Memorandum by the Strategic Rail Authority
(CHT 08)
RAIL FREIGHT AND THE CHANNEL TUNNEL
1. The purpose of this paper is to assist
the Committee in its Inquiry into "Rail Freight and the Channel
Tunnel", announced by Press Notice 69 of Session 2001-02
(dated 16 May 2002).
CONTEXT
2. In May 2001, the Strategic Rail Authority
(SRA) published its Freight Strategy for Britain's railway industry.
The Strategy defines a range of policy initiatives and investment
projects to increase the attractiveness of rail freight services
so as to attain the target of 80% growth in rail freight in Great
Britain, as set in the Government's 10 Year Plan "Transport
2010". The Freight Strategy provides 10 year forecasts for
key categories of rail traffic, including international freight,
derived from a programme of freight demand analysis and modelling.
3. The SRA stated in its Freight Strategy
that the Channel Tunnel rail freight market comprises "at
the same time the greatest single opportunity to increase rail's
market share and the most difficult problem to address" [Freight
Strategy p36]. Cargo carried on Channel Tunnel freight trains
in 2001 amounted to 2.4 million tonnes. This is less than 40%
of the cargo volumes initially forecast during the planning and
construction of the fixed link, and reflects the impact of a range
of technical, commercial and institutional constraints on business
development. The Freight Strategy cited illegal immigration on
cross-Channel freight trains as an example of an institutional
constraint on the growth of international rail freight.
4. Within the SRA's Freight Strategy, 6%
of the overall 10 year traffic growth target of 80% was estimated
to result from increased Channel Tunnel rail traffic. This reflects
a positive view of the business development opportunities resulting
from the implementation of European Commission initiatives to
liberalise the international rail freight market. However, these
growth forecasts were prepared before the start of the prolonged
series of disruptions and restrictions to Channel Tunnel train
services, due to the actions of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants,
principally in Northern France. These problems have led to the
cancellation of around 2,700 (60%) of cross- Channel freight trains
since November 2001, and to an increasing incidence of damage
and contamination to cargo. The SRA considers that service disruptions
and cargo damage have become so prolonged and acute, that continuing
clandestine immigration should now be seen as a major threat to
the retention of existing freight flows, as well as a possible
constraint on traffic growth.
5. The SRA is to review its international
rail freight forecasts as more information becomes available about
the nature, scale and duration of current traffic losses, and
in the light of the response of cross-Channel freight customers
to the resumption of full rail services. The SRA has not yet formed
a view about the long-term impact of a prolonged period of service
disruption on the potential Channel Tunnel freight market. However,
we consider it likely that some delay will occur to the achievement
of the cross-Channel rail traffic growth targets contained within
the Freight Strategy: freight users and operators will give priority
to the re-establishment of a viable business base on existing
services, before investing in additional service capacity and
transport equipment.
CAUSE OF
SERVICE DISRUPTIONS
6. Since their launch, cross- Channel freight
train services jointly operated by English Welsh and Scottish
Railways (EWS) and French National Railways (SNCF) have been subject
to a counter-terrorist regime based on criteria established by
the Treaty of Canterbury. The counter-terrorist regime comprises
a combination of fixed security installations and inspections
of cargo and rolling stock in the United Kingdom and France: the
effect is to deter and intercept asylum seekers and illegal immigrants
travelling individually or in small groups. It is not designed
to prevent large-scale invasions of trains at operational railway
sites. From October 2002, organised mass incursions at SNCF's
freight operating centre at Calais Fréthun became prevalent,
as a direct consequence of the deployment of more rigorous security
regimes, including improved personnel detection procedures, on
ferry routes from Northern France and on Eurotunnel's shuttle
service.
7. The result of mass incursions by illegal
immigrants at Calais, in conjunction with concerted intrusions
into wagons and freight containers on trains temporarily stopped
at other locations in northern France, has been to severely reduce
SNCF's capacity to receive and forward UK-bound trains at Calais
Fréthun. This reduction in capacity is caused by the need
to intercept and remove clandestine immigrants from operational
tracks and from trains awaiting departure at Calais, and by the
more intensive inspections necessary to detect intruders already
concealed in rail wagons and in containers arriving at the site.
Threats to the personal safety of staff have also led to service
interruptions.
