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21 Jan 2003 : Column 194—continued
Pete Wishart: The right hon. Gentleman will be aware of the survey that the Inter-Parliamentary Union conducted in 1995, which found that, of a total of 178 legislatures, some 127 were unicameral. Unicameralism does exist, and it obviously works.
Mr. Hague: It is not normally associated with the balanced and democratic constitutions of the world, however. Yes, we can go to places such as Pyongyang and Beijing, where there is only one legislative body, but we will not find such bodies in many countries that are founded on liberty and democracy. Let us hope that our country remains committed to those concepts.
That is part of the case for balance in our constitution. That case must be advanced in this debate because it should also lead us to the right options for reform of the upper House. Governments must be able to govern. They must be able to conduct their own foreign policy, and to manage their budget. That must always involve a matter of confidence in the Government. Is it really necessary, however, for Governments always to be able to get every little bit of legislation through exactly as they want it and exactly according to their timetable? I believe that the answer to that is no.
The powers and ability of this House and of Parliament as a whole—this House and the other House—are inadequate to bring proper balance to our constitution. It is possible to govern with authority without being able to legislate with impunity. Today, however, Governments expect to be able to do both. That is why Parliament as a whole should be strengthened, and that includes the strengthening of the upper House. It also includes the strengthening of both Houses vis-à-vis the Government of the day. This is not a zero sum game. More authority and legitimacy for the upper House will not necessarily reduce the authority, legitimacy or power of the lower House, if we conduct our own affairs by giving proper scrutiny to Government actions and legislation. That is what we should be doing.
The Leader of the House has introduced many reforms. Many hon. Members, including me, have disagreed with some of them, but he has introduced reforms designed to improve the scrutiny of Government decisions, and I give him credit for that. The reforms are designed to improve some of the powers of Members of the House of Commons. I particularly applauded his attempt to take from the party Whips the power to nominate Committees—I have to say something to annoy my Front Bench; I am a former leader of the party, and it is traditional to do so—although that attempt was defeated. I hope that he is only biding his time before making the proposal again, because that is the sort of thing that needs to be done in this House. Such measures should be accompanied by reforms that make the upper House stronger and give it greater authority.
That is the case for electing a large part of the upper House, and it lies in two of the five factors that the right hon. Member for Copeland mentioned: legitimacy and representation. May I, in passing, refer to the comments made in the Committee that the reform of the upper House so far has made it less representative of the United Kingdom geographically? It is a more south-east-centred assembly, now that it is largely appointed. The only respect in which the hereditary peers were representative was that they were scattered across the whole of the United Kingdom.
Mr. George Foulkes (Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley): They owned the whole of the United Kingdom.
Mr. Hague: Well, yes, they had that advantage as well. In fact, my constituency was very heavily
represented in the upper House before it was reformed. My constituents have lost most of their parliamentary representation over the last few years.
Mr. Forth: Does not my right hon. Friend concede, however, that representativeness is in some ways a political will-o'-the-wisp? One could set out to identify all the ways in which any House could be "representative"—in respect of gender, ethnicity, region, profession, politics, religion or anything else—but to achieve such a degree of representativeness is impossible.
Mr. Hague: It may be impossible, statistically, to achieve such representation in relation to every possible parameter, but it is not impossible to achieve broad representation of the people in a way that allows them to feel represented and connected with their representatives, even though those representatives may not be exactly the same gender or colour as they are. It is, therefore, possible to improve representation, and to allow people to feel represented.
We must face the fact that this would, however, have the effect of increasing the authority—the boisterousness, the effectiveness—of the upper House. We must vote for it only if we are prepared to face up to that happening. Some hon. Members on the Committee believe that the powers of the upper House will remain as they are written in the rules under the Parliament Acts, but, actually, the powers that have been exercised by the House of Lords throughout history have rarely corresponded to the ones that are written down. Much depends on the confidence with which they are used.
Back in the 18th century, their Lordships had almost equal powers to the House of Commons, except in financial matters. They could throw Bills out in their entirety if they wished—they had a total veto—yet they hardly ever did so. They did so only once during the whole of the 18th century, and that was when the King told them to do so. It is hard to see that circumstance arising now, even in relation to the Hunting Bill. They did not use that power in the 18th century because the power of patronage overrode the power that they had technically. Every peer wanted a step up in the peerage. Every lord wanted to be a marquess; every marquess wanted to be a duke. The most craven of all were the bishops, who all sought a more lucrative diocese and therefore always voted with the Government of the day. Patronage overrode the technical powers held by the House of Lords.
In the last century, their Lordships have rarely used the powers truly available to them. The powers have fallen into disuse by convention, partly because their Lordships have lived in fear of our holding this very debate and debates like it in the House of Commons. They have not wanted to push things too far, or to provoke the House of Commons into following up the Parliament Act. Who can say that that has not been a successful strategy?
The powers that are written down are not necessarily the powers that are used. An elected, or largely elected, Chamber would become a more assertive House, even under existing powers. It would, however, enjoy greater legitimacy in using those powers. The trick, surely, is to create greater legitimacy and representation without
losing the independence and expertise that the Committee identified as key attributes of the upper House as it stands today.We should recognise the value of that independence and expertise. When I was a Minister, the House of Lords was a much more frightening place than the House of Commons. I say that with no disrespect to my hon. Friends and other hon. Members; that is just how it was. If I went along to a House of Commons Select Committee having been briefed for a few hours by a civil servant of a year's experience, I felt that I could pretty much cope with everything. If I went to a House of Lords Select Committee, that civil servant would have to point out that some of the people asking the questions had studied their subject for 30 years and were in the House of Lords because they were a world expert on it, and that the civil service did not know the answer to some of the questions that were likely to be asked. That was a much more frightening thing to do.
In the mid-1990s, when we had a majority of one—and sometimes not even that—in this House and, in theory, a majority of hundreds in the upper House, it was still harder to get legislation through unamended in the upper House than it was to do so here in the House of Commons. It was necessary to work out how to win the vote in this House, but it was necessary to work out how to win the argument down the Corridor.
Mr. Chris Bryant (Rhondda): Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that expertise in the House of Lords is often somewhat out of date? It might have been acquired 10, 15 or 20 years ago. By the very nature of their appointed position, many Members of that House will have made their name quite some time ago.
Mr. Hague: That is sometimes the case, but it is sometimes the case here as well. We have often been treated to speeches from Members who picked up their world-beating expertise a good 20 or 30 years ago. That can happen in any Assembly, whatever the system of appointment or election.
The one way to try to retain the necessary elements of independence and expertise, while improving legitimacy and representation, is to adopt a system of election completely different from the system used in this House. Our report refers to election for 12 years, and it is possible that that would be a non-renewable term. Some think the 12-year period too long: my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe, for instance, believes that those elected under such a system would become too independent of party, or even reality. No doubt he will advance that argument later.
Some Committee members voted for an eight-year renewable term. In any event, we all thought that the period should be much longer than a term of election to the House of Commons. We thought that most if not all Members would not envisage standing for re-election—which would create a marvellous feeling of independence—and, in my view, a majority would be elected on that basis. In my view also, an appointed element would be retained to help to preserve the independent experts whom we have just been praising.
Those are the advantages of a mainly elected House, but if we are not prepared to accept and maximise those advantages of legitimacy and independence in the upper
House—if we are unwilling to see a stronger second Chamber as part of a stronger Parliament—it would be better for us not to do it at all. It would be better for us to vote for 100 per cent. appointment than to say "Well, we think we want election, but we are not prepared to accept a stronger or more assertive upper House".According to reports in the newspapers—although such things cannot always be believed—the Government apparently now believe that 100 per cent. appointment is their preferred option. There has been a remarkable change over the years. Some of us remember the 1992 Labour party manifesto, which spoke of
- "a new elected Second Chamber which will have the power to delay, for the lifetime of a Parliament, change to designated legislation"
"Democratic" usually implies some measure of election. What has happened? We have all experienced political U-turns over the years, but this is a particularly fascinating one. I hope we shall hear from the Leader of the House, either today or in due course, whether the U-turn has happened, and, if it has, what is the basis for it. Has the Prime Minister really enjoyed all that power of patronage and does he want it to continue, or has being in power made the Cabinet less conscious of the need for a stronger Parliament? That could happen to any Government, and probably has happened to every Government. Is it what has happened to the Cabinet of today?
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