Examination of Witnesses (Questions 172
- 179)
THURSDAY 17 JANUARY 2002
AUSTIN MITCHELL
AND VISCOUNT
JOHN THURSO
Chairman
172. We are delighted to have Viscount Thurso
with us. Your particular interest, if I can put it that way, is
of interest to everyone because you have come from one place and
now sit in the other. I see you describe yourself in your paper
to us with a disarming phrase "hereditary radical".
We particularly want to know from you, someone who has experience
now of these two chambers, what your approach to the reform of
the second chamber is? Would you like to say something—we
have seen your paper, I hope all colleagues will have read it—by
way of an introduction to it?
(Viscount Thurso) If I may. Can I first make the point
that that paper was written, as I hope was pretty obvious, before
the first stage of reform. It was actually an internal document
written for a commission within the Liberal Democrats in the Lords.
My thinking has moved on from that. I do not think my thinking
is inconsistent, but there are certain areas where I have refined
what I think. If I can make a couple of brief points, one of the
things is that certainly in my business career I saw a development
in the planning process. In days gone by we used to say, here
we are, what is happening and where is that going to lead us?
We have developed that into saying, here we are, where do we want
to be, and then ask the question, how do we get there? The latter
is what is applicable to the current process. The second point
is the one of function versus composition. I think this is a wholly
circular argument and you can get on or off at any point. Therefore
the third point to me, which is really critical, is to look at
the objectives, what you want to get out of it in the long-term.
To do that you do need to look at the strengths and the weaknesses
and work out what you want to reject and what you want to keep.
For me the key is that whatever you do it passes the legitimacy
test. I hope you have some questions on that. The second is to
preserve the character and atmosphere of the House, which has
a lot of merits in certain areas. The third thing is to strengthen
the role of Parliament as a whole in holding the executive to
account and to leave the Commons as the predominant political
chamber. I dislike the terms of supremacy and primacy, but that
is semantics. That is all I would like to say by way of opening.
173. We will move on to Austin Mitchell. Would
you like to say in a minute or so, by way of introduction, your
general approach to this and then we will fire off questions to
both of you.
(Mr Mitchell) Thank you for the opportunity to present
evidence. I have to say right at the start I have changed my mind
on the issue. I thought initially the elected element had to be
a minority, very much a minority element because I do not want
to the election of another chamber just like us, that is to say
thick-skinned politicians desperate to climb the ladder of success,
as we all are, some of us more successful than others and compliant
tools of the executive. The main problem we have to deal with
is the unchecked power of the executive in this country. I have
changed my mind because I think there is no other legitimate basis
for a chamber that can have a standing and an acceptance and a
clear role, other than a majority of them being elected on an
elected basis. It does allow us to mix in other elements which
are desirable. If we are starting from scratch why not use a variety
of methods which are open to us to supplement what must be basically
elective. I think we are in a situation where it is going to become
an argument between those who are saying, government 20 per cent
elected, and others wanting 30, 40, 50, "Any advance on 50?"
Mine is 60. I think that is a majority. Also, strengthened by
an age requirement, which personally I would like though it might
be difficult, to bring in experience rather than those anxious
to climb the ladder, such as are elected to the European Parliament
or to the House of Commons. That would be a helpful factor. Its
powers need to be those of providing a check to the executive,
supplementing the things the Commons do badly. I think you cannot
consider House of Lords reform just as a separate unrelated issue,
it has to combine with further reforms in the House of Commons
so that you can arrange some differentiation of functions between
the two Houses. There are things which we do very badly and do
not do at all in many respects,-pre-legislative review is one
of them. I was struck by the New Zealand system, indeed I was
a member of the Hansard Commission of Inquiry into the legislative
process, which recommended pre-legislative hearings, legislation
should be brought in, publicised, there should be then a committee,
with a draft bill, which will hear public representations from
those pressure grounds on the bill before it finalises it and
then it is introduced through the formal procedures of second
reading, et cetera. That works well in New Zealand. It would enhance
confidence and participation if we had it here. I think it is
difficult to visualise the House of Commons taking on more duties
because, frankly, we are pretty well over-stretched as it is,
therefore it is a function that could come naturally to the second
chamber. As for post legislative review, two years on how is legislation
working? We need to look at that as well. Again the second chamber
could do that. Those are my basic ideas. It is, in a sense, a
pick and mix proposal, people will do their own picking and mixing.
While you can quibble with the details of it all I am trying to
suggest is a broad outline of a basically elective second chamber
which yet brings in another wider range of opinion than the brutal
thick-skinned creatures we are who will battle through the party
and the election system. Perhaps more sensitively, angelic people,
or whatever, but certainly contributing another element of experience
and an element of diversity, with some limited power for the parties
to nominate. I think that power was grievously abused at that
last election, when people traded seats in the Commons for places
in the peerage. That was a major scandal. If government is going
to abuse its power in that way then the power should be restrained.
It does need some power to nominate a minority to carry on the
purposes of government in the second chamber, I concede that,
with an element of representation by interest groups. That gabble
does not come within your time limit, but there it is.
174. You have both been very helpful there,
let us respond to that and probe you on it. Austin you describe
yourself as somebody who has moved on this, that is always interesting
to explore, surely the one thing that whatever we did would make
it all worse rather than better would be if we finished up with
a second chamber that was more like the first one? You say in
your nice paper to us we are the custard pie place, we are the
place where we throw custard pie at each other all the time and
we need a serious place that looks at what we are doing. If we
had a system that simply was wholly elected on some kind of party
list system would it not be the case that we might call it election,
but it would be actually tantamount to appointment and we would
finish up with critical appointees in a second chamber that would
make the place less independent, less expert, less robust, less
of a check than we have now?
(Mr Mitchell) The House of Commons is basically the
stage on which we conduct the four year long election campaign.
The second chamber is going to have a more considered revising
role, concerned more with the detail of legislation and the revision
of legislation and the faults and workings of legislation. While
it is true that parties are going to be involved in any election
system, you cannot devise an election system unless it is indirect
election by regional assemblies, which we do not have, which is
going to keep the parties out, even that will be strongly influenced
by the parties. We just have to accept that as a given, there
is no way round it. If we try and ensure that a different type
of person is selected by an age requirement and if we add to that
the nominated independent section, which is 100 strong on my proposal,
plus some representation of interest groups, I think we dilute
the party element and widen the range of experience. My answer
would be that this is better than a wholly predominantly nominated
Second Chamber which I think is going to enhance the power of
the executive to a dangerous degree so lets use a different election
system, which will be a regional STV. The regional list system,
not the closed list system we had at the European elections, but
regional STV, this gives the voter more choice and requires the
parties, to nominate rather different people of a wider appeal
in the region than the present system of the selection to constituencies.
175. Of course the government is not proposing
regional STV.
(Mr Mitchell) It is not, but that is no concern of
mine.
176. It is probably a concern of ours. Can I
ask you about one feature of your proposal, as well as the elected
element you do allow the parties a block of nominees. Do you allow
them 100?
(Mr Mitchell) 80. That is for all the parties, I do
not say how they should be chosen.
177. That is an interesting proposal because
it is not one that anyone else has put to us. It giving the parties
something. It is saying, if you give us election, as it were,
we will give you a chunk of straight nominees.
(Mr Mitchell) There has to be some ability on the
part of the executive and also on the part of the parties to have
some power of nomination to bringing in people to serve their
purposes, provide their backbone in the second chamber. What I
am proposing is appointment renewed after each election, four
year renewal, so that they will be reappointed after each election
to the House of Commons, and only a minority. If you give then
the large amount of nominating power that they seem to be aspiring
in the other proposals for the second chamber then it will be
abused, it will become a dustbin for political relics. I myself
was not approached at the last election, to my great chagrin,
but I would only have stood for the Ambassadorship in Iceland
rather than a seat in the House of Lords. It is either going to
be that kind of dustbin or it is going to be used for the kind
of political manoeuver which went on as people were winkled out
of seats and went to the House of Lords. It will be abused, in
other words.
(Viscount Thurso) I do think the manner in which people
are sent to the upper House will have an effect on how it will
operate it. One of the things that I have developed my thinking
on is I am very much in favour of a minimum age, I think it should
could be quite high, something in the order of 45 or possibly
50, specifically to prevent people starting a career in the second
chamber and specifically to try and the get away from the hurly
burly of the party politics that is the prerogative and preserve
of the Commons. The other thing which I think is very important,
in my view, is a relatively long term and no possibility of reelection
and reappointment, because that is where the power of the whips
really lies. The difference between the Commons and the Lords
is very marked. In the Lords it is very much, we have a three
line whip do you think you could possibly make it, great thanks
if you did and, as I am sure everybody here has experienced, it
is not that gentle in the Commons. That is a very, very important
point. I think, therefore, if you have that preservation of the
atmosphere through a slightly older House, through people who
have had, obviously, a career somewhere else, which could well
be in the Commons, it should be no bar; and you will do that by
preserving conventions. We use conventions a lot in our system.
There is a convention in the Lords that you do not take part in
any party politics in the area in which you live. It is a very
good convention. You do not undertake constituency work, by convention,
you tend to take up causes or regional issues. I think all of
these can be quite easily preserved and maintain the difference,
quite a proper difference, between the two Houses. The other area
where I have moved, I have to say I am moving in the same direction
as Austin, although I started from much more election anyway,
which is I think really I am quite happy to see the whole place
elected. I am much less convinced now about the value of crossbenchers
than I was when I wrote my paper. I have to say that crossbenchers
do tend to be very elitist, they do tend to represent certain
specific areas of society and I do not see any system that actually
produces the broad range one would really like to see. The key
thing is that it should be people of ability. I have nothing against
the test of being able to pass an election. I would, most of all,
favour STV, but I would be happy to see an open list system. I
would hate to see a closed list system.
178. Election in this country means party. 95
per cent, or more, of the people in this country do not belong
to a political party. If we want to bring people of independence
and expertise into a second chamber, not the primary chamber,
a secondary revising chamber would we be mad to invent a system
that stopped us recruiting the people we need to do that job?
(Viscount Thurso) That is a slight, "when did
you stop beating your wife" question. I do not think we would
be mad because I do not think the premise actually holds good.
First of all, I do not see anything wrong with a party system,
provided it is a system which allows for more than two parties,
and certainly a good proportional representation system does allow
for a number of minority parties to be represented. Secondly,
I think that the idea that the crossbenchers are wholly independent
of politics is actually not to understand how the crossbenchers
work. Certainly my observation was that it was not difficult to
predict on a lot of political issues how the crossbenchers would
vote. On certain issues which they were very keen on they would
go in a different direction, perhaps to the one you might suspect
was their political allegiance. The crossbenchers are not as a-political,
in my view, from experience, as people make out they are. I think
a great deal is talked about the independence of the Lords and
the independence of the upper chamber and I do not think it holds
up to scrutiny. This is apocryphal, but a number of former colleagues
have said that since the last reform the mood of the crossbenchers
have changed even more, it is even more apparent that they hold
broadly to one political persuasion or the other. Although 95
per cent of the country do not belong to a political party a much,
much higher percentage have a regular political affinity. I do
not see anything wrong with a broadly based party system that
allows for minority parties to be a foundation for producing members
of the second house, the senate.
Mr Trend
179. I wanted to ask Austin about his plans.
You have always had fairly radical views about this, do you think
this is an opportunity to address the question of holding the
executive to account in rebalancing the positions and functions
of the two Houses? Would you like that to be part of this process?
(Mr Mitchell) I think that is the crucial issue. Since
we are now divising something new it is possible to start from
scratch and ask what basic functions it should fulfill, I think
that has to be the start of the question. Controlling the executive
more effectively is clearly the prime one. I think the Commons
are never going to be able to do it and because of its nature
in the British system the executive controls the legislature.
We are, after all, selected on a party ticket and there to support
the government. What we need is not some rebalancing of the functions
between the two Houses but a second chamber which can effectively
say to the executive, hang on, have another look at this and,
secondly, can bring in a wider range of experience and backgrounds,
people who will supplement the basic party debate and give it
a wider dimension. Of its nature this is going to be government
by party, you cannot get away from that, if there is an election
system the parties will move in, it is like being drawn into a
vacuum. But we can supplement the kind of person who is coming
in in career politics. This is a big change, we now have career
politics, where people want to get up and climb ladders, and you
do not climb ladders by making controversy or by dissenting. The
great mavericks of yester year, Churchill or whoever, if they
dissented now would end their careers immediately. We do need
to create an institutional chamber, which will have to be the
second chamber, it can only be a partial chamber and it can bring
in a wider range of voices and it can examine through its committee
structures what the government is proposing in terms of legislation,
bringing in wider public participation and what the government
has done in terms of legislation. I do not think you are ever
going to be able to stop, nor indeed should we, the power of the
executive or political party, because that is the basic choice
that the electorate has to have.
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