COMPUTER FAILURES
50. NATS's computer systems has failed three times in recent monthsat
West Drayton on 27 March and 10 April, and at Swanwick on 17 May.[130]
Mr Everitt explained that the failures at West Drayton were caused
by the flight data processor, which is a "piece of software
... 20 or so years old".[131]
The failure at Swanwick involved a communications fault between
workstations, which arose following a routine operation to enter
data overnight.[132]
NATS is conducting an inquiry into the incidents to establish
whether further adjustments are required to ensure the long-term
robustness of the system.[133]
Both NATS and the Government are content that safety was not compromised
by any of the failures at West Drayton or Swanwick.[134]
51. If NATS' business plan is to succeed, the company must
demonstrate that its computer systems are robust and will increase
the productivity of its controllers. The Committee is not convinced
that the systems at Swanwick have shown either the necessary robustness
or the productivity required.
52. NATS is not required to pay compensation for the delays that
it caused. Ryanair state that "all airlines were forced to
refund passengers for cancelled flights due to the sheer incompetence
of NATS", and recommends a "compensation mechanism that
would make NATS accountable directly to passengers for long delays
and cancellations caused by their continuing inefficiency".[135]
NATS confirmed that it was not intending to pay any compensation
because it is exempted from doing so under the Transport Act 2000[136]
The Committee recommends that the Government reconsider the
exemption from compensation. NATS is supposed to benefit from
the private sector pressures introduced by the PPP. It should
be subject to the pressures of financial penalties in situations
where it has failed to deliver its services to its customers.
Longer term prospects in air traffic control
53. The Government supports proposals for a Single European Sky,
which involve greater interoperability between the various suppliers
of air traffic services. The Government stated:
"In the long term, closer integration between Europe's
air traffic service providers seems likely, particularly given
the need to enhance efficiency so that future air traffic levels
can be accommodated safely."[137]
The project does not require the integration of service providers
but focuses on more collective management of the European air
traffic management system. In the long term, closer integration
between Europe's air traffic service providers seems likely, particularly
given the need to enhance efficiency so that future increases
in air traffic demand can be accommodated safely.[138]
The Committee doubts that a financially vulnerable NATS would
be able to play an appropriately significant role in a more centralised
European air traffic control service.
54. New satellite-based air traffic control systems are being
developed that would remove the requirement for service providers
to be geographically close to the air space they control. NATS
is not in a position to be the leading player in these advances
in air traffic control and is in danger of losing customers in
the longer term. The Government must react to the possible erosion
of NATS revenues by alternative providers of new air traffic control
technologies. At present, NATS is far from capable of meeting
the challenges of the long term future of air traffic control
services in the United Kingdom. The cost-cutting and penny-pinching
mentality foisted on NATS merely to survive will leave it ill-equipped
to compete with the new satellite-based air traffic control service
provision being developed in Europe and North America.
95
QQ 1, 18; HC Deb, 10 June 2002, col 759w. Back
96
Q 270; Ev. pp 75-77. Back
97
NATS' Response, para 3.10. Back
98
Ibid, para 3.12. Back
99
Ibid, para 3.15. Back
100
Ibid, para 3.28. Back
101
QQ 18-19; Ev. p 52. Back
102
QQ 80-84, 270. Back
103
Ev. p 76. Back
104
Q 79. Back
105
QQ 20-22, 78. Back
106
Q 79. Back
107
Ev. p 76. Back
108
Ev. p 43. Back
109
Ibid. Back
110
Ev. p 76. Back
111
QQ 53, 289. Back
112
Q 82. Back
113
Q 290. Back
114
QQ 290, 294. Back
115
QQ 294-295. Back
116
Ev. p 54. Back
117
Controllers 'misread' aircraft data, The Financial Times,
23 May 2002. Back
118
Ev. pp 46-47; HC Deb, 10 June 2002, col 759w. Back
119
QQ 38, 42-46, 309-310; Ev. pp 78, 80-81. Back
120
QQ 310-313. Back
121
QQ 313, 375; Ev. p 78. Back
122
NATS bankers' (Abbey National Treasury Services plc, Barclays,
Banc of America Securities and Halifax) response to the CAA Consultation
on NATS' Application to Reopen Eurocontrol Charge Control, June
2002. Back
123
Ibid. Back
124
NATS' Response, para 3.25. Back
125
Ibid. Back
126
Ibid, para 3.26. Back
127
Ibid, Appendix 7. Back
128
Q 168; Ev. p 46. Back
129
Q 1; Ev. p 46. Back
130
HC Deb, 25 June 2002, col 768w. Aggregate total delays to affected
aircraft were: 88,000 minutes at West Drayton on 27 March; 34,000
minutes at West Drayton on 10 April; and 82,000 minutes at Swanwick
on 17 May. Back
131
Q 40. Back
132
Ev. p 78. Back
133
see HL Deb, 23 April 2002, col WA24. Back
134
HC Deb, 10 June 2002, col 760w. Back
135
Ev. p 56. Ryanair refunded more than £250,000 to its passengers
for the three recent delays. Back
136
QQ 325-329. Back
137
HC Deb, 16 April 2002, col 803w. Back
138
Ibid. Back