Memorandum by the Democratic Audit, Human
Rights Centre, University of Essex (LR 52)
RESPONSE TO THE WHITE PAPER, "THE HOUSE
OF LORDS: COMPLETING THE REFORM", CM 5291
INTRODUCTION
1. In 1999, a Task Force, chaired by Lord
Plant of Highfield, gave evidence to the Royal Commission on the
Reform of the House of Lords on behalf of the Democratic Audit.
The Task Force report argued that only an elected second chamber
would possess sufficient legitimacy in the eyes of the public
to fulfil the role of legislative scrutiny and, wherever necessary,
to employ the delaying powers that the House of Lords generally
fears to use. The Task Force argued for a full-time salaried House
with the capacity to undertake systematic scruting of the Government's
legislative proposals.
2. The Task Force stated that the House
of Commons should remain pre-eminent. But its members echoed long-standing
complaints about the poor quality of legislation emerging from
the House of Commons; and argued that since the Commons has largely
become the instrument of the executive, the need for a stronger
second chamber with the capacity to thoroughly examine government
Bills and the legitimacy and powers to require the executive and
first chamber to reflect for a limited period was all the more
desirable.
3. We enclose a copy of this evidence with
this submission.1
4. Our first aim in this supplementary evidence
is to set the debate over reform in the context of a public mood
of disillusion and withdrawal from the formal political process
and to consider how reform of the second chamber could contribute
to combating that disillusion. To assist the Government, Democratic
Audit commissioned a public opinion poll from ICM Research, which
was designed to follow up previous polls on the future of the
House of Lords in the "State of the Nation" series of
polls commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust. These
previous polls confirm other results which show that the public
greatly prefer an elected, or largely elected, second chamber
to one which is solely or largely appointed (see pages 77-81 of
Voices of the People, which summarises the "State of the
Nation" polls).
5. We then go on to discuss the issues raised
in the White Paper.
PART 1: THE PUBLIC'S
VIEWS
6. The Rowntree polls over the period 1991-2001
indicate that the public is in general committed to the principles
of accountable Government; to the adoption of strong legal and
formal scrutiny and rules of conduct for government and Parliament;
to more popular participation in government decision-making; and
to the proportional principle in elections. Few people profess
to have a wide knowledge of constitutional and political affairs,
but the public as a whole has consistently revealed a basic grasp
of democratic principle and the underlying issues in polls over
the ten-year period of the Rowntree polls.
7. The public has consistently expressed
a principled preference for an elected, or largely elected, second
chamber and hostility towards party political patronage in appointments
to that chamber. Our advice to the Government and Department is
that reform of the House of Lords should as far as possible conform
with the views of the public. These views are reasonable, principled
and consistent. If the Government is willing to give them the
consideration they deserve, then it will do much to restore public
confidence in the country's political system and to give the future
second chamber popular legitimacy. We will enlarge on these points
as we respond to the White Paper.
Election or Appointment?
8. In the ICM poll for Democratic Audit2,
respondents were first asked what was the best course for the
future of a new second chamber; and then, which would give a reformed
House most right to block government legislation. There was a
simple majority for an elected, or largely elected, second chamber;
and 54 per cent of the public would choose such a chamber against
14 per cent who are in favour of the government option of a largely
appointed House (see Table below). Most respondents also believe
that election would give the reformed House more legitimacy to
block government legislation. Nearly half those interviewed (49
per cent) believe that election would give the House "most
right" to block legislation, whereas only one in 10 (11 per
cent) believe a largely appointed chambers would have similar
legitimacy.
9. The public's views in full were as follows:
| In your view, which of these proposals, if any, is the best course for a future second chamber?
| For
% | Which would give a reformed
House most right to block
government legislation? (%)
|
| A mixed House, with a majority of elected members
| 27 | 22
|
| A wholly elected House | 27
| 27 |
| A mixed House, with a majority of appointed members
| 14 | 11
|
| A wholly appointed House | 9
| 18 |
| Don't knows | 24
| 23 |
10. The poll further tested people's attachment to the
principle of election, as against the White Paper's insistence
on special knowledge and expertise, by asking respondents whose
views should be considered more important when it came to making
new laws in the second chamber.
| Whose views should be considered more important when it comes to making new laws in the second chamber?
|
| | Much more important (%)
| A little more
important (%)
|
| The views of eminent people with special knowledge or expertise
| 23 | 20
|
| The views of elected representatives of ordinary people
| 35 | 14
|
| Neither of them—1 per cent; don't knows—5 per cent
|
Thus, a third of people think that the view of elected members
are "much more important" than those of eminent specialists,
against nearly a quarter who take the opposite view, and in aggregate,
virtually half the public (49 per cent) think the views of elected
representatives carry more weight, but in a close vote (43 per
cent prefer to rely on eminent specialists).
