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22 Jan 2003 : Column 348—continued
Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. I remind all hon. Members that Mr. Speaker has imposed a 10-minute limit on all Back-Bench speeches.
3.4 pm
Mr. Robert Marshall-Andrews (Medway): The Secretary of State in his opening address to the House set out a list of the dangers that face the world. It was a succinct and clear list and one with which many of us would agree. It contained one glaring omission, which is this: the existence of a single, uncontested, uncontrolled superpower, and the nature of the illegal regime that is presently in control of that country.
There are many in the House and outside it who realise that within America lies the solution, but also within America lies the principal problem. There are many in the House and outside it who understand that within America lies the principal cause for hope, and within America lies the principal cause for apprehension. That American paradox is something that I have lived with all my life.
There is no country on the globe that has a greater breadth of internal freedoms, and there is no country on the globe that is more reviled for the perception—very often the accurate perception—that it actively denies those freedoms to others, and the present example of that, transparently, is the Palestinian Arabs. No country in the world in my lifetime has done more for the cause of peace—and I have in mind the Marshall plan which has underpinned economically the peace that we have enjoyed in Europe—and no country in my lifetime has been a greater cause for war.
There is no country at the moment more committed to the war on the abstract noun "terrorism", and yet there is no country in the world in my lifetime that has given aid, succour and encouragement to more terrorist groups, more military dictatorships and more rogue states.
To simply take a list in no particular order, one recollects the corrupt Diem regime in Vietnam; the military overthrow of the democratically elected Government of Salvador Allende; and the support of the Contra guerrillas in Nicaragua. One recollects now, as we speak, the support for the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, one of the vilest terrorist organisations that are operating in Africa. One recollects the unalloyed support of Saddam Hussein in
his war against Iran. In those days, the United Nations weapons inspectors need have gone no further than the Customs of the United States, or even, possibly, the Customs at Dover. One now sees the unalloyed support of the war criminal Ariel Sharon. As was memorably said in the last debate by an Opposition Member, every single Israeli bullet that kills a Palestinian is paid for in the United States.We would therefore urge the Secretary of State to understand the depth of feeling that there is on this side of the debate and the argument about the nature of the regime that is leading us to war in Iraq. The opposition to the war is not based upon an approbation of Saddam Hussein. On the contrary: it is based on a total aversion to Saddam Hussein. I myself have a total loathing, more than anything else, for authoritarian Governments, which is one of the reasons why I occasionally have so much trouble with our own. Nor is our opposition based—I really ask the Secretary of State and the Government to cease this accusation in public against those who oppose the present war in Iraq—on some form of anti-Americanism in itself.
My family, I am proud to say, fulfilled a number of roles in their generation in the second world war. They never let me forget as a child the debt that we owed to American men and women and to America. Subsequently, when I had the great privilege to debate in many universities in that country during the course of the Vietnam war, I came away not with an aversion to America because of that war, which I loathed, but with an enormous respect and love for American institutions, American vitality and American freedoms.
Those on this side of the House and on this side of the argument—who knows whether the two may yet be synonymous—do not harbour within us festering anti-American feelings. Our opposition is to the nature of the American regime, which is as bad as any that I can remember within that paradox. It is ruled, governed and motivated by a ghastly mixture of fundamental Christian evangelism, ruthless Zionism and the oil economy. That mix, if it is allowed to rule us in our international affairs, will bring us nothing but disaster.
Those of us who oppose this war do so because we believe that it is ill-proven and unnecessary—I am neither by nature nor by inclination a pacifist. If I may respond to the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow), who accused me by implication of "hand wringing", I have never done such a thing. If I had coherent evidence that there were weapons of mass destruction trained on my constituents in Medway my opposition to the war would not be based on any form of clammy, wet liberalism. There is no such evidence, however; on the contrary, the evidence points directly against us. The motivation for this war is suspect in the extreme, and those outside the House know that it is so.
