House of Commons
Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee

ROAD TRAFFIC SPEED


Volume I

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Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee

ROAD TRAFFIC SPEED


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Report and Proceedings of the Committee

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Footnotes
In the footnotes of this Report, references to oral evidence are indicated by ‘Q’ followed by the question number. References to written evidence are indicated by the memorandum number, eg RTS 01.
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NINTH REPORT

The Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee has agreed to the following Report:

ROAD TRAFFIC SPEED

Conclusions and recommendations

Deaths and serious injuries on our roads bring misery to hundreds of thousands, including the relatives and friends of the dead and injured. Although the huge number of serious injuries on the roads is still declining, the number of deaths, including pedestrian deaths, has been at the same high level for several years. We have one of the worst child pedestrian safety records in Europe, and children from poor families are far more likely to be killed. Speeding is endemic. Excessive and inappropriate speed is the largest single contributor to deaths and serious injuries on our roads and significantly reduces the quality of life in many urban and rural areas. The failure to tackle the consequences of speed affects Government policies on the welfare of children, social inclusion, urban regeneration, health and integrated transport.

We know what to do reduce the casualties. The Government has commissioned research and funded the pilot projects which show what should be done. It also monitors best practice from the Netherlands and other European countries, particularly in how to reduce pedestrian casualties. In those places in England where many of the right measures have been taken, such as York, Gloucester, Hull, Northamptonshire and Nottingham, there have been significant reductions in casualties and improvements in the quality of life. In 1997, TRL estimated that the cost of a comprehensive series of measures in urban areas would be £3bn. The sum would be considerably higher today, and measures need to be implemented in rural areas too. Nevertheless, the cost of making very important changes is relatively small: the Gloucester Safer City was a £5m project which transformed a whole city. Unfortunately too few local and police authorities have put the money and effort into implementing the measures which are known to work.

A major reason why too little has been done is that road casualties are a forgotten story which receives far too little national attention. If any disease killed as many people, as die on the roads, there would be an outcry. There would be national campaigns to insist that the Government do something about it. In its reporting of speed, however, the media too often does the reverse, implying that drivers are the best judge of the right speed, and that attempts to get them to observe speed limits in built-up areas are an unacceptable infringement on their liberty. Press reporting too often focuses on the inconvenience to drivers, ignoring the potentially fatal consequences of their attitudes.

A second reason is the slow progress of Government policy. In March 2000, the Prime Minister launched the Government’s Road Safety Strategy Tomorrow’s roads - safer for everyone, but unfortunately since then little has happened: projects have not been undertaken; some proposals have not been implemented; others have been dropped. New rules about the location and visibility of safety cameras have been promulgated which are in danger of reducing their effectiveness. Reluctant local authorities are unlikely to implement effective measures for which they may be criticised if Government Ministers are unwilling to put the case for them.

The Government’s principal task now is ensure that all local and police authorities give reducing road traffic speed the same priority as the best. It must insist that they do so because saving lives is not a matter of discretion. It will also need to provide the funds to enable it to be done. Specifically, the Government should:
- improve the National Safety Camera Scheme by allowing local and police authorities to decide where to site cameras; and ensure that the whole country is covered by 2004

- issue the promised revised Guidance to local authorities about speed limits; this should include a number of changes, in particular, that 30 mph should be the speed in villages,

- re-engineer the roads to ensure that speed limits are obeyed and to make roads safer and more pleasant for pedestrians

- ensure that the funding of Local Transport Plans is dependent on measures to reduce speeds; and

- make road safety a priority for the Ten Year Plan and provide specific funds for a national programme to re-engineer and re-design our roads.

The Government also has to give leadership. It needs to make it very clear that speeding is unacceptable. Drivers should not exceed 30 mph in a residential area where a child might dash onto the road. The Prime Minister has recently rightly stressed the importance of basing decisions on scientific analysis. He now has to decide whether Government policy on speed will be dominated by concerns about how it is portrayed by a section of the motoring lobby and in parts of the press. The alternative is to base it on the detailed research of experts, including TRL, the AA, and the Royal College of Physicians. The evidence which we received is that such a policy would be popular with the public for whom speed is a very serious concern. Drivers are also residents and pedestrians. With the right policies we could reduce deaths on the road to under one thousand a year.
Introduction

1. Seven people died on May 10 as a result of the tragic railway accident at Potters Bar. It was rightly a matter of great concern. The Secretary of State made a Statement in the House. There was enormous news coverage: newspapers devoted pages to analysing why it happened, and it was the lead story on many radio and television news programmes.

2. Every day, year in year out, about 10 people are killed on our roads. In 2000 3,409 died, including 857 pedestrians. This dwarfs many other causes of death: it is four times the number of homicide victims. There can be few of us who do not have a relative, friend or acquaintance killed or seriously injured on the roads. Many of these deaths and injuries are avoidable.

3. The Government has set a target of reducing deaths and serious injuries in road accidents by 40%. This may be met by a reduction in serious injuries, but the number of deaths on the roads has declined little in recent years. The numbers killed fell from 4,568 in 1991 to 3,598 in 1996, but have remained at that level since: there were 3,421 deaths in 1998 and 3,409 in 2000. With the right measures in place we could probably reduce road deaths to under 1,000 each year. There would also be huge cost savings from taking these steps, but there is surprisingly little pressure to act to achieve this. Road casualties rarely merit a mention on the national news; they are indeed greeted with complacency as we pride ourselves on having the best road safety record in Europe.

4. The largest single contributor to casualties on our roads is driving at either excessive (breaking the speed limit and therefore illegal) or inappropriate (i.e., speeds which are foolish for the conditions even if within the speed limit) speeds. It is now a more important factor in road traffic deaths and serious injuries than alcohol. As the AA told us: “the wrong speed on the wrong roads kills around 1000 people a year”. Road traffic speed in both urban and rural areas inhibits walking and cycling and so makes people less physically active. It reduces the quality of life. We are not going to regenerate our towns and cities and make them attractive places to live while they are dominated by fast moving vehicles. In the country too villages are severed and country lanes, once enjoyed by those taking a stroll, or riding a horse or bicycle, are now dominated by traffic travelling at high speed.

5. Children suffer particularly. Road crashes are the single biggest killer of school age children, accounting for “two-thirds of premature child deaths”. The UK’s child pedestrian casualty rate is worse than many other European countries. It is so bad because of the lack of speed restrictions rather than increased exposure to traffic. Poor children

---

1 HDA (RTS 153).
2 ACPO (RTS 137).
3 Professor Allsop has discussed the potential reduction in fatalities in Britain in Europe, 12th Westminster Lecture on Transport Safety, PACTS 2002 (in press) For the discussion of the potential reduction in fatalities; see para 112 below. In Victoria, Australia, there has been a 52% reduction in road deaths (see HDA, RTS 153); Road Accidents Great Britain: 2000 states: “the total cost-benefit value of prevention of road accidents in 2000 was estimated to be £16.920 million, of which £12.170 million is attributable to personal injury accidents, with damage-only accidents accounting for the remainder” (p. 16).
4 Tomorrows roads, p. 48.
5 Road Accidents Great Britain: 2000 states that the “numbers of people killed on the roads in Great Britain in incidents involving drink-driving fell to their lowest levels in 1998-9. However, it is estimated that there were still 460 such deaths per year...” (p. 34).
6 RTS 48.
7 Cyclists Touring Club (RTS 26); and see RTS 4 from the Faculty of Public Health Medicine of the Royal Colleges of Physicians: “Two-thirds of the deaths and serious injuries among children involve child pedestrians injured in road crashes.” The Traffic and Children Coalition stated: “the number of children killed and seriously injured in car crashes is many times higher than the number harmed by strangers” (RTS 47).
8 In 2000, 9 EU countries had a lower child pedestrian death rate than the UK (Road Accidents Great Britain: 2000, Table 50; we were also told that “The death rate from road traffic injuries for children in the UK is twice the European average” (RTS 4).
9 RTS 47, quoting DETR, Comparative study of European child pedestrian exposure and accidents, ‘999.
are much more likely to be the victims of traffic accidents: they are more likely to play on
the street. There have been a number of effective programmes to educate children, parents
and carers, notably Kerbcraft and the work undertaken through the Drumchapel project.
Nevertheless, parental fear of road traffic has reduced the independence of children from
all backgrounds. It has been a significant contributory factor in the decline in the number
of children walking to school: in 1971 72 per cent of seven year olds travelled to school
unaccompanied; by 1990 only 7 per cent of seven year olds went to school alone.\(^\text{10}\)

6. The Committee decided to hold an inquiry to find out the answers to a number of
simple questions:\(^\text{11}\)

— What is known about the causes and consequences of speed, and what to do about
it?
— How far are the necessary measures being taken?
— What should the Government and other relevant groups and organisations be doing,
and are they doing it?

7. This is an opportune time to undertake this inquiry. It enables us to chart the progress
made in the two years since the Prime Minister launched the Government’s Road Safety
Strategy, *Tomorrow’s roads: safer for everyone* in March 2000. It is also almost two years
since the Urban White Paper, *Our towns and cities: the future*, which proposed measures
to ensure that the adverse impacts of traffic are reduced in cities and towns.\(^\text{12}\)

8. Our decision to examine this subject has also been influenced by growing concerns
that since 2000 progress has been slow and that road safety has become less of a priority
for the Government. Since 2000, the Government has:
— dropped its previous commitment to press within the European Union for a
  Pedestrian Safety Directive
— decided that road safety cameras should be painted yellow and should be restricted
to serious accident blackspots
— failed to implement a number commitments made in its Road Safety Strategy
— been slow to bring forward proposals to increase penalties for road traffic offences

The problem is that: “Most drivers and pedestrians think speeds are generally too high but
95 per cent of all drivers admit to exceeding speed limits”.

\(^{10}\) RTS 47.
\(^{11}\) Our full terms of reference were:
• The role of illegal and inappropriate speed in respect of:
  — causing crashes, and the severity of accidents;
  — reducing the quality of life in urban areas; and
  — the consequences of illegal and inappropriate speed for urban design
• The availability and reliability of research on
  — the consequences of, and reasons for, illegal and inappropriate speed, and in particular
  — the reasons for the very high pedestrian casualty rate;
• The extent to which the problems associated with speed should be tackled by:
  — better enforcement; road re-design and traffic calming; road re-classification; physical measures to separate pedestrians
    and cars (e.g. barriers); technology (e.g. through Intelligent Speed Adaptation and car designs which promote pedestrian
    protection); education to improve drivers’ and motor cyclists’ behaviour and pedestrian and cyclist awareness; changes
to speed limits; and what specific policies should be implemented.
  • The extent to which relevant bodies are taking the right actions
  • Whether local authorities, DTLR, the Highways Agency, the police and Home Office are providing a co-
    ordinated approach to speed management, and what they should do
  • Whether the sentences imposed by magistrates and judges on those convicted of speeding offences have in all
cases been appropriate and what other approaches ought to be considered
  • Whether motor manufacturers, the national press, TV programmes about motoring and advertisers have shown
    an appropriate attitude to speed, and how they should change
• The role of speed management strategies

\(^{12}\) Cm 4911, November 2000.
9. We received 157 memoranda. Among those who submitted evidence were the leading researchers on road safety, senior health professionals, motoring organisations, several local authorities, groups working on behalf of children and road safety campaigners. We would like to thank all of them, and our specialist adviser, Rob Gifford of the Parliamentary Advisory Council on Transport Safety.
The consequences of speed

Crashes and casualties

The relationship between speed and casualties

10. With a few exceptions, the evidence which we received argued that illegal and inappropriate speed had very serious consequences. The DTLR has stated that “speed is a major contributory factor in around one third of all road traffic accidents. This means that each year excessive and inappropriate speed helps to kill 1,200 people and to injure over 100,000 more”. There are other important factors: ie use of mobiles, drinking and driving, lack of sleep.

11. There was general agreement about why speed is such a danger. First, “at higher speeds there is less time to make adjustments for error, therefore a crash is more likely”. Professor Stradling of Napier University expressed the situation in the formula: Violation + Speed = Crash. Detailed research by Gloucestershire County Council shows the relationship between speed and crashes. In its survey, the reporting officer at a crash was required to indicate what went wrong (the ‘precipitating factor’) when there was an injury accident. In 97% of cases human error was to blame; in the others it was directly attributable to mechanical failure. When asked to identify other factors which had caused or contributed to the crash, officers attributed excess speed as a causation factor in 14% of crashes and inappropriate speed (such as loss of control) in a further 32%.

12. Secondly, in obedience to the laws of physics, speed makes crashes more severe. This is particularly important in cities, towns and villages, where pedestrians are particularly at risk. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents informed us that:

“Hit by a car at 40 mph, nine out of ten pedestrians will be killed.

Hit by a car at 30 mph, about half of pedestrians will be killed.

Hit by a car at 20 mph, nine out of ten pedestrians will survive.”

In other words, as the DTLR notes: “The change from mainly survivable injuries to mainly fatal injuries takes place at speeds between 30 and 40 mph”. A considerable number of drivers are unaware of this. A survey undertaken for Brake found than one third of drivers thought that “the chances of a pedestrian dying if hit at 40 mph [was] 50% or less”.

13. We took oral evidence about the research which has been undertaken on the relationship between speed and crashes from experts from the Transport Research Laboratory, Professor Allsop of University College, London, Dr Carsten of Leeds University, the AA and the DTLR. The Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) summarised the evidence from national and international sources about the effects of speed on accidents, casualties and wider aspects of the quality of life. The key findings of the research which TRL and others reported to us were that:

13 Tomorrows roads, p. 48.
14 RTS 1
15 RTS 45.
16 RTS 25; and see the AA (RTS 48).
17 RTS 16.
19 RTS 50
20 RTS 27
— each one mph reduction in mean traffic speed is associated with a 5% reduction in accidents; the exact reduction depends on the type of road: thus: a 1 mph reduction in average speed would reduce accident frequency by:
- 6% on urban main roads and residential roads with low average speeds
- 4% on medium speed urban roads and lower speed rural main roads
- 3% on higher speed urban roads and rural single carriage way main roads.\(^{21}\)
— studies of individual drivers show that at a speed of 25% above the average speed, the risk of accident involvement rises more than 500%;
— studies of roads show that the higher the average speed on a given type of road, the more accidents there are; and the bigger the spread of speeds, the more accidents;
— ‘before and after’ studies show that measures to slow traffic have improved safety;
— studies of cars involved in accidents show that they were travelling faster than the average speed of other cars on the same road.

14. The overwhelming majority of the memoranda we received agreed with these findings. Two, however, fundamentally disagreed. The RAC Foundation for Motoring and the Environment and the Association of British Drivers doubted whether speed made a significant contribution to crashes. The RAC Foundation pointed to a study by the West Midlands Police which found that less than 2% of traffic accidents were caused by excessive speed for the conditions.\(^{22}\) The Association of British Drivers argued that “the only truly new research into accident causes is TRL323 and that “the worst abuses of statistics only claim that speed causes one third of accidents, with the true figure likely to be around 10 per cent.”.\(^{23}\) Part of the problem arises from a confusion of terms. The RAC Foundation and the Association of British Drivers claim that other organisations, including the DTLR, ACPO and the TRL, state that speed is a cause of 30% of road accidents; however, they do not argue this, but that speed is a contributory factor in about 30% of accidents. TRL Report 323, A new system for recording contributory factors in road accidents, which was published in 1998, set out the viability of requiring police officers to record contributory factors when visiting road accidents in addition to the data already collected. It noted that excessive speed was a definite factor in 6% of crashes. However, it should not be taken as evidence that speed is not a contributory factor. Sustrans stated:

“Although the much-quoted TRL Report 323 puts excessive speed as a definite factor in only six per cent of occasions a full list of instances given suggests that speed greatly contributes to the number and severity of almost all accidents and certainly more than the one third often asserted”.\(^{24}\)

**Illegal and inappropriate speed is a major contributory factor in crashes and casualties in both urban and rural areas.**

15. Several other witnesses argued that the effect of speed on road casualties was usually underestimated. The Traffic and Children Coalition, an alliance of charities, including many which work with children, claimed that the situation was almost certainly much worse than officially reported.\(^{25}\) There is significant under-reporting of serious and slight injuries as many road traffic incidents are not reported to the police. The police sometimes mis-classify the severity of the injury and reporting rules ensure that anyone dying more

\(^{21}\) The research is reported in TRL Report 421: M Taylor, D Lynam and A Baruya - Effects of drivers' speed on frequency of road accidents.
\(^{22}\) RTS 6.
\(^{23}\) RTS 11.
\(^{24}\) RTS 18.
\(^{25}\) The Traffic and Children Coalition is an alliance of charities, including the Child Accident Prevention Trust, the Child Poverty Action Group, the Children’s Play Council, the National Children’s Bureau, the National Family and Parenting Institute, the NSPCC and others (RTS 47).
than 30 days after a collision is classified as seriously injured.\textsuperscript{26} A national study, TRL 272: National Hospital Study of Road Accident Casualties, found that:

"Casualties recorded in the hospital survey were more severely injured than those recorded in police data, with around a quarter of casualties classified as seriously injured compared with 15% of casualties in Stats 19".

This is a huge difference. The BMA recommended that the health sector should adopt a primary role in the collection of high quality data on injuries and their consequences.\textsuperscript{27} Speed may kill more and seriously injure many more people than has commonly been thought. The health service should play a more active part in the collection of data on injuries, and should be funded to do this.

\textit{Costs}

16. The cost of road accidents is very high. The DTi had estimated that the "medical and ambulance costs attributed to road traffic accidents" was £540m in 2000.\textsuperscript{28} The Institution of Civil Engineers pointed to a Government study in 1996 which had shown that the introduction of suitably engineered 20 mph zones on suitable urban roads could save over £2bn.\textsuperscript{29} The Government's \textit{Tomorrow's roads - safer for everyone} estimated the direct cost of road accidents involving deaths or injuries to be in the region of £3bn. a year.\textsuperscript{30} In a subsequent study the DTi estimated that

"the economic value of preventing injury crashes during 2000 would have been £12,170 m in 2000 prices and values. This figure includes lost output, medical and ambulance costs and human costs. When the total costs of police work, insurance and damage to property are added for all crashes...this figure swells to £16,959 m".\textsuperscript{31}

The full cost to the nation of road traffic accidents is very large; a DTi study has estimated it to be £17 bn in a single year. If drivers travelled at lower and more appropriate speeds, the savings to society would be immense, as the savings to individuals would be. If the measures recommended in this Report were to achieve a reduction of road traffic accidents by a third, the savings to society could be as great as £100 million per week.

\textit{Who gets killed and injured and where}

\textit{Where}

17. The Road Accident statistics indicate casualties by road type, and indicate that most casualties occur on built-up roads.

\textsuperscript{26} RTS 47
\textsuperscript{27} RTS 150
\textsuperscript{28} Quoted by the Department of Health (RTS 151).
\textsuperscript{29} RTS 138.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Tomorrow's roads}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{31} The quotation in the PACTS memorandum (RTS 14) is from DTi, \textit{Highways Economic Note 1 2000, Valuation of the Benefits of Prevention of Road Accidents and Casualties}, and see IHT (RTS 38).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Motorways</th>
<th>Built-up roads</th>
<th>Non-built-up roads</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ksi *</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>ksi</td>
<td>all</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pedestrians</td>
<td>69</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(908)</td>
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<td>(9712)</td>
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<td>All casualties</td>
<td>1475</td>
<td>14129</td>
<td>26604</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(74)</td>
<td>(935)</td>
<td>(5167)</td>
<td>(35984)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(* killed and seriously injured.)

(Source, Road Accidents Great Britain: 1998, DETR - taken from New Directions in Speed Management, DETR, March 2000. The figures in brackets refer to the numbers of children)

In 1998 54% of road deaths occurred in rural areas, including both built-up and non-built-up roads. However, crashes in urban areas are more likely to kill or injure pedestrians. In 1998, 36% of those killed or seriously injured in urban areas were pedestrians. As the table makes clear, motorways are the safest roads.

Who

18. Whereas fewer drivers and passengers are killed on our roads than in most other European countries, pedestrians fare less well. British child pedestrian deaths and injuries are particularly high. More than 3,000 children were killed or seriously injured as pedestrians in 2000. The Institute for Public Policy Research concluded that “speed was a police recorded factor” in the death or serious injury of over 1,000 child pedestrians in 2000. “Each year around a fifth of all deaths of those aged 5 to 19 are due to road accidents”.

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32 New Directions in Speed Management, p. 11; and see PACTS (RTS 14).
33 RTS 51.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Child Pedestrian (aged 0-14) deaths per 100,000 population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.8*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Poor people, and especially poor children, are disproportionately likely to be killed or injured as pedestrians. The Institute for Public Policy Research’s memorandum provided preliminary results of its project which is looking at the links between child pedestrian accidents and social inequality. It shows that child pedestrian accident rates are far higher in more deprived areas. Children “in the 10 per cent most deprived wards... in England have an accident rate around four times that of the 10 per cent most affluent”.34 The pedestrian death rate for children from families in social class V is five times that for those from social class I.35

34 RTS 51.
35 Q 528.
The pedestrian death rate for children from families in social class V is five times that for those from social class I.\textsuperscript{36}

20. The reasons for these large inequalities are clear: speed is more common in less affluent areas and "children from more deprived backgrounds are going to experience the biggest impact on their quality of life as they are most likely to be trying to cross, play and live" near dangerous roads and are least likely to be in cars.\textsuperscript{37} The Association of British Drivers pointed out that 80 per cent of pedestrian injuries result from pedestrians own actions. It suggested that the death of pedestrians may be caused by drug and alcohol abuse and that child pedestrian deaths may reflect the lack of supervision by parents.\textsuperscript{38} On the other hand, the great bulk of memoranda very strongly rejected the idea that pedestrians and especially children and the elderly are to blame for their own deaths.\textsuperscript{39} Most witnesses considered that it was unacceptable to have a situation where children died because they had to play on the streets, or elderly pedestrians because of a slight error of judgement. One witness explicitly contrasted the attitude shown in dealing with health and safety at work with that taken by highway engineers in dealing with road safety.\textsuperscript{40}

21. Most deaths of car occupants take place on rural roads, but most crashes and pedestrian deaths in urban areas. Compared with several other European countries our child pedestrian death rate is high. Speed causes major health inequalities, especially in urban areas: child pedestrians who live in deprived areas are particularly at risk from road traffic.

The quality of life

22. Speed also has a huge impact on the quality of life through intimidation, severance and noise. The Slower Speeds Initiative argued that:

"Public space has been surrendered to traffic. The residual, disrupted and often derelict spaces left to pedestrians and cyclists indicate the low value placed on their safety and time".\textsuperscript{41}

Professor Allsop observed that reducing speed could "help to return street space in towns and villages and the use of country lanes to people on foot, on bicycles and on horseback".\textsuperscript{42} He considered that in many cases cost benefit analysis would show the advantages of constraining speed where it affects the quality of life.

23. Many cities are blighted by roads designed to maintain traffic flows. The Local Government Association argued that:

"The traffic free-flow philosophy as applied to town planning through the 1960s and 1970s has led to divided communities with the social implications which this

\textsuperscript{36} Q 528.
\textsuperscript{37} RTS 153, and see RTS 51.
\textsuperscript{38} RTS 11.
\textsuperscript{39} Gloucestershire City Council told us: "The notion that pedestrians are largely to blame for pedestrian accidents is as much a cultural concept as a technical one" (RTS 25).
\textsuperscript{40} RTS 1.
\textsuperscript{41} RTS 34.
\textsuperscript{42} RTS 36.
brings...The former philosophy implied that the time savings of not allowing congestion to develop was more valuable to society as a whole than the disbenefit to the local community".\footnote{RTS 21.}

Sustrans informed us:

"Highways [have] become roads for cars rather than streets for people ....Multiplied across a city, this impact can have devastating consequences. People will not visit, shop or live in an unattractive environment. Much of the urban decay and ‘doughnut-effect’ of city centres is caused by dangerous, speeding traffic. Those who can, leave".\footnote{RTS 18.}

24. Not so long ago it was possible to enjoy a walk or ride down a country lane; now such a journey can be a nightmare. The Ramblers Association observed:

"Roads do not have footways. Pedestrians are therefore forced to walk within the carriageway and to share the space with motorised vehicles. Beyond the 30mph zones of a village, that traffic may well be travelling at the national speed limit and can take any form from an articulated lorry to a motorbike. Within living memory it would have been safe for walkers to move from the public rights of way network, along a linking stretch of carriageway, and back onto the rights of way network, but that is no longer the case".\footnote{RTS 22.}

Riders are also severely affected by speeding traffic. The British Horse Society’s most recent survey found that 99 per cent of respondents cited the speed of motor traffic as the biggest hazard faced by them when riding on the road. It was found that 5 per cent of the respondents had had an accident with a vehicle while riding in the preceding 12 months and 50 per cent reported a near miss. In Hertfordshire, there are an estimated 68,000 riders. Fewer than 3 per cent could go for a ride without using the roads at all.\footnote{RTS 38.}

25. Speed is an important factor in noise levels. Tyre noise becomes a problem at higher speeds (over 30-40 mph for newer cars). The noise from traffic can spread for miles through the countryside. As the IHT notes noise increases as the square of the speed at higher speeds.\footnote{RTS 10.} Formerly tranquil areas like the South Downs are now dominated by the sound of fast moving traffic on the A27 below. The situation is as bad in cities: a study in Huddersfield found that traffic noise interfered with the relaxation and sleeping of 20\% of respondents.\footnote{RTS 4.}

26. Many witnesses stressed that speed discourages people from walking and cycling.\footnote{RTS 23.} The Health Development Agency pointed to research which shows that:

"the built environment, including road traffic density and speed, is a major influence on the quality of the experience of walking in urban environments...Increasingly, there is an
acceptance that environmental considerations influence the level of physical activity\textsuperscript{50}. 

The TRL found that the speed of vehicular traffic was an important deterrent to cycling and, it was widely believed, walking\textsuperscript{51}. It is hard to see how the Government will meet its target of trebling cycling by 2010 unless the speed of traffic is reduced on routes which cyclists use.

27. The Commission for Integrated Transport found that 20 mph zones had been “fundamental in prompting strong growth in walking and cycling”\textsuperscript{52}. While the precise relationship between traffic speed and walking is hazy\textsuperscript{53}, there is little doubt that in cities where pedestrians have been given priority people walk and cycle more. The City of York Council has introduced “a danger reduction approach to speed management that has helped it meet national casualty reduction targets well in advance of target dates.” This means that it has taken measures to slow traffic down. Such measures, together with the creation of a pedestrian and a cycle network, have also promoted walking and cycling: twice as many people in York walk to work as the national average and there has been an increase in cycling and a reduction of 28% in the number of cycling accidents\textsuperscript{54}.

28. Speeding also indirectly affects health. Physical inactivity is a major public health problem in the UK. Health professionals, supported by a number of other witnesses, stressed that by discouraging walking and cycling speeding traffic led to inactivity, and hence the increased risk of illnesses such as coronary heart disease, colon cancer and diabetes. The Health Development Agency noted that:

“around 60% of men and 70% of women [fail] to reach the minimum recommendation of 30 minutes moderate activity at least five times a week...It is estimated that the population attributable risk of coronary heart disease from inactivity is 37%.”\textsuperscript{55}

The prospect of an unpleasant walk to the shops down a busy road with traffic travelling in excess of 30 mph makes most of us get into our car; a walk of the same distance in a pleasant and peaceful environment is an attractive proposition. The BMA pointed out that the:

“issue of children’s exercise is crucial not only because of its link with their health and fitness in later life, but also because habits such as taking part in and enjoying physical activity are most easily acquired in childhood and may be difficult to acquire later”\textsuperscript{56}.

29. The threat posed by traffic has had a major effect on childhood. The relationship between traffic, air quality and health, including asthma, are well known. In addition, as the Traffic and Children Coalition stated:

\textsuperscript{50} RTS 153.
\textsuperscript{51} RTS 27. The National Cycling Forum has found that cycling in the UK has been in decline mostly because of a lack of safety. Reducing speed was one of the main areas for action (RTS 18).
\textsuperscript{52} Quoted by Sustrans (RTS 18).
\textsuperscript{53} TRL noted that “better knowledge is needed about the possible effect of traffic speed in suppressing walking activity.” (RTS 27).
\textsuperscript{54} The information about York comes from the Health Development Agency (RTS 153).
\textsuperscript{55} RTS 153.
\textsuperscript{56} RTS 150.
“A major deterioration in children’s quality of life has been the increasing loss of their independent mobility with many harmful consequences on their development, as highlighted in Mayer Hillman’s classic ‘One False Move’ study.”

The memorandum quoted Mr Hillman:

“There appear to be alternative responses: either we can continue to with draw children from the growing threat that is posed, and inculcate fear in parents and children about the risks, or we can withdraw that threat from the children by ‘taming’ traffic.”

30. There are serious indirect health effects of inappropriate traffic speed. Fast-moving traffic plays a part in discouraging physical activity by inhibiting walking and cycling in urban and rural areas. We recommend an increase in the number of dedicated cycle routes. Moreover, vehicles travelling at speed are noisy, sever communities and undermine urban regeneration.

31. Measures put in place to protect pedestrians from traffic travelling at speed such as railings, barriers and staggered crossings make matters worse and discourage walking. In its memorandum to this inquiry, the DTLR states

“Physical separation of traffic and pedestrians is appropriate in certain circumstances. For example barriers are erected on fast stretches of road to prevent pedestrians crossing at dangerous points.”

Unfortunately, barriers are not used in this limited way, but appear often to be a measure of first resort. In its inquiry into Walking in Towns and Cities, our predecessor Committee in the last Parliament concluded that barriers were employed to keep pedestrians off the road and to maintain traffic flows. It argued that if walking were to be encouraged there had to be a different approach to pedestrian safety based on danger reduction. The Government replied that it would meet the Committee’s objectives by issuing new policy guidance to local authorities which would “encourage them to develop the most pedestrian-friendly environment which can be achieved consistently with meeting the local casualty reduction targets and with properly serving the interests of other road users.” It is by no means certain that this will be adequate or that local authorities will make sufficient effort to humanise ‘the traffic environment’. Pedestrian railings, barriers and staggered crossings are designed to maintain traffic flows and restrict pedestrian movement. They do not deal with the root of the problem which is that traffic is sometimes moving too quickly. The Government has failed to change this situation; it must advocate a policy which does not create urban areas where cars can speed and pedestrians are corralled behind barriers, but rather places where pedestrians can walk safely because traffic speeds have been reduced. The proposed guidance from Government on designing ‘pedestrian-friendly environments’ should reflect this policy.

57 RTIS 47.
58 RTIS 49.
60 Cm 5277.
Reasons for speeding

Who speeds

32. Speeding is endemic. It is not something just done by a small minority of irresponsible drivers. While there are those who speed “extravagantly to seek thrills etc”, most people “do so within what they may claim are accepted social norms”. Professor Allsop pointed out that “there is an inherent tendency for all of us to drive faster than is good for ourselves”. Mr Silcock’s research for the AA Foundation for Road Safety Research found that:

“85% of respondents to a household survey (of 1,000 households) admit that they “find themselves speeding on occasion”. In a further strand of the research, all but 5 of 243 drivers who drove a pre-determined route whilst being filmed from within the car exceeded the prevailing limit at least once during their one hour drive”.

33. Professor Stradling of Napier University provided a profile of those driving at higher speeds. The following table shows the typical characteristics of drivers who speed:

Demographic, vehicle and vehicle use characteristics of car drivers reporting higher speeds: Who reports higher speeds?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Driver Age</th>
<th>17-24 year olds fastest, then 25-58, then 58 years plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Males faster than females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class</td>
<td>A/B fastest, then C1, C2, then D/E and Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>£30Kpa fastest, then £20-30 pa, then below £20Kpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domicile</td>
<td>Living out-of-town, faster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>1-3 years driving experience, faster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine Size</td>
<td>Drivers of cars with engines 1.6 l and above, faster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Car</td>
<td>Drivers of cars 1-7 years old, faster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Mileage</td>
<td>Above 10K miles pa fastest, then 5-10K, then below 5K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Car</td>
<td>Company car drivers, faster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drive as Work</td>
<td>Driving as part of work, faster</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Professor Stradling, RTS 45.

34. It is, of course, not just car drivers who speed. Motorcyclists driving at excessive or inappropriate speeds can be a serious problem in both town and country. The Freight

61 AA quoting research by Mr Silcock.
62 RTS 36.
63 RTS 12.
64 The survey is reported in Professor Stradling’s paper, entitled Highway Code and Aggressive Violations in UK Drivers (2000).
65 RTS 18.
Transport Association acknowledged that HGV drivers fail to keep to the 40 mph limit on single carriageway main roads.  

35. The groups most likely to speed excessively are those driving in a work-related capacity, members of high income households and young males. Motorcyclists are also a serious problem, and HGV drivers commonly exceed the 40 mph limit on single carriageway main roads.

Why people speed

36. There is a significant amount of research about why people drive at illegal and inappropriate speeds. It points to several factors:

- many drivers do not know what the speed limits are
- they do not regard speeding as a serious offence and they are unlikely to get caught
- they do not appreciate the damage they do because others bear much of the cost
- they are in a hurry or feel pressured into keeping up with other drivers; and
- the comfort of the car and the design of the road means that it feels right to drive more quickly than is legal or safe.

37. Mr Silcock’s research into drivers understanding of the speed limit found that, although people accept the existing speed limits, they only understand where the 30 mph and 70 mph limits apply. The AA informed us that drivers often cannot tell from the design of the road and the surroundings what the legal or appropriate speed is.

38. However, in nearly all cases they exceed those limits they are aware of. A key factor, as the AA’s research shows, is that “drivers do not regard speeding as a serious offence, are not the best judges of their own driving abilities, and often prefer to blame others for crashes, including children”.

39. Moreover, those who speed only suffer a small part of the costs. Professor Allsop pointed out that:

“drivers get much of the benefit immediately for themselves and their associates in terms of earlier arrival (and possibly the pleasure of going faster). They do bear some of the costs themselves but they are known to under perceive these costs. They do not themselves bear any of the human consequences of accidents for others or much of the damage to the environment or quality of life in the areas through which they drive”.

Those most likely to die as pedestrians are poor and live in cities.

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66 The figure may be between 60 and 70% of HGVs (RTS 139).
67 RTS12.
68 RTS 48.
69 The quotation is a description by the Slower Speeds Initiative of research published by the AA (RTS :4).
70 RTS 36.
40. Part of the explanation is the obvious one that drivers need to reach destinations quickly. It is an important factor for some drivers, especially those who are working and have to keep to very tight schedules. It is much more likely to be a reason for speeding on higher than lower speed roads. When questioned why they were speeding, drivers on these roads were most likely to say that they were speeding because they were late.\textsuperscript{71} In 30 mph zones, on the other hand, drivers are most likely to say that they are speeding not because they are in a hurry but rather to keep up with other drivers or because they did not know the speed limit.\textsuperscript{72}

41. Motorists rarely speed accidentally. The surveys which Mr Silcock undertook found that they usually do it consciously because “it feels right”.\textsuperscript{73} They revealed two key factors which had an influence on a speed “feeling right” to an individual. First, modern vehicles encourage speeding by insulating the driver from the effects of speed - both obvious factors such as “the absence of noise, vibration, and wind in the hair” as well as comfort, internal protection and sound systems, which were also cited by drivers as features which encourage speeding.\textsuperscript{74}

42. The second factor is “the nature of the road”.\textsuperscript{75} Mr Silcock observed:

“drivers generally make their own assessments of the speed at which they will drive, irrespective of the speed limit. We found that, as a broad generalisation, the sections of road with the highest proportion of speeding drivers were those with 30 or 40 miles/h limits, which were also wide, straight and with little frontage activity.”\textsuperscript{76}

There was universal agreement with this finding. The Association of British Drivers stated:

“To give an extreme example: the building of a three lane motorway standard access road through a residential estate would not lead to a natural traffic flow at 30 mph. No amount of signs, humps and white paint would make it seem that 30 mph was the optimal speed”.\textsuperscript{77}

TRL’s studies of drivers show that “site characteristics have by far the biggest influence on drivers’ choice” of speed. The design of the road system leads drivers to think that they can drive far faster than is safe.

43. Part of the problem is that many roads came into being long before the motor car was invented. There are therefore so many roads in towns and cities which have shops, schools and other facilities but are also major through routes for vehicles. In England we have not resolved the conflicts which arise in these situations. The policies of highway engineers in the 1960s and 1970s made matters far worse. The Institution of Civil Engineers has convened a working party under the Urban Design Alliance which has found that streets have been designed around the largest vehicles ever likely to be encountered. We were

\textsuperscript{71} The research was undertaken by Brake (RTS 50); there is also evidence is that there are “diminishing returns in terms of journey-time from increasing speed and the ever more rapidly rising risk” (RTS 36).
\textsuperscript{72} RTS 50.
\textsuperscript{73} RTS 50.
\textsuperscript{74} RTS 12.
\textsuperscript{75} Idem.
\textsuperscript{76} The phrase is Professor Allsop’s (RTS 36).
\textsuperscript{77} RTS 12.
\textsuperscript{77} RTS 11.
informed that: "the design of some urban main roads encourage[d] drivers to treat them as racetracks, even where they pass through areas where people live and shop." Efforts were concentrated on allowing traffic to flow as smoothly as possible, for instance by introducing one-way systems. These roads have been death traps for pedestrians: Transport for London has recently found that pedestrian casualty rates on the one-way main roads are double the level on other main roads.  

