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Mr. Blunkett: I commend the hon. Gentleman—I do not demur from that.
Mr. Elfyn Llwyd (Meirionnydd Nant Conwy): I am much obliged to the Home Secretary for allowing me to intervene. The traditional role of the judge is to interpret the law. Juries have always interpreted the facts. That is the truth of the matter and that is what we are talking about.
Mr. Blunkett: Yes, and in the vast majority of cases they will continue to do so.
I want now to make my case about jury interference. If the principle at stake is that no trial at such a level should be conducted without a jury, the same principle would apply in relation to jury interference. I put the case that there are instances—again, there are only a few—in which it is necessary in the interests of justice, and not esoteric arguments, to protect ourselves from the jury interference, alteration or disbandment of juries and jury tampering that exist at the moment.
In Committee, the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins), who used to serve on the Front Bench, referred to a drugs case that had taken place in Liverpool not many months previously. It had lasted six weeks. On the first day of the judge's summing up, one juror had been followed home and offered money to produce a verdict sympathetic to the defendant. He told the judge about it the following day and the judge said that he would discharge him and that the trial would continue. The next day, two more jurors were followed home. They were badly threatened and came into court trembling the following day. The jury had to be discharged and a new trial had to start. The hon. Gentleman said that that cost a lot of money—I think that he referred to £270,000—but much more expensive trials have arisen in very similar circumstances. A recent trial cost £1 million.
I am arguing the case not on the basis of cost, but on the grounds of sheer intimidation and interference, where the process of justice is so damaged that it is not possible for either a fair trial to take place or for us, the public, to be assured that those who have committed offences are being held to account and that the interests of the public and the victims are being secured. That is what the House has to address this evening.
In a limited number of cases, where there is felt to be a problem, it is right that the judge should respond, although a right of appeal is of course built into the provisions. When I was in Liverpool two weeks ago, I talked to the chief constable, who enunciated again and again the difficulty that he faced. The issue is not confined to Merseyside, but 80 per cent. of such cases collapse there. He told me that we needed to ensure that, once the police and the Crown Prosecution Service had
done their job, it was possible to believe that interference would not damage the chance of getting a fair judgment and, therefore, of getting to the truth.
Mr. Malins: I had a bit of a shock when the Home Secretary quoted me. I recall talking about jury nobbling, and I understand the difficulty of juries being severely threatened. Let me tell my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) through the Home Secretary that I hope that I was in accordance with party policy on the issue. However, I have always maintained that long and complex trials can be handled by a jury entirely satisfactorily. That is an entirely separate issue from jury nobbling.
Mr. Bercow: Well, that's shot your fox, hasn't it?
Mr. Blunkett: No, it has not, because I entirely accept what the hon. Member for Woking says. When I was dealing with complex trials, I quoted him on the issue that he describes as nobbling—interference with due process and the jury—so I am not at all abashed.
A moment ago, I said that we were arguing that it was juries for everything or juries for nothing. I am not making that argument, but others are. Either there is a principle that holds the Executive to account for its particular nature, or there is not. Clearly, we are not making that argument. The hon. Member for Woking and I disagree. He believes that his party policy, adapted to provide expertise, is right. On balance, I believe that it is not. I believe, as he does, that where there is interference, there should be an opportunity—spelled out very carefully, and available only in the limited circumstances enunciated in the Bill—to protect the jurors and the public. That is what we are doing.
To give another example, the Metropolitan police spent £9 million in 2001–02 protecting jurors in circumstances where intimidation would otherwise have damaged the process so greatly that it would have been impossible to ensure that those who undertook the intimidation were properly dealt with or sentenced. People interfere with juries not as a game, but because they want to get themselves or their friends off for something that they believe they will be convicted for. Some trials have taken place in interesting circumstances. One that took place in Birmingham just a few months ago, again about drugs, has been drawn to my attention. The defendant was found not guilty, but it is strange that the jurors should all have been invited to a lavish party in the city centre just two weeks later. As I told the Police Federation a few days ago, we all have to live in the real world.
