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21 Jan 2003 : Column 249—continued

Fiona Mactaggart (Slough): Does my hon. Friend accept that the present House of Lords—largely appointed, admittedly, by means of a system for which no one here has argued—divides on political lines? Does he not believe that any future appointed House would find itself doing broadly the same?

Mr. Clelland: Not always. My hon. Friend should have let me finish: I am going to suggest a system for appointments that may prove attractive to Members who favour election but who are not too blinkered.

We are faced with the possibility of another set of elections to fight and finance. I find no great appetite in the political parties, or indeed in the electorate, for either prospect. We are faced with the possibility of yet another tier of national politicians representing the same people in the same Parliament—MPs who will have fought on the basis of a manifesto and who

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will have a mandate. Regardless of any attempts to gerrymander the elections, they will have a mandate and they will have constituents to look after.

Mr. Bryant: How does my hon. Friend deal with the fact that the Labour party manifesto committed us to a more democratic and representative House of Lords?

Mr. Clelland: I hope that, if I am given an opportunity to do so, I will demonstrate that that is what we will have.

With an electoral system, the interests of party politics would undoubtedly dominate in the second Chamber. Frustrating and defeating the Government would take priority over scrutiny and good, considered advice. Such a system would be a recipe for parliamentary gridlock—as other bicameral arrangements around the world have shown—and for bad government. Moreover, as has been said, there is the issue of office costs, allowances, secretaries, salaries and so forth.

Members should also bear it in mind that, out there in the constituencies, two or more MPs may represent the same electors—MPs in the same Parliament too busy scoring points off each other to look to the needs of their constituents. That will apply particularly when elections are approaching, on both sides. We can imagine an Opposition Member using this place to try to embarrass opponents.

What of the five qualities in relation to for elections? Elections cannot guarantee no domination by any one political party. They cannot guarantee independence or expertise. In my view, a partly elected second Chamber would be even worse: it would have all the disadvantages of an elected Chamber, which I have just mentioned, while creating two classes of Member. We can imagine the cries of "Foul!" when elected Members are outvoted by unelected Members. It would be only a matter of time before there was a demand for a wholly elected Chamber, if indeed a majority were elected in the first place. That would, I think, become irresistible.

What, then, do I propose? I want the same as the Members who want elections. I want an end to the hereditary system, and an end to a Chamber dominated by patronage. I want all five of the desirable qualities, plus accountability, in the second Chamber. So why am I going to vote for an appointed second Chamber?

Let me make it clear to the Joint Committee that in voting for that I will not be voting for the status quo. In fact, I am disappointed that the Committee showed so little imagination in considering methods of appointment. I am also sorry that indirect elections did not figure in the final recommendations, although they were mentioned in the report.

I must emphasise that, in promoting and voting for a fully appointed Chamber, I will not be supporting the methods of appointment suggested in the report. I want a wider structure for the appointing bodies. My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge) should have given way to me earlier, for I would have agreed with him. The idea of an appointments commission has been tried and found wanting: all that we got were people like the commission's members. That suggests that, given such a commission, the composition of the second Chamber would be in the hands of those who appointed it. We would have patronage by the back door.

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The problem, as I see it, is that we started from the wrong place. We should have decided long ago what we wanted the second Chamber to be for. We should have decided what it should do before deciding who would sit there and how they would get there. The Joint Committee went some way towards dealing with that question, but it needs more consideration.

I agree with those Members who say that if the second Chamber is to become more embroiled in the legislative process it should be elected, but if it were to do that it would just become a duplicate of the House of Commons. What would be the point of that? Members may as well vote for abolition rather than creating another House of Commons.

There is a role for a properly constituted second Chamber, not as a check on the Executive, as has been suggested—that is the job of the Opposition and Back Benchers in this place—or as a duplicate of the House of Commons, but as an advisory, deliberative and scrutinising Chamber where debates on matters of national importance can be held in full public view, informing and educating. There would still be a role for the second Chamber in the legislative process but not directly. It could suggest amendments, as it does now, but we would not be obliged to consider them. Members in this House would pick them up and move them in this Chamber. We would get far less of what we get at the moment, which is a lot of political posturing and trying to upset the Government's programme. We would get meaningful, helpful amendments that commanded much more respect in the House of Commons.

