| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
30 Jan 2003 : Column 1078—continued
4.31 pm
Julie Morgan (Cardiff, North): Like my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and other hon. Members, I welcome the opportunity to discuss the humanitarian consequences of a possible war on Iraq.
In recent months, there has been a feeling that we are moving inevitability towards war, but I do not accept that war is inevitable. I still hope that a diplomatic solution will be found, and many hon. Members have said that we must do our utmost to prevent it from happening. The debate is important because we can set the humanitarian consequences of the war against the aims of the war, which causes me to ask: at what price war? I hope that when the Prime Minister and President Bush consider the problem at the weekend, they also weigh up the humanitarian consequences of going to war. I do not think that war is the lesser evil.
The recent leaked UN report on the humanitarian impact of such a war shows the vulnerability of the Iraqi population, half of whom are under 14, as many hon. Members have said. The children will be most affected by a conflict. They are most affected by the regime and will suffer most. How will the international community protect them and their families? From what the United Nations says, that will be very difficult, as my right hon. Friend acknowledged, although she did assure us that the structures are being put in place. But the country is vulnerable, much more so than in 1991.
As other hon. Members said, most of the Iraqi people depend on the Government for their basic needs. According to the World Food Programme, 80 per cent. of average Iraqi household income depends on food rations, with 60 per cent. of homes solely dependent on them, which is 16 million people. Those people will be directly affected by any disruption in food supplies, which a war will inevitably bring. Obviously, the amount of disruption will depend on which part of the country people live in. The issues are different in the north and in the south and central areas, as hon. Members said.
My right hon. Friend said that the UN is preparing for war and considering the humanitarian consequences, but I am worried about what money is being made available in the UN. The leaked draft UN report of 7 January 2003, only three weeks ago, says that the UN agencies will not be able to reach their minimum level of readiness unless initial requirements are provided. On 7 January, no funds were available to pre-position stocks to constitute the minimal level of preparedness that the UN talks about. Is the document correct? Has there been any change in the situation since 7 January? I hope that my right hon. Friend can say whether any more money has become available since 7 January.
In the crisis that war will bring, the UN tells us that 4.2 million children under the age of five would be highly vulnerable, as would 1 million pregnant women. At present, 30 per cent. of babies in Iraq are born with low birth weights. Only 80 per cent. of children have had the measles vaccination, and the report says that a measles
epidemic is likely. It estimates that, in a war, 30 per cent. of under-fives would be at risk of death from malnutrition. Those figures have been given several times today, but they cannot be stated too often.There is still a shortage of drugs and vaccines, according to the UN, and UNICEF expects a shortage of drugs, especially antibiotics, within a month of the outbreak of war, as the population begins to suffer from diarrhoea and the other illnesses associated with the inevitable consequences of drinking water supplies being cut off in the event of war.
Mr. Pollard: Is my hon. Friend aware that, in the southern parts of Iraq in particular, many babies are still being born malformed—some with two heads—as a result of depleted uranium used in the last war? We perhaps have that to look forward to in the next one.
Julie Morgan: I had heard that. The situation is of great concern.
The British Government are one of the largest donors to Iraq, having given about £100 million since the Gulf war. Our aid has focused on health, sanitation and water, but still, under the present regime and with the effect of sanctions, Iraq's mortality rate in the centre and the south is 2.5 times the level recorded in 1990. Despite the slight improvement that has already been mentioned, the present situation is very bad, and it is likely to be much worse after a war is declared.
I come now to the situation of refugees. The UN expects that up to 1.45 million refugees and asylum seekers would try to flee the country. Some countries may deny access to refugees or make them stay in camps on the borders or just inside Iraq. As the borders are mined, it is likely that there will be casualties caused by the mines, especially on the borders with Iran and Turkey. Therefore, I too wish to ask the Government what they will do to try to stop families fleeing into areas where there are mines.
I recently visited Iran, which already has 2 million refugees from Afghanistan. We had discussions with the agencies about the plan in Iran to encourage Afghan refugees to return to Afghanistan over a period of four years. Many of them are very reluctant to go back, for reasons that have been mentioned today. Outside Kabul, they do not know what they would be going back to. That is an important point that we should bear in mind when we think that there may be many Iraqi refugees entering Iran, which has the highest population of refugees in the world.