Vera Baird (Redcar): I can easily see a distinction between clause 38 and clauses 36 and 37, and I do not agree with the proposition that it is all in or all out on juries. If clause 38 is to be utilised only as a last resort, as we were assured it would be in Committee—the steps in it are very steep, at any event—I can see its purpose. However, will my right hon. Friend help me with two points? First, the prosecution must convince the judge that there is a real risk of jury tampering. By implication,
that will have something to do with the defendant in most cases. How will the same judge then go on fairly to try that defendant? Secondly—
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Alan Haselhurst): Order. The hon. and learned Lady cannot make a speech in an intervention.
6.15 pm
Mr. Blunkett: I am sympathetic to the point that my hon. and learned Friend made, as well as the one she was about to make. If a trial such as the one originally described by the hon. Member for Woking has been materially interfered with, there is clearly a presumption, given what happened to the first jury. In such circumstances it would be sensible for the judge to recommend that a different judge sit alone on the case. Where sufficient evidence has been presented to a judge, they should make a presumption that had they heard evidence prejudicial to a fair trial they should stand down. I have no problem enunciating that this afternoon.
Vera Baird: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Blunkett: I will oblige my hon. and learned Friend, who was cut off in her prime.
Vera Baird: I am glad to be regarded as in my prime by almost anybody.
I should like to press my right hon. Friend on a related matter. Inevitably, it will be in the public interest to keep from the defence much information that has to be put to a judge to persuade him of the threat to the jury. How will that be accommodated? How can it be fair to allow the prosecution to pour such information into the judge's ear to get an outcome that the defence will not want? How can the defence be protected from the police simply deciding that they want this chap sent down so badly that they will get trial by judge alone?
Mr. Blunkett: If there is a suggestion of trial by judge alone, there will be a right of appeal, which is right and proper. Let us not assume that there are not instances now in which representations are made by counsel to the judiciary behind the chair. My hon. and learned Friend will know a lot more about that than me, because no doubt she has experienced it. However, I am not sure that it could be described as pouring matters prejudicial to the defence into the judge's ear.
Mr. Hogg: The right hon. Gentleman referred to the right of appeal, but he will know that that can only be exercised with leave. Will he tell the House the circumstances that would restrict the right to grant leave? To return to the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird), how will the defendant be able to challenge information privately communicated to the judge that the jury has been nobbled?
Mr. Blunkett: The defendant, of course, is claiming that he has nothing to do with the jury or the nobbling, and let us assume that they have nothing to do with him at all. However, in the real world, some people engaged
in criminality have a great deal to lose from the way in which a trial proceeds. I think I am right in saying that the right hon. and learned Gentleman used to practise—[Hon. Members: "Still does."] Forgive me, I live in a world where we only practise politics, but I am surrounded by people who continue to practise law. The right hon. and learned Gentleman will accept that there are rare occasions in organised criminality when an individual acts alone and that there are people whose interests are affected by the outcome of a trial. We should therefore ensure that we get the right result by getting to the truth and ensuring that justice is done.We are clutching at straws if we argue that those who are trying to interfere with juries and change the nature of juries by doing so—we heard earlier about a jury that was disbanded—are not interfering with the course of justice. There may be esoteric arguments that that does not matter and it is for the wider good of us all to ignore it, but I do not believe that for a moment. Victims of crime do not believe it; those who are trying to tackle organised criminality, which is growing, do not believe it; and those who see what is happening in relation to cross-border crime and international organised activity, using the most modern techniques, do not believe it. I do not believe that the people whom we represent think that we should live in fairyland or be somewhere other than with our feet firmly on the ground. We can argue until we are blue in the face. So long as we are not taking away the right to a fair trial, and so long as we are ensuring that people have the right of appeal—of course, that right will depend on the grounds on which the appeal is lodged—the safeguards will be in place.
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