Select Committee on Work and Pensions Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence



Tuesday 5-Thursday 7 February 2002


  The Work and Pensions Committee visited the Netherlands between 5 and 7 February 2002, as part of its inquiry into ONE Pilots.[48] During the visit, Members met with a number of officials, social security experts, politicians and those involved with welfare to work programmes in both Amsterdam and The Hague.


  Mr Wim Marsman, Director of the Zaanstreek Centre for Work and Income, welcomed the Committee to the Centre. Zaandam was an industrial conurbation and the fourteenth largest city in the Netherlands, with a slightly higher than average unemployment figure. A third of the unemployed were drawn from ethnic minority groups, mainly from the Dutch Antilles, Surinam and Morocco, who had originally been invited into the country in the 1970s to supplement the industrial workforce. Many of these "first generation" immigrants did not speak Dutch, creating difficulties when they sought employment.

  The Centres for Work and Income had arisen from problems with the previous system of welfare provision, where social assistance, insurance-based benefits and employment services had been controlled by different authorities, with little direct Government control. The CWIs were not as ambitious as the UK Jobcentre Plus programme, with the Centres only acting as a "gateway" for services run by other agencies, but they did mean that all welfare services could be accessed from a single building. The CWIs were also paid for by the Ministry of Social Affairs allowing it to exert greater control at a local level; the CWIs were required to submit monthly performance figures.

  The most controversial part of the reform was the use of private reintegration services, which had been seen as "throwing the most vulnerable in society to the private sector". Mr Marsman told the Committee that at present there were about 1,600 reintegration firms operating in the Netherlands, making it very difficult to judge quality. The potential danger was such companies would target those easiest to place, rather than groups such as disabled.

  There was a system of benefit deductions and withdrawals in place, which could be quite harsh. For example, a school leaver who refused their first job would suffer a 100 per cent benefit withdrawal. Such sanctions were only really used as preventive measures, however.

  The "Mission Statement" of the CWI was to: provide a meeting place for employers and job seekers; help employers find workers; inform workers of their rights and the available resources; and provide an access point to the benefits system. There was four-stage process for claiming benefits, used by the CWI, which Mr Marsman set out:

  1.  Reception:

    —  check identity and address;

    —  ensure that he/she is eligible with the local authority (eg not living with parents);

    —  take preventative action—"Why can't you get a job now?"; and

    —  check insurance eligibility and whether sick or unemployed.

  2.  Work interview:

    —  examine all documents and records;

    —  register client officially as unemployed; and

    —  classify them, in terms of their job-readiness, as "Phase" one to four (see below).

  3.  Income assessment:

    —  income and capital are thoroughly scrutinised.

  4.  Employment search:

    —  assist client to find suitable employment with weekly, monthly and bi-annual meetings, as appropriate; and

    —  offer special programmes for some groups, eg ethnic minorities receive first call-back within 72 hours.

  Under the capital rules for benefits, clients were only eligible if they had less than approximately £3,000 of savings (single person). For the unemployed, their benefit was based upon their insurance contributions. For disability benefit they received 70 per cent of their last income. Recently, arrived immigrants were required to undergo Dutch language and culture classes as a condition of claiming benefit.

  In stage two (above), the clients were categorised on the basis of a series of standard questions. The phases indicated different levels of job-readiness:

    —  Phase 1—unemployed but job-ready;

    —  Phase 2—likely to find employment within one year;

    —  Phase 3—will take longer than a year, often owing to language problems; or

    —  Phase 4—client unsuitable to enter the labour market at present, eg owing to disability, lack of qualifications etc.

  CWI advisers took responsibility for Phase 1 clients, often taking them immediately to an employment agency situated within the Centre. One of the advisers informed Members that she had a caseload of about 20 clients at any one time. Clients assessed as Phase 4 were the responsibility of the local authority, who would usually buy in services from private reintegration companies.

  The Committee was then given a tour of the public areas of the Centre, which was open-plan, save for a small screened-off section at the rear that allowed private discussions with clients. There was a security guard present, but Mr Marsman stated that they had experienced few safety problems; no benefit payments were made on the site. Two temporary employment agencies were situated in the Centre permanently, with another one having display boards located near the entrance. Computers providing free access to the internet for job seekers were available, as were "job points" equivalent to those found in UK Jobcentres.


