House of Commons - Public Accounts

Select Committee on Public Accounts Twenty-Third Report

TWENTY-THIRD REPORT

The Committee of Public Accounts has agreed to the following Report:

REPORT ON INLAND REVENUE APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT 1999-2000

INTRODUCTION AND LIST OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In 1999-2000, the Inland Revenue collected revenue of over £139 billion (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Inland Revenue: tax receipts and administrative costs 1995-96 to 1999-2000

	Net receipts (1)
	1995-96 £ billion	1996-97 £ billion	1997-98 £ billion	1998-99 £ billion	1999-00 £ billion
Income tax	68.1	69.1	76.8	86.6	93.0
Corporation tax	23.6	27.8	30.4	30.0	34.4
Capital Gains tax	0.8	1.1	1.5	2.0	2.11
Inheritance tax	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.8	2.0
Stamp Duty	2.0	2.5	3.4	4.6	6.9
Petroleum Revenue tax	0.9	1.7	1.0	0.5	0.9
Windfall tax	—	—	2.6	2.6	—
Total tax receipts (£ billion)	96.9	103.7	117.4	128.1	139.3

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Inland Revenue data
Notes: (1)Shown net after allowing for tax credits, tax reliefs and allowances, and for repayments. Repayments in 1999-00 amounted to £13.9 billion. (2)The Inland Revenue also collected £58.7 billion national insurance contributions, the majority of which are paid into the National Insurance Funds.

2. Each year, the Comptroller and Auditor General reports on the work he has carried out to examine the Inland Revenue's management of the tax system. Based on his Report on the 1999-2000 accounts[1], our predecessor Committee examined the service provided by the Inland Revenue to PAYE taxpayers, how the Revenue polices compliance in the construction industry, how the Revenue manages risk in applications for tax credits, and progress in employer compliance.

3. In the light of our predecessors' examination, the Committee draws three overall conclusions.

In initially deciding to close off over 1 million tax records where due to administrative problems they lacked pay or tax details, the Inland Revenue took insufficient account of the potential impact on individual taxpayers. Further work by the Inland Revenue showed that some 134,000 taxpayers may have paid too little or too much tax, and an average overpayment might be £148. In future, the Inland Revenue should make all reasonable attempts to contact individual taxpayers before taking such decisions, and obtain more accurate information of their likely impact.

Since the introduction of the Construction Industry Scheme in 1999 an extra 100,000 people have registered, and the Inland Revenue collected additional tax receipts of £280 million in 1999-2000. There is still concern, however, about the level of "false" self employment in the industry, which not only puts tax at risk but also limits people's access to benefits and pensions. The Government are now undertaking a review of employment status, focusing on employment rights, which needs to produce a consistent definition of self employment across government. Meanwhile, in view of the extra tax yield obtained in 1999-2000, there is a case for the Inland Revenue to increase their compliance checking in the construction industry.

The Inland Revenue aspire to become an enabling as well as a regulating department and have taken a number of initiatives aimed at helping taxpayers to understand new schemes, such as the Construction Industry Scheme and Tax Credits, to register and to get their tax affairs right. To achieve greater accuracy, compliance, reduced regulation and checking, and without losing tax revenue, the Inland Revenue will need to keep their risk assessment arrangements flexible and up-to-date, and respond quickly to emerging problems.

4. Our more specific conclusions and recommendations are as follows.

On service to PAYE taxpayers

(ii) In administering tax, the Inland Revenue have to decide on the balance to be drawn between pursuing every penny owed to them or to taxpayers, and the administrative costs involved. But where substantial sums may be owed to individual taxpayers, we do not believe it is defensible to base decisions on the net position, after offsetting sums that entirely different taxpayers may owe to the Inland Revenue. In future, we expect the Inland Revenue to give greater priority to the impact of its decisions on individual taxpayers (paragraph 16).