Powers
11. The public clearly want the second chamber to be
a real bulwark against poor legislation. Respondents were given
four options and asked, "What powers should the second chamber
have to make the government think again when it objects to a new
law?"
| What powers should the second chamber have to make government think again?
| For
% |
| Power of delay for a few months | 21
|
| Power of delay for one year | 14
|
| Power of delay for two years | 5
|
| Power to hold up a new law "indefinitely" until the two Houses of Parliament can reach agreement
| 52 |
| Don't know | 9
|
The strength of the public desire for an effective check
upon the executive is apparent in the large vote—52 per
cent—for giving the second chamber the power to hold up
legislation until both Houses can reach agreement. In all, 71
per cent of respondents want a power of delay of one year or more.
Further, two thirds of respondents (63 per cent) agreed that the
second chamber should have "extra powers of delay" where
peers felt that a proposed law would endanger human rights (27
per cent disagreed; don't knows numbered 10 per cent).
The Appointment Process
12. On party patronage, ICM's pollsters first asked respondents
whether they agreed or disagreed that the Prime Minister of the
day and other party leaders should have any say at all over those
who are appointed to the second chamber; and then, "If there
are to be appointed members, who should have the final say on
who is appointed or not?" Public opinion greatly values the
idea of an Appointments Commission,
| Should the Prime Minister and other party leaders have any say at all on who is appointed to the second chamber?
| For % | If there are to be appointed members, who should have the final say on who is appointed
| For % |
| Yes | 37 |
The Prime Minister of the day | 12
|
| No | 56 |
An Appointments Commission independent of the government and parties
| 83 |
| Don't know | 6
| Don't know | 5
|
independent of both government and the political parties, having
the last say on who is appointed to the House (if there are to
be appointed members). An 83 per cent vote for a wholly independent
commission indicates a popular consensus around this view. There
is also a simple majority against the Prime Minister or party
leaders having "any say at all" in appointments.
13. ICM also asked respondents whether they agreed with
the proposal that the Prime Minister should decide on the great
majority of appointments to a reformed second chamber, with an
independent commission appointing a minority. The public were
strongly against such a proposal, with 59 per cent "against"
to 26 per cent "in favour"—more than a two-to-one
vote against.
PART 2: COMMENTS ON
THE GOVERNMENT'S
PROPOSALS
Royal Commission Recommendations
14. Democratic Audit shares the Royal Commission's key
views that the reformed second chamber should be "broadly
representative of society" and that it should work with the
House of Commons to provide "an effective check upon the
Government" (see page 5 of the White Paper). The importance
of creating a new House with sufficient authority and capacity
to check and, if necessary, amend government legislation is vital
to good government in the UK. By comparison with most democracies,
the select committees in the House of Commons are relatively good
at making government accountable for its policies and actions,
and they do so largely in public; but the UK falls far behind
other democracies when it comes to legislative scrutiny. The ad-hoc
standing committees that are supposed to examine Bills in the
Commons are weak, ill-informed and divided on partisan lines.
A survey of parliamentary committees around the world, submitted
to the Modernisation Committee in January 2002, stresses the need
greatly to improve legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament.3
Reports urging reform go back to the 19th century. In more modern
times, several official reports in the 1970s made the case for
reform, which was finally given magisterial authority by Making
the Law, the report of the Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative
Process in 1992.4
15. We do not believe that the Commission's proposals
would have given the second chamber sufficient legitimacy to provide
an effective check. The government's proposals will give the second
chamber even less legitimacy, as the public is strongly against
government and party patronage in appointing members to the second
chamber. The decision to downgrade the role of the Appointments
Committee may very well bring the chamber into disrepute as a
haven for "place" men and women over time.
