THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL PROBATION
SERVICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS STRATEGY
THE
HOME
OFFICE'S
MANAGEMENT
AND
OVERSIGHT
OF
THE
PROGRAMME
8. The Home Office had originally planned that the
probation service as a whole should own and manage the NPSISS
programme. The Strategy was to be overseen by a board comprising
representatives from the probation service and the Home Office.[8]
Individual probation services, however, could refuse to accept
the NPSISS network and associated software. Despite good buy-in
to the strategy initially, there was a high level of resistance
throughout the probation service to accepting CRAMS. A key lesson
from this programme was the need for clarity of ownership from
the outset of an information technology project. The establishment
of the new National Probation Service was expected to bring tighter
management control over information technology in the probation
service.[9]
9. In its first seven years to 2001, the Home Office's
programme management team was led by seven successive programme
directors, of whom only two had significant experience of managing
major information technology projects.[10]
The first programme director was in post for four years until
1997 when she took early retirement. Subsequently, a number of
people were brought in to provide temporary cover, but some left
because they did not have the experience or capacity to do the
job. The National Probation Service has now appointed a new Head
of Information Technology, with relevant experience.[11]
10. The high turnover in the programme director post,
and the lack of appropriate skills and experience, was damaging
to the programme. In the Department's view, the development of
the professional skills required for such specialist jobs was
often difficult within the Civil Service because there was a tendency
to reward and promote officials for breadth of knowledge rather
than specialist knowledge. This made it difficult to keep people
focused on a relatively narrow objective over a period of years.
Following a recent review, the Home Office was introducing better
training in project management disciplines for senior staff and
more intense training for those working on major projects.[12]
11. Consultants commissioned by the Home Office in
early 2000 had found the programme team badly under-resourced
with misaligned skills.[13]
The Home Office failed to recognise at an early stage the need
for appropriate resources to manage the programme. At times, during
the 1990s, there had been as few as five or six people working
on the contract. By November 2001, the National Probation Service
had increased its Information and Technology Group to around 40
staff comprising a mix of permanent staff, probation service secondees
and consultants. With major information technology projects of
this kind it is essential to invest not just in the initial programme
design but also in the management of the contract.[14]
12. The Home Office had intended that normal project
management controls and reporting arrangements, based on the PRINCE 2
project management methodology, would be used throughout the project
but in practice the procedures fell into disuse. The Home Office
had expected, for example, that the project assurance function
- which provides a check that the project continues to meet its
specification - would be undertaken by the people taking delivery
of the system, but they did not do it. Failure to operate proper
project management procedures was a problem more widely in Government,
and the Office of Government Commerce's Gateway review process,
introduced in early 2001, was addressing this weakness. The Gateway
process requires major projects across Government to go through
a process of external review while they are in negotiation and
during implementation.[15]
Conclusions
13. Where information technology is being introduced
to link a group of organisations, responsibility for delivering
the programme, and the resources needed, should be clearly specified
from the start, along with the desired outputs and outcomes.
14. The programme management team were not properly
equipped with the resources and skills needed to deliver a complex
information technology system. Excessive turnover amongst specialist
staff and potential skill shortages on individual projects must
be identified and addressed quickly.
15. Normal project controls and reporting arrangements
were not followed, nor was timely action taken to address these
weaknesses. The Home Office executive board should review regular,
independent reports on progress of information technology projects,
for example from the Government's Gateway review process and the
Department's internal auditors, and assess the adequacy of the
action taken in response to recommendations made by such reports.
8 C&AG's Report, paras 1.4, 1.7, 2.18; Qs 8-9,
18 Back
9
C&AG's Report, para 2.19; Qs 8, 18, 26, 115 Back
10
C&AG's Report, para 2.39 Back
11
Qs 53, 132-137 Back
12
Qs 7, 52, 54, 58 Back
13
C&AG's Report, para 2.43 Back
14
Qs 8, 149; Ev 2 Back
15
C&AG's Report, para 19; Qs 56-57 Back
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