EFFECT OF
SERVICE DISRUPTIONS
8. To retain operational fluidity, and to
avoid congestion on the French rail network caused by queues of
northbound trains awaiting access to Calais (with the attendant
consequences of excessively long transit times and increased risk
of cargo damage due to intrusion by clandestine immigrants), SNCF
has imposed a number of restrictions and temporary suspensions
on UK-bound Channel Tunnel trains. As an example, during November
2001, the unprecedented frequency and scale of mass incursions
by asylum seekers and illegal immigrants at Calais led SNCF to
suspend the acceptance of all UK-bound freight services for around
10 days. As another example, from mid-April 2002, an attempt was
made by SNCF and EWS to increase services from around 40% of timetabled
levels to 75%. Regrettably, it proved impossible to accept, process
and protect this level of service at Calais. A backlog of UK-bound
trains resulted, leading SNCF, in May, to re-impose a temporary
service suspension with only very limited exceptions.
9. The SRA recognises that SNCF and RFF
(the French Rail Infrastructure Authority) have improved fixed
security installations at Calais Fréthun since November
2001, whilst SNCF, in conjunction with French public authorities,
has also assigned additional security guards, railway police and
national police (gendarmes) to the site. However, incursions from
asylum seekers and illegal immigrants continue to be frequent
and aggressive, and the security resources deployed at Calais
are still inadequate to protect services on a continuous 24/7
basis. The SRA is concerned that Channel Tunnel train services,
unlike competing ferry services and Eurotunnel's Shuttle operation,
remain restricted by externally-determined limits on the availability
of security resources, rather than operating within a security
regime capable of handling peak traffic levels. This represents
a major competitive disadvantage to international rail freight.
10. SNCF has indicated that given existing
security installations and police and security staffing at Calais,
it is able to accept a maximum of six UK-bound trains per 24 hours
(roundly 36 trains per week). This can be compared to the standard
service of 96 trains per week timetabled by EWS and SNCF prior
to November 2001. The SRA accepts that EWS and SNCF have attempted
to allocate this restricted capacity on an objective basis. However,
some freight users have expressed concerns over the priority assigned
to different types or flows of traffic and over the lead-times
necessary to obtain space for cargo on international services.
There have also been complaints about the unpredictability of
transit times, and over the incidence of damage to cargo. On some
trains, over 80% of cargo has been contaminated or damaged, particularly
where a train has been parked en-route for a significant period.
11. The SRA has been advised by EWS that
a revised timetable is now being introduced, offering improvements
in train service reliability by reducing the number of tactical
cancellations required to conform to capacity limits at Calais.
The SRA welcomes this development, which should give freight users
greater confidence in the cross-Channel rail offer. The SRA also
recognises that EWS and SNCF have attempted to optimise train
loading in order to mitigate the effect of service reductions
on freight users. However, the impact of service restrictions
on freight carryings remains severe: total cross-Channel rail
freight fell from 2.95 million tonnes in 2000 to 2.45 million
tonnes in 2002—a reduction of 17%. Cross-Channel rail freight
carried in Q1 2002, at 367,000 tonnes, was almost 50% less than
that carried in Q1 2001.
12. The management of EWS has advised the
SRA that the company has already incurred revenue losses of around
£10 million, as a result of service restrictions and damage
to cargoes suffered since November 2001. SNCF is likely to have
suffered comparable losses. The Rail Freight Group, an acknowledged
industry forum, estimates that the cumulative revenue loss since
November 2001 incurred by freight users, traction, rolling stock
and equipment providers and terminal operators, is some £30
million. In volume terms, EWS has indicated that some 25% of cross-Channel
rail freight traffic carried prior to November 2001—particularly
higher value and time sensitive cargo only recently attracted
to rail—has now been lost for a period of at least six months
from the resumption of normal services. EWS contends that without
an early improvement in the capacity and reliability of cross-Channel
services, and a reduction in cargo damage, a further 25% of Channel
Tunnel rail freight traffic may also be at risk. The SRA considers
EWS's estimates to be credible indications of the likely consequences
of continuing service disruptions.
FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS
13. Illegal immigration is a widespread
and complex phenomenon, and preventative measures are often neutralised
by adaptive behaviour patterns. Given these factors, SNCF initially
appeared to adopt a cautious stance about the benefits to be gained
from improving the security regime at Calais Fréthun without
the implementation, in parallel, of measures to address the underlying
causes of clandestine immigration to the UK. However, on 23 May
2002, representatives of SNCF, acting also on behalf of RFF, confirmed
to the SRA that the necessary financial and project management
resources and procurement procedures had been completed to enable
the early implementation of a programme of improvements to the
security regime at Calais Fréthun. The measures are to
comprise:
— The erection of a three-metre high
reinforced, anti climb double fence around SNCF's operational
site.
— This is to be completed by end July
2002.
— The subsequent installation of enhanced
lighting, a new Closed Circuit TV system, infra-red detection
equipment at sensitive locations (eg rail entry/exit points) and
associated security improvements. This is to be completed by year-end
2002.