The Pre—Eminence of the House of Commons
16. Democratic Audit is disturbed by the executive bias
in the Government's description of the "UK's political system",
as set out in the White Paper (page 9, paragraph 15). Elections
in the UK do not only, as the White Paper suggests, seek a "clear
and unequivocal answer" to the question, "Whom do you
choose to govern you?" Elections in the UK have a dual purpose—they
also ask the electorate to choose their representatives to stand
in for them in Parliament. This is a significant difference in
that the White Paper is built around the interests and wishes
of the political executive rather than the principle of democratic
representation; nor can it be said that the disproportionate results
of the majoritarian electoral system give a "clear and unequivocal
answer" even to the choice of the UK's political governors.
The Powers of the House of Lords
17. Democratic Audit agrees that the House of Lords should
continue to be able to delay legislation for a year, but we wish
to see a second chamber that has the legitimacy and the capacity
to use this power when it is appropriate. We agree with the public's
view that the second chamber should possess additional powers
to block legislation that it considers would endanger human rights
in the UK. But we believe it is necessary to go further. As we
are about to witness once again, the Government can generally
change the country's constitutional arrangements by ordinary legislation
passed (or accepted) by a simple majority in both Houses. We believe
that it is incumbent on the Government to put major constitutional
changes of this kind to the people in a referendum; and we urge
the Government to do so in this case. There is also a strong case
for giving the second chamber powers either to insist on a referendum
where legislation has a major constitutional effect; or to give
it extra powers of delay.
Composition
18. We begin by re-stating the case for election which
rests upon principle and connected practical considerations. We
then go on to examine issues of composition, the electoral system
and timing, and pay.
(a) The Principled and Practical Case for Election
Legitimacy can only come from popular election. A modern
legislature acts in a representative capacity: it stands in for
the people as a whole. No appointed body can act in this capacity.5
Election is the primary mechanism of representative democracy.
It is the only means by which everyone can be given an equal choice
of candidates for public office and in which everyone has at least
a formal opportunity to stand for public office. It is true, as
the Lord Chancellor argues, that not all public offices are or
need to be filled by way of election, but most such offices are
normally specialist, not legislative, positions. In the UK, the
appointed state is already growing fast and vast. There are no
compelling reasons for filling most of the second chamber with
appointees. But there is a compelling practical reason for giving
it the legitimacy of election, simply because a largely appointed
House is unlikely to command sufficient public respect and political
authority to fulfil its central duties.
(b) Second Chambers Overseas
The White Paper is deliberately misleading in its discussion
of the composition of the second chamber. To say, as the White
Paper does, that, "Only a minority of democracies worldwide
have wholly directly elected second chamber" is a half-truth.
To go on to argue that the US Senate is not the norm against which
other second chamber should be judged when 15 other nations, including
Australia and Japan, also have wholly directly elected second
chamber is no more than a red herring. Table 1 (over) sets out
the position internationally to the best of our ability within
the short time-scale for consultation. (We are aware that it is
not comprehensive.)
It is true that wholly directly elected second chambers are
in a minority worldwide; but they form the largest minority. Further,
most democracies choose one or another form of election as the
principal means for recruiting members for their second chambers;
41 (or 71 per cent) of the 58 democracies in this survey have
opted for chambers that are wholly or largely elected, directly
or indirectly. Only 17 have wholly or largely appointed memberships.
The Government's preferred option — largely appointed with
an elected minority—is in a very small minority of two democracies,
Malaysia and Swaziland, at the moment.
The trend among established democracies is for elected chambers,
and the main variation from direct election in this trend is towards
indirectly elected chambers in federal states. At the same time,
mixed systems with a variety of variations are common. Overall,
a largely elected House of Lords with up to 20 per cent appointed
or ex-officio members, on the model that we suggest in "Summary"
below, would conform with the major democratic trend around the
world. Such a solution need not mean that "the independent
members would virtually disappear" (page 18, paragraph 40),
especially if the Appointments Commission assumes the full role
over the appointment process that the Wakeham Commission envisaged.
Table 1
COMPOSITION OF SECOND CHAMBERS AROUND THE WORLD
| Composition | No.
