Proceeds of Crime Bill

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Mr. Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister for that response. As I listened to him, I almost substituted the business of ''must'' and ''may'' for the subject under discussion, which he said had never given rise to practical difficulties. He said that he saw no reason to interfere with the provision. This is a matter in which uniformity will not be achieved.

I am happy to let clause 101 stand part of the Bill and shall not oppose it, but I ask the Minister to talk to the Under-Secretary about whether similar protection is required under law in England and Wales. That raises many complex issues, including the value of equitable shares and properties, subjects with which I am not familiar, even in English law. We certainly have not gone into those subjects. As this is probably our only opportunity to consider whether England and Wales should have the extra protection afforded by the clause, I hope that either the Under-Secretary or the Minister will assure us that some thought will be given to the matter before Report.

Mr. Foulkes: I do not think that the Opposition tabled an amendment to that effect, although I may be wrong.

Mr. Grieve: The Minister is absolutely right. The consideration of this Scottish clause has prompted my thought processes. One of the things that I enjoy about Committees is the way in which ideas develop in the course of discussion. Committees are not set pieces.

We may well have overlooked the issue when it arose earlier in the Bill. After all, there is a great deal of Bill to consider. There are differences between this clause and those that we considered earlier. As the clause seems desirable, and as uniformity is one of the Government's aims—an aim that has taken up a bit of the Committee's time today—I should be grateful for an assurance that some thought will be given to whether the English legal principles are satisfactory.

One reason why we did not table an amendment on the subject is that English courts, with their equitable jurisdiction, frequently resolve property disputes. The protection afforded to spouses in such disputes is well established. A spouse who has made contributions for 20 years may well have an equitable share in a property purchased with tainted money. I expect that, under English law, the court might have to respect that share, but I may be wrong. I claim no great expertise in that area of law, although I could discuss it with my wife this evening.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Bob Ainsworth): In your drawing room.

Mr. Grieve: I shall not recite the poem by Lewis Carroll that says:

    ''I took to the law

    And argued each case with my wife''.

I should simply like an assurance.

Mr. Mark Field: For clarification, I assume that my hon. Friend wishes to discuss the matter with his wife because she is a property law expert, not because she has plenty of tainted money.

Mr. Grieve: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for preventing the wrong impression from being given on the record. My wife is a specialist property lawyer. That is why it might be advantageous for me to consult her.

I will be grateful if the Minister will consider the points that have been raised.

Mr. Wilshire: I want to follow up what my hon. Friend has said, and perhaps further persuade the Minister. I do not criticise the provision—it seems very sensible. I did not spot the issue in advance and am sorry for that, because I could have raised it informally with the Minister.

If I heard correctly, the Minister said that there is a difference between the provision for Scotland and the status quo in England. I cannot understand the difference, but I hear that there is one. It seems that the clause offers more protection to Scotland than is available in England. We have talked about ensuring that the Scottish position is the same as the English one. On this occasion, there is a case for asking whether the English position should not be the same as the Scottish one.

The positions might not be the same. If that is the case, I do not expect the Minister to tell the Committee immediately how that will be put right. Eminent lawyers might conclude that it is impossible to achieve that, in English law. However, he should not merely undertake to discuss the matter. I want him to tell us that he believes that an important principle is at stake, and that he will try his best to make the English position the same as the Scottish one.

On that matter of principle, we could try to press the Minister now, so that he might, either on Report or when the legislation is discussed in another place, come up with wording that will bring the English situation into line with Scotland's better situation.

Mr. Foulkes: I am impressed that Opposition Members recognise when I am speaking from my brief—which is when they pay more attention.

I have also been contemplating the discussions that took place in the Grieve household about legal intricacies. It is clear that the members of his family did not have much of a discussion last night about the brilliance of Van Nistelrooy's goals for Manchester United—instead, they were discussing points of law.

There are differences between the three jurisdictions. The Committee has discussed uniformity: it debated the sending of a common message, throughout the entire United Kingdom, about the central thrust of the Bill, which is the confiscation of the proceeds of crime. That message must be clearly and forcefully communicated.

