THE DRINKS INDUSTRY IN SCOTLAND
12. Policy support, image and tourism
134. In June 1999, following what it described as
"a rigorous programme of research, consultation and analysis",[187]
Scottish Enterprise National (SEN) launched a major new policy
support strategy for Scottish Food and Drink,[188]
based on SEN's existing cluster approach. We sought to establish
whether, with the increasingly global nature of industrial competition,
there were any signs that the strategy was beginning to make any
impact in improving the ability of Scottish companies to compete
internationally.
135. SEN has developed a number of activities designed
to upgrade the competitive base of food and drink companies in
Scotland. The table below indicates something of the range of
programmes designed by SEN to meet the five key objectives it
has set for the cluster strategy.
Key Objective |
Specific Programmes
|
Grow leading companies |
- Graduate Placement
- Mentoring
- Learning journeys
|
Building Scotland's reputation in food and drink
|
- Scottish Food and Drink International
- Consumer and Market intelligence Centre
- Market Advantage
- Meet the Buyer
|
Exploiting Technology |
- Food Innovation Network
- Functional Food
|
Building an Efficient Supply Chain
|
- Loadshare
- Seafood Scotland
- Quality Meat Scotland
|
Human Resource Development
|
- Food Skills Group
- Scottish Food Skills
- Food Learning Network
|
136. We recognise that the strategy developed by
SEN aims to assist the development of the Scottish food and drink
industry over the long-term, and that we are presently only at
the early stages of this process. But we had some reservations
about two aspects. Firstly, there appears to be a paucity of information
over how the approach will progress. Secondly, we were not completely
convinced that the philosophy underlying the strategy necessarily
represents the best way to take matters forward. With regard to
this second point, it seems to us that the strategy does not always
aim to realise the full potential of the drinks industry.
137. The memorandum submitted by SEN[189]
was optimistic in tone. The actual targets set by SEN for food
and drink growth, most notably a trebling of exports, seem to
us to be ambitious. The adoption by SEN of what subsequently proved
to be very unrealistic, indeed unachievable, targets for the growth
of new enterprises was recently heavily criticised in a review
of its flagship new firm formation policy, the Business Birth
Rate Strategy (BBRS).[190]
The target of trebling exports looks even more ambitious than
those set by the BBRS.
138. SEN were unable to provide evidence of progress
towards the very ambitious growth targets it has set, a problem
attributed to the time lag before official statistics are published.
However, this reliance on official statistics means that there
will always be a considerable lag before SEN can assess the success
or otherwise of its approach. We were surprised that SEN did not
appear to have even some basic internal method, perhaps through
the use of its own food and drink contacts, by which it could
measure progress. SEN is a public agency and so the spending of
public money is involved in its activities. A basic requirement
should be that SEN was able to measure progress towards targets.
In the absence of information of this sort it is difficult to
determine what level of resources are required to support the
strategy. Additionally, while the relatively short time that the
strategy has been running may be relevant, SEN could only provide
limited anecdotal evidence of instances where companies had benefited
from its assistance.
139. One item on which almost all of those who submitted
evidence agreed was the premier position of whisky as Scotland's
best-known product in the international marketplace. Several witnesses
argued that the positive image of Scotland which whisky helps
promote could have important spin-off benefits for other Scottish
products.
140. The first of these was in helping to promote
Scottish tourism. Several tourist bodies clearly recognised the
distinctive position whisky holds in relation to international
perceptions of Scotland. The Scottish Tourist Board itself, for
example, argued that whisky is an important Scottish icon, that
people recognised whisky as a quality product that comes from
Scotland and that it helps keep Scotland at "front of mind",
especially in overseas markets.[191]
The Highlands and Islands Tourist Board employs the "iconic
element"[192]
of whisky in its promotional literature.
141. The other important way in which this image
of whisky generates spin-offs benefits for other sectors is in
helping create an image of Scotland as a producer of natural,
high quality and high value goods. SEN was well aware of the importance
of whisky in this respect:
"the whisky industry
is one of the principal causes of the image that Scotland has
internationally". It must pump hundreds of millions of pounds
into maintaining and growing the image there. So there is a piggy-backing
issue".[193]
We find it curious then that SEN's policy framework
does not attempt to make greater use of whisky, both to promote
the sale of other high quality Scottish food and drink products
in international markets, and as a means of increasing tourism
to Scotland.[194]
142. Operation of the cluster policy excludes the
large whisky producers, on the grounds that public sector support
is inappropriate given the scale of these companies. We do not
argue with this proposition. The SWA itself said "We do not
need massive support from Scottish Enterprise".[195]
SEN does have a long-term aim of developing closer involvement
between the large whisky companies and the wider food and drink
cluster,[196]
but this is mainly in order to allow small companies to supply
more to the industry majors. However, limiting the involvement
of the large whisky companies in this manner seems to us to miss
the major opportunity of using the positive image benefits generated
by whisky to support sales of other Scottish products. It also
ignores the salient fact that whisky accounts, according to SEN's
own figures, for 35 per cent of all sales of the Scottish food
and drink industry.[197]
SEN seem to recognise that other Scottish producers could piggy-back
on the activities of the whisky majors, and could make much more
of this potential.
143. The evidence given by SEN stated that Scottish
companies, and therefore SEN's own strategy, will only succeed
through the development of high value-added, differentiated, niche
products.[198]
Scotch whisky is very evidently an example of exactly this sort
of product, and one in which Scotland has unique image advantages
in international markets. We firmly believe that SEN should treat
the whisky industry as an integrated whole rather than a sum of
segregated parts. A section of SEN devoted to Scotch whisky might
be a step forward. Promoting the distinctive, high quality aspects
of whisky would benefit both the industry majors and smaller niche
whisky companies. There are clear possibilities for extending
the approach to both beer and bottled water, and over time to
cover a wider range of Scottish products. We therefore urge SEN
to consider how it might take greater advantage of the unique
position of whisky to increase international sales of other quality
Scottish goods, and to increase tourism to Scotland.
187 Ibid. p.166,
para 2.1.1. Back
188 The
strategy is described in detail in Ibid, pp.166-171. Back
189 Ibid,
p.166. Back
190 "Promoting
Business Start-ups: A New Strategic Formula". Report
by the Fraser of Allander Institute for Scottish Enterprise National,
June 2001. Back
191 HC
114-v, Session 2000-01, p.263. Back
192 Ibid. Back
193 HC
114-iv, Session 2001-01, Q.544. Back
194 Regarding
tourism, the Highlands and Islands Tourist Board argues that "there
is not as strong a link as might be expected between Scotland's
two great consumer products". See HC 114-v, Session 2000-01,
p.263. Back
195 HC
973-ii, Session 1999-2000, Q.181. Back
196 HC
114-iv, Session 2000-01, p.169. Back
197 Ibid. Back
198 HC
114-iv, Session 2000-01, Q.537. Back
|