Mr Beggs
121. How satisfied are you, bearing in mind
the amount of effort that has got to be put in to bring forward
a successful prosecution, that sentencing policy is consistent
and is used also to be a deterrent?
(Mr Veness) I am not, sir, for partly the reason that
I touched upon beforehand. I think that certainly we are seeing
that the paramilitaries in Great Britain, particularly dissident
and especially the Real IRA, have seen an opportunity whereby
their profit, both the personal, organisational and terrorist
purposes, can be gained with a relatively low risk as to the eventual
criminal outcome. If they were engaged in doing this with cocaine
they would be in real jeopardy of prison sentences. That is why
they have chosen diesel washing and alcohol and tobacco, because
they know where the ceiling rests and indeed how the courts will
interpret that. To a degree it is a question of understanding
how the forensic map of activity is changing and how criminality,
particularly terrorist criminality, is exploiting that degree
of understanding. I would emphasise that the picture we are painting
of dissident activity, particularly here in Great Britain, is
a year or 15 months old. * * *
122. Can I follow on from this, I had finished
but you provoked another question, there is, I think, quite an
interesting moral and philosophical dilemma here. What you are
saying is that because of the shorter sentences which arise from
smuggling petrol, cigarettes, and so on, the paramilitaries are
moving into those areas rather than drugs. Bearing in mind the
profits from either of those activities are equally devastating
in terms of their capacity to cause disruption, if you like, there
is not a lot of difference, but in terms of the so-called social
consequences the smuggling of petrol and cigarettes, whilst not
below the consequence, is not as devastating as the smuggling
of cocaine and heroin. The latter has far more short-term potential
to cause enormous social damage, so you could almost construct
an argument that it is better keeping them in tobacco and petrol
smuggling than cocaine. I just throw this up as one of the things
we really have to look at because, to a certain extent, there
is always going to be a level of displacement activity and if
they move the penalties for one they will then begin with another
and we have to assess the social consequences of that diversion
of their criminality.
(Mr Veness) I take a rather more optimistic view of
confidence in judicial discretion. If a ceiling is available to
a judge to impose a penalty in a particular case then if within
the facts of that case there are clearly exacerbating factors
that seems to me to be an entirely proper consideration that a
judge should bear in mind. If, for example, he sees a group of
defendants in front of him who although they have been engaged
in diesel laundering but they are, in fact, clearly using part
of that in order to inflict great harm on the British public then
that seems to me, if it is provable on the evidence, to be an
entirely justifiable deduction for a judge to form, providing
he has the sentencing scope to do it. What I am suggesting is
that the sentencing scope at the moment limits the deterrent effect
upon the criminal and, in fact, encourages the criminal to be
a cigarette smuggler and a diesel launderer, because they are
taking advantage of the moral dilemma that you have described.
Mr Bailey: In a way it is similar to the principle
behind the enhanced sentencing debate to a motivated crime, that
is level of discretion.
Mr Barnes
123. On the one hand you have the world of ordinary
criminal activity you describe and then you have terrorist activity.
Terrorist activity is probably the clearest when it is doing its
attacking, bombing, etc, and is, maybe, less clear when it is
involved in illegal fund-raising activities. In between there
is this sort of intermingled world of terrorists out to get cash
and engaging in activities that are the same as the ordinary criminal
world, and they are sometimes involved with those criminals, but
this is going to be at very different degrees. You will even get
criminals in some way involved in assisting these activities who
are not aware of the game they are in to.
(Mr Veness) Yes.
124. How do you establish yourselves that this
is linked in with terrorist-type interests and concerns in this
world that is it in between the two?
(Mr Veness) You are absolutely right, your point is
a significant challenge of detection. With research and intelligent
analysis they are detectable in terms of which is broadly one
and which looks to be exclusively, if I can describe it like that,
without the common criminality which has no link. For example,
what is the logistic chain and is it back to an area where we
know that there are associations with terrorist activity historically?
Can we trace that linkage? The individuals who are concerned,
are their antecedents those of acquisitive criminality exclusively
or are their antecedents more complicated? What you are touching
upon, indicative as well, is the very real challenge for Great
Britain, because if this complication of a terrorist who is engaged
X days a week in either lining his own pocket, lining his organisation's
pocket or creating the financial flexibility to spend £500
on a car which is going to be a car bomb on Saturday but is also
working with GB based criminals the extent to which we are going
to get a leeching of paramilitary activity into mainland criminality,
either willingly or by coercion, is to me a very significant cause
for concern. The drift is in the wrong direction on that at the
moment.
125. Whilst it will be awkward in many ways
just to establish, in terms of getting hold of money, what the
terrorist element is in that it must be more difficult for you
to then prove what the link is between the two?
(Mr Veness) Yes.
126. That, presumably, is what you ideally want
to do in order to stamp down on the terrorist element. Can you,
perhaps, just describe what some of these problems are?
