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26 Mar 2003 : Column 385—continued

Mr. Quentin Davies : Well, Mr. Deputy Speaker. That was one of the most dramatically revealing half hours that we have had in the course of all the debates that I have attended on Northern Ireland issues in the past 18 months. In the first half of the hon. Lady's remarks, with the mixture of charm and mastery of detail that we have come to associate with her, she endeavoured to lull us into believing that all we were dealing with was a purely functional matter; that because of the size of the population of Belfast, the scale of the city and its relation to other cities and other DPPs, it was necessary for practical reasons to divide its DPP into sub-groups. That is completely spurious. We appear to be in the grip of complete unreality.

Then came the dramatic intervention of the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon). I give the hon. Lady full credit for her response; she said that, in all honesty—we know that she is an honest person—she had to concede that the provision was really a concession to Sinn Fein-IRA. We, on the Opposition Benches, have known that all along. All that business about the size and scale of Belfast and the functional attractions of splitting up the DPP is complete eyewash, as it always was. It has all been most revealing. The Government publicity machine—the people who produce all the junk in the explanatory notes, no doubt Mr. Alastair Campbell or someone like that—tells us that the provision relates to purely functional and practical needs, yet the hon. Lady told us, quite directly, the truth. I do not say that she has let the cat out of the bag, as I do not want to get her into trouble. She told us what we all know to be the truth: the whole thing is a concession to Sinn Fein-IRA.

If there had been functional grounds for sub-groups in Belfast with such extensive powers, provision would have been made for them in the Police (Northern Act) 2000 or they would have been provided for unconditionally in the Bill. The reason the proposals have been introduced now is that, once again, the Government have decided to make concessions to Sinn Fein-IRA. Everything that I said earlier about DPP membership applies in this case. The Government's tactics are inappropriate and inept; indeed, they are extremely foolish. Sinn Fein-IRA have done nothing to merit our advancing or preparing these new concessions. Whether the concessions are conditional or otherwise, they send a signal that makes sense only if Sinn Fein-IRA had been doing something, too—if they were a reward for good behaviour. If there had been some good behaviour, we could move a few steps forward; yet there has been no good behaviour and we are taking gigantic steps forward. That is most regrettable and, as I said earlier, it is especially regrettable for the peace process—the point on which we should really be focusing.

I want to make two things plain so that there is no doubt in the minds of hon. Members when we take a decision on the new clause and the new schedule. I challenge the hon. Lady to intervene if I say anything that is not 100 per cent. justified by the facts.

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First, the effect of introducing the new clause and the new schedule will be to emasculate the DPP in Belfast.

Jane Kennedy indicated dissent.

Mr. Davies: The hon. Lady shakes her head, but all the powers of the DPP that were set out in the 2000 Act are now included in paragraph 5 of the new schedule as powers for the sub-group. The powers of DPPs under the 2000 Act are


various duties—


All those powers are in the Act.

Under the heading "District policing partnership sub-groups for Belfast", paragraph five of new schedule 2 states:


then quotes verbatim from the 2000 Act. The sub-groups will have the same powers and functions as the DPP. They will have


and so on. There is no question but that all the substantive powers of the DPP in Belfast will be devolved to the sub-groups. Now those will become the functions and powers of the sub-groups. They will provide views to the district commander, monitor the performance of the police, make arrangements for obtaining the views of the public and their co-operation and act as a general forum, and so on. So there is no question at all but that all the substantive powers—every one of them—of the DPP in Belfast will be devolved to the sub-groups.

The one function or role in life that I can find that remains with the DPP in Belfast is that of making a report to the Policing Board on behalf of Belfast, depending on the reports that it receives from the individual sub-groups, so heaven knows what the DPP will do when it meets once a month. A meeting once a year to consider the reports from the sub-groups, rubber stamp them and pass them on to the Policing Board would be entirely adequate in practice. The DPP in Belfast exists purely for form; the substance has been handed down to the sub-groups. There is no doubt about that at all.

Mr. John Bercow (Buckingham): The Government's proposal is deplorable and should be rejected by the House. If, however, it is not rejected and if the Minister is so confident that emasculation of the kind that my hon. Friend predicts will not transpire, would she not show confidence in her position if she were to agree to the insertion of a sunset clause that would require the Government to return to justify their position in, perhaps, 12 months' time?

Mr. Davies: Indeed, that is an attractive proposal, but in fact I notice that the hon. Lady, who is always very quick to jump to her feet to intervene when she feels that

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she may be able to correct something that I have said, is staying spectacularly seated and pretending not even to listen to me, reading her papers, because she knows that I have accurately described the situation. Whereas the original sub-groups had only a very modest role—merely providing views was all that they were supposed to do—now, under the Bill, they will take over all the powers of the DPP itself. That is one thing that we have established.

David Burnside: Does the hon. Gentleman, understanding the reality of the political complexion of West Belfast, agree with my description of the sub-group? Does he agree that, if Sinn Fein comes on to that sub-group, it will be used as a platform to undermine, operationally and symbolically, the performance of the police in west Belfast? It will be used for propaganda against policing from within the sub-group, and it will be divisive of the community not only in Belfast, but across Northern Ireland.

Mr. Davies: I fear that the hon. Gentleman is all too right. I started with the small transgression, the less worrying feature of the Government's proposal: the emasculation of the DPPs. We have established that point. I was coming to the second effect of the new clause and new schedule if they are allowed to pass on to the statute book, which is very serious indeed. It has already been trailed very effectively by the hon. Member for South Antrim (David Burnside), and it is the politicisation of the police in north Belfast.

Such politicisation of the police would very seriously concern hon. Members wherever in the United Kingdom it was threatened, but it is extremely troubling when it is threatened in a place that has been as troubled as Belfast, with the prospect of Sinn Fein achieving a dominance of the sub-groups in west Belfast and an undue influence over policing, exactly as the hon. Gentleman has just said.

When one hears that that concession is now being made in the absence of any progress by Sinn Fein-IRA and in the very week when Sinn Fein-IRA have apparently been revealed, once again, to be in substantial breach of their obligations under the ceasefire, one has to wonder about the rationality of the people who are charged with the peace process. That is more a criticism of the Prime Minister, who takes the lead and the essential, strategic decisions on such matters, and it would not be fair to make that a direct criticism of the hon. Lady herself.

6.30 pm

Let me move on to the way in which these measures would politicise policing. I have already read out the powers that the sub-groups are now taking over, which are considerable: not merely providing an opinion to the commander but monitoring the performance of the police. That will have a considerable influence on policing right away: the reins will be held by the sub-groups to a considerable degree. Under the new schedule, the sub-groups can


which is quite sinister. With paramilitary organisations such as Sinn Fein-IRA already embedded in parts of Belfast, the community is frightened of them. They have

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an effective structure of authority in many parts of the city where there has always been great resistance to the writ of the Government or of the police force. As they have a majority—probably an overwhelming majority—on some of these sub-groups, they will be responsible for obtaining the views and co-operation of the public.

Those sub-groups are therefore being given, basically, a mandate to orchestrate and deliver so-called public opinion about policing in Belfast. Those are very considerable powers, which we are handing over to people who, in many cases, will have a criminal record, even though, if the Government's proposals go through, they will not have had a conviction in the past five years. Many of those convictions, however, will relate to terrorist activities, and many of them to murder. Anyone who knows the republican organisation in Belfast knows that it is highly disciplined, very hierarchical and, what is more, people have a lifetime relationship with it. They may have had convictions, been to jail, and been released by the Government in 1998, but they are still part of, and known to be part of, the organisation and the structure by local people. They are now being given a status whereby the police are basically reporting to them.

It is an extraordinary state of affairs that we are creating in part of the United Kingdom. It would be an extraordinary state of affairs if it were part and parcel of the peace process, and, as I said, if it really were part and parcel of the completion of the peace process, and of a comprehensive and definitive settlement involving 100 per cent. decommissioning and disbandment, and the permanent setting aside of the gun and explosive as part of public life in Northern Ireland, we might pay a high price for that. The Opposition would not exclude some major moves that, in principle, would appear to be completely out of the question. In such circumstances, however, we might see our way to taking part in them. To propose these measures at the present time, however, and to bring them halfway or three quarters of the way forward, subject only to a completely inadequate statutory instrument arrangement, cannot possibly be justified. It is a bad day for the peace process and for the prospects of good policing in Northern Ireland.

I want to refer briefly to the conditionality, the commencement order and the statutory instrument procedure that the Government have proposed. The Secretary of State left the Chamber a few moments ago, perhaps having convinced himself that he had offered the House a major concession by saying that any discussion of a statutory instrument to bring these powers into effect would take place on the Floor of the House rather than in Standing Committee. Of course, it is desirable that such important matters should be debated on the Floor of the House; I am not suggesting otherwise. All that we are being offered, however, is a debate and a vote, and we have no chance whatever of going back on the substance of what we are agreeing this evening: no amendments or new clauses will be entertained.

The Government have a vast majority, as we know, and they probably feel that they can put through anything that they want, any day of the week. What we are being offered is a farce. We will be told, "Oh well, no decision has been taken, and you can have your discussion on the Floor of the House." When we have

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that debate on the Floor of the House, some of us may still find many of the concessions entirely unacceptable. Although we may be able to agree certain moves, that depends on what has happened on the other side. In particular, it depends on what Sinn Fein-IRA have done in the meantime. We will have no chance to look at that again. The package will have been wrapped up with sealing wax on its string. We will not be able to unwrap it and the Government, with their vast majority, will simply decide to dispatch it to Sinn Fein-IRA. That is not satisfactory at all. I do not want to leave any doubt in the minds of all hon. Members or those in another place that the substantive decision is regrettably being taken this evening, although it should not be for all the reasons that I mentioned.

If the measure were rejected this evening, we would send a message to Sinn Fein-IRA. They are incredibly well organised and would consider carefully what had been said to explain such a dramatic change of events. They would understand that no hon. Member had rejected the peace process, but that a peace process must be and, perhaps, can only be two-sided and reciprocal. Each side must make corresponding moves. There is no justification for us to move forward unilaterally or for this House to take a different view on the measures than it did in November. If it was considered reasonable to publish them then and to put them on one side, with a view to returning to them after progress had been made on the peace process, it must be right to do that now.

There has been no progress whatsoever on the peace process since November. The Minister might hope for progress soon, and I have no doubt that she has been hoping for progress for the past five years, but in fact there has been regress for much of the time. There is no conceivable justification for why events in Northern Ireland should change the Government's stance on the measures from that in November. We should leave them exactly as they were: published, and on the table to consider after substantial progress has been made in Northern Ireland. However, for the moment, we should decisively reject them.


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