Will the Government exercise the considerable influence that they rightly have in Washington to ensure that the progress of the middle east is immensely enhanced by the withdrawal of support for Israel and its present repression of the Palestinian people? At a stroke, that will remove the principal causus belli and the underpinning of terrorism in the world that threatens both them and us. Will the Government also exercise their considerable influence and use the massive sum of £5 billion, which they threaten to expend on this war, in the middle east and particularly in Iraq to give health
and succour—and political succour to those who oppose the Iraqi regime? That is not impossible. It was done in Kosovo, as we were reminded only recently. To starve and force Saddam Hussein into submission, although possible, would be done at a terrible price for world peace and for world security. To feed that country back into democracy should be the aim of all of us. I hope that the Secretary of State and Her Majesty's Government understand that those feelings and those sentiments are the basis for much of the opposition here and in the country.3.13 pm
Mr. Colin Breed (South-East Cornwall): First, I apologise for the absence of my hon. Friend the Member for Hereford (Mr. Keetch), who is at the moment returning from a visit to Kuwait.
There have been very few times in recent years when there has been such worldwide uncertainty and unease owing to a range of perceptible international threats. Central to this collective sentiment is the prospect of an imminent conflict with Iraq, coupled with the shadow of international terrorism that has already spread over a large number of different countries, and the long-standing problems in the middle east. I associate myself with many of the comments of the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) about Israel and Palestine, which I have visited recently. I have considerable sympathy with his views.
The debate could focus on many different aspects of defence in the world, but the Secretary of State implied in his statement last week that this would be the occasion for the House to debate his proposals in dealing with the request from the US to upgrade the early warning radar at Fylingdales for missile defence. The country and the House also rightly expect to have an opportunity to debate in depth current Government policy in respect of Iraq. The point must be made that if the Government believe that missile defence merits the attention of the House, time should also be set aside for a debate on Iraq. Likewise, the time afforded in today's debate is in no way sufficient to address all the strategic and political questions inherent in many of the significant decisions that will have to be taken in the next few weeks and months. How we are to deal with Iraq, and whether or not to participate in the US missile defence programme may both be subjects covered by "defence in the world", but both need separate consideration, and my party has considerable concerns about Government policy on each.
As announced this week, the deployment of more than 30,000 troops to the Gulf is unique in size and has proceeded without any debate or vote in this House. The Secretary of State will be only too well aware that many consider this to be yet another example of proceeding down a predetermined route in conjunction with the United States. Although he has properly emphasised on many occasions that war is not inevitable, realistically, such actions reduce options and increase pressure to use those forces.
The Prime Minister has emphasised that time must be given for the weapons inspectors to undertake their tasks. We entirely agree with that. It therefore seems at the very least somewhat premature to deploy such a large force at this time, bearing in mind the significant
logistical support that will be required over the prolonged period. The Secretary of State seemed to indicate in his statement earlier this week that a force of this size can be maintained in theatre indefinitely, but that is not a view shared by many other experienced commentators. Is it realistic to think that our troops can be maintained over a prolonged period, to enable inspections to be fully completed and weapons inspectors' reports to be received and considered, before any action is taken?I welcome the Secretary of State's statement on Monday that a substantive vote in the House would precede any commitment of British troops. That has considerable public support. What would happen, however, if the House were to vote no or with only a relatively small majority in favour? Could we realistically opt out of any operation if the Government chose not to support a US-led invasion? Are we not so operationally tied in to the United States plans that if President Bush gives the word, we will have no real alternative but to follow?
As regards the preparations for the deployment of our troops, there are many questions concerning the quality of the regulation kit, the capability of tanks and helicopters to operate under desert conditions and the position in hospitals at home once military medical staff have been deployed. The time available to make the modifications to the equipment and artillery seems, at best, to be extremely tight, with little or no opportunity for full testing to ensure that the alternations have been successful. In particular, the communications problems identified in Oman are very significant so much so that the National Audit Office declared a capability gap until 2004. In an increasingly technological world, communications are clearly vital. Will the Secretary of State or the Minister who winds up the debate confirm just how our forces will talk to each other on the battlefield?