There will also be internally displaced people, estimated by the UN at up to 900,000, in addition to those already in Iraq. They are the most vulnerable in the world. The Save the Children Fund has briefed us on the fate of internally displaced people, who are without the established system of international protection. It has vividly described the experiences of children who have been displaced throughout the world. Many become separated from their families and are most vulnerable to sexual abuse and attack and at risk of malnutrition. These children will also lose out on education and on most of their childhood, because the problem will take many years to set right. They will not have the
opportunity of normal play activity. Already in the centre and south of Iraq, one in three girls do not attend primary school, so there is disruption to their education. If children become internally displaced, there is a much greater chance of disruption. The protection of displaced children is a priority for the United Nations, which has produced guiding principles on such children, and it is essential that they are followed. Will my right hon. Friend do all that she can to ensure that, if war starts, the UN protocols are observed?I am pleased that we are having this debate. In deciding whether to go to war, we must take into consideration the humanitarian consequences. At present, I do not believe that war is justified, and everything that has been said today confirms me in that view.
4.40 pm
Mrs. Cheryl Gillan (Chesham and Amersham): It is always a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Cardiff, North (Julie Morgan), who posed some interesting questions that I hope the Secretary of State will have time to answer in her winding-up speech.
First, I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden (Mrs. Spelman) on calling for this debate. I agree with her opening remarks and those of the hon. Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd). I, too, was supposed to be serving on a Committee considering secondary legislation. It was a difficult choice, but I deemed this debate more important—there is no doubt that within the next few weeks we will more likely than not be fighting a war on Iraqi soil to remove weapons of mass destruction from the hands of a brutal and vicious dictator. As my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden said in her excellent opening speech, virtually all contributions to previous debates in the House have concentrated on military operations and the justification for action. It is surprising that the Government have not placed more emphasis on the humanitarian side of the equation, and I hope that today's debate will genuinely help to strengthen the hand of the Secretary of State and give her a louder voice in Cabinet discussions.
Dr. Murrison: Does my hon. Friend agree that the humanitarian and military effort are one and the same? The military need to prepare for what will subsequently be demanded of them. As the Secretary of State said, she is only just starting to liaise with the military so that they can take over many tasks that non-governmental organisations have said they will not do if biological or chemical agents are used in theatre.
Mrs. Gillan: My hon. Friend is right, and anticipates the military angle that I hope to discuss later.
Except for the privileged few, Iraq and its people are in pretty poor shape, as everybody has attested. Almost three quarters of the population now depend on food handouts, and child mortality has rocketed due to the combined effects of malnourishment, poor sanitation, lack of clean drinking water and grossly inadequate health care.
Children are not the only vulnerable ones. Elderly and handicapped people and those who have been internally displaced are also living in highly precarious conditions.
Military action itself will leave a legacy of destruction and deprivation on top of the existing humanitarian disaster. It will drive sick and starving people in their thousands through hostile conditions across the border into surrounding countries, and will displace people from their homes and separate them from family members. There is no doubt that people will die. It is therefore imperative that the House understand the Government's plans and the readiness of DFID and the relevant agencies for involvement in the difficult task of delivering swift and effective aid in a complex humanitarian emergency.I want to explore in the brief time available the role of the military and the pitfalls that may face them. In the past 20 years or so, they have increasingly found themselves facilitating humanitarian assistance following conflicts. Indeed, I have seen our troops in operation in Pristina and surrounding areas, where they played a major role both in peacekeeping and in helping to rebuild communities devastated by war. The military do not act in isolation—they have to deal with various agencies and organisations, all of which have different roles and responsibilities, different methods of working and different chains of command. That can lead to problems, as past experience has shown. I should like to know whether the lessons of previous humanitarian operations have been learned and whether they will be put into practice in any potential conflict.
The first concerns assessment. In dealing with a complex humanitarian emergency, the first priority is rapid assessment to identify or even confirm needs, identify public health requirements and determine priorities and resources. Following the Gulf war, it was found that both civilian and military personnel working in Iraq were not trained in rapid public health and needs assessments or survey skills. I believe that the MOD and DFID have undertaken efforts to train both civilian and military personnel in those vital and basic skills. If so, may we have the details? Is the Secretary of State satisfied that the training so far has been sufficient?
