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28 Jan 2003 : Column 766—continued
Mr. Darling: I am very much aware of the keen interest that, for obvious reasons, the hon. Gentleman takes in the Potters Bar accident. The whole point in having a rail accident investigation branch is precisely in order to get an explanation of what happened as quickly as possible. That is one of the things that many of the relatives of those who lost their lives in that crash, and many of those who were injured, want to know as quickly as possible. So the setting up of the RAIB will be a major step forward, and it will speed matters up far more than does the current system, under which a very long time often elapses before we find out what happened and why.
Mr. Brian H. Donohoe (Cunninghame, South): Although I welcome these proposals, we must consider the fragmentation of the industry, which the Transport Committee has examined. Given that safety is of paramount importance, I wonder whether the Secretary of State's proposals go far enough. Should we not combine all the agencies that he identifies, so that a single agency can look after safety?
Mr. Darling: No, I am afraid that I do not agree with my hon. Friend's final point. It is important to recognise that the two existing branches operate in different ways partly because of the characteristics of the industry. For example, in investigations undertaken by the air accident investigation branch, the manufacturer, air traffic control and everybody concerned are usually anxious to get to the bottom of what happened very quickly, because it may be necessary to send instructions around the world in respect of the operation of particular aircraft. On marine accidents, a slightly different approach is often taken, and the industry is structured in a different way. It has been put to me by the air accident investigation branch and the marine accident investigation branch that much of their expertise and specialism might be lost if they were merged into a single body.
I therefore think it better to establish the rail accident investigation branch and to allow the three branches to continue. If a compelling case is made in future for bringing them together, we shall look at it, but at the moment—given what I know about how they work and
the nature of what they have to deal with—we would lose a lot more by setting up a single branch, rather than continuing with the existing system. What is striking about the air and the marine branches is that both work very well and seem to be highly successful; indeed, other countries throughout the world look at them and ask how they can do the same. If something works, it is best to leave it well alone.
Lawrie Quinn (Scarborough and Whitby): My right hon. Friend mentions the legacy of the rail industry, and for the reasons that he gives there is a great need for technical resources in order to carry out investigations quickly. Does he foresee that the new branch will have its own technical resources, or will it procure them from places such as the former research station at Derby, the facility through which British Railways Board built up the expertise to which he alludes?
Mr. Darling: The answer to that is probably a bit of both. My hon. Friend is probably aware of how the air accident investigation branch works. It has its own technical back-up in Farnborough, but in carrying out investigations it is heavily dependent on outside bodies. No one branch could include the expertise necessary to consider every aspect of a train incident, for example. I am certain that, from time to time, the new branch will need to go to outside bodies to get the expertise that it needs, and that is what people would expect.
Linda Perham (Ilford, North): The Secretary of State mentioned accidents on the tube, and he will probably agree that it would have been useful if this measure had been in place when Saturday's accident happened. My constituents and I use the Central line a lot; indeed, there were 800 people on the train in question. We certainly need to look at accidents on the tube rather more seriously than we have in the past.
Mr. Darling: My hon. Friend makes a good point. Had the RAIB already been in existence, the chief inspector would probably have decided to look at Saturday's accident. As it is, we are a considerable way down the line in finding out what happened on the tube on that day, and the causes of that accident are becoming fairly clear. As my hon. Friend doubtless knows, London Underground is in the process of deciding what needs to be done to put trains back on the Central line. It clearly wants to be sure that it has identified exactly what happened, and to take appropriate remedial action, before restoring the trains. However, my hon. Friend is right, and the new branch, had it been in existence, would have wanted to get involved.
Glenda Jackson (Hampstead and Highgate) rose—
Mike Gapes (Ilford, South) rose—
Mr. Darling: I shall give way in order of seeing: first, to my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and Highgate (Glenda Jackson).
Glenda Jackson: I am grateful to learn that my right hon. Friend is committed to allowing interventions from both genders in this House. I strongly endorse what he
says about the London underground, and I realise that inquiries into the most recent accident are ongoing. However, it is not the case that as far back as the summer of 2001, when a potentially very serious accident occurred in which four trains became blocked in a tube during the hottest day of the year, London Underground's internal inquiry found that the failure was one of command and control? Indeed, some reports on the most recent accident on the Central line point the finger at the same fault. Will my right hon. Friend ensure that we do indeed learn from such mistakes, and that London Underground's current management is urged to make public such inquiries?
Mr. Darling: I spoke to the managing director of London Underground this morning, and he agreed that the findings of the inquiry should be made public, which is the best thing to do. All inquiries should be made public so that people can see for themselves what lessons can be learned. It would not be right—and possibly I would be out of order—to go through what I know and what people believe happened on Saturday, but I can assure my hon. Friend that an inquiry is being held. As soon as its conclusions are known, I hope that London Underground will make them public. At the moment, however, further investigations need to be carried out.