| Examples |
| Fully and directly elected | 16
| Inc. Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Switzerland, USA
|
| Indirectly elected | 14
| Inc. Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland
|
| Mixed, largely elected (directly or indirectly) with appointed members
| 9 | Inc. Chile, Croatia, Ireland, India, Italy
|
| Mixed largely directly elected/co-opted/hereditary
| 1 | Belgium
|
| Mixed directly/indirectly elected | 1
| Spain |
| Wholly appointed | 13
| Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Burkino Faso, Canada, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Jordan, St Lucia, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago
|
| Mixed, largely appointed with an elected minority
| 2 | Malaysia, Swaziland
|
| Mixed hereditary/appointed | 2
| Lesotho, United Kingdom |
| Total | 58
| |
Sources: derived from the Inter-Parliamentary Union database:
www.ipu.org; secondary sources, Coakley, J, and Laver, M, in The
All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution: Second Progress
Report, Seanad Eireann, Government of Ireland, 1997; Russell,
M, Second Chambers Overseas, Constitution Unit, 1999; Hazell,
R, Commentary on the White Paper, Constitution Unit, 2001
(c) The Party Presence in the Future Second Chamber
Two other loose arguments in this section of the White Paper
should be addressed. First, the White Paper states: "The
majority of members should continue to represent the political
parties ... it would be unrealistic to try and keep party politics
out of the second chamber" (page 17, paragraph 35). If this
is the case, what is the argument against election? The Royal
Commission's principal argument against a fully or largely elected
second chamber was that elections would entrench party politics
and squeeze out members of "expertise and experience".
The government has rejected the Royal Commission's recommendation
that the independent Appointments Commission should have the final
say over the identity of party nominations. Thus the government
intends to give the party managers of the main parties the decisive
say over who will fill up to 332 places in the new House, or 55
per cent of the total membership. In other words, the government
is determined that leaders of the established parties should retain
the conveniences of patronage (some of them highly undesirable)
and directly select their party members in the House rather than
trust the people to choose them for their qualities and political
affiliation after a more diffuse selection process has taken place
within the parties (but see "Electoral issues" below).
(d) Gridlock
Second, it is argued that two wholly elected chambers within
the Westminster system would be a "recipe for gridlock"
(page 18, paragraph 39). As the Democratic Audit Task Force argued,
the spectre of gridlock could readily be disposed of by giving
the second chamber clear functions and limits on its powers to
ensure the continuing pre-eminence of the House of Commons (page
13, paragraph 21). Moreover, given the rushed and inadequate nature
of the legislative process in the UK, an element of "gridlock"—that
is, proper time for reflection—should be warmly welcomed;
and the ICM polls suggest that the great majority of the British
people would welcome it.
(e) New Labour's Life Peerage
Democratic Audit examined the make-up of the Life Peerage
in 1999 for the Task Force report and found that former ministers,
MPs and MEPs made up a third of the total (Table 1 of the report).
There was a huge imbalance between life peers drawn from private
business and those from the public service. In terms of "primary
occupation", we found that business people outnumbered public
servants by a ratio of three to one—22 per cent against
7 per cent. Moreover, when the secondary occupations of former
MPs and other peers were examined, 214 of the then 513 life peers
had identifiable business backgrounds or interests—42 per
cent of the total. In all, 250 life peers were also identified
as "party activists" (including councillors) —
49 per cent of the total. About one in ten life peers had the
specialist knowledge or expertise that is used to justify the
appointment process.
For this evidence, we examined the full list of life peers
created under Tony Blair. In the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor
said 247 life peers had been created under the Labour government
(HL Debates, 9 January 2002, col 563). Of these, five were law
lords. Thus we analysed the backgrounds, interests and political
activity of 242 life peers, we also separated out the 15 creations
made on the recommendations of the Appointments Commission. Table
2 (over) shows the basic analysis of the New Labour (or political)
Life Peerage (column 1), as well of the full list (column 2).
We believe the composition of this list to be a significant pointer
for the future, since most creations have been made by the Prime
Minister and party leaders, though it is intended that the Appointments
Commission will supply a large minority in the future.
As before, we have given priority to elected public office
or public service in defining the "primary occupations"
of life peers, even though for example former MPs and ministers
have often had successful business careers as well, or may previously
have worked in the public services. The political contingent from
"the other place" remains broadly steady at a third
of the total. The gap between life peers from business and the
public service has narrowed slightly, down to 17.5 per cent against
13 per cent after the intervention of the Appointments Commission.
However, it is likely that the gap would swell were we to measure
secondary occupations.
