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28 Jan 2003 : Column 808—continued
5.54 pm
Mr. Kelvin Hopkins (Luton, North): I welcome the chance to speak on Second Reading, as I broadly support the Bill, like other hon. Members who have spoken. I speak as a rail commuter of 34 years' standing. I have never yet driven to the House of Commons. I have travelled by train every day, and I feel much safer being driven by my splendid ASLEF driver than I would if I were driving, even at a relatively low speed. That is a comment on my driving, as much as on the safety of the railway system. We have spoken glowingly this afternoon about how safe rail travel is, but we should
remember that the genesis of the Bill was a number of serious railway accidents. Before we are all swallowed up in the warm glow of consensus, we should remember the things that have gone wrong and those that are still not right.I offer the House a personal anecdote. Just over three years ago, it was suggested through a third party that I might take photographs of the state of the track north of Hadley Wood tunnel, an area that I know quite well, on the east coast main line, and send the photographs to my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister, who was responsible for transport at that time. I did not do that, because I did not have time and I was not minded to do it, but it was a serious suggestion. Some time later, there was an accident at Hatfield, and some time after that, an accident at Potters Bar. Potters Bar is the next station north of Hadley Wood, and Hatfield is another three stations further along on the same stretch of the east coast main line. I suggest that there might have been some good purpose in my photographing that track, and sending it to the Deputy Prime Minister at the time, although of course I take no responsibility for the terrible things that happened later.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Stevenson) suggested that we should study accidents that did not result in serious injury or death, but which illustrate the problem. I shall describe such a case, which occurred at a siding in Yorkshire, where the nose of the points was removed—that is, the central metal part of the points, where they join. Six months later a train was directed over the points and was derailed. It was a coal train and no one was hurt, but it was still a serious derailment. Why did it happen?
First, the points should have been clipped—that is, they should have been clamped together on one side so that they could not be moved. Secondly, fuses controlling the signals should have been removed. Thirdly, reminder appliances should have been placed over the operating switch in the signal box. Fourthly, notice detailing the non-availability of the points should have been issued to all drivers and signals in the area. None of that was done. The responsible contractor was Jarvis, the contractor responsible for the track at Potters Bar.
There is a problem with contracting and the contracting culture in the railway industry, and I do not stand alone in saying that. I refer to the comments by Stanley Hall, who spent a lifetime with British Rail as a senior signalling and safety officer at the highest level, who stated in "Rail" magazine this month:
- "One of the worst decisions of those who designed the privatisation structure has proved to be the reliance of the industry on outside help . . . No one wants another organisational upheaval but the present system is unsafe and expensive."
We should remember that even though travelling by rail is safe, and even though railway travel has become safer, it is still potentially very dangerous. One accident on a railway line can cause a horrendous number of deaths. I am old enough to remember the Harrow and Wealdstone disaster, which was terrifying and awesome.
I have made my point: the Bill goes in the right direction, but to be effective it must affect what happens on the railway track now. I could relate one or two more anecdotes told to me by staff who work in the railway industry—for example, about contractors who dispense with the use of a look-out when they are working at night. There have been fatalities of railway workers, who are as important as passengers in matters of life and death. The contracting record is not good. I look forward to the contractors being taken over progressively by Network Rail, and a much safer railway environment for the foreseeable future.
6 pm
Mr. Michael Weir (Angus): On behalf of the Scottish National party and Plaid Cymru, I also wish to give a general welcome to the Bill. I think that that gives the Minister a full set of parties supporting the Bill.
Much has been said in this debate about safety on the railways, and the Secretary of State said that safety was paramount. Many of the current worries about rail safety have undoubtedly been exacerbated by the privatisation of the railways, which has ensured that a multiplicity of organisations are responsible for rail safety, including train operating companies, Railtrack—now Network Rail—the Health and Safety Executive and others. Indeed, as the hon. Member for Luton, North (Mr. Hopkins) pointed out, Network Rail has recently demonstrated the case by renationalising part of the line between Reading and Paddington to keep prices down and ensure the quality of the work. Victims of the Potters Bar crash have blamed Jarvis, the contractor responsible for maintaining the tracks in the area, for failing to carry out its work to the required standard, leading directly to the crash.
Those worries continue on the railway and also in respect of the London underground proposals. Much has also been said about the derailment of a train on the Central line on Saturday. The RMT has expressed serious concerns about what is happening as London Underground heads towards the PPP. Indeed, one of the weekend newspapers reported it as saying that a Piccadilly line driver had recently expressed concern about a banging noise, but was told that if he refused to drive the train and it was found to be safe, he would have to "face the consequences". If that is true, it is a terrible indictment of what is happening on the London underground. The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Stevenson) made a very good point about how safety should be pre-emptive as well as reactive. That must be considered as the situation progresses.
It seems to us self-evident that privatisation has exacerbated the problem through the profit motive and the dispersal of responsibility. We believe that only by running the rail network on a not-for-profit basis can we ensure that safety is put before profit. The right hon. Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir George Young) cited the airline industry in support of his argument, but I am not sure how that position can hold water, given the perilous financial straits of many airlines. Some airlines are running on a state subsidy, while many large American ones have sued for chapter 11 protection because of their financial position.