  Mr Vink has been involved with social services in Nijmegem, Cuijk and Roemond since 1982 and was the Director of Social Services in Helmond (Brabant) for four years. He is now working as a consultant. Mr van Schep is the Managing Director of a small company Stimulansz. Both are working with local authorities to improve the delivery of social assistance, and develop policies aimed at delivering more work-focused services.

  There were two new trends in Dutch welfare policies. First, the attempt to introduce the market through the commissioning of private companies to deliver services aimed at integrating people who are less job-ready into the labour market. Second, there was a trend to transfer more responsibility to local authorities, who now had the responsibility for commissioning such services. Centres for Work and Income (CWIs), introduced from January 2002 and operate by central government, acted as initial gatekeepers to the system. CWIs referred people identified as being some distance from the labour market to local authorities.

  A key aspect of the new system was the classifying of benefit claimants by CWIs into four categories depending on their distance from the labour market. "Phase four" people were those at the greatest distance from the labour market. High employment meant that 75-80 per cent of unemployed people on social assistance were now in the phase four category. Many had multiple problems. Caseloads were going down, because it was more work-intensive to engage with people with multiple barriers.

  To develop a "work first" approach required giving individuals a trajectory. This might involve sorting out debts, childcare arrangements or providing education. The method of classifying people helped identify where to put resources poverty alleviation at one extreme or direct into the labour market at the other.

  Mr Vink argued that phasing on its own, however, was not enough. For example, the category was too broad brush and needed to be further broken down. Phasing did provide a useful means of identifying a client's problems, but not necessarily what the individual could do. A next phase of development might be mechanisms aimed at exploring with the individual what their possibilities were, to be able to work with the individual in a tailored way, so that they would take the next step towards work.

  One problem at present was that case managers, working with individuals, had a lot of discretion. Some made it very easy for participants; not much labour-related activity was demanded. Others pursued a work-focused agenda, more actively. It was important that an organisation had a good "work-first" policy as a whole, then the individuals within it could act in a standardised way when making decisions. One example was work with drug addicts. One local authority said it was too difficult to place people with drug problems in work. Another had an active programme with employers, making deals directly with them to take people on, whilst providing drug treatment at the same time for clients. This was also an example of working to overcome employer prejudice, which could itself be a barrier.

  A key issue was dealing with motivation. In the US (in Wisconsin in particular) work was not a choice; a deal was a deal. There was both carrot and stick. It was important to get the person to act like a contract partners, whilst helping them overcome their impediments.

  Mr Dick Vink emphasised the value of an integrated approach in assisting people to work. This was one reason why giving local authorities greater responsibility to introduce "work first" policies was a good idea: they also could attract local employers, and were in charge of other services such as housing. They therefore had extra levers which could be used to effect employment gains.

  For the future, Mr Vink identified the need to tackle financial disincentives to work caused by the fact that the social assistance levels were similar to minimum wage levels. Mr van Schep said that he expected further devolvement by local authorities—and a further shift of financial responsibility for work programmes from the state to local government. Costs had already shifted from a 90:10 split to a 75:25 split. In future, he saw it shifting even more.


  Two presentations were introduced by Mr Maarten Ruys, Director-General of the Centre for Work and Incomes Project. One on Dutch labour market policies; and one on the changing organisation structure for delivering benefits and employment services.

(a)  Dutch labour reforms

  The early 1980s in Holland had been characterised by large scale unemployment and the demise of traditional heavy industries. The mid to late 80s had seen a strong recovery, which had been consolidated in the 1990s. The successes from this era had been strong employment growth—almost 2 per cent in the 1990s—and a high employment rate, with less than 3 per cent unemployment, compared to a European average of 8 per cent and an UK figure of 5.5 per cent.

  There were some problems, however. Looking at the population under 65 years of age, 31 per cent of people in Holland did not work. (This compared to 37 per cent in the UK). A high number of these were people receiving disability benefits. There also remained a large labour reserve of less educated, less skilled, and older workers. There was also concern that the participation of women in full-time (as opposed to part-time) work was not high enough.

  Mr Selous inquired why older workers had dropped out of the labour force. The answer was both early retirement, and people retiring with disability pensions. The social partners—employers and employee organisations—had had a common interest in encouraging this development. Wage levels increased with age, but productivity declined.

  Agreement between the social partners in the 1980s had enabled economic recovery and curbed unemployment through wage moderation, freezing social benefits and the minimum wage, and lower budget deficits as a result.