Table 2
LIFE PEERS CREATED (UNDER 1958 AND 1876 ACTS) SINCE MAY
1997*
| Category | All Government and party appointees
| All life peers, including Appointments Commission creations
|
| | No
| % | No
| % |
| Former ministers, MPs and MEPs | 80
| 35 | 80
| 33 |
| Corporate and private business | 41
| 18 | 43
| 17.5 |
| Academics, specialists etc | 17
| 7 | 21
| 8.5 |
| Lawyers (other than Law Lords) | 12
| 5 | 12
| 5 |
| Public service work, paid and voluntary (including social work, the NHS, police and military service, etc)
| 24 | 10.5
| 32 | 13
|
| Senior civil servants | 5
| 2 | 6
| 2.5 |
| Councillors | 13
| 6 | 13
| 5.5 |
| Trade union officials | 11
| 5 | 11
| 5 |
| Political party officials (including high-ranking volunteers and Parliamentary candidates)
| 6 | 2.5
| 6 | 2
|
| Political advisers | 4
| 2 | 4
| 1.5 |
| Culture and media | 10
| 5 | 10
| 4.5 |
| Religious office (other than ex officio Anglicans)
| 2 | 1
| 2 | 1
|
| Royal Household | 2
| 1 | 2
| 1 |
| Total | 227
| 100* | 242
| 100* |
| *Percentages rounded. |
| Sources: Dod's Parliamentary Companion 2002; Who's Who 2002; The Guardian Guide to Parliament; Journal Office, House of Lords; Parliamentary Profiles.
|
(f) Party Politics
We have researched the political backgrounds of life peers
as thoroughly as we could in the short time available. We counted
as "political activists" elected politicians at all
levels; failed parliamentary candidates; known party donors; party
workers, paid and voluntary; and close allies of party leaders
("cronies" in the vernacular). Many life peers had played
many political roles. The records at our disposal were incomplete.
Nevertheless, we found that 163 life peers were political activists
in this sense. Thus nearly three out of four of the appointments
made through the Prime Minister and party leaders are party political
activists. The composition of the House of Lords is being saturated
by the very party politics that the Royal Commission warned against.
These figures throw into relief the White Paper's expressed
belief in the value of "non—politically aligned members
of the Lords" (page 23, paragraph 62). Nomination rather
than being a safeguard against excessive party political influence
in the second chamber actually creates a well-trodden, and half-concealed,
alternative path of party political preferment into Parliament.
(g) Specialism
Much is made of the specialist contribution, which the House
of Lords makes to parliamentary debate and scrutiny. Yet the scepticism
about the breadth of specialism that appointments bring to the
House expressed in the Task Force report (page 38) is confirmed
by the low level of academic and specialist peers created under
the current regime (at 8.5 per cent of the intake, even after
the Appointments Commission's contribution). On the other hand,
there is likely to be a tendency to be sympathetic to the needs
of the executive, with 80 more former ministers, MPs and MEPs,
and six more senior civil servants, added to the already considerable
number of recruits from Westminster, Whitehall and Strasbourg
on the House's benches.
(h) The Role of the Appointments Commission
If the government's view that there should be a majority
of appointed peers in the reformed chamber prevails, it will be
vital to public confidence in the new House and its political
authority for the Appointments Commission to assume the full role
envisaged by the Royal Commission. This would be the case even
if appointees were to be in a minority. The government does propose
two significant reforms: the relinquishing by the Prime Minister
of his current powers of appointment to the House; and the fact
that nominations by other party leaders will no longer need to
pass through the government's hands (page 26, paragraph 67).
But the judgment in paragraph 66 above that the "parties
of whatever persuasion must be able to decide who will
serve on their behalf" [our emphasis] is mistaken. No explanation
is given for this arbitrary decision. But it holes the legitimacy
of the whole structure of the government's reform. A process of
party political appointment of over half the members of the new
House will be widely seen as a recipe for party political patronage
and cronyism; and there will be some truth in such a perception.
It is axiomatic that not all such political appointments
are made on merit. Party leaders must reward party or personal
loyalty or services; donors are often given a short-cut to public
office, as many of the New Labour Life Peerage have; MPs in safe
seats are given peerages to smooth the path of the Prime Minster's
aides and allies into the House of Commons (as happened in at
least two cases at the last election). Patronage of this kind
should be a remnant of the old politics, not preserved in the
very fabric of a modernised new chamber. The damage that such
practices will do the reputation of the House and politics in
general is incalculable. The government must be persuaded to put
democratic principle first, and the convenience of party leaders
second. The proper route for party control of recruits to the
second chamber is via the ballot box.
