House of Commons - Public Accounts

Select Committee on Public Accounts Eighteenth Report

EIGHTEENTH REPORT

The Committee of Public Accounts has agreed to the following Report:

INLAND FLOOD DEFENCE

INTRODUCTION AND LIST OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1 The Government's policy aim for flood defence is to reduce the risk to people and the developed and natural environment from flooding. Defences are designed to protect against flood events of a particular magnitude, expressed in terms of events of a size which might occur, for example, on average once in one hundred years or less. The Environment Agency estimated that some 280,000 properties benefited from the successful operation of flood defences in October and November 2000. However, flood defences can only reduce the risk or extent of damage; they cannot prevent all flooding. Awareness of risk and flood warning systems are also forms of defence in that they seek to reduce the risk to life and the economic impact of flooding.[1]

2 Up to 5 million people and 2 million homes, businesses and other buildings in England are in areas at some risk of flooding. Changes in climate, storminess and rainfall patterns over the next 50 years may increase the frequency with which flooding occurs and increase the rate at which defences deteriorate. The floods in England in October and November 2000 demonstrated the serious consequences which flooding can have for people and their property. 10,000 properties were flooded at over 700 locations.[2] Flood defences are a vital national resource. It is not acceptable that they have been neglected.

3 The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (previously the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) has responsibility for establishing flood defence policy in England, and administers the legislation that enables flood defence works to be carried out. It pays grant aid in respect of capital expenditure, but not maintenance expenditure, by the Environment Agency.[3]

4 The Environment Agency ('the Agency') is the largest single operating authority carrying out flood defence work in England and exercises a general supervisory role over all flood defence matters. Broadly speaking, the Agency's powers in respect of warning systems and the building of flood defences are exercised almost exclusively on main rivers; whereas powers in respect of ordinary watercourses rest with local authorities and, in some low-lying areas of the country, internal drainage boards. The Agency is required to exercise its flood defence operations through regional and local flood defence committees. These committees raise funds mostly from local authorities, and determine flood defence programmes with advice from the Agency. Expenditure by the Agency on inland flood defences in 2001-02 was planned to be some £290 million. Following the flooding in 2000, a further £57.6 million over the next four years or so was announced by the Government in November 2000.[4]

5 On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, our predecessor Committee took evidence from the then Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (the Ministry), the Environment Agency and the then Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions. Our predecessor Committee examined the responsibilities for providing flood defences; the prioritisation of investment in flood defence; and flood warning and preparedness. Since then, changes to government departments mean that the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs is now the sponsor of the Environment Agency and has taken over the responsibilities for flood defence previously held by the Ministry. The new Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions has responsibility for planning guidance.

6 Our main conclusions are:

Organisational responsibility and funding arrangements for inland flood defences are complex, involving numerous bodies and creating confusion in the minds of the public. They result in inconsistent service levels across England as a whole. The public are endangered. Whilst we recognise the importance of local involvement and accountability, there is however an overriding requirement for a countrywide strategy which delivers to the public appropriate flood defence measures where similar flood risks exist, regardless of where a person lives.

Although investment in new flood defences is set to increase over the next few years, flood risks will increase if climate changes bring greater storminess and rainfall. To ensure the most effective use of available funds, the Agency must put in place strategies which cover the whole of river catchments, working with other operating authorities, and taking appropriate account of environmental issues and land usage.

Adequate flood warning helps to reduce damage to property and to prevent injury and loss of life. The Agency has increased the percentage of households receiving at least two hours warning of floods from 13 per cent in 1996 to approximately 60 per cent during the recent floods. The Agency aims to increase this further, to 80 per cent of all households at risk by 2009-2010. The Agency should use their consultants' review of the success of warning systems in different parts of the country during the autumn 2000 floods to put in place a strategy which would ensure that virtually all households at risk to receive a flood warning within at least two hours' notice. This should be achievable within a shorter timescale than 2009-10. It is unacceptable that for the next few years 4 out of 10 homes will not receive at least 2 hours warning of floods.

The autumn 2000 floods demonstrated the severe risks to people and property where flooding occurs, yet demand to build in flood plains continues. This is a danger for the public. All parties involved in new property developments should aim to minimise the risks to human life and property from flooding. Where relevant, developers should be required to make appropriate flood defence provision, including any ongoing maintenance. The revised planning guidance for flood plain development issued by the Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions is helpful.