On policing compliance in the construction industry

(iv) Whether workers are correctly classified as employed or self-employed remains a key risk, since self-employed status can reduce the tax and national insurance people pay. "False" self employment also limits people's access to benefits and pensions. The Government has launched a review of employment status with a focus on employment rights. This review needs to deliver a clear and consistent definition of self employment across government, so as to clarify the situation for employers, taxpayers and those enforcing the rules, and to fulfil the commitment to discuss and take on board concerns raised by the Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians (paragraph 25).

(v) In the early stages of implementation of the Construction Industry Scheme the Inland Revenue have focussed their efforts on helping employers register, understand the new arrangements, and get their tax affairs right. As a result they took the decision only to apply sanctions where there was clear evidence of deliberate non-compliance. This strategy appears to have paid off, in terms of new registrations and extra tax paid, and the relatively low level of irregularities found in their compliance work. Now the scheme has matured, the Inland Revenue should take steps to increase its compliance activity to build on the increased tax yield already delivered (paragraph 26).

On managing risk in applications for tax credits

(vii) Tax credits also shift some of the burden of administration from government bodies to employers. We are encouraged by the Inland Revenue's efforts to help small businesses through their Business Support Teams, and through targeted Helplines and workshops, and by advance funding where payments of tax credits by employers to employees will exceed the tax and national insurance contributions due. However, they need to keep the impact of these regulatory burdens under review. (paragraph 35).

(viii) The Comptroller and Auditor General still does not have access to employers' records to assure himself of the accuracy and regularity of tax credit payments to their employees. Substantial sums of public money are involved, more than an estimated £4.5 billion from 2000-01. It remains to be seen whether the Comptroller and Auditor General will in practice be able to rely on the outcome of the Inland Revenue's own compliance activity to give Parliament the assurances it needs (paragraph 36).

On progress in employer compliance

(x) There are significant variations between local offices in the yield from compliance activity, though in part these will reflect differences in local tax-payer populations. The Inland Revenue are taking a range of initiatives to address this variation, such as sharing good practice and undertaking risk research across offices. But there is still much to be done, and they should set targets against which management and Parliament can assess progress (paragraph 43).

THE SERVICE THE INLAND REVENUE PROVIDE TO PAYE TAXPAYERS

5. Twenty million basic rate PAYE taxpayers are not required to complete tax returns. They rely on the Inland Revenue to confirm that they have paid the correct amount of tax each year. The Inland Revenue therefore check the end of year returns completed by employers for each employee to see whether there has been any under- or over-payments of tax. Cases are investigated and may result in the issue of demands or refunds. Once this process has been completed, the taxpayer's record for the year is formally closed.[2]

6. The information needed to carry out these checks is first processed by the national insurance computer system operated for the Inland Revenue by Accenture (formerly Andersen Consulting) before being transferred to the PAYE computer system operated by EDS. The first returns processed on the new national insurance computer system (NIRS2) were for the 1997-98 tax year. A number of difficulties affected the transfer of pay and tax details to the PAYE system and despite significant administrative effort, by December 1999 the Inland Revenue were unable to close off around 2.5 million tax records. These included 1.4 million records where they had no pay or tax details at all.[3]

7. The Comptroller and Auditor General noted that the existence of cases without pay and tax details following the processing of employers' end of year returns was not unusual, but in the past had been on a much smaller scale, typically around 300,000 cases. In these circumstances, the Inland Revenue would normally approach the taxpayer or the employer for the relevant information. However, for the 1997-98 tax year they rejected this option because it would involve costs which were disproportionate to the amount of tax involved. On the basis of previous experience, they estimated that the net tax at risk from failure to match the records was about £2 million, whereas reviewing the cases, including approaching taxpayers for the missing information and dealing with the results of that exercise, would cost around £9.5 million. The Inland Revenue also believed that extending the processing of 1997-98 information for a further year would risk destabilising the processing of 1998-99 and 1999-2000 data. As a result, they decided to close off the records of 1 million taxpayers without having carried out their normal checks.[4]

8. Although initially they thought this would result in a net loss of £2 million to the Exchequer, later work indicated that it was more likely to have led to a net gain of £18 million, at the expense of individual taxpayers who might have overpaid tax by as much as £22 million.[5]