44. The combination of bad road design, driver ignorance and a belief that speeding is acceptable must be tackled if speeds are to be reduced to safe levels.

How problems associated with speed should be tackled

45. The evidence is that reducing speeds would bring large benefits. No one disputed that many drivers travel at inappropriate speeds in both urban and rural areas. The differences between our witnesses were about the extent to which speeds should be reduced, where they should be reduced and how. The bulk of the evidence indicated that we need to drive more slowly and reduce illegal and inappropriate speed on almost every type of road and in almost every location.

46. There are three main approaches to reducing speed which are conventionally described as enforcement, engineering and education. Some measures can be implemented quickly; other changes will take many years. The approaches consist of the following:

- more effective enforcement, which can be introduced quickly;
- better engineered roads, linked to changes to speed limits and re-classified roads, which could be widely introduced throughout the country during the period of the Ten Year Plan for Transport;
- changes to car engineering and design, including in the long run the use of new technology, notably, Intelligent Speed Adaptation; and
- education, including changes to cultural attitudes to speed, which may take many years, as has the change in attitudes to drinking and driving.

47. Government can influence each of the approaches. Professor Allsop argued that “existing information is more than sufficient to underpin the initiation of policies for speed management on roads of various kinds”. The TRL concluded that the substantial body of knowledge on the effects of speed and facts influencing it “place Government in a strong position to drive the change required. We believe that this is now a pressing need”. Many agreed. Through a series of pilot projects Government has found out what types of

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78 T2000 (RTS 8); Sustrans stated: “Much fast traffic is encouraged by highway design manuals. Roundabouts are notoriously dangerous for cyclists and pedestrians. The traditional British roundabout — unlike its continental counterpart — is large with flared entrances and exits which encourage high speed driving... many sde road crossings have inappropriate speed. This feature, and the thinking that lies behind it, is one major reason why drivers fail to give way to drivers on foot or bicycle, in clear contrast to European situations.” (RTS 18).
79 RTS 8.
80 All witnesses agreed that all elements were necessary to reduce speed, but the ABD and RAC argued for a different balance. The RAC believed that there should be a move away from enforcement to speed management with more emphasis on education and engineering, including the inclusion of responsible road use in the senior school curriculum (RTS 6).
The RAC called for “roads that are self-explaining where speed limits are sufficiently self-evident as to require minimal enforcement” (RTS 6).
81 RTS 36.
82 RTS 27.
education, enforcement and engineering measures reduce speed and casualties. We now look at what should be done.

**Enforcement**

48. In the short term enforcement is the most effective means of reducing speeds. Witnesses stressed three key elements:
- the National Safety Camera Scheme;
- traditional road traffic policing; and
- appropriate penalties for offenders.

*The national safety camera scheme*

49. Cameras have been successfully used to enforce speed limits in the UK since 1991.\(^{83}\) A Home Office study published in 1996 showed a 28% reduction in accidents at speed camera sites. However, the cost of purchasing and operating them fell entirely on police and local authorities, which restricted their use.

50. To overcome this problem, the Government decided in 1998 that fixed penalty fine income from speed and red traffic light cameras could be used (netted off is the expression usually employed) to pay for additional camera deployment and usage. In April 2000, the scheme began in eight pilot police force areas. In each area partnerships were established involving police authorities, local authorities, magistrates, health authorities and others.\(^{84}\)

51. The pilot projects have been very effective. There have been much larger decreases in casualties in the pilot areas than in the country as a whole. The ACPO memorandum describes the remarkable results. In the first year there were 35% fewer collisions and 47% fewer people were killed or seriously injured at the camera sites.\(^{85}\) The results in Northamptonshire were spectacular: in 2001 accidents fell at fixed camera sites by 50 per cent and the number of people killed and seriously injured by 67 per cent; in the whole county there was a 30 per cent reduction in the number killed and seriously injured compared with the 1994 to 1998 average. The cost of the scheme was £10m (all met by offenders via fine revenue); DTLR estimated that £27m had been saved by the reduction of fatal and serious casualties at these sites.\(^{86}\)

52. A few witnesses, in particular, the RAC and the Association of British Drivers are very critical of enforcement policy, and the “exponential growth in the numbers of speed cameras”. The RAC informed us that “there is a widespread and growing perception amongst motorists and sections of the press that camera deployment is motivated by revenue raising capacity”, although it added that “the view may not be correct”. On the other hand, several other witnesses argued that public opinion strongly supported the scheme. ACPO informed us that although a section of the national press strongly opposed the safety camera scheme:

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\(^{83}\) DTLR (RTS 49).
\(^{84}\) Details of the scheme are described in Annex 5 of the DTLR memo (RTS 49) and Annex 3 of the ACPO memo (RTS 137). The memorandum from Northamptonshire emphasised the importance of partnerships.
\(^{85}\) RTS 49.
\(^{86}\) ACPO (RTS 137).
“There is a wealth of information available to show that the public do in fact support the use of safety cameras...Over 80% of drivers believe that cameras encourage drivers to keep to the limits, and 70% agree that cameras reduce collisions. Direct Line Insurance carried out independent research at the same time. Their results confirm significant public support”.

The research carried out for Direct Line by MORI in 2001 found that 69% of motorists believed that speed cameras had a positive impact on reducing the number of road traffic accidents. 68% of those asked favoured locating speed cameras around schools and 64% favoured cameras being used more extensively at accident blackspots. Surveys of local residents in Northamptonshire and Nottingham carried out in 2000 came to very similar results about speeding and the popularity of cameras with local people. ⁸⁷

53. In August 2001 the Government decided to extend the camera scheme to the whole country. In October 2001 seven new partnerships based on police force areas were accepted into the scheme. Ten areas were approved to start in April 2002. Thus 25 of the 43 police areas have joined the scheme, and it will continue to be extended. ⁸⁸ ACPO expects that all police areas will have joined the scheme within two years. ⁹⁰ The Minister told us that although the scheme was not currently mandatory, it would be reviewed to see whether this was necessary. ⁹⁰

54. In the initial pilot areas, authorities had considerable discretion over the location of cameras. In Northamptonshire cameras have been used at “locations where there is public concern about the speed of vehicles but not necessarily a serious accident problem”. The TRL supported this approach. Several witnesses argued that the Government should permit this approach to be extended to enable cameras to be used where speeding seriously affected the quality of life and had indirect as well as direct effects on health, for example where communities were severed by major urban roads. ⁹¹ ACPO was sympathetic to this approach and recommended “that the concept of environmental enforcement of speed limits receives serious consideration”. ⁹²

Guidance in respect of the visibility and location of cameras

55. As the scheme became national, rules on the visibility of cameras and criteria for their location were announced by the Government. ⁹³ Rather than allowing cameras to be employed at a wider range of sites, they restricted where and how they might be employed. Three aspects of the rules attracted particular attention, namely:

- the cameras were to be located where there was a history of casualties (cameras should only be sited at locations with four killed or seriously injured accidents or eight personal injury accidents in the last three years);

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⁸⁷ The survey in Northamptonshire was carried out by MORI; in Nottingham the council conducted its own opinion survey (Appendix 1 to RTS 9).
⁸⁸ DTLR.
⁹⁰ RTS 137.
⁹¹ Q410.
⁹² RTS 137.
⁹³ DTLR (RTS 49).
- the camera sites were to be well-signed; and
- the camera housings were to be painted yellow.\textsuperscript{94}

The decision was taken by the Safety Project Camera Board which included officials from the DTLR, Home Office other departments and organisations, but not the Department of Health.\textsuperscript{95} As a result of the new rules, cameras may have to be removed from sites where they were placed during the pilot project.

56. The majority of those who submitted evidence to the inquiry were very critical of the new rules. Among the critics were academic experts, including the Transport Research Laboratory, health professionals, local authorities and road safety groups. The President of the Faculty of Public Health Medicine of the Royal College of Physicians informed us:

"I am writing to you...in response to the rules to increase the visibility of speed cameras that were announced on 3 December (2001). We are concerned they appear to give the message that DTLR is only concerned about excess traffic speed in the small number of locations where there have been several deaths or serious injuries from collisions. The emphasis on conspicuity could even give the impression that motorists need only restrict their speed when they are approaching a brightly coloured traffic camera".\textsuperscript{96}

Transport 2000 stated:

"The requirement that all speed cameras in areas covered by safety camera partnerships must be signed and painted bright yellow seems to us akin to telling burglars that they will only be arrested in areas where signs announce the presence of police patrols. Elsewhere, motorists (or burglars) will be free to break the law".\textsuperscript{97}

57. It was argued that:

- many casualties are not clustered at black-spots but occur along the whole road; cameras should be located to take this into account; in particular, as the Government noted: "accidents to walkers and cyclists do not tend to ‘cluster’ in identifiable hotspots";\textsuperscript{98}
- the new rules imply that speeding is acceptable away from the camera sites
- when the cameras are visible and well-signed, drivers tend to slow down when they see them and then speed up again
- the new rules were not based on a proper scientific analysis of the evidence or any assessment of the consequences of this decision; Mr Brunstrom of ACPO told us: "There is no research evidence to say that yellow cameras work better than ones that are not; nor is there any to show that they do not".\textsuperscript{99} TRL agreed, stating that "there is no evidence that painting cameras yellow will reduce accidents".\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{94} DTLR Annex 5 (RTS 49).
\textsuperscript{95} Q496, Q540 (RTS 49).
\textsuperscript{96} RTS 4.
\textsuperscript{97} Transport 2000 (RTS 8); Nottingham City Council compared the recent Government approach to "instructing undercover drugs squad officers to always wear a police badge" (RTS 9).
\textsuperscript{98} Tomorrows roads, p 42.
\textsuperscript{99} Q61.
\textsuperscript{100} RTS 27.
- the evidence from Victoria in Australia shows that many more lives “are saved by covert rather than overt cameras”.

- the new rules encourage authorities to react to deaths and injuries, rather than produce a thoughtful preventative strategy: people have to be killed or injured for a camera to be installed.

58. The DTLR justified the decision on the grounds that:

- overt cameras were more likely to modify drivers’ behaviour; and

- it was important to retain public support, and there was strong public opposition to covert cameras.

 Ministers agreed, however, that no ‘scientific calculation’ had been undertaken to see whether covert or overt cameras were more effective.

59. In evidence, the DTLR indicated that some preventative use of cameras should be permitted in areas where changing circumstances pose an increased risk of accident. Guidelines should allow local decisions to be taken to site cameras in locations where such a risk has been identified.

60. Effective enforcement saves lives. In the pilot project areas the Safety Camera Scheme has been very successful, bringing about a big reduction in crashes and casualties. ACPO expects that all police force areas will be part of the scheme within two years. If police force areas have not joined the Safety Camera Scheme by the end of 2004, the Government should consider making it mandatory.

61. Unfortunately, it is likely that the Scheme has been made much less effective because the Government has changed the rules which apply to cameras: it has insisted that they were painted yellow with more signs to warn motorists of them, and severely restricted where they could be used. The new rules about the visibility and location of cameras are unreasonable. Crashes do not just occur at accident blackspots. There was no scientific research to support this decision. People will die as a result. Police and local authorities should decide where to locate cameras and whether they should be visible. Their decisions should informed by pilot projects to [1] test whether safety cameras should be overt or covert and [2] identify a series of locations other than severe accident blackspots where the speed of traffic needs to be reduced. The Department of Health should be on the Project Board for the Safety Camera Scheme to ensure that public health issues are fully taken into account in the decisions it makes.

Traffic police

62. In recent years there has been a significant reduction in the numbers of traffic police. ACPO noted that “traffic police numbers (as defined by HMIC) appear to have dropped

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101 Nottingham City Council discusses the evidence from Victoria (RTS 9).
102 QQ 402-3, Q498-505. Cameras used by those forces outside the ‘netting office’ schemes are not yellow, adding to confusion. Q462.
103 QQ 362-3.
by some 11%" between 1996-7 and 200-01. The national changes mask very differing pictures in different authorities. In some areas, the reduction in police numbers has been much more than 11%: the Metropolitan Police had 921.9 traffic police in 1996-7, but only 685.7 in 2000-01. This number was further, and severely reduced in 2002, albeit, we were assured, temporarily.\textsuperscript{105}

63. ACPO justified the fall on the grounds that the greater use of cameras compensated for the loss of police numbers, as the increasing number of speeding offences dealt with by the police showed.\textsuperscript{106} It admitted, however, that there was “a clear demand from the public...to see more police officers out on public roads”. This demand is not unreasonable. While cameras bring many benefits, they cannot do everything. They cannot be used to prevent inappropriate speed. They are of little use against the large number of unlicensed drivers in the country. Transport for London informed us that:

“\textit{A minority of drivers operate beyond the traffic regulations without being registered as the vehicle’s owner, without tax or insurance and these drivers have a disproportionate number of crashes...In London, the Havering road safety group instigated a survey in October. With the help of local police cadets they stopped and checked 157 vehicles (in four hours, over two days) and found 48 with no road fund licence}”\textsuperscript{107}

There is now the technology to detect untaxed cars. In addition, in the future, Mr Brunstrom, the Chief Constable of North Wales, suggested that it would be possible to ensure compliance through digital cameras which could recognise faces, but this has important civil liberties implications. For the present action against unlicensed drivers requires, first and foremost, traffic police who stop motorists.\textsuperscript{108} \textbf{Safety cameras are of little use in catching or deterring drivers travelling at inappropriate speeds or unlicensed drivers.} Moreover, cameras paid for under the scheme can only be used at severe accident blackspots. The Police must ensure that there are adequate numbers of traffic police to deter:

- inappropriate speed;
- unlicensed drivers; and
- drivers who speed at places away from the accident blackspots where camera will be located.

\textbf{There should be no further reduction in the numbers of traffic police.}

\textit{Penalties}

64. The sanction for speeding is in two parts: fines and the risk of disqualification. Speeding offences detected by police action and by cameras can be dealt with by way of fixed penalty. \textit{A fixed penalty involves payment of £60 and three endorsement points.}\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{104} ACPO Annex 4 (RTS 137); ACPO added that due to inconsistencies in counting rules and definitions this figure is not robust and cannot be firmly relied upon.
\textsuperscript{105} See the Metropolitan Police’s memo (RTS 154).
\textsuperscript{106} Q35, and see Q31.
\textsuperscript{107} RTS 24.
\textsuperscript{108} Q 67.
\textsuperscript{109} In court the maximum penalties available are a fine of £1,000, for speeding on a motorway £2,500, three to nine points, disqualification, and a requirement to take a fresh driving test. The penalties are described in Road Traffic Penalties, A Consultation Paper, December 2000, pp. 22-5.
For those convicted of speeding, as ACPO notes, the level of fine is more or less irrelevant, but the threat of disqualification is a real deterrent.\textsuperscript{110} Surveys undertaken for the AA support this contention. There are more severe penalties for those convicted of careless or dangerous driving; excessive speed is the most common element among dangerous driving cases.\textsuperscript{111} Dangerous driving can carry a prison sentence, but this is usually only given when a death has occurred.\textsuperscript{112}

65. Witnesses argued that current penalties for speeding, as well as for other road traffic offences, are inadequate,\textsuperscript{113} and in particular:

- penalties for speeding should be higher, and judges and magistrates did not adequately use the penalties available to them;\textsuperscript{114}
- there were particular problems in deterring unlicensed and disqualified drivers.

66. The Government has recognised that there is a problem. The Road Safety Strategy in March 2000 stated that the Government was:

"Undertaking an urgent review led by the Home Office of penalties for road traffic offences".

The Consultation Paper (Road Traffic Penalties) was issued in December 2000.\textsuperscript{115} The review proposed (Proposal 18) that a new fixed penalty system for speeding offences should provide for two levels of fixed penalty with a higher level of points awarded to those exceeding the limit by a wide margin. The higher tier of fixed penalty includes a fine of £90 and an endorsement more than double the standard number of points\textsuperscript{116}. Responses were sought by March 2001.\textsuperscript{117} Unfortunately, to date there has been no further announcement. The Home Office memorandum claimed that because there were over 1,000 responses it has taken a long time to consider them. We note that the 13,000 responses to the Planning Green Paper were analysed in under two months.

67. While several of our witnesses called for stronger measures;\textsuperscript{118} most wanted the speedy implementation of the proposals in the Consultation Paper as a first step to improving the present situation. ACPO strongly supported Proposal 18. \textbf{Existing penalties for speeding are inadequate. The Home Office's dilatoriness in implementing the proposals in its Consultation Paper on road traffic penalties issued in 18 months ago is unacceptable. We recommend that the proposals in the}

\textsuperscript{110} A report commissioned by the AA found that fines were considered too low and ineffective by the participants (see RTS 14).
\textsuperscript{111} TRL (RTS 27).
\textsuperscript{112} Brake (RTS 50).
\textsuperscript{113} RTS 34.
\textsuperscript{114} RTS 34.
\textsuperscript{115} Road Traffic Penalties, A Consultation Paper, December 2000.
\textsuperscript{116} See Annex 4, DTLR memo (RTS 49).
\textsuperscript{117} The Home office stated: "Any changes to penalties arising as a result of this consultation exercise would be introduced in appropriate legislation at the earliest opportunity" (RTS 44).
\textsuperscript{118} Brake was very concerned that speeding was dealt with under the fixed penalty system since "speeding is not only serious, it also threatens and costs lives". The organisation argued that "speeding is included in the fixed penalty system not because it is a minor offence (which clearly it is not), but because of the sheer numbers of offenders, and the burden it would place on the legal system if these offences were dealt with by the courts". It called for fines of at least £1,000 for speeding along with prison sentences and loss of licences, depending on the severity of the offences (RTS 50).
Consultation Paper be implemented without delay. There should be legislation in the next session of Parliament.

68. The worst offenders have a disproportionate effect on casualties.\textsuperscript{119} There is a concern that magistrates are too often unwilling to give heavier sentences to serious offenders, and, in particular a reluctance to disqualify drivers. Magistrates are able to exercise "special reasons not to disqualify". We were informed that this power is not being exercised consistently, and that serial offenders are escaping disqualification.\textsuperscript{120} We recommend that the Home Office and Lord Chancellor’s Department issue clearer guidance about the use of magistrates' discretion in “exercising special reasons not to disqualify”.


\textsuperscript{120} PACTS (RTS 14).
Road engineering, speed limits and road classification

Existing speed limits

69. Almost every witness told us that our speed limits are a mess. Speed limits need to be lower on many roads, and higher on others.121 The problems, which witnesses identified, are that:

- drivers often do not know what the speed limit is (as we have seen);
- speed limits are often not appropriate for the road;122 and
- the system of road classification is out of date.

The failure to set and enforce the right speed limits is a major factor in deaths and injuries, and in particular in the high pedestrian casualty rate in urban areas.