  In the 1990s labour market reforms had been designed to give greater flexibility. Measures included reforms on working hours; allowing greater use of fixed term contracts (subject to protection of these workers); ensuring a better work/life balance through improved childcare provision; the redesign of early retirement schemes to make them "pre-pension schemes;" and tax breaks to employers to take on certain workers. Other changes included the introduction of subsidised labour programmes aimed at disabled people, the long-term unemployed, and people hard to place in the labour market.

  By 2000 it was clear that the labour market had changed. There was a shift from demand to supply, leading to a tight labour market. Yet there was little outflow from subsidised into real jobs, despite this. There was also an awareness that policy implementation was not a big success, and that local authorities wanted more freedom to initiate policies rather than simply implement central government initiatives. Changes were necessary and a number of starting points had been developed:

    —  work had to pay—there is a considerable work disincentive problem in the Netherlands caused by the fact that levels of social benefits are linked to the minimum wage level. Yet wage subsidy through tax breaks would be very expensive;

    —  there were obligations as well as rights when claiming benefits—the Government had introduced various "sticks" as well as "carrots" to enforce benefit recipients' obligations to seek work. But the municipalities die not always enforce the sanctions regime;

    —  outcomes not process measures were what mattered—the Government wanted more focus on results;

    —  reintegration into employment—this had to be goal of welfare policies. Municipalities (responsible for paying social assistance) and the insurance boards (responsible for paying social insurance benefits) were supposed to do this. The problem was that people rarely moved off the various schemes into jobs. The exit rates from subsidised jobs into work was less than 10 per cent. The task had now been given to the private sector.

  Mr Dismore asked how the success of the private sector was judged and value for money measured. The answer was that it was very early days. Local authorities were entering into contracts which aimed to reward by results. But it was not yet clear how effectively the contracts had been framed to achieve the goals of reintegration, and how to prevent "cream skimming"—where companies concentrated their efforts on the most job ready. The introduction of the market was a new development. For two to three years it would be an imperfect market. It was not yet clear how much it cost to get someone into the labour market from a certain distance. They were not regulating the market too much during the early days, although they were trying to ensure that there was transparency.

  Most of the reintegration agencies, which has been established to work in the new market, were not-for-profit organisations. There were some private recruitment agencies and also some local authority related companies. Were there really profits in this kind of work? The answer appeared to be "yes", although local authorities had the safety valve that they could still run programmes where they found it impossible to get private sector involvement.

  Members also raised the issue of reintegration into the labour market of people in receipt of disability benefits. Officials admitted that strategies to get this group back into work were not well developed. This was partly because it was "very complicated". The flow of workers on to long-term disability benefits were no longer older manual workers, but younger workers, many women, and those with mental health problems—accounting for around 30 per cent of the new intake. There was also little political will to tackle the problem; there had been a big political crisis in the early 90s over the last attempt at reform. Finally, the present system created substantial financial disincentives to people to return to work. Over half of workers could get up to 100 per cent of their salary when off sick.

(a)  Structural change in the delivery systems

  In the mid-1990s it was recognised that there was a problem with large numbers of people being paid benefit but with no incentive to go back to work. There was a lack of independent supervision of a benefit system run largely by the social partners. In 1995, a parliamentary inquiry called for a policy of "work above income", with more "activating" programmes for the unemployed and greater use of regional bodies to deliver such programmes. They also recommended that the influence of social partners on individual decisions should be minimised and that there should be independent supervision of implementation.

  In 1998, a new programme was implemented, designed both to create a more "active" work-related system, and to give a greater separation to public and private areas of responsibility. This latter aspect did not work; commercial insurance companies were keen to get their hands on the five organisations running insurance-based benefits, not least because of the opportunities they offered for cross-selling. There was a realisation that, in terms of driving the "work first" policy agenda forward, giving the insurance boards over to the private sector would not work. Therefore in 2000, the five insurance boards were merged into one organisation, the UWV, which had the task of claims assessment, levying contributions and handling the administration of claims.

  Under the new system, both the UWV and local authorities were responsible for job reintegration activities for the benefit recipients they each deal with. This responsibility has to be contracted out to the private sector. (Although one private company KLIK, dealing with Phase 4 people, is a previous state organisation, whose shares are owned 100 per cent by the Government.)

  Since 1 January 2002, there has been a more direct relationship between government and the public partners. The Government supervises the work of the UWV, the CWI and the local authorities. Their performance results go direct to Parliament, without interference from Ministers, thus holding the Government to account.

  Under the current implementation chain, the CWIs act as the gateway to the system. Their first task is to find people jobs. They then deal with new claims, before passing the information on to either the UWV (insurance based benefits) or the local authority (social assistance). These bodies are responsible both for benefit payment and reintegration, via the private market.

  Current issues arising from the new processes were:

    —  staff at the CWIs were not used to collecting benefits information needed for new claims;

    —  whether claimants had absorbed the new "work first" focus; and

    —  complaints from the social partners that they had been excluded. As a result, a Council for Work and Income had been established to give advice on policy relating to work and income; labour market policy more generally; levels and distribution of reintegration funds and European Social Fund money; the promotion of quality and transparency in the reintegration market. The Council also had a budget of 90 million euros to introduce innovation and added value.

  The consequences for the Ministry were:

    —  the Minister was directly accountable for benefits delivery;

    —  it acted as a single point for guidance on implementation;

    —  it had a supervisory role in relation to the UWV and DWI—agreeing budget and performance standards for quality, quantity and cost. But delivery was left to the organisations themselves.

  Possible problems ahead:

    —  communication and exchange of information between the CWIs and both the UWVs and the local authorities, and the need for better IT systems which can talk to each other;

    —  whether the UWV—created by the merger of five organisations—would work;

    —  capacity problems for the CWIs—they were dealing with more claims than expected;

    —  the role of case officers—a demanding job requiring both benefit and work skills. They were having recruitment problems; and

    —  the role of sanctions. It was important that the culture in local authorities changed. There was a job to be done in supervising local authorities to make sure that the policy objectives were being met. Activation must be at the top of the local authority agenda—the "frame of reference" of officers must change.


  Mr Vic Nuy, Chief Operating Officer, and Mr René Joosten, Regional Manager, gave the Committee a short presentation about their company and its mode of operation. Maatwerk provided a range of reintegration services to local authorities. Its programmes were aimed at groups such as the long-term unemployed and the disabled. Mr Nuy stressed that Maatwerk offered clients "action-based, personal guidance" based upon the individual's barriers to work. Its programme also stressed "work first", with clients being placed in three different jobs before other options, such as voluntary work, were explored. One of Maatwerk's flagship programmes was its "home coach" network; these advisers visited those clients hardest to place in their homes.

  Maatwerk worked in a number of countries, as well as the Netherlands, including Hungary, France and the USA. It had carried out a two-year project in Hamburg, Germany, between 1996 and 1998 aimed at funding "permanent and sustainable employment" for the long-term unemployed, with specific targets for the number and character of placements that the company had to achieve.[49] He estimated that the 644 placements achieved by the scheme during the two years had saved the municipality approximately 10 million Deutschmark in costs such as unemployment benefit. At that time, Maatwerk was also carrying out work in the Glasgow Employment Zone placing similar clients.

  The Chairman asked what Maatwerk had done before the recent reforms in the Netherlands, which had opened up the market to private reintegration services. My Nuy replied that even before the reforms, Maatwerk had had direct contacts with local authorities placing the long-term unemployed, with whom traditional labour agencies had been unable to cope.

  The Chairman also asked what services Maatwerk could offer in the UK. The representatives of Maatwerk gave the example of Glasgow, where the company had a contract with Working Links to operate in the Employment Zone there. The contract set out Maatwerk's remuneration based upon the number of clients successfully placed in "sustainable" jobs. ("Sustainable" was defined as a placement that lasted at least six months.) The company had managed to place 94 out of 400 clients during the past year. Their clients were drawn mainly from groups such as: those unemployed for more than two or three years, those with significant health problems, single parents, etc. Sixty five per cent of those placed had been unemployed for more than five years, and many were aged over 50. The company had found it "easier" to show results working with the long-term unemployed, as they would almost certainly have not returned to work without some intervention.

  The clients were identified for Maatwerk by the contract partner as being most in need of help. Individual files were then studied intensively to identify clients' needs and those who needed home visits. Experience had shown that 99 per cent of people were "open" to the process; they often did not believe it would work for them, but were willing to try. The biggest problem many clients faced was usually their low self-esteem; Maatwerk had to convince them that there was a suitable job available somewhere. For others it was identifying their individual barriers to work (such as lack of training) and rectifying the situation. The success of Maatwerk was essentially based on the failure of existing systems to go into individual cases in sufficient detail. One conversation would not do. A lot of time was spent establishing what was possible and what was not for individuals. They would use assessments to help clarify the range of possibilities for an individual. In their view, 50 per cent of the process of getting people into work was providing them with the right professional services so to do. Maatwerk started with the client and their needs, to ensure that they found the right job for that person.

  Mrs Humble enquired whether those advisers carrying out home visits ever felt "at risk" from the clients. Mr Nuy replied that all Maatwerk staff had a week's training and were, thereafter, supported on the job by coaches. On the first visit, two advisers were always present.

  Mr Dismore asked how Maatwerk had "slimmed down" the caseload from 600 to 400 in Glasgow. Mr Nuy and Mr Joosten replied that, they screened the 600 selected by the contract partner to identify the 400 they would take on. The people selected had to be in, what the Dutch describe as, the "phase four" category; it was not possible to simply "skim off the best". They also weeded out ineligible people—some had only been unemployed for a few months, others were aged over 70, etc. The system of referrals in the UK and the Netherlands was described as "not perfect", with offices not knowing about the people they were dealing with in detail.

  Once selected, there would then be a "diagnostic phase", where they worked with individuals intensively to identify their interests, motivation and skills and reach agreement about what work is possible. Each person would have around four to five interviews, lasting between one and three hours. They then looked for job openings suitable for that person, and continued to work on a one-to-one basis with the person in the job, to ensure the placement was a success.

  The average cost per client to placement was around £3,000. Maatwerk was paid by results. They got a basic fee—generally between a fifth and a quarter of the project costs. There were then further payments based on placements. It was the placement bonus which made the work profitable.

  In the UK, the company could only work in Employment Zones, at present. Messrs Joosten and Nuy were critical of the terms under which the Employment Zone contract worked, where they were given 17 weeks to work with clients and get them into work. This did not give an adequate opportunity to the clients to be successful. If work was seen as an essential part of social integration, they had to be given more time to work with the clients. Otherwise, a considerable number of people were simply being written off. Maatwerk was currently in negotiation to start work in Manchester with Reed Employment.

  Ms Buck asked whether childcare was a significant issue for the clients. Mr Nuy replied that it was sometimes a problem but advisers usually found that many women were actually afraid of returning to work and hid behind the childcare issue. Maatwerk left other organisations to do work such as setting up day care centres, and instead concentrated on finding clients a job that fitted their needs. There was also an issue of the "poverty trap" for lone parents—no one wanted less money—but he believed that the financial motive was only one of many that inspired such people. They wished to return to work to set a good example to their children, be part of society, etc. Sometimes these were more important than any financial return.

  Mr Stewart wanted to know how Maatwerk built up a picture of the local labour market, when it was operating from the Netherlands. After the first analysis, Mr Nuy replied, 50 per cent of the advisers' time was spent looking at the local job market—meeting employers, identifying vacancies, and noting what employers needed. They also sought out employers they thought could give their clients jobs. Maatwerk built up a relationship with employers, not by appealing to the social conscience of employers, but by promising to get the right personnel. However, he stressed that Maatwerk essentially operated the other way round to many other companies: it identified the client's skills and needs, and then went to the employers. Usually the clients were placed with smaller companies employing up to 100 employees, who did not have their own personnel departments and welcomed Maatwerk's assistance in recruiting and HR work. Voluntary work was sometimes considered as a precursor to full-time employment, but it was important that people were learning something while doing it and entered into full-time work as soon as possible.

  Maatwerk attempted to create a "chain", which was about getting people into jobs. They used the existing infrastructure in an area in terms of training programmes, etc but would introduce case management—ensuring that the programmes selected were steps along the way towards a job.

  The Chairman concluded the session by asking the managers what value they felt Maatwerk brought to the system as a private, rather than public, enterprise. Mr Nuy answered that although the company had a financial incentive, it was also motivated by a belief that one could discover new talent in people and achieve an employment result. The company was working with clients whom most people had "written off" long before. He also argued that it brought a results-orientated system: "only jobs matter", getting people nearer to the employment market was not important.