9. The Comptroller and Auditor General concluded that a fundamental review of the Inland Revenue's systems, then underway, needed to be completed quickly to provide assurance on the completeness and reliability of the entire process, particularly as the systems would have to cope with additional information on tax credits and collection of student loan repayments from 2000-01. He also recommended that the Inland Revenue should examine the scope to alert those taxpayers affected to the risk that they may have under or over paid tax.[6]

10. The Department told our predecessor Committee that in these cases the difficulty had been that they lacked pay and tax details, and had been unable to get them through tracing action. As a result, they did not know who had under or over paid tax. However, since the Comptroller and Auditor General's Report, and after the full scale of the potential net overpayment of tax became apparent, they had decided to alert the 1.04 million taxpayers affected to the risk that they might have overpaid tax. They added that in every year they had to decide the amount of administrative effort and cost they could justify spending, in terms of value for money, in tracing and posting information on contributions and tax. They applied tolerances in all areas of their work, in common with other departments, and it would not be sensible to spend limitless sums in order to track down every last penny. But if new information came to light, or if the taxpayer contacted them, then the taxpayer could claim back the money overpaid at any time.[7]

11. The letter to taxpayers would invite those who thought they had paid too much, and could support this with documentary evidence, to get in touch with the Inland Revenue. In practice, sampling suggested that 87 per cent of these people would have paid the right amount of tax, leaving some 134,000 who might have paid too much or too little. A typical average overpayment might be £148.[8]

12. The Inland Revenue promised to do their utmost to contact all those involved, but could not guarantee complete success. They would use current tax records, which included any changes of address in the intervening period. Where people were no longer in employment, the case would be listed for clerical review to obtain the new address, usually by writing to their last employer.[9]

13. One of the causes of the data transfer problems between NIRS2 and the PAYE system was the difficulty in testing the interface between the systems before NIRS2 went live. An internal review by the Inland Revenue recommended improvements in the way they and their information technology service providers addressed issues of mutual interest, including procedures for dealing with problem and incident management. As a result, the Inland Revenue and Accenture had introduced a revised operational working agreement to define and manage the year-end processing on NIRS2.[10]

14. In view of previous concerns about the implementation of NIRS2, our predecessor Committee asked Accenture and EDS how they now ensured that there was effective liaison between them on developments that affected their respective systems. The firms pointed out that the communication problems had arisen at a time when EDS was working to the Inland Revenue and Accenture to the Contributions Agency. Since then the Agency had been transferred to the Inland Revenue. There was a single client and a number of operating mechanisms to bring the parties together.[11]

Conclusions

15. For each tax year, it takes some time before the Inland Revenue have sufficient information to clear all tax records for those paying PAYE. For the tax year 1997-98 however, difficulties with the interface between the new national insurance computer system (NIRS2) and the PAYE system caused significant problems, leading to over 2.5 million remaining open by December 1999. We have already reported several times on the poor implementation of NIRS2, and its impact on taxpayers and efficient administration.

16. In administering tax, the Inland Revenue have to decide on the balance to be drawn between pursuing every penny owed to them or to taxpayers, and the administrative costs involved. But where substantial sums may be owed to individual taxpayers, we do not believe it is defensible to base decisions on the net position, after offsetting sums that entirely different taxpayers may owe to the Inland Revenue. In future, we expect the Inland Revenue to give greater priority to the impact on individual taxpayers.

POLICING COMPLIANCE IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

17. Taxation of the 1.4 million people working in the construction industry generated approximately £1.5 billion in income tax in 1999-2000. The Inland Revenue introduced new arrangements in August 1999 for the taxation of around one million workers in the construction industry. The aims were to:

reduce the risk of non-compliance by introducing a new registration system for firms and individuals in the industry to reduce the risk of undeclared cash payments to "ghosts" and "moonlighters"; and

increase the number of workers whose income would be subject to deduction of tax at source.[12]

18. The scheme involves contractors and subcontractors registering with the Inland Revenue; EDS issuing tax certificates to those entitled to payment without deduction of tax at source, and registration cards with the individual's photograph to those not so entitled; and contractors completing a payment voucher for every payment made. These vouchers are sent to EDS and recorded on the Department's computer system.[13]