As has been said, it is impossible to exclude entirely the possibility of incidents of friendly fire in warfare. However, everything should be done to ensure that they are reduced to the absolute minimum, so will the Minister indicate what identification friend or foe—IFF—upgrades are not yet complete and what preparations are in hand to ensure that British tanks are not bombed by US planes?
I briefly want to mention defence medical services where the shortfalls in capability are perhaps most stark. Considerable pressure is being placed on the reservists to fulfil other international peacekeeping commitments—let alone those in the middle east. Ministry of Defence hospital units are understaffed and locums are employed to take up the slack. Even the use of private hospitals to treat service members is beginning to fail to cope with the situation. In my local district general hospital at Derriford in Plymouth, the deployment of military medical staff has already brought the closure of a 35-bed surgical ward. I am therefore extremely concerned that any further deployment of such staff will have even more profound effects on a hospital that is already struggling to cope with other related problems.
I applaud the staff and managers alike at Derriford for their manful attempts to keep all hospital services running as normal, but further reductions in key medical staff will inevitably mean that patient care is compromised and that waiting lists will lengthen. What contingency plans have been made by the Ministry of Defence, in conjunction with the Department of Health, to spread the pressure more evenly, so that particular hospitals that have a higher than normal proportion of military medical staff are supported by other units that are not so greatly affected?
I turn now to missile defence. Can the Minister explain the seemingly incredible rush to judgment on an issue that is of huge strategic and political importance? It seems only a matter of days since the Secretary of State received the formal request from the United States, yet here he is, inviting consultation on the one hand, while wishing to sanction the request at the very earliest opportunity on the other. If, indeed, the decision to allow the US to upgrade the radar station at Fylingdales in no way commits us to participate in the US programme, why did the Secretary of State feel the need to make such a lengthy statement extolling the virtues of missile defence if his only purpose was to announce a simple software upgrade? His Department's public discussion document was published just before the Christmas recess, but already a number of serious questions about our participation in a future US programme remain unanswered.
First, is any agreement to this upgrade truly "not at odds with the view of our allies"? The NATO Prague summit agreed to examine options for different kinds of missile defence; it certainly did not issue a statement in favour of the development of a US programme. What discussions has the Secretary of State had with our allies and what do they really think of this US request? What are the terms of the memorandum of understanding that the MOD is apparently negotiating with the US on access to the American missile defence programme? This is an important aspect of any technological integration and needs to be more clearly explained.
Many strategic and technological dimensions to the missile system are not well understood, and the hasty deployment of any system must carry political and strategic consequences, not least among other nuclear powers and for the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. Will the Government set out the clear criteria by which they seem to have already judged their decision on this matter? The Foreign Office deserves recognition for its role in promoting the new Hague code of conduct against ballistic missile proliferation, so are the Government satisfied that this, and other non-proliferation measures, will not be undermined by the missile defence system, whether at the instigation of the US alone or the US with others?
What is certain, however, is that missile defence is not an option just yet, and that the dangers of proliferation represented by North Korea, Iran and Libya, which the MOD consultation document discusses at length, are problems that have to be dealt with now with the tools currently available. Does the Minister agree that, regardless of the development of future defensive measures, the best way to reduce the threat from ballistic missiles is to strengthen the international non-proliferation and monitoring regimes?
I began by saying that we live in an uncertain world. It is unlikely that a war on Iraq will eradicate the fight against international terrorism in one fell swoop. The next few months will be a defining time for the UN and the countries that support it. The threats to world peace now offer far more complex challenges to all countries and their Governments. The UK has played a significant role in the defence of the world and the maintenance of peace, and it must continue to do so using its influence, patience and long-standing policy of military force as the very last resort, having exhausted all other avenues to peace. The British Government must hold on to those principles in the face of what appears to be considerable pressure for more immediate action. They must ensure that firm political control is maintained over their armed forces so that any future decision on their use is retained and not compromised by their deployment as part of an international force.
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