| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
13 Feb 2003 : Column 1069—continued
Mr. Straw: I do not accept that. I am glad that the hon. Gentleman acknowledged that the focus of my statement today has been on resolution 1441, because that will be the focus if any action becomes necessary. We cannot, however, exclude other terrible aspects of the Iraqi regime, including its lamentable humanitarian record and the fact that it has supported and continues to support terrorism, in the circumstances that I have already described.
Mr. Robert Marshall-Andrews (Medway): May I ask my right hon. Friend for a clear statement of principle and intent? If the weapons inspectors report that Iraq is reasonably and fully complying and co-operating with them, and if, as a result of that compliance, matter is found that indicates that the original declaration was misleading, false or—to use the topical term—dodgy, would that be regarded as legitimising war?
Mr. Straw: I will send my hon. and learned Friend a copy of resolution 1441. The test for a further material breach is clearly laid out in operational paragraph 4, and we are subscribing to that.
Mr. Michael Jack (Fylde): The Foreign Secretary has put before the House today a well argued and well presented assessment for action, but he will realise that many members of the public are still sceptical. Many of them would have liked some real proof from the weapons inspectors. To that end, why was the latest intelligence information presented by Colin Powell to the Security Council—namely, a point at which the mobile germ warfare units replenished their stocks of materials—not made available to the weapons inspectors, so that, as Colin Powell was presenting it to the United Nations, Hans Blix and his inspectors could have found it and linked the assessment to reality?
Mr. Straw: Of course I understand the anxieties of members of the public. I have constituents, as does every other hon. Member, and I make myself fully available to them. I did so last Saturday, when I had a very good and thorough debate in an open-air meeting on Iraq that I organised in the centre of Blackburn. That consultation with my constituents will continue.
Mr. Keith Simpson (Mid-Norfolk): And with your son.
Mr. Straw: That is the essence of democracy, and I fully subscribe to it.
Of course there is no unanimity here, but the public want to hear the arguments in favour of the very difficult decisions that are before the Government and that will, perhaps, be before the House in due course. When they hear the arguments, they are convinced of the need for dealing with the issue in the way in which my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green
(Mr. McCabe) has just spelled out. On the other point that the right hon. Member for Fylde (Mr. Jack) raised, there has been very active co-operation between the intelligence agencies in the United States and the United Kingdom, and the weapons inspectors. I shall not go into detail about that, but there is always a difficult judgment to make about whether any intelligence should be given publicity, because its source could be extinguished immediately. We also had to be very careful, in the initial stages, about the degree of intelligence sharing, to ensure that it was done on a secure basis. It has been there, however, and it continues. I do not believe that either of the chief weapons inspectors has any complaint about the level or degree of intelligence sharing with them.
Alan Simpson (Nottingham, South): I am genuinely saddened at the answer—or non-answer—given to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews), because it will only serve to reinforce the public presumption that the Government are seeking a pretext for a war on Iraq, rather than the avoidance of one. I want to ask the Secretary of State a specific question about chemical and biological weapons. On 5 February, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld made it clear that America has plans to use what he referred to as "non-lethal" biochemical weapons on Iraqi society. Will the Secretary of State confirm what was admitted in that testimony, and that such weapons are illegal under the chemical and biological weapons conventions? Will he also confirm that the current UK policy is for UK troops not to be involved in any operations involving the use of such weapons? If that is not the case, will he explain why it would be acceptable for such weapons of mass destruction to be used on Iraqi society, if it is unacceptable for them to by used by Iraqi society?
Mr. Straw: I think that my hon. Friend is talking about CS spray, which our own police use.
Dr. John Pugh (Southport): In the Foreign Secretary's statement, we heard the line:
- "The central premise of Iraq's so-called disclosure—that Iraq possesses no weapons of mass destruction—was . . . a lie."
Mr. Straw: We have not received any evidence to that effect, but we know that he did have working nuclear devices and that he was within three years of being able to launch real nuclear weapons. We also know that the inspectors found—contrary to the disclosure—3,000 pages of documents relating to Iraq's nuclear programme, which were not in the offices of the Iraqi Ministry of Defence but in a private house.
Mr. David Chaytor (Bury, North): Does my right hon. Friend accept that the majority of British people have not been convinced by the Government's case, not because they have lost their nerve or do not take seriously the nature of the Iraqi regime or the problem of proliferation, but because they have not been convinced by the logic that a massive military attack will solve the problem. They see the United States' approach to North Korea and the inclusion of Iran—which is
currently our ally—in the axis of evil, and they ask questions about double standards. The Government, rather than continuously reiterate the threat from Iraq, should explain to the British people how a massive bombing attack would reduce the risk of terrorism in future. People see—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The Foreign Secretary will be able to answer that question.
Mr. Straw: As a matter of fact, I do not accept my hon. Friend's assertion that the British public do not acknowledge the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Indeed, in the past few months public understanding of the nature of the threat has greatly increased. I accept that public opinion is divided about whether we should back active diplomacy with a credible threat of force and be ready to follow that through. I understand that and I share the anxieties that people have about military action, because it should only ever be a last resort. We must show, as I hope we have, that we are being very patient and following through our obligations under international law by the United Nations route. However, as we know from world history, on occasions it is essential to enforce law by force; otherwise the world becomes extremely dangerous.
Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East): How realistic is it to maintain that Saddam Hussein can be permanently disarmed of his weapons of mass destruction without the removal of his regime?
Mr. Straw: We are following through resolution 1441, which lays out a peaceful pathway for Saddam's regime. I have dealt with the fact that, whether we like it or not, it would still remain in place under the resolution, albeit in very different circumstances. Of course, if that happened, we would need to maintain a continuous presence, with some kind of inspection to ensure continued compliance. However, the fact that we would be willing to accept that is further evidence that we are straining every sinew to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.
Glenda Jackson (Hampstead and Highgate): Is it British Government policy not to engage in a pre-emptive strike on Iraq without a second UN resolution to that effect? Would it still remain British Government policy to engage in a pre-emptive strike against Iraq if one or—as seems likely—more than one of the five members of the Security Council veto a second resolution?
Mr. Straw: I have spelled out to my hon. Friend and to the House our great preference for a second resolution, if one proves necessary. However, there has never been the least dubiety that we must reserve our position in the event that a second resolution is not possible. I understand my hon. Friend's anxieties about so-called pre-emption, but the United Nations charter, in article 50 and several other articles in chapter 7, clearly anticipates the use of what is described as "preventative force" to enforce the will of the United Nations.
Mr. Christopher Chope (Christchurch): Does the Foreign Secretary accept that one of the reasons why the
public are sceptical about the issue is the inherent ambiguity in resolution 1441? The Foreign Secretary today said that the words "serious consequences" could only mean disarmament by force. If that is the only interpretation of that expression, why were the words "disarmament by force" not included in the resolution originally?
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |