Supplementary memorandum submitted by
Mr Mark Harris, Chief Executive, National Lottery Commission
The following note contains the additional information
which I agreed to provide to the Committee during oral evidence
on Wednesday, 22 May 2002.
Question 69: If the ticket sales had been on the
projection that The People's Lottery had given, and that they
would give all the profit to good causes, how much more would
have gone to good causes?
In its Statement of Reasons for the decision
to grant the licence to run the National Lottery to Camelot, dated
19 December 2000, the Commission stated:
"22. At the same sales levels the
commitments offered by The People's Lottery would lead to larger
contributions to the NLDF than would Camelot's. At the bidders'
principal forecasts, in which The People's Lottery's sales figures
are higher than Camelot's, The People's Lottery would contribute
some £160 million more a year than Camelot. At sales of £5
billion a year, The People's Lottery would contribute some £110
million more a year than Camelot. These figures are based on the
bidder's own cost assumptions. They would be affected by The People's
Lottery's cost performance, as they take account of a secondary
contribution to the NLDF that consists of any surplus that The
People's Lottery generates."
The figures quoted above are expressed in cash
terms. The National Audit Office Report quotes figures as net
present values, showing the present worth of the future flow of
money. The net present values of the two figures quoted above
over the full seven year term of the licence (at October 2001
prices) are £933 million and £596 million respectively.
The figures quoted above are based on common
sales levels for each of the two bids. In its Statement of Reasons,
the Commission explained the basis for its final decision as follows.
"8. Although The People's Lottery offers
higher contributions than Camelot at the same sales levels, this
fact is outweighed by two considerations. The first is that the
Commission has concluded that Camelot is on balance likely to
deliver more sales over the licence period than The People's Lottery.
The second is that the accumulation of risks that is inherent
in The People's Lottery's bid, particularly in the early stages,
is uncomfortably high by comparison with those posed by Camelot's
Question 181-182: During the period of the first
licence how many times did the on-line system fail?
During Camelot's first seven-year licence period,
there were 37 incidents that caused total unavailability of the
on-line system. The total period that the whole system was unavailable
was 8 hours and 44 minutes. The system is scheduled to be available
from 6 am-11 pm every day except Christmas Day. During the first
licence period, the system was scheduled to be available for a
total of 42,602 hours.
The on-line system availability performance
standard referred to in the response to Q182 measures the overall
availability of service at the retailer on-line terminal, taking
into account loss of service due to central system, retailer network
and retailer on-line terminal failures.
The performance standard is 99.5% availability,
an annual basis. It is maintained on a rolling year-to-date basis
measured over four-week periods. On this basis, Camelot has consistently
achieved 99.8% availability throughout the first licence period.
There have only been two four-week periods, both in 1995 (the
first year the Lottery was operational), when performance for
the relevant period dropped below 99.5%. On each occasion performance
for the relevant period was 99.4% availability.
National Lottery Commission
20 June 2002