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21 Jan 2003 : Column 216—continued
Mr. McCabe: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
Mr. Clarke: No, it is not an important enough point.
I emphasise that we are looking for a stronger Parliament. We should not resent the suggestion of stronger competition between the two Houses. The problem facing us is that the necessary checks and balances that ought to exist in a modern constitution and parliamentary democracy are not at present strong enough in this country. The Government have waddled into a situation in which they find that they are reforming far more than they intended. We should take advantage of that and push on to ensure that we produce an elected and stronger upper House—within the lifetime of this Parliament, if we can hold the Government to that.
I agree with those who have said that a stronger upper House needs the legitimacy of democracy, but I also accept that we must guard against the danger of the tyranny of the majority. That danger can arise in a parliamentary democracy, and it is one of the problems that exist at present. I wholly approve of the electoral system for the Commons, but it greatly exaggerates the parliamentary support for the party with the largest percentage of votes. The party system means that Governments strictly control their followers, from whom they derive their power. As regards the checks and balances in the British system, it is difficult to explain to an American, for example, how on earth such amazing presidential power—without clear parliamentary check—is put in the hands of our Prime Minister. People have referred already to the emergence of a presidential system.
The way to avoid that, if one has an elected second Chamber based on elections in which parties will undoubtedly play the major part, has already been answered by others. It is necessary to have a different form of election. It is necessary for it not to coincide with the parliamentary election. It is necessary for the elected membership to rotate, with, for example, a third retiring after a given interval.
Although I agree with all that, I was one of those who voted in the Committee against people being too nervous and proposing that there should be tenure of 10, 12 or 15 years. That strikes me as excessive caution. If we had undertaken these reforms a generation ago, would people elected on the political issues current in 1988 retain democratic legitimacy? They would probably have changed half their opinions on those issues by the time they were debating them in 2003. However, a different form of election is certainly required.
We should also consider the situation if the two Houses were in conflict. It is important that there is a system whereby, usually, no one party is in command. I look forward to that; it is the key to the American system and constrains what would otherwise be an impossible presidential system. That would change the political culture in this country. There would be genuine search for agreement and not our current ping-pong, with the convention that the upper House always gives way—although it usually would.
From the give and take that would have to take place between the two elected Houses and the Government would come an altogether more responsive and genuinely pluralistic and democratic system, to which I look forward. I hope that we decide on the options before us and that we give a steer to the Committee. The Committee will have to return with more seriousness to many other issues; it was not unanimous on everything, and for example I agree with everything that has been said about the possibly excessive size of the House. A clear steer is needed so that we can maintain a timetable that produces a result in the foreseeable future—certainly by the end of this Parliament.
3.30 pm
Tony Wright (Cannock Chase): I want to talk about a word that has already surfaced many times in the debate and is much used by both proponents and opponents of reform: legitimacy. Those who oppose reform, especially those who oppose election, argue that election is not the only route to legitimacy. That argument deserves to be taken seriously and, if there was time, we could develop it to show that there is truth in it.
I want to set out the problem with that argument, as it goes to the heart of what we are being asked to decide. That requires me to describe what was for me a defining moment. We have many such moments in my party, but this was one of my recent ones. The context was the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which we passed with great haste—rightly so. However, I had doubts about some aspects of the measure and felt that we might not be taking sufficient care with it. As we trooped through the Lobbies, abolishing habeas corpus in an afternoon, one of my colleagues said, "Never mind, the Lords will sort it out for us."
The Bill went to the Lords and it did indeed sort it out for us. It did a magnificent job to make sure that the legislation was better, but when the Bill came back to this place our friends in the Whips Office contacted those of us who had had doubts. The call that I received was memorable. As it was thought that I might misbehave again, I was told, "Those people aren't elected, you know", to which I replied, "No, they are not elected but I think that they are right—furthermore, I didn't know that it was the view of the Whips Office that they should be elected."