We are now debating a detail concerning uniformity, and the hon. Member for Beaconsfield would not expect my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary or me to give an immediate undertaking—to borrow the word that the hon. Member for Spelthorne used—about the matter. However, my hon. Friend has heard the arguments, and we will examine whether there should be common ground, and—if we decide that that is desirable—how it should be achieved. He will report back on that, at an appropriate time.

Mr. Wilshire: I thank the Minister for those remarks.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 101 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 102


Mr. Foulkes: I beg to move amendment No. 155, in line 36, at end insert

    'or if the accused has failed to comply with an order under section 105(1)'.

The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to take the following: Government amendments Nos. 156 and 157.

Clause stand part.

Government amendments Nos. 158 to 160.

Clause 103 stand part.

Mr. Foulkes: As clause 102 is currently drafted, the period of postponement of two years does not apply if there are exceptional circumstances. For the avoidance of doubt, amendments Nos. 155 and 156 make it clear that the accused's failure to comply with an order under clause 105(1) is a circumstance that causes the two-year postponement period to be disapplied. The amendments are designed to afford the prosecutor the opportunity to consider the accused's case, if he has appealed against conviction, at least six months prior to the expiry of the two-year period, and to be in a position to proceed to the final hearing within the time limits.

Amendment No. 157 is designed to ensure that, when an application to extend proceedings is made before the end of the current postponement period, but the postponement period ends before the application can be heard, the application can nevertheless be heard after the end of the postponement period.

Amendments Nos. 158 and 159 are technical. They cure an omission in the clause, by adding a reference to compensation orders.

The overall effect is that a court cannot impose a fine or other monetary penalty on the accused during the postponement period before a confiscation order is made. That is because the court needs to determine the confiscation order before it can decide on the appropriate amount of fine.

Amendment No. 160 enables the court to impose a fine or other monetary penalty once the postponement period has ended and the confiscation order been made. It reflects the provisions in clause 16(3) and (4). Clause 102, as amended, enables the court to postpone the confiscation proceedings for up to a total of two years.

11 am

Confiscation proceedings are often complex and time may be required to gather together all the necessary financial information. The two-year period may be extended by the courts in exceptional circumstances or if the accused has failed to comply with an order under clause 105 requiring him to respond to a prosecutor's statement of information within a certain period. The clause, as amended, like part 2, contains provision to deal with a situation in which an application for a postponement is made before the previous period of postponement expires, but cannot be dealt with by the court in time.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 156, in page 60, line 38, leave out from 'conviction' to end of line 39.

No. 157, in page 61, line 4, at end insert—

    '(6A) If—

    (a) proceedings are postponed for a period, and

    (b) an application to extend the period is made before it ends,

    the application may be granted even after the period ends.'.—[Mr. Foulkes.]

Clause 102, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 103

Effect of postponement

Amendments made: No. 158, in page 61, line 17, leave out 'or'.

No. 159, in page 61, line 18, at end insert—

    '(c) make an order for the payment of compensation under section 249 of the Procedure Act.'.

No. 160, in page 61, line 18, at end insert—

    '(3A) If the court sentences the accused for the offence (or any of the offences) concerned in the postponement period, after that period ends it may vary the sentence by—

    (a) imposing a fine on him,

    (b) making an order falling within section 100(3), or

    (c) making an order for the payment of compensation under section 249 of the Procedure Act.

    (3AB) But the court may proceed under subsection (3A) only within the period of 28 days which starts with the last day of the postponement period.'.—[Mr. Foulkes.]

Clause 103, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 104

Statement of information

Amendments made: No. 161, in page 62, line 12, after '(2)', insert



No. 162, in clause 104, page 62, line 13, at end insert—

    '(b) must, if the prosecutor believes there would be a serious risk of injustice if a required assumption were made, include information he believes is relevant in connection with deciding whether it should not be made.'.—[Mr. Foulkes.]

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