7 Our more specific conclusions and recommendations are set out below:

On responsibilities for flood defence

(ii) Responsibility for flood defence measures is partly determined by whether a watercourse is regarded as main or ordinary, and a further category of critical ordinary watercourse has recently been introduced. In some instances, the current categorisation of a watercourse arises more from historical circumstance than from an up-to-date assessment of relative risks and priorities. The categorisation of watercourses in England should therefore be simplified, and a review undertaken to determine responsibilities for flood defence measures based on a current assessment of the severity of the flood risk issues and their relative priority. (paragraph 19)

(iii) During the autumn 2000 floods responsibility for the provision, distribution and placing of sandbags to protect individual properties was unclear. Members of the public whose properties are at risk should not have to live with uncertainty about whether sandbags will be provided should flooding occur, or about who will provide them where relevant. The Agency should work with local authorities to develop a clear policy on the provision of sandbags, and to provide appropriate guidance to householders in flood risk areas. (paragraph 20)

On investment in flood defence

(v) Between a third and a half of flood defence assets on main rivers are in a fair, poor or very poor state, and a survey of the condition of assets maintained by local authorities was incomplete. In the light of flooding in 2000 it is essential that all parties give priority to ascertaining the true state of flood defences under their control, and to putting in place a programme of repair where necessary to ensure flood defences remain fully effective. (paragraph 35)

On flood warning and preparedness

(vii) The Agency should review the reasons for variations in the use of different types of warning systems between regions, and satisfy themselves that the methods used are the most effective for the circumstances rather than a reflection of local attitudes or the willingness to make funds available for warning systems. (paragraph 49)

(viii) The Agency now has available maps covering the country identifying areas of flood risk which are also targeted for building development. However, some parties have expressed doubts about the usefulness of the maps in their current form. The Agency should work with other authorities to meet the needs of planning authorities, developers and the public, and to consider how this work should be funded, for example by charging for maps. (paragraph 50)

(ix) The Agency has improved the quality of its flood warning services, and recognises the importance of making the public aware that they live in an area of risk. The Agency should build on heightened awareness from the autumn 2000 floods to further encourage householders to take appropriate actions, for example to review the adequacy of their insurance policies. The Agency should also pursue other options of raising awareness such as the provision of flood risk information in the house seller's pack which is being developed. (paragraph 51)

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FLOOD DEFENCE

8 The administrative arrangements for the provision of flood defences are complex, involving the Department, the Environment Agency, local authorities and internal drainage boards.Flood defence legislation provides permissive powers for operating authorities and private owners to carry out flood defence work. This means that work is not mandatory and there are no benchmarks as to the standards that flood defences should meet.[5]

9 Watercourses in England are categorised as main river and ordinary watercourses. Broadly, flood measures for main rivers are the responsibility of the Environment Agency whereas ordinary watercourses are the responsibility of local authorities and, in some parts of the country, internal drainage boards.[6] The current situation, based on historical circumstance, has almost certainly led to inconsistencies in the classification of watercourses and the standard of service between regions across England. The different arrangements that apply can also result in difficulties for members of the public in understanding where responsibility lies, where to obtain further information, and the nature of the services to be expected.[7] The floods of autumn 2000 reinforced the need to have a clear understanding of who should take responsibility for resolving flood problems in different locations. The Agency's review of the 2000 floods concluded that attribution of responsibility for the management of watercourses posing a significant flood risk should be reassessed in order to resolve the current confusion.[8]

10 The Agency's duty to exercise general supervision over all matters relating to flood defence includes activities such as monitoring and encouraging other operating authorities to inspect defences and critical ordinary watercourses, and assessing flood risk and the means to reduce it. The Agency exercises its flood defence operations through regional and local defence committees. These committees provide direct links with local authorities— whose members provide a majority on each committee—and with the public and other customers of flood defences.[9]

11 The Agency had experienced difficulties in obtaining the assistance of 135 local authorities in completing surveys of their river defences. 82 local authorities had replied that they were unwilling or unable to carry out inspections of their flood defences or had not responded to the Agency's request.[10] Asked about the effectiveness of its general supervisory and advisory role, the Agency said that its responsibility could be frustrating because proposals for defences, decisions on the allocation of funds, and on priorities for mapping and assessing the condition of defences, required the consensus of other authorities. The Agency could not therefore move ahead as fast as it would like.[11]

12 Asked whether there was a problem in forcing private owners of watercourses to discharge their responsibilities, the Agency said that the land drainage legislation of 1991 did not impose maintenance obligations on private owners. It merely empowered operating authorities to serve notice on landowners requiring them to ensure a free flow of water through their land, for example by removing obstructions.[12]