Much was made of high-speed rail links, especially in Japan. However, its Bullet trains were brought into being with specifically designed new lines. One of the
problems of the rail system in this country is that there has been no investment for many years, which makes it much more difficult to upgrade lines so that they can take new high-speed trains. That has been demonstrated by the difficulties encountered on the west coast main line.We are pleased that the Government have decided to implement the recommendations of the Cullen inquiry and accepted that Her Majesty's rail inspectorate could not adequately perform the dual role of safety regulator and accident investigator. We accept that the new body will be better placed to deal with investigations into rail accidents.
Like many hon. Members, however, we have some concerns about the specifics of the Bill. In an intervention on the hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby (Lawrie Quinn), I referred to the definition of accidents. While the Bill requires the new body to investigate serious accidents, it allows it discretion over whether to investigate non-serious accidents. In my mind, a problem therefore immediately arises about what constitutes a serious accident, as the Bill gives no definition. The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South asked whether a serious accident was one in which people lost their lives. How is such an accident defined? In many cases, it will be obvious that an accident is serious, but there could be a fairly large grey area, so it would be helpful for the Minister to clarify his definition.
There is a potential problem of accidents that may not superficially be serious—whatever the definition—but have grave implications for safety in other parts of the system. It is worth remembering that large parts of the east coast main line were effectively closed for a long time after the Hatfield accident because of worries about equipment on the rails. The Bill does not adequately cover that.
A relatively minor accident that disclosed a fundamental flaw in some aspect of equipment or use might have a serious effect on the whole rail system. It would have been helpful if the Government had laid the regulations before the House and included definitions in the Bill. That could have assured us that the new bodies were committed to undertaking a range of investigations into all sorts of accidents rather than allowing the system to slip back into its old ways of investigating only obviously serious accidents.
I am not clear about the way in which the new body links with other organisations, especially the Health and Safety Executive, which might have a role in investigating apparently minor accidents. How would it cross-check with the rail accident investigation branch? For example, how would evidence taken by the Health and Safety Executive be used if a further matter came to light that would encourage the new body to investigate the incident further? Would the new body be informed automatically of findings during investigations into apparently minor incidents that might have wider implications? Would it be able or obliged to take over that investigation if the issue affected the rest of the rail network?
The Transport Salaried Staffs Association raised anxieties in its briefing for the debate about confidentiality, especially about clause 8(4). The briefing states:
- "It is expected that regulations will provide that a witness statement given to the RAIB may not be disclosed to a third party (such as the police or the Health and Safety Executive) without consent, or a court order. For RAIB to be effective it is absolutely essential that operational staff have confidence in its integrity and expertise. Confidence in RAIB is dependent upon employees being assured that these statements . . . are treated as confidential."
However, what would happen if the position were reversed, and an investigation by the Health and Safety Executive unearthed information that made it more appropriate for the RAIB to take it over? Could statements to the Health and Safety Executive be passed to the new body, or would the RAIB have to start from scratch?
Other hon. Members have mentioned clause 102, which gives details of the railway safety levy. There appears to be confusion about that because one briefing suggests that the provision relates to the RAIB, but it appears to refer only to the Health and Safety Executive. It is not clear who will pay the levy because that is to be stated in regulations. Subsection (5)(b) simply provides for the Secretary of State to determine
- "the persons by whom the levy is to be paid".
The Secretary of State skipped perfunctorily over part 2, which relates to the establishment of the Office of the Rail Regulator. We would generally welcome that. The hon. Member for Greenock and Inverclyde (David Cairns) mentioned the responsibility of members of the body for Scotland, Wales and the English regions.
It may not entirely surprise the Minister to be told that we would urge upon him the need to ensure adequate Scottish and Welsh representation on the Committee. Indeed, there may be a case for a separate Scottish Committee to consider matters relating to Scotland. The right hon. Gentleman smiles, but this is as much a practical as a political point. He should be aware that the structure and control of the railway system in Scotland is not identical to that in the rest of the United Kingdom. In particular, the Scottish Parliament has some powers in these areas.
Rail journeys that commence and end in Scotland are within the ambit of the Scottish Parliament. Those that begin in Scotland but cross over the border are within the ambit of this House. The result is that control of most of the commuter traffic in Scotland, and in particular commuter traffic going into Glasgow and Edinburgh, is devolved, while control of intercity rail
travel is essentially reserved. That leads to some strange anomalies. In my Angus constituency, which is on the main east coast line, many services that are effectively local services for the people in the area are intercity trains reserved to Westminster.Therefore, I urge the Minister to give careful consideration to this matter, and not simply to dismiss this request for separate Scottish representation. It is important that the Scottish Parliament be fully involved in discussions on all aspects of the railways that relate to Scotland, particularly within the boundaries of Scotland, for which it is responsible.
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