SNCF has advised that these improvements to
fixed installations and security systems will, if accompanied
by increased on-site police and security staff, enable the operation
of a full programme of Channel Tunnel freight services. SNCF considers
that by year-end 2002, site security at Calais Frethun will meet
the standards attained at Eurotunnel's Shuttle terminal at Coquelles,
where the threat of invasion by asylum seekers and illegal immigrants
has been effectively countered.
ACTIONS BY
SRA
14. The SRA welcomes the decision by SNCF
and RFF to implement the package of security improvements described
above, as a priority project. However, given the service disruptions
already faced by cross-Channel rail freight users, and the revenue
losses and risks to traffic described in paragraph 10, the SRA
is concerned that the current work programme will not permit resumption
of full Channel Tunnel freight services until year-end 2002. International
cargo flows are directly influenced by UK retail sales, and strong
seasonal growth in cross-Channel rail traffic typically begins
in October and continues until Christmas/New Year. Unless the
timescales currently proposed by SNCF and RFF are accelerated,
cross-Channel rail services will be unable to carry seasonal traffic
growth in Q4 2002, leading to a further reduction in customer
confidence, and to additional road transport movements within
the UK. The Chairman of the SRA is to contact the President of
SNCF, to emphasise the importance of taking early action to address
this problem.
15. The SRA has recognised, from an early
stage, the need to take action to counter the increasing risk
to rail traffic levels due to service disruptions. In January
2002 and in May 2002, the SRA advised SNCF of its willingness
to consider providing financial support by means of a Freight
Facilities Grant, to permit the installation of enhanced security
equipment at Calais allowing earlier resumption of a full service
timetable. On May 23, SNCF stated that it was impracticable to
accelerate the installation of improved security facilities at
Calais Fréthun, beyond the dates given in paragraph 12.
Instead, SNCF requested the SRA's support in principle for the
deployment of additional police resources and immigration control
staff on-site, together with the provision and use of more advanced
personnel detection equipment to allow more effective searches
of trains, wagon and freight containers.
16. The SRA has kept the Department of Transport,
Local Government and the Regions [DTLR] (now Department for Transport
(DfT)) fully advised of SNCF's evolving stance as regards security
improvements at Calais. The SRA has confirmed its support in principle
for any of the measures requested by SNCF that would allow the
operation of additional Channel Tunnel freight services before
year-end 2002—SNCF's estimated completion date for the new
package of security improvements. In addition, the SRA intends
to co-operate with EWS and SNCF to promote other, longer-term
operational improvements to Channel Tunnel freight services, so
as to improve service quality and increase productivity. One such
initiative is to extend the operating area for Class 92 electric
locomotives from Calais to a freight hub in northern France; this
should allow better locomotive utilisation and reduce the risk
of incursions from illegal immigrants by minimising train dwell-times
at the approaches to the Channel Tunnel.
17. The SRA is also considering ways in
which its existing freight grants procedures may be used to attract
new freight flows to rail, or to retain cross-Channel rail flows
likely otherwise to switch to road transport in the UK. Freight
Facilities Grant may enable rail freight users and service providers
to re-engineer or replace transport equipment and modify loading
and transhipment sites, where existing equipment or facilities
have been damaged by incursions by illegal immigrants, or require
upgrading to reflect changes in operating practice designed to
counter such incursions. The availability of Track Access Grant
may also permit EWS to reinstate withdrawn international services
or to increase timetabled frequencies, more rapidly than if it
were to forced to bear all the incremental commercial risk. The
SRA is also co-operating with freight users and industry bodies
affected adversely by cross-Channel service disruptions, to ensure
that the scope for legal action to obtain compensation for financial
losses is fully understood.
18. In line with its core objectives, and
with the Directions and Guidance subsequently issued to the Authority
by DTLR, the SRA is supporting DfT and other government departments
to provide rail industry input into inter-Governmental initiatives
to address the underlying problem of the continuing flow of asylum
seekers and illegal immigrants from France to the UK. Resolution
of some of these factors will reduce pressures from clandestine
immigrants at Calais Fréthun, permitting an increase in
operational capacity at the site, and allowing an increase in
cross-Channel service levels.
19. Finally, it should be noted that the
Transport Act 2000 gives the SRA a specific duty to promote international
services via the Channel Tunnel. The SRA, through the British
Railways Board, is also the co-signatory with French National
Railways (SNCF) of the Usage Agreement with Eurotunnel, governing
the use of Channel Tunnel capacity for through rail freight and
passenger services. The SRA is hence a key stakeholder in the
operation of international rail services. To discharge its responsibilities,
the SRA is to prepare a Channel Tunnel Strategy during 2002. This
Strategy will identify ways to improve rail service quality and
to promote the growth of cross-Channel rail traffic, and as indicated
earlier, will provide a revised view of longer-term prospects
for international rail freight.
|