13 The Agency agreed that there was considerable confusion amongst the public over which public authorities had responsibility for different aspects of flood defence and emergency response and there was a need for effective communications to clarify matters. The arrangements in England were similar to other countries but the Ministry accepted that this did not necessarily mean that they were the best arrangements. Getting shared responsibility right would continue to be kept under review. The Agency had recommended that its Floodline be used as a "first stop shop" to enable people to use one nationally recognisable line during flood emergencies to get information about all aspects of flooding.[13]

14 Asked about the categorisation of watercourses as main rivers, the Agency said that there were no strict criteria for determining main rivers but they included all major rivers and others presenting significant flood risk.^. The distinction was useful in that many ordinary watercourses would not pose a major flood risk and were much better dealt with on a local level. There were, however, some ordinary watercourses which present a major flooding risk that the Agency defined as "critical" and thought might appropriately be brought under the aegis of the Agency.These were equivalent to between five and ten per cent of the existing main rivers in England. Enmaining them would, however, need to be associated with a transfer of funding from the operating authority currently responsible. There was no guarantee that changing the designation of a river would automatically result in it receiving higher priority in flood defence terms. The process of enmaining was itself an expensive and lengthy one.[14]

15 Inconsistencies between regions in the classification of main and ordinary watercourses were mirrored in other areas such as mapping flood risk and the condition of defences.[15] Asked whether the Ministry and the Agency should seek to standardise their approach to flood defence in different parts of the country to develop a consistent nationwide strategy, the Ministry indicated that arrangements needed to strike a balance between an overall strategy and a respect for local democracy and accountability^.. The introduction of high level targets for flood and coastal defence, which came into operation in April 2000, sought to ensure more certain delivery of Government policy aims and objectives. Operating authorities had been required to produce by 31 March 2001 a publicly available policy statement which indicated flood risk locally, how it would be managed, and who would be responsible for management of watercourses. This should increase the transparency of different approaches to flood defences.[16]

16 During the floods of autumn 2000 some 2.5 million sandbags were used nationally to shore up defences. Sandbags were provided from Agency stores, commercial suppliers, local authorities and army stores. The Agency's primary role is to use sandbags to repair and reinforce flood defencesbut the autumn 2000 floods revealed that one of the greatest demands facing the Agency and local authorities was the public call for sandbags, which could divert resources from the vital task of securing flood defences.However, the autumn 2000 floods also highlighted inconsistencies in the provision of sandbags to the public and, in some areas, there were cases where the public found that nobody would accept responsibility and assist them in obtaining sandbags.[17]

17 The Agency acknowledged that responsibility for provision of sandbags was a grey areaand that practice varied across the country. The Agency's review of the autumn 2000 floods accepted the need for clarification of this responsibility. It had undertaken to work jointly with local authorities to develop a policy for the provision of sandbags; investigate joint call-off contracts for the supply and distribution of sandbags; and assess the capacity to supply large numbers in an emergency.[18]

Conclusions

18 The Agency has limited ability to carry out its supervisory and advisory role in respect of all flood defences. It can suggest actions and solutions to flood defence issues where it is not the operating authority but it cannot insist on others taking action, and cannot intervene to do the work itself. Nevertheless, the Agency has an essential role in monitoring and reporting to its sponsor departments decisions or lack of action by other operating authorities which represent a threat to existing defences or might lead to a failure to provide an adequate level of service. The Agency, with its sponsor department, should determine how this role could best be discharged, and consider if current powers should be reviewed.

19 Responsibility for flood defence measures is partly determined by whether a watercourse is regarded as main or ordinary, and a further category of critical ordinary watercourse has recently been introduced. In some instances, the current categorisation of a watercourse arises more from historical circumstance than from an up-to-date assessment of relative risks and priorities. The categorisation of watercourses in England should therefore be simplified, and a review undertaken to determine responsibilities for flood defence measures based on a current assessment of the severity of the flood risk issues and their relative priority.

20 During the autumn 2000 floods responsibility for the provision, distribution and placing of sandbags to protect individual properties was unclear. Members of the public whose properties are at risk should not have to live with uncertainty about whether sandbags will be provided should flooding occur, or about who will provide them where relevant. The Agency should work with local authorities to develop a clear policy on the provision of sandbags, and to provide appropriate guidance to householders in flood risk areas.

INVESTMENT IN FLOOD DEFENCE

21 The Agency is required to exercise its flood defence operations through regional and local flood defence committees. These committees are responsible for determining flood defence programmes, with advice from the Agency, and for raising the necessary funding from local authorities.In 1999-2000, some £216 million out of £275 million spent by the Agency on flood defence in England was raised by flood defence committees via local authority levies.[19]

22 The Agency advised flood defence committees on the amount of funds needed from local authoritiesbut investment levels are dependent ultimately on the funds allocated by each local authority for measures in its area. This basis is unlikely to lead to consistent levels of investment across the country. For example, in the North East region the Agency wanted to extend flood warning systems to 80 communities but the flood defence committees could provide funding for only 16.Furthermore, the Agency said that the condition of flood defence assets in the North East, the poorest in the country, was a result of conscious decisions by the local flood defence committees on the level of funding over the years.[20]

23 The Ministry was carrying out a review of the organisational arrangements for the provision and funding of flood defence that was due to report in September 2001. Our predecessors asked how the Ministry intended to address the estimated shortfall in funding of £100 million a year in capital works and maintenance, which did not allow for the impact of climate change.The Ministry said that the last spending review had led to an increase in the baseline provision of capital for flood defence measures which by the third year 2003-04 would amount to £25 million. In addition, in November 2000 the Ministry had announced further funding of £51 million spread over three years and, in January 2001 an additional contribution of £6.6 million towards the exceptional costs of the Agency in responding to flooding.[21]

24 The Ministry said that climate change was predicted to expose the country to an increasing frequency of flooding over the next fifty years or so. The Ministry had commissioned research into the appropriate level of flood defence expenditure. The results of the research would provide the Ministry with a better informed position for the next Spending Review in 2002.[22]

25 The level of funding available meant that the Agency had to prioritise proposals, seeking to get the best benefit for the maximum number of people at risk.In 1997 the Ministry had introduced a priority scoring system for the appraisal of new flood defence schemes to ensure that limited funds were allocated in accordance with agreed priorities. The system took account of ministerial priorities for urban, coastal, rural, or tidal defences, the urgency of the need for new defences and the economic justification for each scheme. As a result of flood events last autumn the Ministry now required a higher priority to be given to inland flood measures and equal weighting was now given to the protection of urban areas on the coast and on rivers. Flood warning systems still carry the highest priority.[23]

26 The priority scoring system was essentially an economic assessment based on an aggregate benefit to cost ratio. If a scheme did not rate highly enough on the priority scoring system then it would not proceed. Detailed appraisals weighed up the benefits and costs valued in monetary terms in order to decide which was the best option. The Agency undertook a considerable amount of work to identify schemes that would be most appropriate, taking account of not only the cost-benefit but also practicality and the topography of the area.[24]

27 Asked how the public could be reassured that it was receiving a reasonably consistent standard of service nationwide, the Agency said they applied the Ministry's priority scoring system consistently to schemes from across all regions. However, this did not mean everyone in the country could expect a consistent level of protection. Where the number of properties at risk was small, the damage avoided by building flood defences would be comparatively small in economic value, and therefore would not score highly on the Ministry's priority scoring system. Where there were a small number of houses a flood defence scheme might be possible if it was relatively simple and of low cost.[25]

28 There were areas affected by floods in 2000, some of them repeatedly, where flood defence proposals had been made a number of years ago, but funding had not been available. In Sussex, for example, higher priority had been given in earlier years to coastal rather than fluvial schemes. Many places in the Southern Region flooded because it was difficult to provide adequate defences.[26]

29 The Ministry recognised the need to review the priority scoring system and methods of evaluation, and they planned to consult the Agency and other operating authorities. The Agency believed that as well as taking into account the benefit/cost ratio the decision making framework should consider the impact on individuals, society, health and also the frequency and scale of flooding.[27]

30 The Ministry had made available extra funding of £2 million to enable the Agency to establish catchment flood risk management plans over the next two years. This would enable more catchment modelling to analyse trade-offs between different techniques; for example, building banks in the town, building diversionary channels, or holding water higher in the catchment. Catchment plans should enable the Agency to more readily identify those schemes which give maximum benefit for the whole catchment.[28]

31 In 1999-2000 the Agency spent £126 million on the maintenance and administration of 34,000 kilometres of main river in England—some 50 per cent of their annual expenditure on flood defence. Maintenance works are not subject to central review as funding comes mainly from levies on local authorities but programmes of work are approved by the regional and local flood defence committees in general terms. The Environment Act states that the Agency should have regard to an assessment of likely costs and benefits prior to carrying out the maintenance.[29]

32 The Agency uses its in-house workforce on maintenance programmes. The Agency's offices vary in their approach to, and the level of, maintenance they provide. The results of the Agency's condition survey of flood defence assets showed that nearly half of the flood defence structures and a third of the barriers were categorised as fair, poor or very poor and 165 kilometres of flood defences were in a derelict state.[30] A survey of other operating authorities' assets was incomplete.

33 Asked whether the Agency could provide assurances that maintenance work was being carried out properly, the Agency stated that despite limited resources it had sustained the defences in the North-East during the floods in 2000, particularly for the large conurbations and villages, although breaches had occurred. Where defences had been damaged in recent flooding, the Agency had repaired and replaced them. The condition of defences reflected its ability to do the work within the resources it was given and, as a result, it had to prioritise available funds. In rural areas where the number of properties at risk was small, the Agency might only be able to do the minimum necessary to provide some form of defence. Where defences protected land rather than built property, the Agency might have to consider whether it was appropriate to spend funds on such defences or to use them to protect built property elsewhere.[31]

Conclusions

34 The Agency's approach to maintenance is determined by its area offices and local and regional flood defence committees, and hence the extent of maintenance varies across the regions. This is reflected in the significantly different condition of flood defences across regions as revealed by a recent Agency survey. The Agency should put in place common minimum standards of maintenance service and monitor the performance of its area offices to ensure these standards are met. They should disseminate best practice in maintenance programmes across the regions to ensure the most effective use of the limited funds available.

35 Between a third and a half of flood defence assets on main rivers are in a fair, poor or very poor state, and a survey of the condition of assets maintained by local authorities was incomplete. In the light of flooding in 2000 it is essential that all parties give priority to ascertaining the true state of flood defences under their control, and to putting in place a programme of repair where necessary to ensure flood defences remain fully effective.

FLOOD WARNING AND PREPAREDNESS

36 The Agency uses a range of methods for disseminating flood warnings; including automated voice and fax messaging, warning sirens, the use of loud hailers, flood wardens, radio and television bulletins and their telephone service, Floodline.The most effective warning mechanism can vary depending on, for example, the extent of urbanisation and the time of day when flooding is imminent. The Agency aims to provide one direct and one indirect method of disseminating flood warnings where it offers a service.[32]

37 Asked why at that time only 40 per cent of residents living in flood warning areas will receive a flood warning, the Agency explained that this related to its present ability to provide flood warnings with at least two hours notice. Over the next ten years the Agency was seeking to increase progressively the geographic coverage of systems from 40 to 80 per cent of the flood risk area. The Agency had commissioned consultants to quantify the success of their warning systems in different parts of the country during the autumn 2000 floods.It calculated that the successful receipt of warning had increased from 13 per cent in 1996 to approximately 60 per cent during the floods in 2000.[33]

38 The automated voice messaging system was introduced in 1996.[34] It is probably the most sophisticated of the Agency's methods for transmitting information to individual properties.The number of properties connected to the system has increased from 23,000 in 1996 to 58,000 in 2000. However, this represents only 3.8 per cent of those living in areas at risk in England.[35]

39 Asked why the national figures for the take-up of the automated voice messaging system were so low, the Agency replied that the system was only one of the methods of primary flood warning, and was not necessarily the most effective for all areas. For example, in areas where flash floods occurred it might not be as appropriate as other methods such as loud hailers, and in areas where people moved house more frequently keeping the system up to date would be extremely difficult.[36] Nor was it necessarily appropriate for sheltered housing where the Agency sought to warn people by other means to avoid causing unnecessary alarm. The Agency ran awareness campaigns, including television advertising to draw attention to the system.[37]

40 The automated voice messaging system was only connected to those people who requested it rather than to all people in areas of danger, because as a computerised system, the Data Protection Act required the occupier's prior consent for inclusion. The Agency had publicised the system by running marketing exercises and had sought people's agreement to go on the database, but often received a low level of take-up. They expected recent flood events to lead to a larger response. It was not always easy, however, to persuade householders to be included on the database as some were concerned about the impact on their property value.[38]

41 The number of properties linked to the system varied from 32,500 properties (16.4 per cent) in Southern region to 2,500 (1.2 per cent) in the Thames region.[39] Asked about the regional variations in the use of the automated voice messaging system, the Agency said that this reflected the appropriateness of the system to the region. Southern region, which piloted the system, had the risk of catastrophic shingle bank collapse which would affect a substantial number of people. The North East had the lowest percentage of potential recipients for whom the automated voice messaging system would be a suitable method of warning, partly due to the nature of catchments.[40]

42 The Ministry had estimated that some eight per cent of the total land area in England (some 10,000 square kilometres) was at risk from flooding from rivers, tidal rivers and estuaries. In recent years the Agency had been engaged in preparing maps indicating flood risk areas to assist local authorities in their planning and development control role, to assist in emergency planning, and to raise public awareness of flood risk areas.[41]

43 Asked how accurate the floodplain maps were and how often they were updated, the Agency said that the maps indicated areas with an estimated flood risk of about a one per cent probability. They were available for the whole country and contained the best information available at present.[42] The Agency had a programme of work to improve the quality of information and upgrade maps as they received additional information from floods or its own surveys. However, the flood risk area was a moving target because of developments in catchment areas and the potential impact of climate change. The Agency had also made progress in completing detailed mappings of priority areas ("hot spot" maps) and 57 per cent of these maps had been completed.[43]

44 The Agency had sent letters to 843,000 properties known to be in high risk flood areas to raise the awareness amongst householders that they were in the floodplain. This campaign set out where householders could find additional information about the risks to which they were exposed. Mailing and general promotion of flood warning systems was important, to increase awareness and to encourage people to take appropriate precautions. Flood risk maps had been made available on the Agency's website and additional information was available by direct contact if necessary.[44]

45 Our predecessor Committee asked whether it would be desirable for a standard part of the search process in property purchases to include enquiries about flood risk. More information was now in the public domain about the risks and standards of defences, so people could make informed choices about where they lived and the impact on insurance premia. The Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions said that negotiations were underway with the Law Society and Local Government Association on whether flood risk information should be included as part of the house seller's pack which is currently being developed.[45]

46 In the last five years there has been a year-on-year increase in the amount of development proposed in flood risk areas. A Government objective for flood defence is to discourage inappropriate development in areas at risk from flooding.The Agency provides advice to planning authorities through the local plan and on individual planning applications where flood risk is an issue.[46]

47 The Agency said that it would not rule out development in the floodplain but planning and development applications needed to be examined to consider the flooding implications. The Agency believed that the introduction of planning guidance, PPG25, could make a substantial difference to its ability to work with local planning authorities.PPG25 would assist in delivering control over future development in the floodplain and should ensure a more sustainable approach to development and flood risk. In particular, PPG25 was likely to use a sequential search approach to identify sites for development, promoting sites with the lowest flood risk first.[47]

Conclusions

48 Not all people at risk from flooding live in areas covered by the Agency's flood warning systems. The Agency should review the availability of warnings to such people and consider with other authorities whether a more joined-up approach to flood warning services would improve the overall safety of those at risk.

49 The Agency should review the reasons for variations in the use of different types of warning systems between regions, and satisfy themselves that the methods used are the most effective for the circumstances rather than a reflection of local attitudes or the willingness to make funds available for warning systems.

50 The Agency now has available maps covering the country identifying areas of flood risk which are also targeted for building development. However, some parties have expressed doubts about the usefulness of the maps in their current form. The Agency should work with other authorities to meet the needs of planning authorities, developers and the public, and to consider how this work should be funded, for example by charging for maps.

51 The Agency has improved the quality of its flood warning services, and recognises the importance of making the public aware that they live in an area of risk. The Agency should build on heightened awareness from the autumn 2000 floods to further encourage householders to take appropriate actions, for example to review the adequacy of their insurance policies. The Agency should also pursue other options of raising awareness such as the provision of flood risk information in the house seller's pack which is being developed.

1 C&AG's Report, Inland Flood Defence, (HC 299, Session 2000-2001) paras 2, 1.4, 1.5; Environment Agency Review "Lessons Learned" (not printed) Back

2 C&AG's Report, paras 1, 1.11 Back

3 ibid, paras 3, 1.9 Back

4 ibid, paras 3, 1.8-1.20 Back

5 C&AG's Report, paras 1.6-1.7 Back

6 ibid, para 1.8 Back

7 ibid, paras 2.31-2.35 Back

8 Q83; Ev, Appendix 1, p17, para 7 Back

9 C&AG's Report, paras 1.10-1.12 Back

10 ibid, paras 20, 4.11 Back

11 Qs 15, 17-18 Back

12 Q51; Ev, Appendix 1, p18, para 13 Back