(i) Religious Representation
In a modern and pluralist nation of many faiths and none,
it is an anachronism for the Church of England to be the only
church or faith represented as of right in the chamber. The "practical
obstacles" to a wider representation of faith do not justify
the anomalous position that the White Paper adopts with the retention
of 16 places for the Church of England in the House. In our view,
the specific representation of "faith" in the House
is wrong in principle; the various faiths that exist within the
UK should be represented in the legislature alongside all beliefs
and political and social affiliations through the votes of the
people at the ballot box. Representation of "faith"
in the second chamber would breach the democratic principle of
political equality and give certain values systems and interests
preference over others. However, if "faith" is to be
privileged, no one institution should monopolise that privilege.
There should be no places reserved for the Church of England in
the House; and the Appointments Commission should be given the
responsibility for deciding on the representation of faith in
the new chamber.
(j) The Electoral Process
The government recommends that elections for elected members
of the House should be by a proportional list system and should
primarily seek to introduce representation on a regional basis
into the House. We welcome the decision to adopt a proportional
system, but there should be debate now about the most appropriate
system. The electoral system chosen should be as open and flexible
as possible, enhancing the degree of accountability that is available
to voters. At the same time, the degree of control exerted by
party managers over the choices open to voters should be restricted.
If the government opts for a "closed list" system alongside
party control of most appointed places, the undesirable political
saturation of the House, under the control of the party managers,
would increase yet further. The parties in effect control the
composition of some three quarters of the whole House.
There are three types of list system:
— fully open systems under which voters must choose
the individuals they wish to vote for from party lists
— flexible systems which give voters a choice between
accepting the party list or voting for individual candidates;
and
— closed systems which give voters only a basic
choice between rival party lists.6
It is this third system that the government introduced for
the Euro-elections amidst a great deal of controversy. The system
goes against the grain of electoral traditions in the UK, since
most voters value the idea that they are choosing a representative
as well as a party when they go to the polls. The system diminishes
any real sense of democratic accountability since any candidate
elected as part of a list will naturally seek to satisfy the party
managers and members who gave her or him their place on the list
rather than the voters. We recommend that the government at least
opt for a fully open list system and change the system for Euro-elections
to conform. We also recommend that the government consider the
advantages of the Single Transferable Vote (STV), a broadly proportional
system which encourages voters to discriminate between candidates.
We are aware that there is considerable hostility towards STV
within the Labour party's (and presumably the government's) ranks,
but it does enhance personal accountability and its use would
more fully realise the government's professed aim of a more diverse
and independent second chamber. It also becomes more nearly proportional
in large constituencies.
(k) Timing of Elections
Democratic Audit agrees with the Royal Commission that elections
to the second chamber should be held alongside elections to the
European Parliament. Turnout would probably be lower, as the White
Paper argues, than if they were held at the same time as general
elections. But holding the elections both to the European Parliament
and new House together would raise turnout for the Euro-elections,
the more so the more substantial the elected element in the new
House is to be. There is a real danger that a minority of 120
elected members will be regarded only as a token. Linking elections
to the second chamber to general elections would also have the
profound disadvantage that the terms of elected members would
be variable. They may even have to stand for election twice in
one or two years, as has happened in general elections.
The case that the Royal Commission made for longer terms
of office in the second chamber in terms of greater independence
and continuity is very persuasive and should not be cast aside.
We also regard it as a disadvantage that the dominant national
issues on which general elections are fought would almost certainly
determine the results of the elections to the second chamber and
heavily influence the party and personal choices that were made
by voters. The composition of the elected element in the second
chamber could become a pale reflection of the composition of the
popular chamber. The degree of accountability to voters would
diminish. Regular elections on a different time-scale would reduce
this danger; and would bring stability to the second chamber.
The regional nature of both elections could be emphasised rather
than the purely European influence that the government fears (page
21, paragraph 21).
(l) Terms of Office
Democratic Audit does not believe that the terms of office
for elected or appointed members need be of 15 years; nor that
the two categories must necessarily serve terms of equivalent
length (page 22, paragraph 57). Nevertheless, the Royal Commission's
argument for long and regular terms of office is compelling and
we recommend that terms of 10 years are appropriate for both categories;
and 10-year terms would fit well into the European Parliament's
electoral cycle.
(m) An Electoral Threshold
Finally, a 5 per cent threshold for party election to the
House seems high, at least in relation to the government's current
proposals for the size of the elected element. The dangers of
a too homogenous House are far greater than any distant danger
of "unacceptable fragmentation" (page 25, paragraph
67). The second chamber must not become yet another preserve largely
for the three main parties, a prospect that seems likely under
the White Paper's schema. We also recommend that any threshold
set be on a regional, not national, basis.