19. The new scheme led to the identification of around 100,000 people not previously registered, and an estimated £280 million extra tax receipts in 1999-2000. While the scheme had improved compliance, implementation was not trouble-free. There were difficulties in processing applications for registration cards and tax certificates and in managing the issue and receipt of payment vouchers. The Inland Revenue had to scale back planned work to reconcile tax receipts with contractors' returns which increased the risk of fraud remaining undetected in the early stages of the scheme.[14]

20. The Inland Revenue told our predecessors that they had learned a number of lessons. The construction industry was very volatile and there had been compliance problems in the past. In implementing the new scheme the Inland Revenue had not fully understood their customers, and they could have done more to test the forms and guidance at an early stage. They could also have improved their internal and external communications strategy, building on good practice in some offices and developing a more active understanding of their approach to their customers.[15]

21. Our predecessor Committee asked if the Inland Revenue's stance on whether or not somebody was self-employed was looser than in other parts of the economy. For example there were cases where the courts deemed people to be employees under health and safety legislation when under the tax system they were regarded as self-employed. There were also cases where industrial tribunals awarded people holiday pay, even though they were treated as self employed by the Inland Revenue. The Inland Revenue were not familiar with the cases, but they assured our predecessors that if they were alerted to the situation then they would certainly investigate. They were also willing to explore any evidence that the Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians might have.[16]

22. The Inland Revenue had made around 8,500 compliance reviews of employers and contractors operating the scheme since it started. They had found 312 industry-related irregularities, in which more than 69 people had been caught and had sanctions applied against them. But their main aim was to help employers to understand the scheme, to get used to it and to comply. A key aspect was the work of Business Support Teams in providing advice.[17]

23. While the scheme had resulted in 100,000 extra workers registering, and £280 million extra tax and national insurance contributions, the Inland Revenue had taken a conscious decision not to check whether there was money outstanding from previous years. What they wanted was to make sure that the sub-contractor got his or her tax affairs in order and registered. If they had evidence that people had defrauded the system or evaded tax, they would pursue them, take the tax due, and apply penalties. Where there was deliberate large-scale fraud, they would prosecute. But they had no evidence of large-scale fraud and evasion by large construction companies. In the case of the 100,000 new people registering it would have been very difficult to prove fraud or evasion whatever suspicions they had.[18]

Conclusions

24. Collecting the right amount of tax from the construction industry has caused difficulty because of the highly mobile nature of the industry, practical difficulties in determining whether people are employed or self-employed, and a culture of non-compliance. In this context, the new construction industry scheme has achieved significant impact: over 100,000 new people registered and estimated extra tax receipts of £280 million were collected, against a total tax take of £1.5 billion in 1999-2000.

25. Whether workers are correctly classified as employed or self-employed remains a key risk, since self-employed status can reduce the tax and national insurance people pay. "False" self employment also limits people's access to benefits and pensions. The Government has launched a review of employment status with a focus on employment rights, and expects to report in the early part of 2002. This review needs to deliver a clear and consistent definition of self employment across government, so as to clarify the situation for employers, taxpayers and those enforcing the rules, and to fulfil the commitment to discuss and take on board concerns raised by the Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians.

26. In the early stages of implementation of the construction industry scheme the Inland Revenue have focused their efforts on helping employers register, understand the new arrangements, and get their tax affairs right. As a result they took the decision only to apply sanctions where there was clear evidence of deliberate non-compliance. This strategy appears to have paid off, in terms of new registrations and extra tax paid, and the relatively low level of irregularities found in their compliance work. Now the scheme has matured, the Inland Revenue should take steps to increase its compliance activity to build on the increased tax yield already delivered.