To achieve that, we must have Members who command respect and are generally recognised as having expertise and experience. How can we assemble those experienced, knowledgeable, respected individuals, independent yet at the same time representative? It can be achieved by widening the responsibility for making appointments, by calling for representatives from bodies such as the Confederation of British Industry, the Trades Union Congress, religious and voluntary organisations, devolved Assemblies, local government and political parties, too—they are an important part of the national system.

The representatives would have a fixed term of office, following which they would either be replaced or reappointed, one third at a time. That would produce a Chamber that had legitimacy and representativeness. It would not be dominated by any political party. It would have independence and expertise. Its Members would be accountable to the appointing body that sent them there. It would be different from the House of Commons, a second Chamber preserving the primacy of the elected Commons but commanding respect in the country and among Members of Parliament.

Such a process of appointment has important advantages, as has been pointed out. Appointing bodies can be required to ensure proper representation of women and ethnic minorities, something that elections have failed to do and will continue to fail to do.

Julie Morgan: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Clelland: I do not have time.

We can be assured that the appointing bodies will wish to ensure that representatives are knowledgeable,

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able and can articulate their interests in the second Chamber. That will ensure that it is an effective and useful tool in our democracy. It need not be entirely divorced from the electoral process. Appointing bodies such as the devolved Assemblies may want to appoint representatives by way of indirect elections. In that sense, indirect elections could be introduced into the system.

Once the Government have tabled the motion to deal with the issue, which they have not done yet, it may be possible to table amendments to give clearer guidance to the Joint Committee on alternatives such as those that I have described. If not, I appeal to colleagues on both sides to vote for an appointed House, but on the clear premise that the Joint Committee must examine the contents of the debates, not just the results of the votes, and come up with a more imaginative and diverse system of appointments than is currently the case or is on offer in the report before us.

5.43 pm

Mr. Simon Thomas (Ceredigion): I apologise to hon. Members, especially those on the Front Benches, for having missed some of the debate. I have been on Committee duty scrutinising the Government without much effect on the Communications Bill. That is relevant to what we are discussing.

It has been dispiriting and disheartening to listen to much of the debate. It was disappointing to hear so many Members advocate an appointments system of which Caligula would have been proud, and turn their backs on a truly democratic opportunity to reform the bicameral system of Parliament.

Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National party are firmly committed to the view that democracy must pervade any representation in this Chamber or the other place, so both parties have turned down opportunities to nominate while the present Gilbert and Sullivan farce continues in the House of Lords. We hold firmly to the principle that all Members of the second Chamber must sit as the result of an electoral process. If one is a democrat, one cannot believe anything else. We sit in this House as the result of an electoral process. Our legitimacy and accountability would be washed away if there were any suggestion of appointment from above by the great and good or of this place serving as a retirement home for people from the TUC or public bodies. That is a sure-fire way of creating a poor second Chamber for review and scrutiny.

We are not debating a bicameral system but a multi-cameral system—with the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, Northern Ireland Assembly and Greater London Assembly and with regional government for England yet to be introduced. All those chambers provide some scrutiny and, in some cases, legislation.

In reforming the House of Lords, we must address a multi-cameral, semi-federal system. Plaid Cymru wants the abolition of the other place and its replacement by a very different second Chamber. The Scottish National party does not even see the need for a second Chamber in Westminster because the Scottish Parliament fills that important role. The present state of devolution in the Welsh context means that much legislation is still rushed through this House—such as with changes to the criminal justice system and terrorism legislation.

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A second Chamber can play an important role but it should not be based on heritage, patronage or any type of appointments system. A totally different second Chamber is needed, based firmly on election.

I was disappointed with the Joint Committee's report because the second Chamber cannot be divorced from its make-up, from which flows its legitimacy. At present, the other place provides a convenient excuse for the Government, who can claim that legislation such as the Bill on blood sports has become stuck in the House of Lords, even when that is not true. Ultimately, Government business always gets through. Cronies can be whipped in and independent Cross Benchers can be picked off at will. It is a political urban myth that the other place shows great independence of mind. There are great independents in the House of Lords but on the whole, until recently, its history was one of entrenched conservatism married to the occasional flash of reform.

I agree with the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague), that any reformed second Chamber needs teeth to hurt, if not disable, the Executive. That means rejecting one of the Joint Committee's key principles—that the second Chamber must be constructed in such a way that it never has a Government majority. If we accept the principle of election, the Government would occasionally enjoy a majority in the second Chamber but that would be rare.


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