  Mr Rens de Groot explained the background to the development of the CWIs. There used to be three separate "clusters" of institutions responsible for the different aspects of unemployment services. The Public Employment Service (PES); the local authorities, responsible for social assistance benefits; and the Insurance Boards—five bodies responsible for employee insurance benefits. On a political level, there had been a re-appraisal of the role of the social partners in welfare reform; there was a view that the wider public interest was ignored. For example, the PES was part of the Ministry for Social Affairs. It had then been split off as an Agency, with a tripartite board: civil servants, and employer—and employee-organisations, which operated at central and regional level. There were lots of arguments between the centre and the regions, with each loyal to their own board. Employees and customers were ignored. There were few measures of performance.

  The present Government was committed to a policy of "activation": a "work first" approach towards people out of work. It also wanted a clear structure of responsibilities and tasks in the public and private domain; greater efficiency in administration; and a clear focus on customers, leading to a reduction in numbers claiming benefits.

  The new CWIs were designed to offer a one-stop shop for work and income. They dealt with the 60 to 70 per cent of customers who were in the "Phase 1" and "Phase 2" category—ie immediately job-ready. A "chain of service delivery" then followed. One public organisation had been created to be responsible for employee insurance benefits (UWV). The UWV and, in the case of social assistance cases, local authorities would be responsible for the reintegration of unemployed job seekers, who were not job-ready. The basic services of the PES would now be delivered through the CWIs, whilst its other work—reintegration and vocational training—had been privatised. A key element of the mission of the CWI was that it was the customer who was important. Therefore, promoting the chain of delivery at local level was the crucial thing. The 130 local CWIs were main deliverers. The regional and central CWI offices were for professional support and the collection of statistics.

  Mr de Groot saw his task as to make the new CWI organisation professional, both in its management and organisation. Unlike in the past, CWIs operated in a transparent way. All performance data were available on an intranet site to which both Ministry officials had access and people within the CWIs. Thus managers could check the performance of their office, compared to others.

  There had been some initial teething problems with the Centres:

    —  The new task for CWIs (mostly staffed by former PES employees) was dealing with the intake of people with benefit claims. It was this work which was pre-occupying staff rather than work search. Overcoming this was "just a matter of staffing and organisation" said Mr de Groot;

    —  There had been pressure, owing to elections, to get up and running. As a result, the CWIs had opened before they were fully ready. There were, therefore, recruitment problems and delays—far more people were coming into claim benefit than had been anticipated. They were dealing with this by hiring more staff, and were learning from experience; and

    —  Their IT was not at the level they had wanted from the start. They were still building the software and there was a problem of lack of integration of IT between the CWIs and the municipalities and UWV. Improved IT would enable them to do the same work with less staff.

  The introduction of competition and market rules was another key element of the reforms. Mr de Groot was fairly equivocal about the advantages this would bring. In his view, the public sector could compete with the private sector in reintegration work. If it reformed itself and became efficient, it could get people into jobs more cheaply and do a better job. As an example, Mr de Groot cited a special reintegration project run by the public service for immigrants. The target group were 20,000 claimants. Private employment agencies had taken around a third of the cases. But they had performed badly in the first year, and the following year the proportion of cases they had taken had dropped by half. In contrast, the public sector part of the project had been very successful. Staff had had to get out from behind their desks and find their customers, engaging with people in their homes and addressing the barriers which these particular groups faced. Staff were enthusiastic. Incentives arose through bench-marking rather than performance bonuses.

  There were, at present, 800 reintegration companies operating in the Netherlands. This was a new market and a big shake-out was expected. The worry was that unemployed people would lose out in the process. There had been a debate about how to introduce private sector involvement. One model would have been to attempt to regulate the market by laying down a quality assurance threshold for managing tenders. However, this had been tried in relation to the privatisation of sickness prevention services and it had not worked. This time, it had been left to the market to organise itself. The private sector had set up an umbrella organisation which regulated quality assurance.

  Consideration was being given to providing individuals with their own personal reintegration budget. Through a voucher system, or similar, they would be able to choose their reintegration partner.

  There was a role for public/private co-operation. For example, job advice at the CWIs started off by flagging up the availability of help from temporary job recruitment agencies. They worked, not in competition, but in co-operation with such private recruitment agencies.

48   Towards a work-focussed agenda: lessons from the "One" Pilots, House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee Press Notice, 1 July 2001. Back

49   The Road to Work: Final report of the Maatwerk project in Hamburg, Maatwerk, February 1991, p 4. Copies of this report are available from Committee staff. Back

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