MANAGING RISK IN APPLICATIONS FOR TAX CREDITS

27. In the 1998 budget, the Chancellor announced the introduction of two tax credits for working families and disabled people, as part of the Government's strategy to make work pay. They replaced two social security benefits, family credit and disability working allowance, administered by the Benefits Agency and were introduced in October 1999. In the first six months the Inland Revenue paid out just over £1 billion, and expected this to rise to over £4.5 billion in 2000-01, the first full year of operation.[19]

28. In the first six months of the scheme, the Inland Revenue made payments direct to applicants each week, using the Benefits Agency's payment systems, but from April 2000 payments had also been made through the PAYE system by employers and were included in people's pay packets. Employers offset the cost of tax credit payments against the combined total of PAYE tax and national insurance deductions due to the Department each month or quarter. Where tax credit payments were likely to exceed deductions, the Inland Revenue funded employers in advance.[20]

29. The Comptroller and Auditor General noted that implementation had gone smoothly and the Inland Revenue were continuing to strengthen the controls necessary for the effective operation of the scheme. He recommended that they should continue both to refine their approach to managing the risk of erroneous or fraudulent applications and improve the assurance obtained about the reliability and accuracy of the substantial amounts paid out of tax revenue.[21]

30. Our predecessor Committee asked about the level of fraud and evasion, particularly as a result of accidental or deliberate mis-statement of information by applicants. First indications were that this was not very widespread. The Inland Revenue had developed a risk scorecard to target resources more accurately on those claims most worth investigating. This would pick up, and indeed had identified, issues such as the non-declaration of a partner's earnings and concerns about employer/employee collusion. To help focus their risk approach they were carrying out a full check of a sample of several thousand cases between August 2000 and August 2001, which would give them a benchmark of the proportion of cases where for some reason applicants had not provided the correct information. The risk score card was not their only tool, however. Third party information was important, as was data matching with data on their other systems as well as those of the Department of Social Security (now the Department for Work and Pensions).[22]

31. During consideration of the Tax Credits Bill in 1999, questions were raised about whether the Comptroller and Auditor General should have access to employers to obtain direct assurance about tax credit payments made on the Department's behalf. In correspondence with the Chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts, the Paymaster General took the view that access would be inappropriate in view of sensitivities about burdens on business. She suggested that the Comptroller and Auditor General should instead take assurance from the Inland Revenue's employer compliance visits, but agreed to reconsider if this caused difficulties in practice.

32. Our predecessor Committee asked whether the Inland Revenue would be able to give the Comptroller and Auditor General sufficient assurance about employers' operation of the tax credit scheme during 2000-01. The Inland Revenue thought that they would be able to do so. They had done a lot both on employer compliance and in bringing together the overall management of the tax credit scheme. Local districts and Tax Credit Offices reported to the same Board member, compliance work on tax credits at employers was risk based and employer compliance staff were familiar with tax credit rules. In addition, employers' annual returns would bring together all their responsibilities to the Inland Revenue, including tax credit payments, which could then be checked against authorisations.[23]

33. Our predecessors also asked whether administration of the tax credit system placed undue burdens on small businesses. The Inland Revenue accepted that there had been quite a few complaints, because it was a new scheme. But the number of complaints had fallen, for example from 10 per cent of calls to the Employer's Helpline to 5 per cent. Inevitably, small businesses tended to find the resource implications of a new scheme more difficult, and the Inland Revenue had heard more from them. For that reason, they had concentrated on helping small businesses through their Business Support Teams, and through targeted Helplines and workshops.[24]

Conclusions

34. Tax credits represent a major change in the Inland Revenue's business, involving significant payments to taxpayers and employers alongside collection of tax. The risks are very much those faced by the Department for Work and Pensions in paying benefits where they have led to significant error and fraud. So far there is limited evidence of fraud and error in tax credits but that could change as they develop. The Inland Revenue need to continue to refine their risk assessment methodology, drawing on their review of several thousand cases, data matching and third party information.

35. Tax credits also shift some of the burden of administration from government bodies to employers. We are encouraged by the Inland Revenue's efforts to help small businesses through their Business Support Teams, and through targeted Helplines and workshops, and by advance funding where payments of tax credits by employers to employees will exceed the tax and national insurance contributions due. However, they need to keep the impact of these regulatory burdens under review.