A second issue that arose was the poorly defined role of the military, which contributed to co-ordination problems. What has the Department done to ensure that better communication between agencies and the military will be facilitated in the field during the humanitarian phase of the operation? Such was the failure of preparation that the aid efforts were even hampered by workers and military personnel being unable to speak the same language or the local language. What language training has been carried out for our NGOs and our forces?
Thirdly, political barriers to effective aid delivery were encountered in the last Gulf conflict. The western relief programme, Operation Haven, for the displaced Kurdish population was not as successful as it might have been. The refugees were restricted to high, cold and exposed mountain slopes, with poor sanitation and water supplies. The mortality rate was consequently high, and even though the public health needs strongly indicated the need for a rapid move, probably to a position over the Turkish border, that was not possible. Turkey was having its own internal political problems with the Kurdish nationalist movement, and some commentators have speculated that that may have been why the refugees could not be moved to more suitable
terrain.There is no doubt that many people died from the harsh conditions, and would not have died, had they been moved to suitable areas.What has the Secretary of State done to ensure that suitable sites have been identified in Iraq or the surrounding countries, and what discussions have taken place or are planned to take place, particularly with Turkey, to reduce the likelihood of the situation being repeated? We need to be able to guarantee that political expediency does not take precedence over epidemiological evidence.
Fourthly, the western relief programme was hampered by the absence of the UNHCR and its usual co-ordination role because its mandate did not cover internally displaced people. Can the Secretary of State tell us whether that is still the case, or whether it will be able to play a full role in any relief programme, irrespective of the status of the people?
Practical issues have arisen in other humanitarian relief operations and I should be grateful if the right hon. Lady could address these. Initially, in Goma in 1994, the military rather than an NGO such as Oxfam was required to provide a clean water supply for more than 50,000 refugees from neighbouring Rwanda. The military personnel faced huge technical problems for which they were not well equipped, and within eight days, a cholera epidemic raged through the camp, killing more than 30,000 refugees. In the end, at the height of the epidemic, more then 100 NGOs and 50 military contingents were working together. The UNHCR had no control over them, and when the final analysis took place, it was discovered that the military interventions were six times more expensive than the NGO interventions, and of course their presence in this instance exacerbated the co-ordination problems in the field. Can the Secretary of State reassure me that the lessons from Goma have been taken on board, and that only well-equipped personnel with appropriate equipment and training will be used in any humanitarian aid programme in Iraq?
Also in Rwanda, a small military contingent set up a field hospital for the refugees in Gikongoro and after a few weeks passed the operation over to NGOs. Although the military had provided superb medical and surgical care, it was found that the death rate among the refugees was more than eight per 1,000 per day, which is far above the accepted norm of 0.5 per 1,000 per day. Post-event analysis showed that although the medical care was excellent, the military had not recognised that the lack of shelter, water and sanitation was a priority, and the resulting public health problems had caused the high mortality. They had been focused on the priorities that they had rightly identified through their military training—that is, treating the wounded—and had failed to appreciate the public health implications. Inadvertently, they had added a dimension to the problems and many refuges died from common communicable diseases before it was even realised.
There are many other examples where the best intentions have not resulted in the best outcomes. I should like some reassurances, in particular that DFID has addressed the poor training and inadequate preparedness of personnel, the inadequate understanding of public health problems and priorities, the variable quality and poor targeting of aid, the
political override of epidemiological needs, and the lack of co-ordination of military and civilian or NGO operations.In addition, I would like to know what the MOD has done on those issues and about equipment, training, liaison with NGOs and civilians, cost-effectiveness studies and command structures during the aid phase. Military contingents have a role in humanitarian aid programmes, but those issues need to be addressed. The one thing that the military hate is dual tasking. Therefore, I should also like an assurance that there will be a follow-on military contingent to provide appropriate aid and security following any conflict.
We all hope that war will be avoided, but that depends on the actions of Saddam Hussein. We in this House need to know in the eventuality of war that we are well prepared to help the people of Iraq. The Secretary of State has so far disappointed us with her responses, but she will have another opportunity at the end of the debate to give the reassurances that we require. I hope that she will take that opportunity.
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |