Role of the Appointments Commission
in maintaining overall balance
143. We are concerned at the lack of clarity in the
White Paper about the role to be played by the Appointments Commission
in maintaining the diversity of the second chamber. It is not
clear, for instance, whether the Commission is intended to have
responsibility for the balance simply of the independent appointed
members, of all appointed members, or of the chamber as a whole.
We believe that it should take on the responsibility for balancing
the whole chamber. This is a further reason why it should appoint
not just independent members but also those members nominated
by parties.
144. We recognise that under our proposals for a
predominantly elected House, the Commission would only have direct
control over the selection of the 40 per cent of its members who
are appointed. This might make its task difficult if there are
serious imbalances amongst the elected members. The Commission
should be required to publish an annual report about the balances
and imbalances in the House as a whole, and to inform the political
parties of the imbalances which need redressing. The Commission
cannot control the selection process of the political parties,
but it should be able to identify those parties which are contributing
to the imbalance, and so exercise some influence over their selection
criteria.
145. There will also be a need to decide on the correct
allocation of appointed members for each political party. We believe
that the Appointments Commission should decide the proportions,
basing them on the share of the vote won by each party in the
second chamber elections. Any other allocation, such as one based
on general election shares, would threaten to undermine the credibility
of the second chamber elections and mirror some of the least satisfactory
features of the White Paper rebalancing proposals. It will take
time to achieve this, and realistic timetables would have to be
drawn up.
146. We recommend that the Appointments Commission
should allocate the numbers of politically nominated members to
each party, based on the share of the vote won by the parties
in the most recent second chamber election.
147. In terms of appointed members, we have already
recommended that the Commission should make the final selection
of party nominees as well as independent members. This would also
help the Commission in its task of ensuring overall balance. The
kind of political rebalancing role envisaged by the White Paper
for the Appointments Commission (described by Professor Iain McLean
in his written evidence as 'a ZANU-PF conception of democracy')[63]
is neither necessary or desirable.
Selection of the independent
members
148. One way in which the statutory Commission can
signal a fresh start is by seeking out individuals who would not
have featured an any conventional Honours List. This is one reason
why the initial group of nominations received such a lukewarm
reception: they appeared little different from the Establishment
figures who appeared on such lists in the past. We wish the Commission
to be more innovative and imaginative in encouraging able people
from a variety of backgrounds to come forward to serve in the
second chamber. This could be achieved by a variety of methods,
including nomination from local and community groups and from
professional associations: no one can be compelled to serve, and
those appointed by this route must be willing to give the same
amount of time and commitment to the second chamber as everyone
else. What matters is that a distinctive approach (or set of approaches)
is adopted to produce a distinctive and fresh set of faces to
sit alongside the well known figures with distinguished records
of public service who also (quite properly) feature strongly on
the cross benches.
149. One possibility that might have merit is to
allow the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh and Northern Ireland
Assemblies to be the nominating bodies for independent appointed
members from their nations and regions. This would be a form of
indirect election that could be applied more widely as and when
regional assemblies are established in England.
59 HC 494-i Q 1-5 Back
60
HC 494-iii Q 425 Back
61
Ibid Q 320 Back
62
HC 494-iii, Q321/2 Back
63
HC 494-II, LR 58 Back