36. The Comptroller and Auditor General still does not have access to employers' records to assure himself of the accuracy and regularity of tax credit payments to their employees. Substantial sums of public money are involved, more than an estimated £4.5 billion from 2000-01. It remains to be seen whether the Comptroller and Auditor General will in practice be able to rely on the outcome of the Inland Revenue's own compliance activity to give Parliament the assurances it needs.

PROGRESS IN EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE

37. Since the Committee of Public Accounts reported on employer compliance in November 1997,[25] the Inland Revenue has made a number of improvements to the way it checks employers' compliance with PAYE regulations. The Contributions Agency has transferred to the Inland Revenue, providing the opportunity to merge the previously separate PAYE and national insurance compliance teams. Employer compliance work now includes policing the national minimum wage, the payment of tax credits and the collection of student loan repayments by employers. But this, and other organisational changes, had affected the level and quality of work, and the tax yield from compliance work had fallen. The Comptroller and Auditor General saw further scope to target resources on higher-risk employers.[26]

38. In addition, the Comptroller and Auditor General drew attention to significant variations in performance between Inland Revenue offices in terms of identifying non-compliance. There was still limited sharing of best practice between offices and between the respective teams which carry out work on larger and smaller employers. Staff also lacked access to and confidence in using the computer system to identify higher risk cases for analysis. In addition, the Inland Revenue had announced a further restructuring of their local office network,[27] which created a risk of diverting their attention from addressing these issues.[28]

39. The Inland Revenue assured our predecessor Committee that they policed all the schemes effectively. There had been a number of purposes behind the merger with the Contributions Agency. One had been to reduce the burdens on business—to avoid two sets of people going over the books. Another was to achieve genuine efficiencies. As a result the number of compliance staff had been reduced. Ideally, the compliance yield would be zero, because everybody got it right and paid up without enforcement activity. There was, however, a balance to be drawn between helping employers get it right and compliance activity. As a result, the Inland Revenue had expanded enormously the business support function. They were working closely with the Small Business Support Service, and had a New Employers Support initiative, Business Support Teams and a range of helplines.[29]

40. The Inland Revenue saw the fall in compliance yield as a direct result of the management time and resources they had devoted to delivering major changes, such as the merger with the Contributions Agency and the implementation of new IT infrastructure. Variations in yield across local offices reflected in part different tax districts dealing with different populations. However, risk and research would help them develop a better understanding of what they might reasonably expect. A rigorous examination of any failure to meet those expectations could then be conducted.[30]

41. Variations in quality across local offices continued to be a matter for concern. The Inland Revenue were doing a number of things to counter this. Employer compliance effort was now well integrated and working together. Each office had as part of its compliance unit specialists looking at risk, including risk research to improve targeting. They had introduced other risk specialists who were able to look at compliance across the board. More good practice was shared between offices, and as a result the variation was narrowing, although more could be achieved.[31]

Conclusions

42. The merger of the Inland Revenue and the Contributions Agency gave them the opportunity to sharpen their compliance activity, whilst delivering efficiency savings and easing the burdens on business. This was a challenging agenda, and although managing this change led to a fall in the quality of compliance work the tax yield is now recovering.

43. There are significant variations between local offices in the yield from compliance activity, though in part these will reflect differences in local tax-payer populations. The Inland Revenue are taking a range of initiatives to address this variation, such as sharing good practice and undertaking risk research across offices. But there is still much to be done, and they should set targets against which management and Parliament can assess progress.

1 C&AG's Report, Appropriation Accounts 1999-2000, Volume 16: Class XVI, Departments of the Chancellor of the Exchequer (HC 25 XVI) Back

2 C&AG's Report, paras 3.2-3.3 Back

3 ibid, paras 3.5-3.7 Back

4 ibid, paras 3.8-3.10 Back

5 ibid, para 3.11 Back

6 ibid, para 5 Back

7 Qs 2, 53-60, 92-106, 143-145 Back

8 Qs 35-40, 43-46, 50-52, 80-91 Back

9 Qs 41-42, 47-49 Back

10 C&AG's Report, paras 3.12-3.14 Back

11 Qs 4-5 Back

12 C&AG's Report, paras 5.2-5.6 Back