70. Current guidance to local authorities about how to set speed limits does not take sufficient account of safety and has led to limits higher than is safe. The guidance is given in Circular 1/93. It is set by reference to the speed of the traffic travelling along the road, and is based on the speed of the 85th percentile of vehicles, ie the speed up to which 85% of traffic is travelling.123 The existing classification of roads (A, B, and “C and Unclassified roads”) is, as the Government stated in March 2000, “not appropriate for speed management purposes since those designations define routes rather than the nature or function of the road or its relative safety”.124

Setting speed limits in future

71. A new system of speed limits is required. Ideally they should:

- be understood, consistent, respected; and
- take into account a wider range of factors than the speed of the traffic, including the need to protect all road users.

In its Road Safety Strategy in March 2000, the Government promised significant changes along these lines. These were to:

- create a “national framework for determining appropriate vehicle speeds on all roads, and ensuring that measures are available to achieve them”.

121 RTS 48.
122 ACPO (RTS 137) informed us: “There is no doubt that the public fails to see the logic of many individual speed limits. ACPO shares this concern”. IHIE’s views were typical. The organisation “believes that speed limits must be seen as reasonable and appropriate to encourage willing compliance. A consistency of approach is need” RTS 33).
123 Many witnesses argued that there was a need to take into account many more factors than this. The Slower Speeds Initiative informed us: “Speed limits have historically been determined by driver acceptability or by reference to a combination of factors such as road geometry and traffic flows...There is no reason why the factors that lead drivers to choose particular speeds should result in levels of speed that are preferable from the point of view of society as a whole” (RTS 34A).
124 Tomorrow’s Roads, p. 50.
125 Tomorrow’s Roads, p. 48
- revise its "guidance to local authorities on the setting of local speed limits to achieve appropriate and consistent standards nationally to reflect, as far as possible, the needs of all road users on different classes of roads";\textsuperscript{126}
- in rural areas, "develop a new hierarchy of roads defined by their function and quality, which combine flexibility at local level with consistency nationally";\textsuperscript{127}; and
- in urban areas, in the longer term "develop an urban hierarchy of roads to provide clearer guidance in this area, in a similar manner to that proposed for rural roads".\textsuperscript{128}

72. Unfortunately the Government has not undertaken most of these tasks and failed to complete any. There has been a report on a rural road hierarchy but it failed to provide an immediate and implementable solution.\textsuperscript{129} A major problem is that the proposed changes to date have been too complicated.

73. Despite the problems there is sufficient evidence to indicate that a new system of speed limits is required as a matter of urgency. They are best set, as at present, by local authorities following national guidance. A national framework for speed assessment and a new classification of the urban and rural road network could describe in more detail how those limits should be applied. The Government should publish as a priority revised Guidance to local authorities on setting local speed limits and principles for speed management. The Guidance should also offer information on the range of interventions available to local authorities to act as preventative measures in advance of crashes and injuries occurring. Local authorities should subsequently be guided by a national framework for determining appropriate vehicle speeds on roads and by a new hierarchy of roads defined by their function and quality in urban and rural areas.

\textit{What the speed limits should be and the use of engineering measures to enforce them}

74. According to a significant number of witnesses there are four main types of road which are wrongly classified or where existing speed limits are unsatisfactory. They are those in some villages, in country lanes, on single carriageway A and B roads, and in urban areas. The key issues raised by witnesses in the inquiry were whether the speed limit:

- on urban residential roads should be 20 or 30 mph
- should be a 20 mph limit outside schools
- in villages should be 30 mph
- in country lanes should be 40 mph
- on single carriageway A and B roads 50 or 60 mph.

There was little pressure from witnesses for a change in motorway limit.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{126} Tomorrow's Roads, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{127} Tomorrow's Roads, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{128} Tomorrow's Roads, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{129} See Annex 7, DTLR memo (RTS 49).
\textsuperscript{130} A few wanted a change: Green Speed argued for a 55mph national speed limit which would save lives and reduce pollution (RTS 3); in contrast, the RAC Foundation wanted a variable 80 mph limit (RTS 6).
75. We recommend that the following guidance on speed limits be issued to local authorities. We discuss below the rationale for these limits.

Proposed guidance to local authorities re speed limits for cars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limit</th>
<th>Type of Road</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 mph</td>
<td>Many residential areas, some mixed routes, vicinity of schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 mph</td>
<td>Main roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 mph</td>
<td>Major outer urban roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 mph</td>
<td>Poorer quality ‘A’ and ‘B’ roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 mph</td>
<td>Good quality single carriageway ‘A’ roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 mph</td>
<td>Dual carriageway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vicinity of schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘C’ and Unclassified roads*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Some current ‘C’ roads should become ‘B’ roads

76. Changing speed limits will achieve little by itself. The TRL informed us that speed limits were not effective unless the road is designed for lower speeds: a reduction in the limit without supporting measures by itself typically only leads to a very small reduction in average speed.\textsuperscript{131} The supporting measures include:

- a design which indicates the speed limit; the IHT noted that “roads need to look as though motorists should drive along them at the appropriate speed”;\textsuperscript{132}
- engineering which enforces the speed limit; and
- improved signs.

77. Traffic calming measures have been very effective, as evidence from Nottingham indicates\textsuperscript{133}.

\textsuperscript{131} RTS 27.
\textsuperscript{132} The AA stated that “speed limits should be reconciled to the character of the road (and vice versa)”. The “... key lies in finding the right speed limit for each stretch of road.” The organisation added that “all speed limits should be reviewed in a formal programme with a timetable and a budget. Getting the right speed on the right road is the single most pressing road safety issue - the benefits of a review are more than proportionate to the costs”. Drivers need to be able to easily realise what the speed limit is (RTS 48). As Professor Stradling pointed out, this means first and foremost that the design and type of road must reflect the speed limit (RTS 45). The RAC supported this idea which is often described as the “the self-explaining” road (RTS 6).
\textsuperscript{133} RTS 9.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Traffic Calming</th>
<th>Mean Speed in MPH</th>
<th>% Reduction in Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Round Top Road Humps (18 schemes)</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9m square Cushions (19 schemes)</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8m Plateau (7 schemes)</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Traffic calming can be used both to enforce both 30 mph limits and lower 20 mph limits.

78. There have been problems with traffic calming. Some speed humps can cause excessive noise and isolated calming measures can cause traffic to be displaced to surrounding areas. However, there is now very considerable experience of different types of calming measures, and suitable ones can be chosen for each situation; for instance, speed cushions are often used on bus routes.\(^\text{134}\) Displacement can be avoided if measures are employed over a whole area. Traffic calming has been unpopular with some motorists, but, according to the evidence submitted to the inquiry, these views were not representative of public opinion.\(^\text{135}\)

79. On some roads where it has not been possible to design the roads in a way which indicates the speed limit, or install traffic calming, it is necessary to use speed limit signs. This could mean using repeat signs in 30 mph limit zones where they are not currently permitted. Mr Silcock proposed that signs give a reason for the limit, particularly where it may not be obvious to the driver. The derestricted sign which signals the national speed limit (60 mph for single carriage way roads, 70 mph for dual carriageways and motorways) is not widely recognised; several witnesses proposed that it should be replaced by signs which indicate what the limit is. **Repeat signs should be permitted in 30 mph zones where the speed limit is not apparent from the design of the road or cannot be enforced by traffic calming. The ‘derestricted’ sign should be replaced by a sign indicating what the speed limit is.**

Urban areas

80. There is now a wealth of experience to show the effects of measures to reduce speed in towns and cities. TRL refers to evidence that the low instance of low speed limits in the UK and of measures to reduce speed contributed to the high pedestrian casualty rate here compared with other European countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden.\(^\text{136}\) Cities such as Gloucester, Hull and York have shown that similar results can

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\(^{134}\) Nottingham City Council noted that the fire service, ambulance service and bus operators will only support the use of cushions on the strategic emergency routes and bus routes (RTS 9).

\(^{135}\) See RTS 47; for instance, a recent poll by MORI for the Commission for Integrated Transport found that 68% of those questioned would like to see traffic calming measures in residential areas compared to 19% who opposed this.

\(^{136}\) RTS 27.
be achieved in England. The main contrast between the situation in England and the Netherlands is the extent of 30 kph zones (under 20 mph) in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{137} In Hull, where they have been widely applied, well-engineered 20mph zones have achieved reductions in injury accidents of:

- Total accidents: -56%
- Killed & seriously injured accidents: -90%
- Accidents involving child casualties: -64%
- All pedestrian accidents: -54%
- Child pedestrian accidents: -74%

The reason for these reductions "is simply because of the reductions in average vehicle speeds which 20mph zones enforce through their engineering measures."\textsuperscript{138}

81. Several witnesses thought that the speed limit on the majority of roads in built-up areas should be 20 mph.\textsuperscript{139} In New Directions in Speed Management the DTLR concluded that 30 mph was the appropriate speed limit for urban areas, but the Government is committed to an expansion of the use of 20 mph zones and ACPO supports such zones.\textsuperscript{140} The only uncertainty is about how extensively they should be employed. The Government should encourage local authorities to make more use of 20 mph zones, enforced by suitable engineering measures. The measures should be area wide to avoid displacement. They should concentrate on accident prevention and improving the quality of life, and should not be only introduced as an ad hoc response to serious crashes.

Home Zones

82. Another measure which reduces speed, increases safety and improves the quality of life is the home zone. It usually consists of redesigning streets to make them places for people rather than traffic; speeds are reduced to 10 mph.\textsuperscript{141} Home zones have been very effective in Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands in reducing speeds, increasing pedestrian safety and creating an agreeable ambience for those walking, playing

\textsuperscript{137} Moreover, in the Netherlands, it is proposed that up to 90% of urban roads will be subject to a 30kph limit (RTS 34)
\textsuperscript{138} Hull City Council memo (RTS 152).
\textsuperscript{139} The call for more widespread 20 mph limits in urban areas was common. The Government’s conclusion that the urban speed limit should remain at 30 mph was criticised on safety and other grounds. It was argued that too much of the DTLR’s analysis was based on the effects of free flowing traffic.
\textsuperscript{140} ACPO “fully supports the recent introduction of the 20 mph limit and [has] retested all equipment to ensure that we can enforce it” (RTS 137).
\textsuperscript{141} RTS 49, DTLR states: “The aim is to change the way streets are used to improve the quality of life by making them places for people, not just for traffic. This usually includes design measures to reduce vehicle speeds below 10 mph. The road space is shared between motorised traffic and other road users and the design of schemes takes account of the wider needs of residents and those on foot or bicycle, and particularly children” DTLR added that “whilst home zones may confer road safety benefits they are not primarily road safety measures” (DTLR 49).
or chatting in the street. In the UK too the initial evidence is that home zones are proving to be a success. In the first of the Government’s pilot zones at Northmoor Manchester average speeds have fallen to 9.8 mph as a result of “a combination of traffic calming, staggered parking to break up driver’s sight lines and good design”. We recommend that the Government publish the results of the home zone pilot projects as soon as possible. If successful, the Government should fund them and support their widespread introduction.

The Gloucester ‘Safer City Project’

83. The Gloucester ‘Safer City Project’ went beyond the area wide approach. It was a scheme to improve the safety of roads in the whole city. It took a preventative, not a reactive approach to road safety. The main focus was on engineering and the reclassification of routes, but it was backed up by education, publicity, training and enforcement. A hierarchy of measures was established with —

- at the highest level — a network of roads that remained through routes;
- then mixed use — these were routes which usually predated the motor car but did not have the capacity or alignment to be suitable as through routes but were carrying a significant amount of traffic. Physical measures were taken to reduce traffic speed. Vulnerable road users were given a higher priority than on main roads.
- the remaining roads were essentially to be access only.

The project reduced serious injuries and deaths by over one third and adult pedestrian casualties by 22 per cent and child pedestrian casualties by 13 per cent. A similar city-wide approach has been employed in York. Following the success of the Gloucester ‘Safer City Project’, the Government should ensure that similar projects are introduced into towns and cities throughout the country.

Mixed use routes

84. An important part of the Gloucester Safer City Project was the treatment of mixed use routes. As TRL noted on many urban roads the segregation of pedestrians and motor vehicles is not possible. They require redesigning and ‘speed limiting’ measures. Many of the most dangerous urban roads have to be used by both pedestrians and motor vehicles. Guidance to local authorities should recommend that particular care is taken to ensure that these routes are suitably engineered to enforce the speed limit. Local authorities would be assisted in this task if the Government were to develop its proposed ‘urban hierarchy of roads’. The Government must now establish the ‘Urban Road Hierarchy’ which it promised in its Road Safety Strategy in March 2000.

\[142\] RTS 34.
\[143\] RTS 8.
\[144\] Gloucester Safer City, DTLR, June 2001; and see Gloucestershire evidence (RTS 25).
\[145\] An agreement with the police guaranteed a minimum level of enforcement. Speeding tickets quadrupled.
\[146\] RTS 27.
Schools

85. Because of the high child pedestrian casualty rates, and the effect of speed on children’s mobility and quality of life, a number of witnesses including the Traffic and Children Coalition, called for “well-enforced 20 mph speed limits around all schools and parks” as “an important part in redressing the balance in favour of children on our streets”.

It would not only reduce the danger to children but also make it easier for them to cycle to school as many wish. **We recommend that guidance to local authorities indicate that a 20 mph limit should be the norm in the vicinity of schools in urban and rural areas during the day on weekdays, though they should have the ability to vary the limits at other times.**

Rural areas

86. There are three types of rural roads where it is particularly important that speeds fall:

- in villages;
- on country lanes, ie C class and Unclassified roads; and
- on some badly designed ‘A’ and B roads.

There is a very strong demand for lower speed limits. However, there are fewer examples of good practice in rural than urban areas, so it will be necessary to undertake a number of pilot projects to examine the best means of enforcing them.

Villages

87. The Government’s Road Safety Strategy proposed that 30 mph be the norm for villages, but according to some witnesses little has occurred since to make this happen. Consultants Steer Davis Gleave have examined the road safety policies of 20 rural local authorities and found that fewer than one in five had or were intending to introduce a policy of 30 mph for all villages.

88. The DETR saw the main problems in instituting 30 mph limits in villages as:

- how to ensure a 30 mph limit is obeyed;
- how to do this without creating clutter and ugliness; and
- how to define a village.

These are poor excuses for not issuing guidance to local authorities. Traffic calming will often be necessary to enforce the limit, particularly on the approaches to small towns and villages. In some places vehicle-activated signs may need to be employed, as the IHIIE proposed: these are “traffic signals just within speed limit zones which are triggered by speeding vehicles, forcing them to stop”.

Although traffic calming, signs and traffic

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147 RTS 47
148 The consultants were commissioned by the CPRE (RTS 31).
149 RTS 33.
lights are often unsightly, these effects can be mitigated in various ways. Schemes should be installed as sensitively possible. There is already a great deal of unnecessary clutter in villages, and when traffic calming is introduced many unnecessary existing signs could be removed. New signs to indicate 30mph limits could be incorporated into the village sign.\textsuperscript{150} As in some Norfolk villages, speeds can be reduced by removing road markings and clutter.\textsuperscript{151}

89. 30 mph limits have already been successfully introduced in villages throughout Suffolk. The County Council established 450 new 30 mph limits in two years, producing a 20% reduction in accidents.\textsuperscript{152} Guidance to local authorities on speed limits should recommend that there be a 30 mph limit in villages. Appropriate measures should be taken by the local authority in consultation with the villagers to ensure the limit is obeyed. They should also decide which settlements are villages. There has been some concern about the slow progress of the Highways Agency in introducing 30 mph limits in villages on its part of the network. We consider this below.\textsuperscript{153}

C Roads and Unclassified roads

90. In \textit{New Directions in Speed Management} the DETR stated

"The one aspect of the national speed limit system that comes in for most criticism is the notion that 60 mph is a reasonable maximum speed on country lanes".\textsuperscript{154}

However, the Department decided that with the information at hand it was not possible to set a lower national limit. Country lanes could not be legally defined and speed signs would be intrusive. If set too low respect for limits as a whole would be diminished. These arguments were not considered convincing by those who submitted evidence to the inquiry. Many memoranda which we received reflected the view that there have to be lower limits on country lanes. These could be readily defined as C and Unclassified roads. A limit of 40 mph would curb the worst excesses and provide a little more safety for those taking a stroll, or riding or cycling. We recommend that guidance to local authorities indicate that 40 mph be the speed limit on C and Unclassified roads. Research should be undertaken into the best ways of enforcing such a limit. Some of the better quality, wider C and Unclassified (where a higher speed is appropriate) might be reclassified as B roads. If a 40 mph limit were introduced on minor roads it may be possible to increase the limit for HGVs on A and B roads from the present 40 mph.

A and B roads

91. There is some dissatisfaction with the national speed limit (60 mph) on single carriageway main roads. It is inappropriate on many roads, and there is a strong case for lower limits on poor quality A and B roads.\textsuperscript{155} Some local authorities, such as Gloucestershire County Council, are increasingly introducing 50 mph limits on lower grade

\textsuperscript{150} RTS 31.
\textsuperscript{151} RTS 34.
\textsuperscript{152} RTS 31.
\textsuperscript{153} See below section on Highways Agency.
\textsuperscript{155} ACPO saw a case for lower national limits, particularly in relation to single carriageway rural roads.
‘A’ and busy ‘B’ class roads in the county. Already, many people do not know what the national speed limit is or what the sign which indicates it means. The piecemeal adoption of 50 mph limits on dangerous roads will only add to the confusion. Guidance to local authorities should include advice about which types of single carriageway main roads should have a 60 mph limit and which the lower 50 mph limit. The sign which currently indicates the national speed limit should be scrapped; road signs should indicate what the actual speed limit is.

A Rural Road Hierarchy

92. If local authorities are to establish a speed limit of 30 mph in all villages, and 40 mph on C class and unclassified roads, they need to undertake detailed analysis of both usage and traffic flow along their roads, and makes changes to the design of some roads. In some places more effective enforcement is required. They would be greatly assisted in this task if the Government were to produce a Rural Road Hierarchy (ie a re-classification of the road system) which it promised in its Road Safety Strategy and which many witnesses recommended. It is a feasible task, and has already been undertaken in Devon. However, the working group it established decided that a “system of different speed limits would be costly financially and in terms of environmental intrusion”. The Government now has a project to develop practical speed management measures on rural roads and has identified the need for more information before “we can properly assess the case for lower rural speed limits”. The Government should now make every effort to introduce the Rural Road Hierarchy it promised over two years ago. There are fewer examples of good practice in rural than in urban areas: there should be pilot projects in rural areas comparable to the Gloucester Safer City project.

Dual carriageways and Motorways.

93. In Tomorrow’s roads - safer for everyone the Government decided that motorway and dual carriageway speed limits would be kept at 70mph for cars, but compliance be improved. A few witnesses, for instance Green Speed, called for a lower speed limit on the grounds that lives would be saved and carbon dioxide emissions reduced; on the other hand, others, for example the RAC Foundation, argued that the there should be a variable 80 mph limit on motorways (ie 80 mph in good conditions and lower in bad). It is alleged that the Home Secretary would also prefer such a limit; in oral evidence to us the Parliamentary Under Secretary in the Home Office gave the impression that this was the case. He was asked:

“Is it true that the Home Secretary wants an 80 mph limit on motorways?”