(Mr Veness) In many ways the utopian outcome is to
achieve an exclusively focussed terrorist prosecution which portrays
before the courts the criminality and the fact that this was all
geared towards a terrorist outcome, a bomb or an assassination,
or whatever. That would be our overwhelming objective. The duty
is more complicated for us because if we have opportunities under
the criminal law to prosecute somebody for criminality and that
would have the effect of disrupting what they are able to do as
a terrorist it would seem to me to be in the public interest to
vigorously pursue them across the board. For example, to use the
international example, here on the mainland a great many international
terrorists are engaged in credit card fraud. If we can deal with
them before the courts for that that seems to me to be in the
public interest because whilst they are engaged in dealing with
the problem of being prosecuted for credit card fraud their inclination
or attitude for other forms of activity will be reduced, so we
have to move on the broad front.
127. You indicated that you had an interest
in seeing sentencing scope extended in various areas, because
you felt that that would have, maybe, a deterrent effect on criminal
activities that would be linked in with terrorist activity. Are
there other problems that you feel that the courts or legislative
system presents to you in not being able to get action taken,
prosecutions established and that there is some scope for adjustment?
(Mr Veness) There are very significant broad challenges
in mounting a terrorist prosecution in Great Britain, regardless
of whether it is Irish of whatever form, loyalist or dissident
Republican or, indeed, international. They all arise from the
very best possible motives. These are entirely legitimate areas
of concern. Custody time limits place an enormous burden upon
the investigators in order to bring those matters promptly before
the court; the provisions and challenges that exist under the
European Convention of Human Rights, all entirely respected; the
position that arises under Public Interest Immunity and the probing
of the sources of information. If you put all of those factors,
all extremely justifiable individually, together then there are
formidable hurdles in bringing successful terrorist prosecutions.
This is true of many legal jurisdictions, ours is an example of
that. I am not pretending those can be changed this afternoon.
Chairman
128. You use the word "coercion" have
you any evidence that on the mainland what you might call ordinary
common criminals having been associated with some scam involving
some terrorists, he then gets lent on, as is endemic in Northern
Ireland, and once you join that club you do not leave it or else
somebody gets killed or knee-capped. Do we have evidence of that
in Britain?
(Mr C) * * * There is certainly evidence of people
being pressurised not to speak out to the authorities of the people
they are dealing with. Very serious threats.
129. Not just not speaking out but continuing
in the same line of criminality because once you have done it,
once you are in the club we will see that you will stay in the
club.
(Mr Veness) I will not pretend it is on the same scale
as our colleagues face in Northern Ireland. There are certainly
examples, both historic, in the medium term and current where
we are seeing this.
Mr Barnes
130. In Northern Ireland there is some indication
that the Provisional IRA get themselves more involved in what
might be termed mafia-type activities, that is the backlog of
their previous position and now they are used to this type of
activity they now do it very much for their own benefit. Being
as they are not as active in Great Britain as the Real IRA, who
have different objectives in this connection, is this a different
pattern that you think that you have got here with the Real IRA,
although you did use the term IRA plc and indicated there might
be a deal of ripping things off for one's own individual benefit
that was behind it, it was part of the culture that may be occurring
within the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland?
(Mr Veness) The broad distinction I would draw, and
colleagues may wish to add to it, is that the structure that one
sees associated with PIRA is very much akin in organisational
terms to a mafia-type structure of organised crime. One sees a
great deal of discipline. One sees a significant degree of coercion
and one sees the profits under control for the benefit of the
organisation. I would not exclude the footprint of that activity
associated with PIRA here in Great Britain, I do not think we
can draw a neat division in respect of where that occurs. The
reason I have focussed on the Real IRA is because that is the
group that is currently bombing Great Britain, I think that is
entirely appropriate. They are marked at the moment by a much
looser structure, one which appears to be rather more nakedly
geared towards profit, both of the individual members and, to
a degree, the organisation, and almost having the capability,
because there is a significant amount of used bank notes as part
of the process, that if you do want to buy a motor car for £500
on a Saturday afternoon you can do that without significant obstruction
or need for specific fund-raising activity. I think one sees a
distinction in terms of the structures of the two organisations
and they are not exclusive.
Mr Barnes: Thank you.
Mr Tami
131. The Metropolitan Police Service is not
represented on the Organised Crime Task Force for Northern Ireland,
do you think that is a problem, something that should be changed,
or are you happy with that relationship?
(Mr Veness) We respect that the Northern Ireland Organised
Crime Task Force is a Northern Ireland entity under ministerial
leadership. We see an increasing nexus, as I hope we have been
able to pit this afternoon, and a worrying one, between the spread
of particular forms of paramilitary criminality on to Great Britain.
I think the case is either driven by the needs of a particular
investigation, a particular project that the Task Force are engaged
in, and we would be anxious to contribute if we could play a useful
part. We are conscious that that is an entity that is growing
and developing. We are very much encouraged by its work and we
would wish to be supportive if the opportunity presented itself.