9. PAYMENT
Implicit in both the Royal Commission's report and the White
Paper is the assumption that the second chamber will continue
to be a public home for an elite. We are not in a position to
judge how far the House benefits from its part-time and expenses-based
system. But the government's preference for such a system sits
neither in principle nor practice with opening up membership to
election. Every citizen should, as we have already stated, have
at least a formal opportunity to stand for public office in the
new second chamber. This formal right must be given substance
so that, for example, all members of society should be able to
put their names forward knowing that they will not suffer financially.
If we assume that the expenses are broadly genuine attempts to
meet the actual costs of attendance and membership, then the current
arrangements will be inadequate to recompense those who cannot
supplement their service in the House from the rewards of their
existing professional or work lives.
Table 3 (below) sets out the sitting days of the House over
the last four years for which information is available. If we
assume that the daily subsistence payment of £60 for attendance
at sittings would be the equivalent to a salary, then in the last
three years the full annual "salary" for a member would
be varied between £9,420 and £10,140; and in an election
year might fall as low as £7,500. The average gross full-time
wage in 2001 was £23,607 a year. The Audit's Task Force report
in 1999 argued that the Lord was "woefully under-resourced"
for its current duties and recommended that a reformed House should
be a full-time body and that all members should be paid salaries
and fees, and given resources, commensurate with their responsibilities.
In the interests both of democratic equity and effectiveness we
repeat that recommendation again. Membership of the House should
be a full-time paid post. If members wished to serve on a part-time
basis, they should if possible be able to do so. But full-time
and fully-paid peers should become the norm.
Table 3
HOUSE OF LORDS DAILY SITTINGS, 1997-2000
| By calendar year | 2000
| 1999 | 1998
| 1997* |
| 1 | No of sittings days (excluding days when the House sat for judicial business only and swearing in days)
| 169 | 157
| 163 | 125
|
| 2 | No of weeks during which the House sat
| 40 | 37
| 39 | 31
|
| 3 | No of hours for which the House sat
| 1,261:37 | 1,190:28
| 1,211:21 | 816:39
|
| * General election year |
| Source: House of Lords Annual Report, 2000-01
|
SUMMARY — A MODEL
NEW CHAMBER
We will not summarise this brief paper. But we accept that
we should present a model for a new chamber for discussion. Our
preference—both for reasons of principle and practice—is
for a fully directly elected chamber. But we believe that a compromise
is acceptable. This compromise model should above all be simple.
Hence we suggest:
— the chamber should have a considerable majority
of elected members over appointed members;
— the upper limit for appointed members in a 600-member
House should be set at 200 members, or a third of the House;
— the Appointments Commission should be wholly responsible
for appointing all appointed members and should be statutorily
responsible for holding a proper balance in terms of party allegiance,
gender, ethnicity and faith;
— the Prime Minister should be able to create a
limited number of peers to serve as ministers in the House;
— party leaders should be allowed to submit lists
of possible appointees to the Appointments Commission, alongside
public rights of nomination and self-nomination;
— the electoral system should either be a fully-open
list system or STV;
— elections should be on a regional basis and should
be held at the same time as Euro-elections under the same more
open system.
February 2002
REFERENCES
1 The Plant Report, Making a Modern Senate: a new
and democratic second chamber for Britain. Democratic Audit
Paper No. 17, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, 1999.
2 ICM interviewed a random sample of 1,000 adults aged
18+ by telephone between 14-16 December 2001. Interviews were
conducted across the country and the results were weighted to
the profile of all adults. The full tables giving demographic
information are available from ICM and were posted on their website.
3 Weir, S, and Kearton, I, Object Lessons: Parliamentary
committees abroad, their functions and powers, Democratic
Audit, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, January 2002.
4 Hansard Society, November 1992. See page 2 for the
long history of informed dissatisfaction with the legislative
process, dating back to 1835!
5 See Beetham, D, "Democratic criteria for electoral
systems", in his Democracy and Human rights, Polity,
1999 (esp. pages 174-79).
6 See further, Dunleavy, P. and Margetts, H, "Electing
Members of the Lords (or Senate)", LSE Public Policy Group,
in the Report of the Royal Commission on Reform of the House of
Lords, vol. 2 (CD), Cm 4534.
|