I ask those who use the legitimacy argument—especially those in the other place—to think about it from this end. They should think about the type of second Chamber necessary to enable it to perform its proper role in our parliamentary system. If the second Chamber can be routinely rolled over using the argument that "they're not elected, you know", we may as well pack it up. The unicameralists may be right. However, they and we have to address the fact that on any test our system of Executive power is the most concentrated of any system of parliamentary government and that it has got worse. The power of the Executive has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished. Either we know and believe that, and want to do something about it, or we do not. That power comes through party—of which we are all part—and patronage, but it has changed our system fundamentally over the past half century or so.
We must either redress the balance and do something about that power by using reform of the second Chamber as one part of the package, or not. The Public Administration Committee, which I have the honour of chairing, concluded that it is possible to find a way through by adopting a mixed system. We can be open about the dangers of going too far in certain directions. I concede that it would be possible to construct a wholly elective system that made matters worse rather than better. We might simply have a system of election that was appointment by a different name—through party list systems. If we do not attend to the nature of those elections to ensure that they produce different people from those in the House of Commons, elected differently and for different terms, we shall run into that difficulty.
Some say, however, that we must remember that if we want to secure legitimacy—not that of individuals, which is not in question wherever they come from—the institution must be put on a different footing. There is no question in my mind but that the Select Committee concluded that there should be a mixed system that recognises that there is a place for election and a place for appointment, but in a balance that secures the legitimacy of the institution. That is crucial.
Some people are not comfortable with the options now being offered. Some people may prefer a system of indirect election, with which I have some sympathy. If I were to choose my second preference, it might be the scheme recommended by the Bryce commission, which suggested that the House of Commons should become an electoral college—in the present circumstances, that might include Members of the devolved legislatures in Scotland and Wales—that it would elect 75 per cent. of Members of the House of Lords and that the other 25 per cent. would come through a joint committee of the two Houses. That would be an improvement; there would be more legitimacy through that route, although not as much as the mixture that we recommend would produce.
The mention of Lord Bryce in 1918 reminds us how long we have been going round this circuit. It would be most extraordinary if a Government with constitutional reform as one of their centrepieces—indeed, they have delivered major constitutional reform—and with the current majority did not manage to reform the second Chamber. What a failure of historic proportions that would be.
The Leader of the House has issued a challenge to the House of Commons. In a sense, he wants to take the decision away from the Executive and say, "Come on House of Commons, it is up to you. Rise to the challenge." The question is whether the House will rise to the challenge. We shall find that out, at least initially, in a week or so.
The Select Committee on Public Administration has shown that, if the House wanted, we could have a mixed second Chamber, with 60 per cent. elected and 40 per cent. appointed Members, in 10 years. That could be achieved in a way that works through arrangements suitable for that purpose, but it will be done only if the House of Commons recognises that it has both an opportunity and a responsibility to put that process in place.
3.38 pm
Sir Patrick Cormack (South Staffordshire): We all listened with great interest to my friend and neighbour, the hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Tony Wright). In his opening remarks, he gave as good an argument against elections as I have heard for quite a long time because the whole scheme that he proposed would rule out that power of party and patronage that inevitably comes with elections.
We all have to thank the right hon. Member for Copeland (Dr. Cunningham) for the way in which he introduced this debate. We have heard some scintillating speeches—most of all that made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague)—but I beg the House to think of the future of Parliament and what will best serve us and those who send us here.
Over the past seven or eight months, a group of us from both Houses and all parties and generations have been meeting regularly as what we call the campaign for an effective second Chamber. We are not status quo merchants, but we strongly believe—this belief has united the group—that the country would be better served by a wholly nominated, all appointed second Chamber.
There is a very respectable case for a largely or entirely elected Chamber, but that would involve drawing up a new constitution and redistributing powers between the two Chambers. If we are to attract men and women of sufficient calibre and quality to stand for election, they must have the opportunity responsibly to exercise real power.
That is not a course with which our group would agree. We would agree with the general conclusions of the Joint Committee that the present role and powers of the House of Lords are about right, and that the conventions governing its relations with this place are about right. Indeed, the Joint Committee chaired by the right hon. Member for Copeland recommends fairly emphatically that the second Chamber should not be given any new significant or additional power. The Joint Committee's report lists the five requirements, which I will not repeat. A close reading of that report indicates that a reasonable degree of consensus was reached that the present second Chamber has those qualities, some of them in good measure.