He replied:

“I think the Committee would be very surprised if Ministers, if any ministers came into a situation and simply accepted the handed-down version of what was right and proper without first of all questioning it...”

156 RTS 25.
157 RTS 34.
158 DTLR memo, annex 7 (RTS 49).
159 Tomorrow’s roads, p. 50.
160 RTS 3, RTS 6.
Moreover, the situation is, according to the same Minister, to be kept under review.\footnote{The Home Secretary’s views were reported in Local Transport Today;\ for the Minister’s comments see QQ466-7.}

94. In contrast the great majority of witnesses, including ACPO, TRL, the AA, and the Minister for Transport, thought that the existing limit should be retained. It is likely that more people would die or be seriously injured if it were raised (in 1998 1475 people were killed or seriously injured on motorways). In the United States “increases in the national speed limit have been shown clearly to be associated with increases in fatalities”;\footnote{RTS 27.} Casualties, including deaths and serious injuries, on the motorways might be expected to increase by 5 to 10%. A DTLR official explained to us why there would be more deaths if there were to be an 80 mph limit. First, average speeds would be higher than at present: “there is an estimate of perhaps 2.5-5 mph increase in the mean speed”;\footnote{Q380.} when incidents occurred drivers would have even less time to react; and therefore more people would die. Secondly, unless the limit for lorries were raised the difference between the speed of lorries and cars, itself a cause of crashes, would widen. Moreover, we were told that higher speeds would do little to reduce journey times; on the congested motorways of England an 80 mph limit might well increase them because it would create an uneven flow.

Changing speed limits

95. \textit{New Directions in Speed Management} observes that “another difficulty for local traffic authorities is the time and cost involved in making individual speed limit orders” to change speed limits.\footnote{New Directions in Speed Management, p. 27.} The Transport Act 2000 made some changes, giving authorities the power to designate any road a quiet lane or home zone with a speed limit of 10 mph. However, it is excessively costly and time-consuming to make other changes. For instance, Gloucestershire County council told us that it was impractical to raise Orders to change the limits on country lanes.\footnote{RTS 25.} PACTS recommended the introduction of a simplified procedure for making speed limit orders.\footnote{RTS 14.} \textbf{The Government should make it easier for local authorities to make changes to the speed limit on roads. It should introduce a simplified procedure for making speed limit orders.}

Local autonomy

96. \textbf{The Government should ensure that guidelines should not be in a form that discourages local authorities from taking appropriate decisions to reflect local circumstances.}

Costs

97. The cost of measures such as traffic calming to re-engineer our roads to save lives, reduce injuries, encourage healthy modes of travel and improve the quality of life would not be that large. Several years ago TRL estimated that a comprehensive package of measures in urban areas would cost £3bn: this figure is a small fraction of the expenditure in the Ten Year Plan. TRL’s findings were that:
"Taken together, traffic calming schemes and area wide safety management schemes have the potential to prevent 25% of all casualties in urban areas if fully applied. TRL's estimate is that the potential casualty savings are 50,000 a year, or some 16% of the 1995 overall casualty total. A programme to produce this level of saving would cost a total of £3bn,...One third of the savings would be pedestrians".167

The BMA also stressed the scale of the savings which could be achieved:

"the initial costs can be high but savings are possible in the long run through prevention of injuries and resulting care and rehabilitation costs...A decrease in the amount of these injuries would reduce the burden on the NHS to treat them. Moreover, by making roads safer, the public are more likely to cycle and walk therefore realising the health benefits of doing so".168

In 1997 the TRL estimated that a comprehensive package of traffic calming measures in urban areas would cost £3bn. We recommend that this estimate be updated and that an estimate be made of the cost of measures to reduce casualties in rural areas be undertaken with a view to providing the funds in the Ten Year Plan. We note that the sum is likely to be less than the funds proposed for safety improvements on the railways, but spending it would save many, many more lives than are lost on the railways every year. Safety should be a priority for all modes of transport.

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168 RTS 150.
Car design and engineering

98. There are a number of changes in vehicle design and engineering which could bring about reductions in speed. Some are small; others could transform the way we drive. Two, in particular, were brought to our attention. They are:

- changes to the speedometer to mark speed limits more clearly; and
- intelligent speed adaptation;

Speedometers

99. RoSPA observed that:

“modern cars provide a smooth, quiet drive, even at high speeds, and therefore drivers are often insulated from any real sensation of the speed at which they are travelling...it is very easy to creep above the speed limit...Manufacturers should consider how they can design cars so that drivers have more awareness and receive better information about their actual speed...For example, the design of the speedometer is often very unhelpful...Placing 30 mph in the 12 o’clock position on the speedometer dial might raise drivers’ awareness of their speed, particularly on urban roads”.

We recommend that type approval for speedometers be amended so as to provide for designs which make drivers more aware of the 30 mph speed limit. We also urge the industry to develop further use of digital speedometers to ensure that more accurate information is given to drivers.

Intelligent Speed Adaption

100. Intelligent Speed Adaption (ISA) is a system by which the vehicle ‘knows’ the permitted or recommended speed for a road. The standard system “uses an in-vehicle digital road map onto which speed limits have been coded, combined with a [satellite] positioning system”. The system can be advisory, voluntary (the driver can allow the system to determine the speed or not) or mandatory (ie the driver cannot override the system which controls the car). ISA can inform the vehicle of the posted speed limits or could be variable (additional limits are introduced at danger spots such as dangerous corners) or dynamic (dynamic refers to a system which responds to road conditions rather than just the posted speed limit; eg. implementing lower speed limits to take account of weather, proximity to schools etc.).

101. Dr Carsten informed the Committee of the findings of the External Vehicle Speed Control Project, which took place from 1997 to 2000. The study included using a driving simulator, road trials, computer models and interviews with volunteers. The road trials “required volunteer drivers to drive a predetermined route in a car equipped with an ISA

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169 RTS 16.
170 The memorandum from Dr Carsten of the University of Leeds describes the system, the trials which have been undertaken, and their results (RTS 39); and see Annex 6 of the DTLR memo (RTS 49).
171 RTS39.
The mandatory dynamic system was most effective, predicted to reduce fatal accidents by 59%. Predictions from a study in Sweden were similar. The voluntary system, however, was preferred by drivers because it gave them greater control. Cost/benefit analysis showed massive advantages in ISA. The Project proposed that a mandatory system be the ultimate objective, which it suggested could be in place by 2019. A new project began in 2001. Its prime objective “is to place 20 ISA passenger cars on the road with four groups of volunteers for...six months at a time and to measures any changes in their driving behaviour”.

102. There were differing opinions about how ISA should be applied, but general agreement that its development should be encouraged. The AA supported the Government’s programme, but opposed its early use in a mandatory form. The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders noted that further development had the potential to improve road safety, but added that they remained at an early stage and there were significant technical and legal issues to be overcome. It should develop from being a voluntary aid before it can be proposed in a mandatory form.

103. The External Vehicle Control Project set out a timetable for the implementation of ISA. This included:

- mandatory fitting on vehicles within the European Union by 2013;
- voluntary use between 2013 and 2019; and
- potentially mandatory usage from 2019.

Dr Carsten argued that regardless of whether ISA was eventually made mandatory it was important to be in a position to use ISA in some form or other. He made a number of recommendations to this end. They were supported by several other witnesses. In the long run Intelligent Speed Adaption offers the opportunity to put an end to illegal and inappropriate speed. The Government should strongly support this technology by:

- continuing to fund research, including the projected trials from 2002 to 2006;
- encouraging voluntary adoption by fleet managers and providing tax incentives to those who do;
- establishing a Europe-wide requirement that all new vehicles sold from 2013 should have an ISA capability; and
- fund the development of a digital road map to ensure that the information needed to make ISA successful is easily available.

172 RTS 39
174 Eg see RoSPA (RTS 16).
175 RTS 48.
176 RTS 140.
177 RTS39.
178 RTS39.
179 Eg., see PACTS (RTS 14).
Changing attitudes

104. People's attitude to speed is confused. As one submission put it:

"Road safety is a concern to the public, but speeding is not despite being a major cause of collisions".\(^{180}\)

We hate the effects of speed, especially when they have a major impact in the vicinity of our homes, but we do not consider speeding a serious offence.

105. We were left in no doubt that reducing speeds would be popular. A survey by MORI in Hertfordshire found that 79% of people regarded dangerous driving and speeding as a problem in their neighbourhood. In Shropshire 87% of parishes had sought action from the county council or police.\(^{181}\) We were informed that:

"When local people were asked about road safety in these areas it was rated as an issue of concern to rank alongside burglaries and muggings";\(^{182}\) and

"A North Yorkshire survey asked people whether their neighbourhood was a safe place for children. Of the 6,747 people who answered the question, 41 per cent said no and of these 81 per cent stated that this was due to speeding or other road safety reasons."

106. On the other hand, as the Government notes, there is a cultural attitude which regards speed as trivial.\(^{183}\) We were informed:

"Society does not seem to be very critical of the conduct of drivers and so when an accident occurs unless the behaviour of the driver is atypical and extreme, it is the typical and often childlike behaviour of the young pedestrian where blame is directed."\(^{184}\)

107. Almost every witness said that there had to be a change in attitudes to speed: many said that the Government should aim to make speeding as socially unacceptable as drink driving.\(^{185}\) TRL found that:

"Many drivers have difficulty in recognising the added risk from increased speed. Misperceptions abound. In many respects attitudes and beliefs are similar to those on drinking and driving some 40 years ago".\(^{186}\)

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\(^{180}\) Street Management, TFL (RTS 24).
\(^{181}\) RTS 8; the evidence presented to us about the Hertfordshire survey did not separately distinguish views on dangerous driving and speeding.
\(^{182}\) ACPO, Annex 3 (RTS 137).
\(^{183}\) Tomorrow roads, p. 78.
\(^{184}\) TRL 47.
\(^{185}\) Eg see Nottingham City Council (RTS 9); ACPO noted that "speeding is still socially acceptable in the way that drink-driving used to be a generation ago, but now is not." (RTS 137); an exception was the ABD which argued that most only speeded where it was rational and safe to do so (RTS 11).
\(^{186}\) RTS 27.
108. The success in changing attitudes to drink-driving was, as Leeds City Council informed us, based on publicity and enforcement over a long period. Mr Brunstrom of ACPO told us that these significant changes had been brought about by:

"Over 25 years of consistent policy from several governments and police service, with consistent educational messages, with a consistent enforcement policy".

According to ACPO, the National Safety Camera Scheme should make a huge improvement to enforcement. This should play a major part in making "speeding socially unacceptable within a decade ...". There will also need to be improvements in publicity. While the DTLR, and road safety organisations run national and local publicity campaigns, such as Speed Kills, they have not been very successful.

109. However, education and publicity campaigns can be effective. Several witnesses suggested improvements. We were informed that:

"Drivers see speed as a principal source of danger...Thus the climate of opinion may well be favourable...but more effort is needed to raise awareness of the risks and impacts, and change behaviour"

TRL argued that there was now a lot of evidence about the link between speed and accident risk, which should be used as the trigger to change attitudes: "the measures need to be coherent and to generate clear perceptual understanding by the driver of the risk inherent in the speed they adopt for a particular circumstance".

110. Among the views put forward for improving publicity were that:

- general publicity should take the form of "year-round publicity campaigns on speed through TV, radio, cinema, bill-boards and leaflets"; Susan Beck of Safety Camera Partnerships argued that there should be a national television campaign co-ordinated with the National Safety Camera Scheme;

- the Government should encourage positive media coverage, and should refute "information based on misquoted research"; PACTS called for a "rapid rebuttal unit in the Department to do this";

- campaigns should be targeted at specific groups of drivers, in particular those prone to crashes, for example, young drivers, high mileage drivers. Fleet managers should be encouraged to develop "a company culture which prioritises safety and does not pressure drivers to speed"; many good companies do.

\[187\] RTS 17.
\[188\] Q3.
\[189\] RTS 137.
\[190\] RTS43.
\[191\] RTS 27.
\[192\] Brake, RTS50.
\[193\] RTS 43; Susan Beck is the National Communications Lead for the National Safety Camera Scheme, representing all the existing and new partnerships throughout the country, ie the rts43.
\[194\] RTS 14.
111. In addition to publicity, the training and re-training of drivers provides opportunities to improve attitudes to speed. In some of the safety camera partnerships, for example in Northamptonshire, “speed diversionary workshops” have been established as an alternative to fixed penalty notices and penalty points. These workshops encourage drivers to re-examine their driving habits, but it is too early to assess their effectiveness. The national driver improvement scheme, which is similar, and under which drivers are referred for training after committing serious offences, have been successful. Driving tests are to be improved by incorporating hazard perception tests; Mr Silcock argued that these should include speed-related hazards.

112. Better publicity and education must play a part in reducing speeds together with more effective enforcement and engineering. We recommend that the Government:

- establish a comprehensive, all-the-year-round publicity campaign, using the television and other media, and co-ordinated with the National Safety Camera Scheme;
- establish campaigns targeted at specific groups;
- ensure that local partnerships support enforcement and traffic calming measures with education campaigns;
- ensure that schemes like the ‘speed diversionary workshops’ in Northamptonshire be copied through out the country if they prove to be successful;
- make speed-related hazards a part of the hazard perception tests to be introduced in the driving test.

113. While these measures could in conjunction with more effective enforcement and engineering make a significant improvement, making speeding socially unacceptable will be difficult. As Gloucestershire County Council noted “...drivers are constantly receiving a subliminal message that it is acceptable to speed. All drivers know that it is illegal to break the speed limit yet they also know that “they” (ie the police, local authorities and Government) do not stop drivers from speeding”.

The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents informed us:

“Unfortunately road safety education and publicity are often undermined in the mass media. Motor manufacturers and their advertising companies continue to emphasise the speed and power of their vehicles. Television motoring programmes continue to promote the thrill of speed, placing undue emphasis on performance at speed, often showing cars being raced (albeit not on the public highway). Television dramas often show characters driving at speed when speed is not essential to the plot or the characterisation”.

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195 RTS 12.
196 RTS 12
197 RTS 25.
198 RTS 16.
What has been and what could be achieved

114. Steps have been taken to improve enforcement, engineering and education. However, it is possible to do much more. Implementation has been spasmodic, particularly of traffic calming and other engineering measures. As the Slower Speeds Initiative noted

"the European best practice study shows that we differ not in policies but in the scale and intensity of implementation". 199

If our society were to match the scale of implementation seen in some other Europe countries, reductions in speed and casualties, and improvements in the quality of life would be very considerable.

115. The effect of widely applying well-researched and understood measures to improve enforcement, engineering and education would produce very impressive result both in reducing lives and transforming the quality of life of millions of people. Even spreading best practice to all parts of country would have an enormous effect. Many of the very high total of deaths and serious injuries to which inappropriate speed contributes could be avoided. Total deaths could be reduced to under 1,000 per year. The Government's target of reducing the number of people killed and seriously injured by 40% could easily be exceeded. However, progress to date is slow, and the Government's new rules about the location of safety cameras threaten to undermine this target.

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199 RTS 34.
The role of key groups and organisations

116. The many speed reduction measures which need to be taken will be implemented by many organisations, including local authorities, police authorities, Government departments and their agencies. In this section we consider how effectively they have undertaken their task and what improvements should be made. One of the most important changes required is in people’s attitude to speed: if all drivers drove at lower and more responsible speeds, enforcement and traffic calming would be unnecessary. Because of their concern about attitudes, many of the witnesses submitted evidence about the role of the media and the motor industry. Much of it was very critical.
The media and the motor industry

The local media

117. Many witnesses praised the local media. In general they were seen as responsible, putting forward local people’s concerns about speed. The Association of Chief Police Officers informed us that the local press had been giving great support to the safety camera scheme. Its analysis showed that 90 per cent of local press reports were positive, six per cent were neutral and only four per cent negative.\(^{200}\)

The national media and motor manufacturers

118. In contrast, we received many criticisms of the national media and the motor industry. The main criticisms were that:

- speeding is glamourised
- vehicles are manufactured capable of speeds far in excess of the speed limit; and
- issues related to speed are reported from the point of view of the inconvenience to the speeding motorist rather than the dead pedestrian.

The portrayal of speed

119. Sustrans informed us:

“TV Advertising is more worrying as it often not only portrays cars invading the countryside but almost never shows any other road users and certainly not those on foot or cycle. This contributes to the impressions that speeding has no consequences as there is no one else out there. We suggest that the Committee ask for a six month monitoring of this issue”.\(^{201}\)

Motoring programmes were also criticised; they emphasise cars’ ‘performance’, which seems to be a more acceptable way of saying speed and acceleration. ‘Top Gear’ was singled out as ‘highly irresponsible’.\(^{202}\)

The Motor Industry

120. Witnesses were concerned both about the way the motor industry marketed cars, and because they were manufactured to be capable of speeds far in excess of the motorway speed limit.\(^{203}\) RoSPA informed us that:

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\(^{200}\) RTS 137.
\(^{201}\) RTS 18.
\(^{202}\) RTS 1; the programme is no longer shown on the BBC.
\(^{203}\) RoSPA added: “Motor manufacturers, national press, tv and advertisers should not glamourise speed as exciting and exhilarating nor as normal behaviour. See also RTS 2, Crewe and Nantwich Local Agenda 21 Group,
“Manufacturers continue to produce cars and motorcycles that are capable of achieving speeds of 160 mph and more. RoSPA believes that the European Commission, national governments and the motor industry should work together to develop restrictions on the top speeds and power of new cars and motorcycles.”

**News reporting**

121. While there is a great deal of advertising of, and programmes devoted to, the glamour of “high-performance cars, the national media pays little attention to deaths and serious injuries on the roads, even those of children. In fact, the reverse is true. Speeding is seen from point of view of the driver who is inconvenienced not from that of a dead child or his parents. Campaigns are waged against safety measures such as safety cameras and traffic calming schemes. Nottingham City Council referred to the hostility of some of the national papers to speed enforcement, speed cameras and traffic calming.

**The response the BBC, ITC, ASA and the motor manufacturers**

122. We received memoranda from several branches of the media: the BBC, the ITC and the ASA, and from the motor manufacturers. The ITC informed us that it received few complaints in relation to high speed driving, and added:

“As to the motoring programmes our experience is that they take care not to encourage high speed driving on the roads. Sometimes the limit of a car’s road-holding, acceleration and braking may be tested, but this is almost invariably done on an off-road circuit”.

123. The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders emphasised that the motor industry placed the highest priority on safety and had made progressive improvements in the design and structure of its products; it took every care to ensure that vehicles are appropriately represented in advertising materials, and strongly supported the existing regulatory regime, which had demonstrated its effectiveness.

124. The BBC stressed that the organisation behaved responsibly. Although the BBC Producers’ Guidelines did not specifically refer to speed, one of their core editorial values was to “try and ensure that any life threatening, anti-social or criminal behaviour portrayed in BBC programmes does not encourage copycat actions.” The BBC’s Programme Complaints Unit has so far upheld no complaint about inappropriate speed in a BBC programme. The organisation was very happy with its motoring programmes. Part of their editorial brief “was to be an authority on all aspects of the cars they tested: performance was a vital part of the assessment of any car”.

125. However, the memorandum gave no indication that the BBC did anything to promote responsible attitudes to speed. The view seemed to be: “We’re behaving

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204 RTS 16.
205 RTS 9.
206 RTS 5.
207 RTS 140.
208 RTS 7.
209 Idem.
responsibly; it’s not for us to change attitudes to speed”. There was no mention that addressing problems of speed and road safety might be part of the Public Service Broadcasting Remit, and no discussion of why road deaths and road safety are not widely reported.

The reasons for the national media’s reporting, and portrayal, of speed

126. There are a number of possible reasons for the media’s attitudes. First, it seems that so many people are killed on the roads that it is not news - if fewer died it would be news. This is one of the key difference between road and rail crashes.

127. Secondly, there is a strong link between the media and car advertising. Indeed, the media is very dependent on car advertising. In 2000 total expenditure on ‘motoring’ display adverts in national newspapers was £307 million, 12.2% of the total. 15 of the top 50 advertisers in national newspapers in 2000 were car manufacturers.

The consequences of reporting by the national media

128. The portrayal of cars in the media plays a part in the public’s view that speeding is a trivial offence. Its campaigns against safety cameras and traffic calming are in danger of undermining key planks of the Government’s safety policy. A few organisations argued that such campaigns did nothing more than reflect public opinion. The RAC Foundation stated:

“e-mails, letters and telephone calls to the RAC Foundation suggests that there is a growing level of cynicism among motorists of all groups that central and local Government road safety strategy and police enforcement activity has become disproportionately concentrated on excess speed. There is a widespread and growing perception among motorists and sections of the media ... that speed camera deployment is as, or more, motivated by their revenue raising capacity as by considerations of road user safety”.

The RAC Foundation, however, added that this view might not be correct.

129. In contrast, the majority of the evidence which we received argued the opposite case - that campaigns against safety measures did not represent public opinion. The Association of Chief Police Officers memo notes “There is a wealth of information to show that the public do in fact support the use of safety cameras in this way”. However, there is concern that the campaigns will have an effect on public opinion and are already affecting Government policy:

“The tabloid press and some individual motoring correspondents have waged a vigorous campaign to reduce speed enforcement on the grounds that compliance with the law constitutes an unacceptable constraint on motorists” freedom ...tabloid press coverage

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210 The media pocketbook 2001, The Advertising Association
211 Idem
212 RTS 6.
213 RTS 137.
has created a climate in which it is more difficult for the Government to reduce speed limits and in some cases has constrained the ability of local authorities to introduce calming ...we do not believe that the pro speed views expressed by tabloid newspapers are representative of the views of society as a whole. We are concerned that their repetition may make them widespread. We believe that the often one-sided coverage of this issue is highly irresponsible and we do not believe Ministers should be swayed by it". 214

The Association of Chief Police Officers believes that the Government may now be affected by the relentless media campaign: it is concerned that “some in Government seemed more worried by the ill informed and erroneous position taken by a very small but vociferous section of the national press than by public opinion or even by the facts” 215

130. The failure to take road safety in general and speed in particular seriously has important effects. We would have expected campaigns to be mounted to reduce so tragic and avoidable form of death and serious injury. There are many opportunities for all parts of the media to do this; unfortunately, some elements in the press do the reverse: they rail against the very measures designed to reduce speed and save lives. The evidence to this inquiry shows that there are serious concerns about the link between motor industry advertising and journalism. We are also concerned that the BBC has done so little to promote road safety in pursuance of its general public service obligation.

131. However, during this inquiry we have had no opportunity to put the criticisms we have received to representatives of the media or the motor industry. These issues need to be considered in more detail. We hope that the new Transport Committee will investigate them.
Local authorities

132. Local authorities, working with the police, health authorities and others, implement many of the necessary measures. Their policies are put forward in Local Transport Plans. Local authorities:

"Must...examine where accidents and casualties occur and plan cost-effective remedies as one element of an overall strategy. Through this wider remit, the LTP also ensures that enforcement, education, training and publicity are considered along with engineering measures".\textsuperscript{216}

133. The DTLR presented a relatively optimistic view of what was being achieved:

"It is envisaged that some 8,200 smaller scale improvements will be carried out, mainly focussing on road safety and including 20 mph zones outside schools, other traffic calming measures, safe routes to school, and school travel plans".\textsuperscript{217}

134. Others were less sanguine. While a few local authorities had done an excellent job, others had achieved little. They had spent too little. The SSI pointed out that in the UK we spend 10p per head on traffic calming; in the Netherlands the sum is £1.60p.\textsuperscript{218} Hull City Council's memorandum enables us to compare its achievements with the national record:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Hull & & & Great Britain & \\
\hline
All casualties & 1546 & 1225 & -21\% & 30620 & 320283 & +5\% \\
Child casualties & 292 & 218 & -25\% & 45151 & 39715 & -12\% \\
All pedestrians & 388 & 246 & -37\% & 48653 & 40665 & -16\% \\
Child pedestrians & 174 & 107 & -39\% & 19263 & 16184 & -16\% \\
Adult pedestrians & 212 & 139 & -34\% & 28091 & 24481 & -13\% \\
All cycle casualties & 296 & 233 & -21\% & 24813 & 20612 & -17\% \\
Child cycle casualties & 68 & 58 & -15\% & 8075 & 6260 & -22\% \\
Adult cycle casualties & 228 & 175 & -23\% & 16074 & 13630 & -15\% \\
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\end{tabular}
\end{center}

135. Several reasons were put forward to explain the poor performance, including:

- funding, both capital and revenue, was inadequate;

\textsuperscript{216} RTS49
\textsuperscript{217} RTS 49.
\textsuperscript{218} Killing Speed, Slower Speeds Initiative (2001).
- traffic calming was often impossible to justify on cost-benefit grounds;
- many local authorities did not make road safety a priority; and
- DTLR did not provide adequate incentives to take the right actions.

136. There is no doubt that local authorities have too few skilled staff to design and oversee the implementation of traffic calming and road safety schemes. This is because spending on staff in highway departments is not a priority for expenditure. The capital funding for these schemes comes from £8.4 bn provided for local authorities to implement their Local Transport Plans over the next 5 years. This is a large increase on previous years, but it must cover a wide range of other items, including road maintenance.\textsuperscript{219} Despite the increased expenditure, the Local Government Association argued that because effective physical measures were expensive, local authorities could not afford them. There is an element of truth in this: the money is inadequate for the £3bn of necessary traffic calming measures proposed by TRL in 1997. Nevertheless, the money already available could fund many more schemes than in the past.

137. Another concern raised by a few local authorities was the difficulty in showing that road safety schemes were cost-effective.\textsuperscript{220} Bath and North East Somerset Council was concerned about sites where there were problems caused by speeding traffic, but because of the low accident rate it was "difficult to justify expenditure on these schemes on the basis of traditional rate of return criteria".\textsuperscript{221} There is a problem that conventional assessment has put immense value on saving drivers' time. Nevertheless, the evidence is that using a more accurate and appropriate cost benefit analysis local road safety schemes are very cost-effective. TRL Report No. 512 shows that they generate first year average returns of 500%. Moreover, the DTLR has improved the assessment method. We were informed that "...there is no requirement for local authorities to treat only those sites with a proven accident record Local authorities must instead examine where accidents and casualties occur and plan cost effective remedies as one element of its overall strategy...".\textsuperscript{222}

138. However, since some local authorities have been able to install an impressive array of measures, it is hard to believe that either shortage of funding or narrow methods of assessment projects can fully explain poor performance. A number of witnesses blamed local authorities because they placed insufficient emphasis on road safety and spent too little on it; many still gave priority to road building rather than saving lives. The SSI argued that:

"Only a fraction of the £1.5 billion allocated in this year’s local transport settlement will be spent on safety schemes and even less on schemes to control traffic speeds... the single most important change local authorities could make would be to stop rationing local safety schemes..."\textsuperscript{223}

The CPRE told us about the situation in Dorset:

\textsuperscript{219} RTS 49; the IHT has concerns that the move to the Single Capital Pot will make matters worse (RTS 38); the Government is also encouraging an expansion of 20mph zones (£3.5m) house zones (£30m fund) funding five demonstration projects to improve safety on mixed priority urban routes (£5.5m).
\textsuperscript{220} RTS 17.
\textsuperscript{221} RTS 32.
\textsuperscript{222} RTS 49.
\textsuperscript{223} RTS 34.
"An average of 25 children a year were killed or seriously injured from 1994-98 in the county and the actual numbers have been rising, to 30 in 1999 and 37 in 2000. The county has allocated £8,500 to each of 12 schools to improve safety in their vicinity. At that rate it would be 2028 before each of the 338 schools in the county were to benefit from road safety funding. In contrast the County Council is able to allocate £728,000 to further the case for the Weymouth relief road scheme".  

139. The DTLR’s task is to ensure road safety is given adequate priority by local authorities. The DTLR does monitor Local Transport Plans: the Department’s memorandum stated:

“The road safety element of the LTPs will be assessed and monitored on an annual basis...DTLR has also commissioned research to monitor annual progress with LTPs and to ensure that safety objectives, scheme performance and value for money are achieved and maintained".  

However, it could do more: witnesses argued that it should provide additional guidance about tackling speed in Local Transport Plans and use financial incentives to improve performance. For instance, Mr Silcock argued that funding should be linked to having speed management strategies in place, which should include a review of speed limits.

140. A few local authorities have taken very effective measures which have saved lives and led to major improvements in the quality of life. Others, however, have done much less. All should aim to reach the standards which the best have now achieved. Local authorities do face funding difficulties: there are too few revenue funds (which means that are too few skilled staff) and too many obstacles to getting cost-effective schemes approved. Although it is insufficient for the programme outlined by the TRL in 1997, there is more capital available than before. The principal problem is that too few councils have made road safety and speed reduction a priority.

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224 RTS 31.
225 RTS 49.
226 RTS 12.
The police

141. In 1998, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabularies (HMIC) Report on Road Policing and Traffic stated:

“It was disappointing that many forces have not seen road policing as a priority”.

The Association of Chief Police Officers’ memorandum agreed that HMIC’s concern over the lack of priority in the late 90s had been justified but it was no longer:

“Road policing in general and casualty reduction in particular is now seen by the service as core policing. The consistency issue has been addressed and exciting nationally coordinated major projects are now in hand ... The main project is the National Camera Safety Scheme”.

ACPO added that a new set of speed enforcement guidelines had been published in 2000. They included a nationally agreed minimum trigger level for enforcement action. The organisation reviewed the National Road Policing Strategy (first established 1996).

142. Although The Association of Chief Police Officers has shown a very impressive commitment to tackling speeding and submitted a forceful and detailed memorandum, it is by no means clear that all police authorities have followed its lead. As we have seen, some authorities have significantly reduced the numbers of road traffic police. Not all police authorities have casualty reduction targets in policing plans. The Metropolitan Police was singled out for criticism by several witnesses even before its decision to remove half its traffic police from their duties. Sustrans drew attention to:

“the ongoing lack of interest by the Metropolitan Police. There may be a disturbing link here with the continuous poor road safety record in London, notably for pedestrians.”

143. The evidence which we received indicated that it would be impossible to get every police authority to pay sufficient attention to traffic policing unless the Home Office indicated that it was a particular priority. We discuss how this should be done below.

144. The Association of Chief Police Officers has shown an impressive commitment to tackling road traffic speed. Unfortunately, not all police authorities have given it the same priority. The Home Office must make it very clear to all of them that road traffic policing is a priority. The Metropolitan Police was singled out for criticism for its disregard of this important aspect of policing. We recommend that the Greater London Authority review the Metropolitan Police’s approach to traffic policing as a priority.

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227 RTS 137.
228 ACPO has had a National Road Policing Strategy since 1996. Its strategic aim is to contribute to the reduction of death and injury, damage and fear on our roads. Speeding is highlighted as one of the three operational priorities.
229 RTS 15. p. 48.
230 RTS 18.
The Government

145. The Road Safety Strategy which the Government published in March 2000 at the same time as the DETR’s speed review was, despite some short-comings, an impressive policy document. The Government and its agencies were to do the following to bring about safer speeds: The DETR would:

- publicise widely the risks of speed and the reasons for limits;
- develop a framework for determining appropriate vehicle speeds on all roads, and ensuring that measures are available to achieve them;
- research a number of speed management problems;
- implement An Action Plan for reducing speeding; 231
- establish a pedestrian protection directive.

The Health and Safety Commission would consider examining work-related road safety

The Highways Agency would play its part by looking at traffic calming in villages

The Home Office would provide for higher penalties for offenders

The key measures would be taken by local and police authorities. The Government would assist them by:

- enabling them to make enforcement more effective through the National Safety Camera Scheme;
- providing more funding through Local Transport Plans;
- permitting local authorities to take into account environmental, economic and social effects of policies when assessing their ability to reduce casualties.

Targets were set for a 40% reduction in the number of people and a 50% reduction in the number of children killed or seriously injured; and a 10% reduction in the slight casualty rate.

Finally, and very importantly, the Government would give political leadership. The symbol of this leadership was the Prime Minister’s launch of the strategy at No. 10 Downing Street surrounded by children.

231 The DETR’s “New Directions in Speed Management - A Review of Policy”, March 2000, (p.31) stated that a speed Action Plan would be initiated. The Plan proposed that “the Government:
- develops a national framework for determining appropriate vehicle speeds on all roads, and ensuring that measures are available to achieve them;
- publicises widely the risks of speed and the reasons for the limits;
- researches a number of speed management problems to develop and test new policies; and
- ensures that policies take account of environmental, economic and social effects when assessing their ability to reduce casualties.”
146. With a few exceptions the Road Safety Strategy was praised. Unfortunately, in the two years since it was issued, progress has been limited, and the strategy is in danger of collapsing. Almost every Department's performance has been disappointing.

**Developments since March 2000**

**DTLR**

147. The DTLR has not;

- developed either a framework for determining appropriate speeds; nor the promised urban and rural road hierarchies (see section above);
- established a publicity campaign which has made a significant impact (see section above);
- established an Action Plan to tackle speeding.\(^{232}\)

While the Department maintains its impressive record of commissioning research\(^{233}\), there are fears that it will fail to carry forward the results of the research into policy.

**Pedestrian Protection Directive**

148. *Tomorrow's Roads* states:

"The UK is backing proposals for the European Commission to bring forward a Directive in early 2000 to make car fronts safer. This would be a challenging initiative which could ultimately reduce fatalities and serious injuries by up to 20%."\(^{234}\)

149. Subsequently, however, the UK Government subsequently changed its policy and accepted a voluntary agreement rather than a directive. Motor manufacturers argued that this would produce improvements more quickly.\(^{235}\) However, the decision was criticised by a number of expert organisations. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents informed us:

"It is extremely unfortunate that the European Commission has recently decided to accept a negotiated agreement proposed by the motor industry which is much less stringent than a mandatory Euro directive would be."\(^{236}\)

**TRL** stated that the voluntary agreement would only produce a fraction of the savings of the Directive.\(^{237}\) **The Government should not have accepted the European**

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\(^{232}\) ACPO supported the Government's speed policy review recommendations but was concerned that the Action Plan proposed before the election had not yet materialised (RTS 137).

\(^{233}\) The SSF noted that "the DTLR has a valuable research programme that underpins much of the best recent policy development (RTS 34).

\(^{234}\) *Tomorrow's Roads*, p. 59.

\(^{235}\) RTS 140.

\(^{236}\) RTS 16

\(^{237}\) RTS 27.
Commission’s decisions to introduce a voluntary scheme rather than a Pedestrian Directive. The voluntary scheme must now be carefully monitored. If it has not been successful by 2005, the Government should press the European Commission to introduce a Directive.

The Highways Agency

150. The Highways Agency published its Strategic Plan for Safety, Making the Network Safer, in February 2000. The Plan contains proposals not just for to make its roads safer for car occupants but also for walkers, cyclists, riders and others. This included the continued introduction of traffic calming schemes in villages. These proposals marked a significant change in the attitude of the Agency; it has had a reputation, in the words of one witness, of always seeming “much more interested in capacity and flow than safety”. The Agency prepared an Interim Guidance Note on Traffic Calming in early 2000. Further research is being carried out so that the interim advice can be incorporated in the Design Manual for Roads and Bridges. Calming schemes are installed where there have been accidents and where it is seen as the appropriate measure. Only eight schemes were completed in 2000-01.

151. The Agency memorandum notes that the Rural Road Hierarchy for Speed Management Review envisages 30 mph as the normal limit for trunk roads in villages; however, the priority attached to schemes depends on the number of accidents. Where limits are imposed it is usually in conjunction with traffic calming. We were informed that “a considerable number of villages on the trunk road network now have lower speed limits typically 30 or 40 mph imposed through the limits of the village”. The information is not available about the number of villages with 30 mph limits on the trunk road network.

152. Many who live in villages on the Highways Agency’s road network endure intolerable conditions. The Agency has made some progress in introducing traffic calming and 30 mph limits, but it has been very slight and very slow. Too few traffic calming schemes have been installed. Insufficient account is given to the severance of communities and the quality of life in assessing the introduction of both schemes and 30 mph limits. The Agency should now establish a programme for installing 30mph limits and attendant speed reduction measures in all villages along its network.

Health and Safety Commission and Health and Safety Executive

153. The Road Safety Strategy stated that the Commission and Health and Safety Executive ‘wanted to do more’ to prevent work-related road incidents. The Commission agreed with Ministers to set up ‘an interagency task group’ to make recommendations and to promote a public debate on best practice. As soon as possible the group was to publish a Discussion Document.

154. This proposal was widely supported for a number of reasons. RoSPA stated:

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238. RTS 17.
239. As part of the LMNS programme; see RTS 155.
240. RTS 155.
“Research by the Transport Research Laboratory suggests that company car drivers have a 30 to 40 per cent greater involvement in road accidents than those driving for domestic purposes. The victims of ‘at work vehicle accidents’ include not only company drivers and passengers but other road users including cyclists and elderly and child pedestrians. These facts are highly relevant to all organisations in the light of the legal and moral duty of care to manage the risks faced and created by their employees who drive on the road as part of their work”.