Mike Gapes : The Secretary of State will be aware that the implications of the accident on the Central line are serious for people who commute to work in central London from east and west London. He will be aware that it has been predicted that it could be at least several weeks before the Central line is operating properly. In those circumstances, will he join me in calling on the Mayor of London to delay the introduction of congestion charging until the Central line is fully operational; otherwise there will be continued chaos and pressure throughout east and west London as a result of the crash?
Mr. Darling: No doubt, the Mayor of London will want to consider that in relation to the new scheme. I accept my hon. Friend's point that the loss of the Central line will have a major impact on commuters who normally use it, but I believe that he would agree that it is important that London Underground identifies correctly the cause of the accident, then makes sure that it takes the right remedial action before trains are put back on the track.
If it is all right with hon. Members, I should like to make progress and return to the point touched on by my hon. Friend the Member for Cunninghame, South (Mr. Donohoe). It is important to remember that safety is not an add-on extra—it must be seen as an essential part of every activity, indeed every decision, every day on the railways. The new branch will help, but we must ensure that the right management and controls are in place, particularly for maintenance. As I have said before, the Strategic Rail Authority has provided the industry with strategic direction, and under its leadership different parts of the industry have worked together and have been able to get to grips with difficult problems that need to be resolved.
Maintenance is critical to safety, which is why Network Rail is making a number of fundamental changes to the way in which it controls maintenance, so
getting a much-needed grip on it. We must ensure that there is accountability for what happens, and certain steps are essential if safety on the railway is to be improved. Under Railtrack, as the House will know, decisions about maintenance were farmed out to other companies in too many cases. There was no end-to-end responsibility or accountability, but that is now changing. Network Rail is operating in the public interest, and is putting safety and reliability first. In future, Network Rail will decide what work is done and how it is done. Critically, it will make sure that the work is done properly, because rigorous control of maintenance is essential for safety, as well as making good business sense. As existing maintenance contracts end, Network Rail will decide whether to extend existing arrangements or to tender new contracts to take the work back in-house, as it will do on the route between Reading and Paddington, for example. Contractors will only be appointed when Network Rail thinks that that is the right thing to do. However, whatever it does, it will ensure proper supervision of work from start to finish, which is essential and will meet demands from Members on both sides of the House for proper supervision and accountability in maintenance work. In addition, the franchising arrangements that are being overhauled will allow for tighter management of train services and ensure that some of the deficiencies left over from privatisation are finally tackled and dealt with.With the changes that we have now made, we have the means to manage the railway, but that needs to be underpinned by substantial investment. That brings me to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, South about safety. Rail investment in real terms will be more than three times as much as it was in the decade leading up to 1997. Indeed, spending will double in the four years between 2001 and 2005, and will buy new, better and safer rolling stock—there is almost £1 billion-worth of new rolling stock now on the track, and more is on order—will help to pay for the west coast main line and other improvements and upgrades, allowing for safer and reliable travel, and will pay for the train protection warning systems that are now being installed.
I can tell the House that train protection warning systems have been installed on 97 per cent. of trains and 76 per cent. of the necessary tracks. The programme is well on the way to completion. By the end of this year, the rest of the work agreed with the Health and Safety Executive will be complete, and a warning system will operate on all trains. There are, of course, some parts of track where a warning system has little or no safety benefit so, with the HSE's agreement, one will not be installed there. However, on the great bulk of track, all the work agreed with the HSE will be completed.
My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, South asked about the European position. There are three levels of warning system in Europe. Level 1 uses line-side signals and, although it could be installed in this country, it would restrict capacity on busy lines. It is fitted on a comparatively small number of lines in Europe, and its use is not widespread. Level 2, which is a slightly more sophisticated version, uses transmission-based signalling—it is installed on the train instead of on the track—and would allow increased capacity.
However, the House needs to be aware that level 2 of the European safety system works only on a limited number of lines, including the line between Berne and Olten in Switzerland, which does not have any junctions and has a limited number of sidings. The problem with Lord Cullen's inquiry is that the learned judge was led to believe that there was a system in Europe that was tried, tested and working and could be installed on trains in this country. That is not the case.The level 3 system in the long term has a great commercial and safety advantage, as it can operate on trains and monitor their progress. No doubt, one day it will be extremely useful, but the difficulty is that it is not in use anywhere at the moment. The systems put before Lord Cullen have the disadvantage that even the basic level is not in widespread use in Europe and would lead, if used here, to restrictions in the number of trains that we could run. The more sophisticated and advanced level 2 system operates on one line in Switzerland with no junctions—we do not have many lines like that—and level 3, as I said, does not exist in operation. For those reasons, I believe that we are right to ensure that the train protection warning system, which can stop trains travelling at comparatively high speed, is installed. As I told the House, 97 per cent. of trains and 76 per cent. of necessary track have already been fitted with the system.
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