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2 Apr 2003 : Column 997—continued
Mr. John Gummer (Suffolk, Coastal): I rise to tell the House of my recent experience of defending a constituent who was prosecuted and, in the end, executed in the United States. During that experience, I saw the operation of a law that allows precisely what is currently being proposed. It is easier to accept such provisions when people cannot suffer such unacceptable punishment, but I still feel that it would be an extremely dangerous road down which to go.
The first reason for that is the question of bias. Sometimes, one feels that one does not need a great deal of evidence for something that is self-evident. It is extremely hard to believe that juries or magistrates
should be put into a position in which, having heard evidence of previous bad character, or something that would currently not be admitted, they would have to put it entirely behind them and consider only the evidence before them. There is something fundamentally odd about that.Of course, as others have said, evidence of previous convictions or of bad character is admitted in certain circumstances, but they are clearly circumstances that any rational person would see as reasonable: that is, where the specifics of the case so parallel the one before the court that it would be an amazing coincidence for someone different to have behaved in that series of ways on, for example, the fifth occasion. The circumstances must be such that most rational people would say that it was odd to keep the knowledge from the court as it would obviously be of value. The current proposals would go significantly beyond that, however, and with only extremely limited protection.
Let me draw the House's attention to an issue that arose when I was Secretary of State for the Environment and responsible for granting final planning permission for supermarkets at a time when we were seeking to restrain out-of-town development. I instructed my officials to remove from the documents the name of the supermarket involved in the application because I knew that there were some supermarkets that I thought did a good job and some with which I was less satisfied, and I knew instinctively that I would be more willing to grant planning permission in certain cases and less willing in respect of some other companies. I am being very delicate and not referring to Walmart. The fact remains that I knew that I had an instinctive concern. That caused me two difficulties: on the one hand, I might be biased in favour of someone, and on the other, I might make myself biased in favour of someone lest I admit of a bias. I sensed much greater difficulty in making an honourable and decent decision, so it was far better not to know certain things. The first problem facing us now is that we are making it difficult for decent jurors and magistrates to strike the balance that they want to strike.
Secondly, I am concerned about the police and the general forces of law and order. To return to the case of my constituent, he had been guilty when he was very young of being in some sense part of a group of young people in which a fatal shooting occurred. He was being prosecuted for an entirely different murder—one that, having read all the documents, I am entirely convinced he did not commit. However, when the police came to decide who among the group of young people they should prosecute, it was far easier to prosecute the man who had form, even though it was acquired through a wholly different and unconnected circumstance. It is arguable that that form proved that he was less likely to have done what he was now accused of having done, but it was easier for the police to say, "Well, this chap has form and we've got another chap who's prepared to bear witness against him, so we'll go for it." I am not suggesting that the British police in any circumstances would do anything of that sort, but I would prefer it to be beyond peradventure. It strikes me that the provision is too dangerous an element to have in the Bill. The problem was summed up for me by the senior law officer who said to me, "Well, you know, Mr. Gummer, he may not have done this thing, but he isn't a very nice man and we know that, and it would be better to have him off the streets." There is an element that takes that view.
Now I will say something unkind, albeit extremely carefully, about the Government. I think that the Government have taken this issue far too lightly. There is much in the Bill that is shameful and contrary to the best traditions of British justice. Again and again, the Bill lowers British justice compared with our neighbours'. There is much in it that makes unsafe prosecutions more likely than in countries in the rest of Europe about which we are doubtful when we compare their system with our rule of law. The Home Secretary should reconsider not only the current provision but several others that we have discussed.
The rule of law is more important than any other element of our constitution. After many years, I have concluded that democracy is less important to the poor and the vulnerable than the rule of law. The rule of law cannot be kept long without democracy, so the distinction is not entirely real. None the less, it is true that the rule of law is crucial if the vulnerable are to feel safe in society. The reason why I support the excision of the clause and the various ways suggested to make it less dangerous is that it undermines the safety of vulnerable people because it can be averred of them that, in the past, they have behaved badly.
That is why I want to talk about bad behaviour, about which I am particularly unhappy. I think that such language is so loose that it would never have been accepted in previous debates. I find it incredible that the Government have produced a Bill that is so loosely written in precisely that way. The idea that one might have a propensity to behave in a particular way is a very worrying aspect. First, as the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) said, other people might have a propensity as well, as propensities are very widespread. The fact that a person has a propensity to do something may not mean that they are the only person who has such a propensity; there may be many others.
Secondly, the phraseology that explains that issue is plain peculiar:
- "he has behaved, or is disposed to behave, in a way that, in the opinion of the court, might be viewed with disapproval by a reasonable person."
I believe that "disapproval" is not only a pathetic word, but a misleading one. It can be used to cover a multitude not of crimes, but of sins. That important distinction is not made when we talk about disapproval. An atmosphere can be built up in a court around a particular person suggesting that he is the sort of person—I go back to my American example—whom we do not really like very much and not the class or type of person whom we really want to take too seriously, and that we should create circumstances in which it is hard
for him to argue that he should be given the benefit of the doubt. Yet the English law is about the benefit of the doubt being given to the person who is charged.That brings me back to the nature of what is being proposed. I find it very hard to accept that there are any circumstances beyond those that are already allowed in the court in which we should allow such evidence to be received. I see no example in which there is sufficient public interest to overcome the manifest public damage that will be done.
I shall end my speech by returning to the police. It would be wrong for the House to fail to understand that there is much more widespread unhappiness with the police than has hitherto existed. That is the case for a range of reasons, not least including difficulties with traffic offences and the like. Such an attitude exists in rural areas such as mine because the police are so thinly spread and people find it disconcerting that they cannot call upon the forces of law and order when they need them. I have a constituent who was hit over the head in his house by somebody from outside—the clause will not make him any happier about it—and waited for an hour and a half for somebody to come after making a 999 call. He rang again and they promised to come, but an hour and a half later, the police rang him and said that they did not have anybody to send. He did not find a policeman until 12 o'clock the next afternoon.
Such people are unhappy about the police for reasons that are not the fault of the police, but which certainly exist. We must therefore be very careful that we do not open up other areas in which the police can find themselves vulnerable. If such a possibility is damaging to the jury and defendant, it is also damaging to the police. It would be easy to say that the only reason I was picked on was that it was easier to pick on me than on someone else. At the moment, it is difficult to make that argument because we have very careful protections, but the moment it becomes easy to say that we can prejudice—that is what it is—the court against this person in a way that we could not against that person, the temptation to do so will be too great and, even if it were never succumbed to, it would be thought to be too great by those outside. That is why I believe that the proposal is terribly damaging to the police. Even if they behave with saint-like care, people will not believe them.
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