155. Secondly, there is no good reason why Health and Safety procedures are not applied to those who are driving as part of their work. It means that there are different approaches to road safety than to safety at work, as the following table indicates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety Policy</th>
<th>At work</th>
<th>On roads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Vulnerable people taken</td>
<td>Vulnerable people expected to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>care of or excluded</td>
<td>take care, (excluded on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>motorways)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Seminars with updates —</td>
<td>TV ads which you might</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>usually compulsory</td>
<td>happen to see</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>High standards</td>
<td>Driving test — basic minimum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regular updates</td>
<td>No updates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design/engineering</td>
<td>To protect people from</td>
<td>Mostly to sell cars, safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>their errors</td>
<td>secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Safety over convenience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>Strict</td>
<td>By luck</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

156. The interagency group has met and reported. It recommended that much needed to be done in this area. Subsequently the report has been considered by the Health and Safety Executive. It is believed that the Executive decided that taking on work-related road safety policy would result in an excessive increase in work. **Crashes which occur while drivers are working are very common, and deaths caused in this way are probably the largest single cause of work-related fatalities.** The HSC would be negligent if it failed to extend its activities to this most important safety issue. The fact that it would cost money is not an excuse for ignoring it. If it does not do so, the Government must demand that it reconsiders the matter. It must provide the money to ensure that the HSE can employ the necessary staff. Clearer guidance to employers on managing road risk is urgently needed. We recommend that the Transport Committee investigates this in more detail.

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241 RTS 16; the research referred to is TRL Report 317: P Lynn and C Lockwood - Accident liability of company car drivers.

242 Submitted by West Yorkshire 2000.
The Department of Health and health authorities

157. Road deaths are one of the most important public health issues, as those health organisations, which submitted evidence to this inquiry stressed.\textsuperscript{243} Other diseases kill more people, but few kill more young people in the prime of life, and therefore make such a contribution to the years of life lost.

158. The Department of Health memorandum echoed these serious concerns about the consequences of speed - both in respect of the number of casualties, their cost and the obstacles created to healthier life-styles.\textsuperscript{244} However, the memorandum also makes clear that the Department's role in influencing speed policy is as yet fairly minor. It supports others work in reducing speed and injuries through:

- developing 'green transport' plans in the NHS;
- the Healthy Schools programme (asking parents to consider letting their children walk or cycle to school); it is a member of the School Travel Advisory Group; and it funds BRAKE to help it mount road safety campaigns.

Its major role is in the Accidental Injury Task Force, where it brings together Government departments and others to prevent accidental injuries, including road traffic injury. The report "is still being finalised; it will recommend more co-ordinated efforts to reduce accidents.\textsuperscript{245}

159. Co-ordination between health authorities and other organisations is improving if in a piece-meal way. In a few areas health authorities are part of the safety camera partnerships with local authorities, police authorities and magistrates. Health organisations are consulted about Local Transport Plans.

160. However, while many doctors, especially those who specialise in public health, are concerned about these matters, road safety and traffic speed have not yet become a priority for the NHS. The Government's White Paper, Our Healthier Nation, does indicate the seriousness of road safety: it sets targets for reducing accidents (including a separate target for reducing accidental deaths among 16-24 year olds), which will not be achieved without a large reduction in the number of young people killed in road accidents. However, there is no reference to road safety or to speed in the NHS Plan.

\textsuperscript{243} Eg see the memos from the Faculty of Public Medicine (RTS 4), the HMA (RTS150) and Wakefield Health Authority (RTS 20).

\textsuperscript{244} RTS 151.

\textsuperscript{245} In the summer of 2000, the Task Force was set up to advise on the prevention of accidental injuries, promised in the White Paper, Saving Lives: "Our Healthier Nation". It is chaired by the Department of Health and involves other Government Departments as observers. Its terms of reference are:
Taking account of Saving Lives and other initiatives in hand to reduce the burden of accidental injury, advise the Chief Medical Officer on:
- the most important priorities for immediate action in order to meet the target
- the development of an implementation plan, consulting with other stakeholders whether the necessary delivery structures are in place to take forward the implementation plan
- how progress on the implementation plan should be monitored how to develop and publicise a more unified approach to accident prevention across Government and the National Health Service.
A report with recommendations should be submitted to CMO within one year of its first meeting.
161. If any other activity were to cause as many deaths and injuries as car crashes, it would be treated with much more concern and much more vigorous action would be taken. The Department of Health and health authorities should:

- take road safety and speeding more seriously as a public health issue, and encourage public health officers to do so as well;
- take a lead in major Government publicity campaigns to promote responsible attitudes to speeding; and promote such attitudes in GP surgeries and hospitals;

In addition,

- partnerships should be established locally between local authorities, police authorities, magistrates and primary care trusts and other health organisations;
- a national road accident database of the type already working in Cambridge;
- in preparing Local Transport Plans, local authorities should consult public health departments and primary care trusts, seeking their opinions on the plans at an early stage of preparation; they should also ensure that health improvement programmes are linked with Local Transport Plans;
- the Department of Health should be represented on the National Safety Camera Project Board.

The Government Offices in the Regions

162. The DTLR is one of several Departments represented in the Government Offices in the Regions. There must be better co-ordination between Government Offices and local authorities, regional planning bodies, and health professionals; and between the Government Offices in the Regions and the DTLR’s Local Transport Plan Division and Road Safety Division.

163. There also needs to be very significant improvements in the co-ordination between speed management strategies and the Regional Economic Strategies of the RDAs and Regional Planning Guidance.

The Home Office

164. The strongest criticism was reserved for the Home Office. Nottingham City Council had concerns about its role. The Association of Chief Police Officers was critical of the “mixed messages emanating from Government, particularly the position of the Home Office”.

165. The specific criticisms made by witnesses were that the Home Secretary had

- played a key role in imposing the new rules about safety cameras;
- failed to implement the proposals in the 2000 Consultation Paper on Road Traffic Penalties;
- pressed for an 80 mph speed limit on motorways; and
- failed to make traffic policing a priority, and was reducing its relative importance.

166. Witnesses were concerned that the present Home Secretary, in line with many of his predecessors, did not consider road policing to be very important. In addition, new proposals from the Home Office have caused some concern. A National Policing Plan has been proposed by the Home Office in the White Paper on Police Reform, Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform. ACPO is disappointed that it makes no mention of road policing, and has recommended that the Plan include a clear statement of the importance placed by the Government on road policing and casualty reduction.

167. The Home Office is also to reducing the number of police’s performance indicators, and has considered the abolition of the only best value indicator which relates to road policing, No.132 - the number of road collisions involving death or injury per 1,000 of the population.

168. In response to these criticisms Bob Ainsworth MP, the Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Home Office the Minister told us that road policing was one of the overarching objectives of the police force. He was surprised at Commander Brunstrom’s comments, and believed that there were no grounds for thinking that the Home Office was not interested in this area of policing. He thought that the fact that road policing was not mentioned in the National Policing Plan was not relevant because the Plan was about police reform.

169. We recommend that the Home Office emphasise that road traffic policing is a priority and that the National Policing Plan contain a commitment to that effect. The best value indicator relating to traffic policing should be retained.

What the Government should do now

170. The research commissioned by the Government and the pilot projects which it has funded have shown very clearly what ought to be done. Unfortunately, too few local authorities have adopted comprehensive speed reduction measures. Local authorities rightly cherish their independence, but this should not extend to neglecting road safety: saving lives should not be a matter for discretion. The Government has to change this situation and take a lead.

171. The Government should establish a National Speed Management Strategy which should:

- highlight the effect of decreases in speed on reducing casualties;
- set targets for reductions in speeds by local authority;

248 The ACPO has long asked Home Secretaries to regard road policing as “core policework of the highest importance”
249 ACPO states: “A worrying recent development has been a proposal to remove from the police service the only road policing related performance indicator.” It notes that “What gets measured is what gets done.”
250 QQ479-80.
- publish examples of success and good practice, and take measures to get them adopted;
- establish a programme to change attitudes, including misinformation from the press; seek a more responsible attitude to speeding from the media, advertisers and motor manufacturers; and provide a much larger publicity budget to encourage safer driving;
- involve Government, highway authorities, police, and motoring organisations in developing the strategy, and

172. This strategy will not be sufficient on its own. **Road safety should be given a higher priority in the Ten Year Plan.** The Transport Research Laboratory concluded that £3bn would be adequate to make urban roads safer by major changes to their design. This sum will no longer be sufficient. The Department of Transport should now estimate the total amount which needs to be spent on safety measures. This should be specifically identified in the Ten Year Plan. The DTlR should provide funds for further demonstration projects, including Safety City Projects in each region of the country, and similar projects in rural areas.\(^{251}\)

173. **The Government should insist that all local authorities introduce Speed Management Plans which give priority to pedestrians in urban and rural areas.** If local authorities do not introduce schemes to deal with speed, best practices should apply.

174. **Road Traffic Speed is not just a matter for the DTlR, but for the whole Government. There has to be a consistent approach from the whole of Government, including DTlR, the Home Office, the DfES, the DTI and the Department of Health. Road safety must be a central part of the many strategies which these Departments are drawing up.**

175. **Finally, and most importantly, the Government needs to give political leadership.** This could have a major effect on whether local authorities take action or not. It means that when the media attacks measures to reduce speed and promote road safety, Ministers are present to defend their policies and those of local authorities. When lives are at stake the Government should attempt to lead public opinion. This has not happened to date. Professor Allsop informed us that

> “Another judgement that the Government will have to make in their determination to influence speeds is how and how fast it is effective to try to move ahead of current opinions and behaviour on the part of drivers who will continue to determine what will be the prevailing speeds in the future ... but the Government often has the job of moving ahead of relevant opinion”.\(^{252}\)

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\(^{251}\) The DTlR already provides: to encourage an expansion of 20mph zones (£3.5m) home zones (£10m fund) and to fund five demonstration projects to improve safety on mixed priority urban routes (5.5m).

\(^{252}\) RTS 36.
Conclusions and recommendations

176. Deaths and serious injuries on our roads bring misery to hundreds of thousands, including the relatives and friends of the dead and injured. Although the huge number of serious injuries on the roads is still declining, the number of deaths, including pedestrian deaths, has been at the same high level for several years. We have one of the worst child pedestrian safety records in Europe, and children from poor families are far more likely to be killed. Speeding is endemic. Excessive and inappropriate speed is the largest single contributor to deaths and serious injuries on our roads and significantly reduces the quality of life in many urban and rural areas. The failure to tackle the consequences of speed affects Government policies on the welfare of children, social inclusion, urban regeneration, health and integrated transport.

177. We know what to do to reduce the casualties. The Government has commissioned research and funded the pilot projects which show what should be done. It also monitors best practice from the Netherlands and other European countries, particularly in how to reduce pedestrian casualties. In those places in England where many of the right measures have been taken, such as York, Gloucester, Hull, Northamptonshire and Nottingham, there have been significant reductions in casualties and improvements in the quality of life. In 1997, TRL estimated that the cost of a comprehensive series of measures in urban areas would be £3bn. The sum would be considerably higher today, and measures need to be implemented in rural areas too. Nevertheless, the cost of making very important changes is relatively small: the Gloucester Safer City was a £5m project which transformed a whole city. Unfortunately too few local and police authorities have put the money and effort into implementing the measures which are known to work.

178. A major reason why too little has been done is that road casualties are a forgotten story which receives far too little national attention. If any disease killed as many people as die on the roads, there would be an outcry. There would be national campaigns to insist that the Government do something about it. In its reporting of speed, however, the media too often does the reverse, implying that drivers are the best judge of the right speed, and that attempts to get them to observe speed limits in built-up areas are an unacceptable infringement on their liberty. Press reporting too often focuses on the inconvenience to drivers, ignoring the potentially fatal consequences of their attitudes.

179. A second reason is the slow progress of Government policy. In March 2000, the Prime Minister launched the Government’s Road Safety Strategy *T tomorrows roads - safer* for everyone, but unfortunately since then little has happened: projects have not been undertaken; some proposals have not been implemented; others have been dropped. New rules about the location and visibility of safety cameras have been promulgated which are in danger of reducing their effectiveness. Reluctant local authorities are unlikely to implement effective measures for which they may be criticised if Government Ministers are unwilling to put the case for them.

180. The Government’s principal task now is ensure that all local and police authorities give reducing road traffic speed the same priority as the best. It must insist that they do so because saving lives is not a matter of discretion. It will also need to provide the funds to enable it to be done. Specifically, the Government should:

- improve the National Safety Camera Scheme by allowing local and police authorities to decide where to site cameras; and ensure that the whole country is covered by 2004
- issue the promised revised Guidance to local authorities about speed limits; this should include a number of changes, in particular, that 30 mph should be the speed in villages,
- re-engineer the roads to ensure that speed limits are obeyed and to make roads safer and more pleasant for pedestrians
- ensure that the funding of Local Transport Plans is dependent on measures to reduce speeds; and
- make road safety a priority for the Ten Year Plan and provide specific funds for a national programme to re-engineer and re-design our roads.

181. The Government also has to give leadership. It needs to make it very clear that speeding is unacceptable. Drivers should not exceed 30 mph in a residential area where a child might dash onto the road. The Prime Minister has recently rightly stressed the importance of basing decisions on scientific analysis. He now has to decide whether Government policy on speed will be dominated by concerns about how it is portrayed by a section of the motoring lobby and in parts of the press. The alternative is to base it on the detailed research of experts, including TRL, the AA, and the Royal College of Physicians. The evidence which we received is that such a policy would be popular with the public for whom speed is a very serious concern. Drivers are also residents and pedestrians. With the right policies we could reduce deaths on the road to under one thousand a year.
LIST OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) Illegal and inappropriate speed is a major contributory factor in crashes and casualties in both urban and rural areas (paragraph 14).

(b) Speed may kill more and seriously injure many more people than has commonly been thought. The health service should play a more active part in the collection of data on injuries, and should be funded to do this (paragraph 15).

(c) The full cost to the nation of road traffic accidents is very large; a DTcLR study has estimated it to be £17 bn in a single year. If drivers travelled at lower and more appropriate speeds, the savings to society would be immense, as the savings to individuals would be. If the measures recommended in this Report were to achieve a reduction of road traffic accidents by a third, the savings to society could be as great as £100 million per week (paragraph 16).

(d) Most deaths of car occupants take place on rural roads, but most crashes and pedestrian deaths in urban areas. Compared with several other European countries our child pedestrian death rate is high. Speed causes major health inequalities, especially in urban areas; child pedestrians who live in deprived areas are particularly at risk from road traffic (paragraph 21).

(e) There are serious indirect health effects of inappropriate traffic speed. Fast-moving traffic plays a part in discouraging physical activity by inhibiting walking and cycling in urban and rural areas. We recommend an increase in the number of dedicated cycle routes. Moreover, vehicles travelling at speed are noisy, sever communities and undermines urban regeneration (paragraph 30).

(f) Pedestrian railings, barriers and staggered crossings are designed to maintain traffic flows and restrict pedestrian movement. They do not deal with the root of the problem which is that traffic is sometimes moving too quickly. The Government has failed to change this situation; it must advocate a policy which does not create urban areas where cars can speed and pedestrians are corralled behind barriers, but rather places where pedestrians can walk safely because traffic speeds have been reduced. The proposed guidance from Government on designing “pedestrian-friendly environments” should reflect this policy (paragraph 31).

(g) The groups most likely to speed excessively are those driving in a work related capacity, members of high income households and your males. Motorcyclists are also a serious problem, and HGV drivers commonly exceed the 40 mph limit on single carriageway main roads (paragraph 35).

(h) The combination of bad road design, driver ignorance and a belief that speeding is acceptable must be tackled if speeds are to be reduced to safe levels (paragraph 44).
(i) Guidelines should allow local decisions to be taken to site cameras in locations where such a risk has been identified (paragraph 59).

(j) In the pilot project areas the Safety Camera Scheme has been very successful, bringing about a big reduction in crashes and casualties. If police force areas have not joined the Safety Camera Scheme by the end of 2004, the Government should consider making it mandatory (paragraph 60).

(k) The new rules about the visibility and location of cameras are unreasonable. Crashes do not just occur at accident blackspots. There was no scientific research to support this decision. People will die as a result. Police and local authorities should decide where to locate cameras and whether they should be visible. Their decisions be should informed by pilot projects to [1] test whether safety cameras should be overt or covert and [2] identify a series of locations other than severe accident blackspots where the speed of traffic needs to be reduced. The Department of Health should be on the Project Board for the Safety Camera Scheme to ensure that public health issues are fully taken into account in the decisions it makes (paragraph 60).

(l) Safety cameras are of little use in catching or deterring drivers travelling at inappropriate speeds or unlicensed drivers. Moreover, cameras paid for under the scheme can only be used at severe accident blackspots. The Police must ensure that there are adequate numbers of traffic police to deter:

- inappropriate speed;
- unlicensed drivers; and
- drivers who speed at places away from the accident blackspots where cameras will be located.

There should be no further reduction in the numbers of traffic police (paragraph 63).

(m) Existing penalties for speeding are inadequate. The Home Office’s dilatoriness in implementing the proposals in its Consultation Paper on road traffic penalties issued 18 months ago is unacceptable. We recommend that the proposals in the Consultation Paper be implemented without delay. There should be legislation in the next session of Parliament (paragraph 67).

(n) We recommend that the Home Office and Lord Chancellor’s Department issue clearer guidance about the use of magistrates’ discretion in “exercising special reasons not to disqualify” (paragraph 68).

(o) The Government should publish as a priority revised Guidance to local authorities on setting local speed limits and principles for speed management. The Guidance should also offer information on the range of interventions available to local authorities to act as preventative measures in advance of crashes and injuries occurring. Local authorities should subsequently be guided by a national framework for determining appropriate vehicle speeds.
on roads and by a new hierarchy of roads defined by their function and quality in urban and rural areas (paragraph 73).

(p) We recommend that the following guidance on speed limits be issued to local authorities (paragraph 75).

**Proposed guidance to local authorities re speed limits for cars**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limit</th>
<th>Type of Road</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 mph</td>
<td>Many residential areas, some mixed routes, vicinity of schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 mph</td>
<td>Main roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 mph</td>
<td>Major outer urban roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 mph</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 mph</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 mph</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Some current 'C' roads should become 'B' roads

(q) Repeat signs should be permitted in 30 mph zones where the speed limit is not apparent from the design of the road or cannot be enforced by traffic calming. The 'derestricted' sign should be replaced by a sign indicating what the speed limit is (paragraph 79).

(r) The Government should encourage local authorities to make more use of 20 mph zones, enforced by suitable engineering measures. The measures should be area wide to avoid displacement. They should concentrate on accident prevention and improving the quality of life, and should not be only introduced as an ad hoc response to serious crashes (paragraph 81).

(s) We recommend that the Government publish the results of the home zone pilot projects as soon as possible. If successful, the Government should fund them and support their widespread introduction (paragraph 82).

(t) Following the success of the Gloucester 'Safer City Project', the Government should ensure that similar projects are introduced into towns and cities throughout the country (paragraph 83).

(ii) Many of the most dangerous urban roads have to be used by both pedestrians and motor vehicles. Guidance to local authorities should recommend that particular care is taken to ensure that these routes are suitably engineered to
enforce the speed limit. The Government must now establish the ‘Urban Road Hierarchy’ which it promised in its Road Safety Strategy in March 2000 (paragraph 84).

(v) We recommend that guidance to local authorities indicate that a 20 mph limit should be the norm in the vicinity of schools in urban and rural areas during the day on week days, though they should have ability to vary the limits at other times (paragraph 85).

(w) Guidance to local authorities on speed limits should recommend that there be a 30 mph limit in villages. Appropriate measures should be taken by the local authority in consultation with the villagers to ensure the limit is obeyed. They should also decide which settlements are villages (paragraph 89).

(x) We recommend that guidance to local authorities indicate that 40 mph be the speed limit on C and Unclassified roads. Research should be undertaken into the best ways of enforcing such a limit. Some of the better quality wider C and Unclassified (where a higher speed is appropriate) might be reclassified as B roads. If a 40 mph limit were introduced on minor roads it may be possible to increase the limit for HGVs on A and B roads from the present 40 mph (paragraph 90).

(y) Guidance to local authorities should include advice about which types of single carriageway main roads should have a 60 mph limit and which the lower 50 mph limit. The sign which currently indicates the national speed limit should be scrapped; road signs should indicate what the actual speed limit is (paragraph 91).

(z) The Government should now make every effort to introduce the Rural Road Hierarchy it promised over two years ago. There are fewer examples of good practice in rural than in urban areas: there should be pilot projects in rural areas comparable to the Gloucester Safer City project (paragraph 92).

(aa) The Government should make it easier for local authorities to make changes to the speed limit on roads. It should introduce a simplified procedure for making speed limit orders (paragraph 95).

(bb) The Government should ensure that guidelines should not be in a form that discourages local authorities from taking appropriate decisions to reflect local circumstances (paragraph 96).

(cc) In 1997 the TRL estimated that a comprehensive package of traffic calming measures in urban areas would cost £3bn. We recommend that this estimate be updated and that an estimate be made of the cost of measures to reduce casualties in rural areas be undertaken with a view to providing the funds in the Ten Year Plan. We note that the sum is likely to be less than the funds proposed for safety improvements on the railways, but spending it would save many, many more lives than are lost on the railways every year. Safety should be a priority for all modes of transport (paragraph 97).
(dd) We recommend that type approval for speedometers be amended so as to provide for designs which make drivers more aware of the 30 mph speed limit. We also urge the industry to develop further use of digital speedometers to ensure that more accurate information is given to drivers (paragraph 99).

(ee) In the long run Intelligent Speed Adaptation offers the opportunity to put an end to illegal and inappropriate speed. The Government should strongly support this technology by:

- continuing to fund research, including the projected trials from 2002 to 2006;
- encouraging voluntary adoption by fleet managers and providing tax incentives to those who do;
- establishing a Europe-wide requirement that all new vehicles sold from 2013 should have an ISA capability; and
- fund the development of a digital road map to ensure that the information needed to make ISA successful is easily available (paragraph 103).

(ff) Better publicity and education must play a part in reducing speeds together with more effective enforcement and engineering. We recommend that the Government:

- establish a comprehensive, all-the-year-round publicity campaign, using the television and other media, and co-ordinated with the National Safety Camera Scheme;
- establish campaigns targeted at specific groups;
- ensure that local partnerships support enforcement and traffic calming measures with education campaigns
- ensure that schemes like the ‘speed diversionary workshops’ in Northamptonshire be copied through out the country if they prove to be successful;
- make speed-related hazards a part of the hazard perception tests to be introduced in the driving test (paragraph 112).

(gg) The effect of widely applying well-researched and understood measures to improve enforcement, engineering and education would produce very impressive result both in reducing lives and transforming the quality of life of millions of people. Even spreading best practice to all parts of country would have an enormous effect. Many of the very high total of deaths and serious injuries to which inappropriate speed contributes could be avoided. Total deaths could be reduced to under 1,000 per year. The Government’s target of reducing the number of people killed and seriously injured by 40% could easily be exceeded. However, progress to date is slow, and the Government’s new rules about the location of safety cameras threaten to undermine this target (paragraph 115).

(hh) The failure to take road safety in general and speed in particular seriously has important effects. We would have expected campaigns to be mounted to reduce so tragic and avoidable form of death and serious injury. There are
many opportunities for all parts of the media to do this; unfortunately, some elements in the press do the reverse: they rail against the very measures designed to reduce speed and save lives. The evidence to this inquiry shows that there are serious concerns about the link between motor industry advertising and journalism. We are also concerned that the BBC has done so little to promote road safety in pursuance of its general public service obligation (paragraph 130).

(ii) However, during this inquiry we have had no opportunity to put the criticisms we have received to representatives of the media or the motor industry. These issues need to be considered in more detail. We hope that the new Transport Committee will investigate them (paragraph 131).

(jj) A few local authorities have taken very effective measures which have saved lives and led to major improvements in the quality of life. Others, however, have done much less. All should aim to reach the standards which the best have now achieved. Local authorities do face funding difficulties: there are too few revenue funds (which means that are too few skilled staff) and too many obstacles to getting cost-effective schemes approved. Although it is insufficient for the programme outlined by the TRL in 1997, there is more capital available than before. The principal problem is that too few councils have made road safety and speed reduction a priority (paragraph 140).

(kk) The Association of Chief Police Officers has shown an impressive commitment to tackling road traffic speed. Unfortunately, not all police authorities have given it the same priority. The Home Office must make it very clear to all of them that road traffic policing is a priority. The Metropolitan Police was singled out for criticism for its disregard of this important aspect of policing. We recommend that the Greater London Authority review the Metropolitan Police’s approach to traffic policing as a priority (paragraph 144).

(ll) The Government should not have accepted the European Commission’s decisions to introduce a voluntary scheme rather than a Pedestrian Directive. The voluntary scheme must now be carefully monitored. If it has not been successful by 2005, the Government should press the European Commission to introduce a Directive (paragraph 149).

(mm) Many who live in villages on the Highways Agency’s road network endure intolerable conditions. The Agency has made some progress in introducing traffic calming and 30 mph limits, but it has been very slight and very slow. Too few traffic calming schemes have been installed. Insufficient account is given to the severance of communities and the quality of life in assessing the introduction of both schemes and 30 mph limits. The Agency should now establish a programme for installing 30mph limits and attendant speed reduction measures in all villages along its network (paragraph 152).

(nn) Crashes which occur while drivers are working are very common, and deaths caused in this way are probably the largest single cause of work-related fatalities. The HSC would be negligent if it failed to extend its activities to this most important safety issue. The fact that it would cost money is not an excuse for ignoring it. If it does not do so, the Government must demand that it reconsiders the matter. It must provide the money to ensure that the HSE can
employ the necessary staff. Clearer guidance to employers on managing road risk is urgently needed. We recommend that the Transport Committee investigates this in more detail (paragraph 156).

(o0) If any other activity were to cause as many deaths and injuries as car crashes, it would be treated with much more concern and much more vigorous action would be taken. The Department of Health and health authorities should:

- take road safety and speeding more seriously as a public health issue, and encourage public health officers to do so as well;
- take a lead in major Government publicity campaigns to promote responsible attitudes to speeding; and promote such attitudes in GP surgeries and hospitals;

In addition,

- partnerships should be established locally between local authorities, police authorities, magistrates and primary care trusts and other health organisations;
- a national road accident database of the type already working in Cambridge.
- in preparing Local Transport Plans, local authorities should consult public health departments and primary care trusts, seeking their opinions on the plans at an early stage of preparation; they should also ensure that health improvement programmes are linked with Local Transport Plans.

- the Department of Health should be represented on the National Safety Camera Project Board (paragraph 161).

(pp) There must be better co-ordination between Government Offices and local authorities, regional planning bodies, and health professionals; and between the Government Offices in the Regions and the DTLR's Local Transport Plan Division and Road Safety Division (paragraph 162).

(qq) There also needs to be very significant improvements in the co-ordination between speed management strategies and the Regional Economic Strategies of the RDAs and Regional Planning Guidance (paragraph 163).

(rr) We recommend that the Home Office emphasise that road traffic policing is a priority and that the National Policing Plan contain a commitment to that effect. The best value indicator relating to traffic policing should be retained (paragraph 169).

(ss) Local authorities rightly cherish their independence, but this should not extend to neglecting road safety: saving lives should not be a matter for discretion (paragraph 170).
The Government should establish a National Speed Management Strategy which should:

- highlight the effect of decreases in speed on reducing casualties;
- set targets for reductions in speeds by local authority;
- publish examples of success and good practice, and take measures to get them adopted;
- establish a programme to change attitudes, including misinformation from the press; seek a more responsible attitude to speeding from the media, advertisers and motor manufacturers; and provide a much larger publicity budget to encourage safer driving;
- involve Government, highway authorities, police, and motoring organisations in developing the strategy, and

Road safety should be given a higher priority in the Ten Year Plan. The Transport Research Laboratory concluded that £3bn would be adequate to make urban roads safer by major changes to their design. This sum will no longer be sufficient. The Department of Transport should now estimate the total amount which needs to be spent on safety measures. This should be specifically identified in the Ten Year Plan. The DTLR should provide funds for further demonstration projects, including Safety City Projects in each region of the country, and similar projects in rural areas.²⁵³ (Paragraph 172).

The Government should insist that all local authorities introduce Speed Management Plans which give priority to pedestrians in urban and rural areas. If local authorities do not introduce schemes to deal with speed, best practices should apply (paragraph 173).

There has to be a consistent approach from the whole of Government, including DTLR, the Home Office, the DfES, the DTI and the Department of Health. Road safety must be a central part of the many strategies which these Departments are drawing up (paragraph 174).

Finally, and most importantly, the Government needs to give political leadership (paragraph 175).

²⁵³ The DTLR already provides: to encourage an expansion of 20mph zones (£3.5m) home zones (£30m fund) and to fund five demonstration projects to improve safety on mixed priority urban routes (5.5m).
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE RELATING TO THE REPORT

THURSDAY 13 JUNE 2002

Members present:

Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody, in the Chair
Andrew Bennett
Mr Brian H Donohoe
Mrs Louise Ellman
Chris Grayling
Helen Jackson
Miss Anne McIntosh
Mr Bill O'Brien
Dr John Pugh
Mr Bill Wiggins

The Committee deliberated.

Draft Report [Road Traffic Speed] proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.

Paragraphs 1 to 73 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 73 read, as follows:

‘According to a significant number of witnesses there are four main types of road which are wrongly classified or where existing speed limits are unsatisfactory. They are those in some villages, in country lanes, on single carriageway A and B roads, and in urban areas. The key issues raised by witnesses in the inquiry were whether the speed limit:

- on urban residential roads should be 20 or 30 mph
- should be a 20 mph limit outside schools
- in villages should be 30 mph
- in country lanes should be 40 mph
- on single carriageway A and B roads 50 or 60 mph.

There was little pressure from witnesses for a change in motorway limit.

Amendment proposed, in line 10, at the end, to add the words: ‘On motorways there should be a variable speed limit of 80 mph in line with the RAC’s proposals’—(Mr Brian H Donohoe)

Question put, That the Amendment be made.

The Committee divided.
Ayes, 2

Andrew Bennett
Mrs Louise Ellman

Mr Brian H Donohoe
Mr Bill O’Brien

Noes, 2

Whereupon the Chairman declared herself with the Noes

Paragraph agreed to

Paragraphs 75 to 153 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 154 bought up and read

Question put, That the Paragraph stand part of the Report.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 4

Andrew Bennett
Helen Jackson
Miss Anne McIntosh
Dr John Pugh

Noes, 3

Mr Brian Donohoe
Chris Grayling
Mr Bill O’Brien

Paragraph agreed to

Paragraphs 155 to 181 read and agreed to.

Motion made, and Question, That the Report be the Ninth Report of the Committee to the House, put and agreed to.—(The Chairman.)

Ordered, That the Chairman do make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No. 134 (Select committee (reports)) be applied to the Report.

Ordered, That the Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee be reported to the House.

[Adjourned till Wednesday 26 June at twenty minutes to Four o’clock.]
LIST OF WITNESSES

Wednesday 30 January 2002

ASSOCIATION OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS
Chief Constable Richard Brunstrom

AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION
Mr John Dawson and Mr Andrew Howard

RAC FOUNDATION
Mr Kevin Delaney

TRANSPORT RESEARCH LABORATORY
Dr R M Kimber, Ms Marie Taylor and Mr David Lynham

INSTITUTE FOR TRANSPORT STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS
Dr Oliver Carsten

CENTRE FOR TRANSPORT STUDIES, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
Professor Richard Allsop

Wednesday 13 February 2002

GLOUCESTERSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL
Mr David Radford

NOTTINGHAM CITY COUNCIL
Dr Stewart Thompson

NORTHAMPTONSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL
Mr Jon Shortland

INSTITUTION OF HIGHWAYS AND TRANSPORTATION
Mr Carlton Roberts-James

INSTITUTE OF HIGHWAY INCORPORATED ENGINEERS
Mr Stephen Palmer and Mr Tim Askew

SLOWER SPEEDS INITIATIVE
Paige Mitchell, Mr Don Mathew and Dr Adrian Davis
Wednesday 27 February 2002

DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT & THE REGIONS
Rt Hon John Spellar MP and Mr Adrian Waddams

HOME OFFICE
Bob Ainsworth MP and Mr Geoffrey Biddulph

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Yvette Cooper MP and Mr Gordon Brown
LIST OF APPENDICES TO THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

RTS:
1. West Yorkshire Transport 2000
2. Crewe & Nantwich Local Agenda 21 Group
3. Green Speed
4. Faculty of Public Health Medicine
5. Independent Television Commission
6. RAC Foundation for Motoring Ltd
7. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
8. Transport 2000
9. Nottingham City Council
10. The Ramblers' Association
11. The Association of British Drivers
12. Ross Silcock
13. Advertising Standards Authority
14. PACTS
15. City of Bradford
16. ROSPA
17. Leeds City Council
18. Sustrans
20. Wakefield NHS Health Authority
21. Local Government Association
22. British Horse Society - East of England
23. Living Streets
24. Transport for London
25. Gloucestershire County Council
26. Cyclists Touring Club
27. Transport Research Laboratory
28. Greater Manchester Cycling Campaign
29. London Cycling Campaign
30. Direct Line
30A. Supplementary memorandum
31. CPRE
32. Bath and North East Somerset Council
33. Institute of Highway Incorporated Engineers
34. The Slower Speeds Initiative
34A. Supplementary memorandum
35. RoadPeace
36. University College London, Centre for Transport Studies
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<td>Dr Adrian Davies</td>
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UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDA

Additional memoranda have been received from the following organisations and individuals and have been reported to the House. They have not been printed and copies have been placed in the House of Commons Library, where they may be inspected by Members. Other copies are in the Record Office, House of Lords, and are available to the public for inspection. Requests for inspection should be addressed to The Parliamentary Archives, Record Office, House of Lords, London SW1A 0PW (tel: 020 7219 3074). Hours of inspection are from 9.30 am to 5.00 pm on Mondays to Fridays.

RTS:
53. Chorley Borough Council
54. Sutton Seniors Forum
55. High Weald Bridleways Group
56. Vine Lane - Road Safety Campaign
57. The A51 Action Group
58. Tring Safety Group
59. Open Spaces Society
60. Crouch Valley Rural Routes Group
61. B4221 Action Group
62. The Handsworth Park Association
63. Right to Ride Network
64. Petersfield Streets for People
65. Speedlimit
66. Bristol Cycling Campaign
67. Cumnor Parish Council
68. Oxford Pedestrians Association
69. Mr Jim Whitehead
70. W W Geoff Cozens
71. Sara Newman
72. Mr Peter Robinson
73. Dr A. Kennedy
74. Mrs Rebecca Watkinson
75. Mr Peter Feltham
76. Mr W S Bowker
77. Mrs Angela Rackham
78. Mr Trevor Skipp
79. Cllr Nigel Rose
80. Mr John Hufton & Mr Peter Walker
81. Mr John Stanley
82. Mrs Lynne M. Fish
83. J A Clarke
84. Mr G D & Mrs J Clarke
85. Mr John MacKay
86. Celia Jones
87. Dr Crispin Bennett
88. Mr E Jenkins
89. Mr Geoff Leather
90. Mr Michael Ratcliffe
91. Mr Brian Jameson
92. Edith Earnshaw & Jane Tingle
93. Mr Colin Clarke
94. Michelle Whitworth
95. Pam Ashton
96. Mr Laurie Gibson
97. Constance Thompson
98. Mr Colin McKenzie
99. Mr Charles Timberlake
100. Mr Stephen Plowden
101. Mr Andy Lyon
102. Mr R A Stewart
103. Dr Paul Luton
104. Mr Paul Allard
105. Mrs Jonete Coates
106. Mr Roger Fletcher
107. Mr Mike Tyzack
108. Mr Eric Neal
109. R Hogg
110. Mr Martin Garrett
111. R J Jelfs
112. Mr Philip Purkis
113. Mr Neil Howlett
114. Mrs Pauline Fielding
115. Col D W Sluman
116. Ms Alix Otten
117. Mr Michael Tye
118. Mr David Hancock
119. M W Hamilton
120. Mr Steven Daniels
121. Mr Michael Leonard
122. Jo Ripley
123. Sandra Dutson
124. Mr John Geraghty
125. Mr Christopher J Currell
126. Mr Bruce Osborn
127. R Crawshaw
128. Mr J B Howard
129. Mr Daniel Eastoe
130. Mr Ian Tate
131. Mr Mark Candlish
132. Mr Melvyn Sears
133. Mr Robin Kay
134. G. Angell
135. Mr Anthony Fincham
136. Sue Webster
141. Community Alternative Transport Association (CATA)
143. Ms Pat Parkin-Moore
144. Corsham Station Campaign
145. Henley-on-Thames Partnership
146. Mr Howard Nelson
147. J G Harvey
148. Dr Noble Frankland
158. Mr Bill Hollis
LIST OF REPORTS

TRANSPORT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE REGIONS COMMITTEE
REPORTS IN THE CURRENT PARLIAMENT

Session 2001-02

First Report: Passenger Rail Franchising and the Future of Railway Infrastructure (HC 239-I)

Second Report: London Underground (HC 387)

Third Report: Public Spaces: The Role of PPG 17 in the Urban Renaissance (HC 238-I)

Fourth Report: The Attendance of Lord Birt at the Transport, Local Government and Regions Committee (HC 655)

Fifth Report: European Transport White Paper (HC 556)

Sixth Report: Empty Homes (HC 240-I)

Seventh Report: London Underground - The Public Private Partnership (HC 656)

Eighth Report: 10 Year Plan for Transport (HC 558-I)

Ninth Report: Road Traffic Speed (HC 557-I)