That echoes to some degree the fifth report of the Public Administration Committee, chaired by the hon. Member for Cannock Chase, which stated that the considerable virtues of the present second Chamber should be preserved. Among those virtues, it listed the less partisan debating style, the quality and expertise of House of Lords Committees and its vital role in scrutinising legislation, much of which, as we all know to our cost, leaves this Chamber completely unconsidered. Many others in the House and around the world have commented on the quality of scrutiny, particularly of European legislation, which is widely acknowledged to be of a thoroughness and quality unique in the whole European Union.
Therefore, as we consider the Joint Committee's report, we must remember that we are not debating the Chamber that existed five years ago, with an inbuilt Conservative majority and the right of hereditary peers to sit in the Chamber. That has gone, and those debates are over. What we are considering is a Chamber that is largely composed of people who have been appointed since the Life Peerages Act 1958. Since that date, some 984 peers have been appointed, and no one who scrutinises those appointments with any degree of care, thoughtfulness or objectivity could for a moment dismiss more than a handful as cronies. For almost half a century, many able men and women, from differing backgrounds with different skills, have become Members of the House of Lords. The Joint Committee cites examples from the public services, science, medicine, academic life, the voluntary sector, business and industry—one could add the armed forces and the arts—all of whom have been recognised by appointment. The people who have taken part in debates have brought their expertise—often a current expertise—to them.
Since 1958, and particularly since 1999, we have gradually replaced a council of elders with a council of experts. I often think that Lord Winston perhaps best exemplifies what the House of Lords is all about. He takes the Labour whip, but he informs debates with a tremendous amount of experience, and the quality of his contributions—although I disagree with many of them—is immense. A large number of those experts, however, do not take a party whip, and the Joint Committee makes complimentary reference to that fact.
The Public Administration Committee has said that the main cause of widespread disillusionment with our political system is the establishment of virtually untrammelled control of the House of Commons by the Executive. It went on to stress the need to ensure that the dominance of Parliament by the Executive, and by the party political machine, is reduced. Indeed, the hon. Member for Cannock Chase alluded to Dunning's famous motion in his speech:
- "The power of the Crown—
- has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished."
Elections would inevitably bring conflict, and the right hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes) referred to that. Other colleagues who represent Scottish and Welsh constituencies have attended our group and told of us their experience. Even those of us with English seats have Members of the European Parliament elected under the dreadful system of closed lists, and we know what it is like when people are on our patch and do and say things that are wholly incompatible with the good of our constituents. I am experiencing precisely that in my constituency at the moment. What legitimacy can my Member of the European Parliament claim when, in my constituency, only about 20 per cent. of people voted in the last European elections? If the elections for the upper Chamber do not take place on the same day as the general election, we will run the risk of a derisory turnout. What sort of legitimacy does that give?
If the purpose of the exercise is to secure a second Chamber as different as possible from the Commons, can it make sense for the most fundamental change to be the one most likely to reproduce the partisan structures that exist here? Given their constituency or representational functions, what time would the elected Members of the second Chamber have for scrutiny? I have already referred to the fact that much of the legislation churned out by Government is not considered in this House, and those Members would have the right, as the Joint Committee makes plain, to expect the same facilities that we enjoy. Whatever the hon. Member for North Cornwall (Mr. Tyler) says, the costs would be enormous. It would be an extremely expensive, but far less effective second Chamber.
If a second Chamber were elected or largely elected and enjoyed the powers and functions of the present House of Lords, it would be far less well equipped to perform the functions that are performed well at the moment. The hon. Member for Cannock Chase talked about the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and there are many more examples that we could give from the past five years and, indeed, from the period of Conservative government in which the House of Lords put right legislation that was defective and imperfect in the extreme. Of course, it made mistakes, but any elected or non-elected body will make mistakes. However, the quality of debate and decision in that place has been of a high order. To throw that away would be—
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