Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
3 Apr 2003 : Column 1110continued
Mr. Harry Barnes (North-East Derbyshire): The hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Mrs. Browning) said that this is not the time to consider Iraq in any depth, but I am afraid that my speech will be entirely about Iraq. At business questions, I called for a debate on the reconstruction of Iraq after the war, including discussion of how a democracy will be put together and how its society will be rebuilt. I shall not enter that debate now, although I might set out some of the problems with which we must deal. A debate on reconstruction will involve us all, irrespective of our position on whether the invasion should have started, because we should all be equally concerned about Iraq's future. Those of us who oppose the war must face the fact that it is progressing and unlikely to be abandoned. We must therefore consider the consequences and what should happen when we reach the end of the war.
I want to use a book by Dilip Hiro, entitled "Iraq: A Report from the Inside", which I recommend to hon. Members. It is currently available in bookshops; it has hit the market at the right time although it was written before the war started. Its points about the risks are relevant because they are now being experienced, and we should examine them.
Dilip Hiro has written about the middle east, India and racism. He has produced some 20 books, although this is the first that I have seen. I shall read more of his work, especially his background to the current position in the middle east, Iraq and more widely. I want to consider some of his points about the danger of engaging in the sort of invasion in which we are involved.
The League of Nations handed us a mandate to run Iraq. When it gained its independence in the 1930s, we retained Crown territory for 25 years or so under a treaty arrangement. It included the camps of Habbaniya, Shu'aiba and Basra. Basra was a movements unit, where I did my national service from 195456. There were Iraqi levies with British officers, who operated in the country. The agreement ended in
1955, and Harold Macmillan, as Foreign Secretary, did a deal in the Baghdad pact, which allowed our troops to remain. They were there, for example, during the Suez crisis in the following year.The Crown territory was handed over, the Iraqi levies were disbanded and given the opportunity, which most of them took, to join the Iraqi army.The Suez crisis in 1956 had a big impact on Iraq. In 1958, a revolution took place under Kassim. It was a free officers' movement, which enjoyed popular support. The Iraqi communist party was one of the major underground movements, which had been active in the docks and oilfields for a long time. It has often expressed the views of the Iraqi labour movement. For five years, there was great hope, until a coup took place. After coup and counter-coup, matters degenerated to the position under Saddam Hussein.
Iraqis are staunch nationalists, whether they are Shi'a, Sunni or from other groups. Perhaps it is less true of the Kurds, who are loyal to Kurdistan. The point is important because it makes it difficult for Britain to be accepted as the shaper of the future in Iraq.
The book's fourth point is as follows:
Dilip Hiro's sixth point is that
The eighth point is that the war will end up diluting and complicating our commitment to pursue our war against terrorism. I believe that any response to terrorism needs to be intelligence-led. We need to be able to draw on the intelligence in the wider worldin areas such as Pakistan, for exampleto defend ourselves against potential terrorist activity, rather than giving it a field day as we have done by engaging in the actions that we are currently pursuing.
The 11th point is that there is a chance of anarchy and the break-up of Iraq. In a debate initiated by the Opposition on 30 January, the Secretary of State for International Development pointed to the potential humanitarian nightmare that could occur if the war took place. The first point that she made in relation to that was the danger of large-scale ethnic fighting breaking out in Iraq. There will be many scores to settle with the old regime and against different groups, and to keep the lid on all that will be quite difficult.
The 12th point is the danger of the destabilisation of the post-Saddam regime from Iran and Syria, which is presumably why we have already heard threats from the United States in terms of its extending its redevelopment of the middle east by attacking those nations.
The 13th point involves the problem of Iraqi Kurdistan. The great difficulty is that the Kurds want a nation to be put together that includes the southern sections of Turkey, bits of Syria and areas in Iran, as well as northern Iraq. That is their objective and it could produce great destabilisation in the area.
Those are the massive difficulties and problems that there will be. We need to try to handle them in some way, and to overcome them. We also need to draw these matters together in terms of talking about how on earth we can achieve something democratic in these circumstances in Iraq, and how on earth we can achieve reconstruction and bring decent standards of life to a people who have suffered grievously over many years from the actions of Saddam Hussein and from our reactions to him.
Next Section
| Index | Home Page |