132. You talked today about how you interact
with various groups, Customs, et cetera, how well do you think
that works? Where do you think that can be improved? Are there
organisations that work better with you? I know it is a catch-all
question.
(Mr Veness) The closest link, as I hope you predicted,
would be with the Police Service of Northern Ireland, that is
because the logistic route that worries us most is going to emanate
from that territory. Certainly almost of equal significance in
law enforcement terms is the work of the Garda Sochana. Superintendent
A who heads up the Irish Squad of the Metropolitan Police Special
Branch his dealings are more regularly with Dublin and Belfast
than they are with Sussex, and that is operationally essential.
The linkages that exist at chief officer and director level in
respect of the organisations are very effective. I mentioned that
I think there may be the opportunity, particularly as we are seeing
a dynamically evolving picture, of the footprint of these activities
on the mainland for that to achieve yet greater structural and
strategic focus in terms of the sort of concerted endeavours we
have seen against Class A drugs, the exploitation of humans, child
prostitution, where we do see rather more cohesive and enduring
structures and a keener appreciation at all levels of the organisation.
This is a problem that is not only real but is getting worse,
which focuses the endeavours that follow. There are opportunities
which maybe could build upon the work of the Northern Ireland
Organised Crime Task Force. It is almost as if without being unduly
adventurous there is a United Kingdom role that could be performed
here, because this is not just a Northern Ireland problem, and
we have the additional actors who can play a role here, our own
National Crime Intelligence Service and our own National Crime
Squad, who provide a cohesive GB contribution.
133. If I was stopped with a lorry, Customs
stopped me, and I am found to have cigarettes or whatever substance,
how is that interaction worked? What is the mechanism that they
decide, is it on the scale, is it based purely on intelligence
that you might have had before about this particular load, bearing
in mind I might not have any connections with Northern Ireland
or anything like that?
(Mr C) There is a system in place of seizure notification.
You talk about the interaction with other agencies, certainly
over the last 18 months the improvement and the co-operation with
various agencies, not just Customs & Excise, but also traffic
officers, the armed services, they are all working together against
this problem, has been immense, therefore, there is a greater
awareness amongst all of these different agencies that should
something come to their notification that is of interest in terms
of this problem we note it within real time and we can act on
that and try to seize what intelligence is available on that and
the sharing of that intelligence. It is progressing forward in
a very positive manner.
(Mr A) I think it is a very good point to make as
well because the average driver will not have security traces
and they will be selected for that very purpose. The criminals
that are engaged in the warehousing distribution of these goods
when they arrive do not have security traces, they will be British
based criminals. It is important that we do engage very closely,
usually with Customs & Excise, and we deal with that at the
strategic level. We also encourage forces around the country to
engage locally and operationally with their regional customs officers
and certainly any suspicions of these activities are usually reported,
any pre-emptive operations are usually discussed before they happen.
Yes, there are some significant successes being built, one particular
case I can refer to is a lorry entering Great Britain, intelligence
had been developed over the weekend, it had actually come to fruition
over night and the lorry landed in the South of England at Dover.
This lorry was hauling a considerable amount, about 2.5 million
cigarettes were suspected, concealed within a legitimate load,
very cleverly concealed, there was a heavy plant inside the load
that was hollowed out. The only purpose of this lorry was the
carcass * * * stuffed with 2.5 million cigarettes. Customs and
Excise have a certain threshold where they are allowed or not
allowed to let loads go, with very quick negotiations between
four services—that was ourselves, the Police Service in
Northern Ireland, Customs & Excise and the Security Service—we
hooked together an operation plan very quickly, on the hoof, a
very effective operational plan, that took that vehicle to the
North of England, where it arrived at a farm. Just to give you
an indication of the speed of the activity, literally within minutes
of this vehicle unloading its goods in a large empty barn and
then moving on into the road network, off towards its port of
departure back to Ireland, a whole swarm of white vans arrived
to take this stuff off to the local distribution point. Yes, decisions
have to be made very quickly. When we do arrive on the lorry we
have someone with no security tracings, criminals with no security
tracings, and there is this balance to be achieved between seizing
the goods and establishing whether the goods are linked to paramilitary
terrorism. The link is the person who is paying the driver and
engaging the criminals, that person has not touched the British
mainland in the operation. It is really holding up these relationships,
that is the main focus of our activity. I would say they have
been very successful and I hope we continue to be so.
Chairman
134. Thank you. Mr Veness, you and your colleagues
have given us very helpful evidence, very frank. As I said before,
we will send you the transcript of what you said so you can decide
whether any of it should not see the light of day—you cannot
unsay anything you said but we will do our best to accommodate
you all. Thank you very much indeed.
(Mr Veness) May I return the thanks of my colleagues
for your interest in our work as well.
135. We hope in the end we will be able to help
with this report.
(Mr Veness) We regard this as a very important and
developing area and we are very grateful for your time. Thank
you.
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